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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN Supreme Court Case No. 38599 
BIRCH-MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a CONNIE TAYLOR, an
 
individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a
 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; THEODORE
 
L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
 
trust; JOHN DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS
 





CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE RICHARD D. GREENWOOD 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV MARK S. PRUSYNSKI 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 











    
 
Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01:17 PM ROA Report 
Page 1 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments Lie, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
12/31/2007 NCOC CCEARUD New Case Filed - Other Claims Thomas F. Neville 
COMP CCEARLJD Complaint Filed Thomas F. Neville 
SMFI CCEARLJD (5) Summons Filed Thomas F. Neville 
3/25/2008 AMEN CCSTROMJ Amended Complaint Thomas F. Neville 
SMFI CCSTROMJ Summons Filed Thomas F. Neville 
4/15/2008 AFOS CCTOWI\IRD (3) Affidavit Of Service (4-8-08) Thomas F. Neville 
4/24/2008 NOAP CCDWONCP Notice Of Appearance (Connie W Taylor for Thomas F. Neville 
Dallan Taylor and Theodore L Johnson 
Revocable Trust) 
4/28/2008 NOAP CCDWONCP Notice Of Appearance (Jonathan 0 Hally for Thomas F. Neville 
Connie Taylor Paul T Clark and Clark and 
Feeney) 
4/29/2008 AFOS CCBARCCR (2) Affidavit Of Service 4/18/08 Thomas F. Neville 
4/30/2008 NOAP CCDWONCP Notice Of Appearance (Connie W Taylor for John Thomas F. Neville 
Taylor) 
5/8/2008 ANSW MCBIEHKJ Answer C Taylor for Taylor, Taylor and Johnson Thomas F. Neville 
Trust 
5/9/2008 NOTC CCEARLJD Notice of Substitution of Counsel (Prusynski for Thomas F. Neville 
Connie Wright, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T 
Clark) 
NOlO MCBIEHKJ (2)Notice Of Intent To Take Default Thomas F. Neville 
5/12/2008 MOTN CCAMESLC Motion to Dismiss Thomas F. Neville 
AFSM CCAMESLC Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Dismiss Thomas F. Neville 
5/13/2008 ANSW CCTEELAL Answer of Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Thomas F. Neville 
Feeney and Paul T Clark to Amend Complaint 
(prusynski for Connie, Clark & Feeney & Paul) 
MOTN CCTOWNRD Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss and/or Thomas F. Neville 
consider same as Motion for Summary JUdgment 
5/14/2008 ORDR DCELLlSJ Order Of Recusal Thomas F. Neville 
CHJS DCELLlSJ Change Assigned Judge: Self Disqualification Kathryn A. Sticklen 
NOTC DCELLlSJ Notice of Reassignment Kathryn A. Sticklen 
5/15/2008 HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone Kathryn A. Sticklen 
06/24/2008 03:00 PM) No Stipulation 
5/19/2008 AFFD CCAMESLC Amended Affidavit in Support fo Motion to Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Dismiss 
6/24/2008 HRHD CCKENNJA Hearing result for Status by Phone held on Kathryn A. Sticklen 
06/24/2008 03:00 PM: Hearing Held No 
Stipulation 
7/23/2008 NOTC MCBIEHK.I Notice of Compliance Kathryn A. Sticklen 
NOTD MCBIEHK.I Notice Of Taking Deposition of Helen Taylor Kathryn A. Sticklen 
8/25/2008 NOTS CCRAND.ID Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
9/4/2008 AMEN CCDWONCP Amended Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Kathryn A. Sticklen 





Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01:17 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current JUdge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments Lie, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
9/16/2008 NOTC CCBURGBL Notice of Association of Co-Counsel and Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Substitution of Counsel 
10/3/2008 MOTN CCAMESLC Amended Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Kathryn A. Sticklen 
JUdgment and Sanctions 
AFFD CCAMESLC Second Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss Kathryn A. Sticklen 
MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Kathryn A. Sticklen 
and/or for Summary JUdgment and Sanctions 
HRSC CCAMESLC Notice of Hearing (Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Summary Judgment 11/06/200803:00 PM) 
10/8/2008 MISC CCLYKEAL Statement of Facts in Opposition to Motion for Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Summary Judgment and Motion for Rule 11 
Sanctions 
AFFD CCLYKEAL Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One Kathryn A. Sticklen 
AFFD CCLYKEAL Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Kathryn A. Sticklen 
MEMO CCLYKEAL Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Dismiss/Summary Judgment and Motion for Rule 
11 Sanctions 
CERT CCLYKEAL Certificate Of Mailing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
10/9/2008 MOSJ CCDWONCP Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment Kathryn A. Sticklen 
MEMO CCDWONCP Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Judgment 
NOHG CCDWONCP Notice Of Hearing (11/06/08 at 3:00 PM) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
(Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment) 
10/17/2008 NOTC CCRAND.ID Notice of Substitution of Counsel (Maile for Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Plaintifs for Wyatt Johnson) 
10/20/2008 MOTN CCCHILEH Motion to Continue Summary Judgment/Motion to Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Dismiss Hearing Set for Nov 6, 2008 
AFFD CCCHILEH Affidavit of Thomas G Maile, IV Kathryn A. Sticklen 
AFFD CCCHILEH Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Compel/Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs 
BREF CCCHILEH Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion Kathryn A. Sticklen 
to Compel/Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs 
NOHG CCCHILEH Notice Of Hearing (11/6/08 @ 3pm) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
NOHG CCCHILEH Notice Of Hearing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
10/23/2008 MOTN CCAMESLC Motion to Continue All Summary JUdgment and Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Motion to Dismiss Hearings Set for 11/6/08 
AFSM CCAMESLC Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Continue Kathryn A. Sticklen 
SUmmary JUdgment Hearing Filed by Defendants 
Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and 
Paul T Clark 
MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion for Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Summary JUdgment Filed and In Support of 
Motion to Continue Hearings 














Date: 5/19/2011 Fc)urth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01 :17 PM ROA Report 
Page 3 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments Lie, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
10/29/2008 HRVC MCBIEHK.I Notice Vacating Hearing result for Motion to Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Dismiss held on 11106/200803:00 PM: Hearing 
Vacated 
NOTC CCBOYIDH (2) Notice of Vacating Hearing on (11-6-08 @ Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3:00pm) 
1/8/2009 MOTN CCAMESLC Motion to Stay Proceedings Until Idaho Supreme Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Court Provides a Decision in Companion Case 
and or Set Matter For Jury Trial 
AFSM CCAMESLC Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Stay Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Proceedings Until Idaho Supreme Court Provides 
a Decision in Companion Case and or Set Matter 
For Jury Trial 
AFFD CCAMESLC Affidavit of Tom Maile Part Three Kathryn A. Sticklen 
MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum in Opposition to defendant's Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Dsipositive Motions 
AMEN CCAMESLC Amended Notice of Status Conference Kathryn A. Sticklen 
(2/10/09@9am) 
NOTH CCAMESLC Notice Of Hearing 1/27/09@3pm (Motion to Stay) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CERT CCAMESLC Certificate Of Mailing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CHRT CCKENNJA Changed Assigned Judge: Retired (batch 
process) 
1114/2009 NOTC CCNELSRF Notice of Non-Opposition to Motion for Stay Richard D. Greenwood 
1/20/2009 NOTC MCBIEHK.I Notice of Non Opposition to Motion for Stay Richard D. Greenwood 
1/22/2009 HRVC CCKENNJA Hearing result for Motion to Stay held on Kathryn A. Sticklen 
01/27/200903:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
HRVC CCKENNJA Hearing result for Status held on 02/10/2009 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
2/9/2009 AFFD CCRANDJD Affidavit in Support of Motion for Sumary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 
2/12/2009 MEMO CCRANDJD Supplemental Memorandum Brief in Response to Richard D. Greenwood 
Supreme Court 
AFFD CCRANDJD Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Four Richard D. Greenwood 
2/13/2009 MOTN MCBIEHK.I Motion for Order Removing Lis Pendens Richard D. Greenwood 
2/17/2009 ANSW CCAMESLC Amended Answer and Counterclaim (Taylor for Richard D. Greenwood 
John and Dallan Taylor and Johnson Trust) 
3/4/2009 NOHG CCRAND.ID Notice Of Hearing re Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment (04.22.09@3:30pm) 
HRSC CCRANDJD Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 04/22/2009 03:30 PM) 
3/6/2009 NOTC MCBIEHK.! Notice of Hearing (4/22/09 @ 3:30 pm) Richard D. Greenwood 
3/10/2009 REPL MCBIEHK.' Reply to Amended Answer of John Taylor Dallan Richard D. Greenwood 
Taylor and John Trust and Counterclaim 









Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01 :17 PM ROA Report 
Page 4 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments Lie, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
3/17/2009 AMEN CCPRICDL Reply to Amended Answer of Connie Taylor, Richard D. Greenwood 
Clark and Feeney and Paul T. Clark and 
Counterclaim 
MOTN CCPRICDL Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendant's Counterclaim 
AFFD CCPRICDL Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile IV Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCPRICDL Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Summary JUdgment 
NOTH CCPRICDL Notice Of Hearing Richard D. Greenwood 
4/3/2009 AFFD CCGARDAL Supplemental Affidavit of Connie W Taylor in Richard D. Greenwood 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
4/6/2009 AFFD CCAMESLC Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Five Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCAMESLC Supplimental Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion for Summary Judgment Filed by 
Defendants and in Response to Supplimental 
Affidavit of Connie W Taylor in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
HRSC CCAMESLC Notice of Hearing (Motion to Compel Richard D. Greenwood 
04/22/2009 03:30 PM) 
4/8/2009 AFFD MCBIEHK.J Affidavit of Helen Taylor Richard D. Greenwood 
AFFD MCBIEHK.J Second Supplemental Affidavit of Connie W Richard D. Greenwood 
Taylor in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Summary Judgment on Counterclaims 
AFFD CCBOYfDR Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment on Counterclaims 
AFFD CCBOYIDR Third Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
for Summary Judgment 
MISC CCRANDJD Joinder Richard D. Greenwood 
4/13/2009 REPL MCBIEHK.J Reply to Opposition to Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 
4/14/2009 MEMO CCNELSRF Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
for Summary Judgment Relating to the 
Defendants Counter-Claim & in Opposistion to 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 
4/15/2009 REPL MCBIEHK.J Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 
4/20/2009 RESP CCBURGBL Response To Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Richard D. Greenwood 
REPL MCBIEHKJ Response to Motion to Compel Richard D. Greenwood 
4/23/2009 DCHH CCKENNJ.A Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on Richard D. Greenwood 
04/22/2009 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hell 
Court Reporter: L. Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 








Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01:17 PM ROA Report 
Page 5 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments Lie, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
4/23/2009 DCHH CCKENNJ.A Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
held on 04/22/2009 03:30 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: L. Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 05/01/200909:00 AM) Continued 
hearing from 4/22109 
5/112009 REQU CCRANDJD Plaintiffs Request to Take Judicial Notice of Richard D. Greenwood 
Pleadings 
DCHH CCKENNJA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
held on 05/01/2009 09:00 AM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: L. Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Continued hearing from 4/22109 --­
less than 100 pages 
5/812009 CERT CCLYKEAL Certificate Of Mailing Richard D. Greenwood 
7/2/2009 DEOP CCKENNJ.A Memorandum Decision & Order Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Richard D. Greenwood 
08/03/200902:30 PM) Plaintiff to initiate call 
7/1312009 MOTN CCHOLMEE Motion for Certification Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCHOLMEE Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
AFFD CCHOLMEE Affidavit in Support of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
7/15/2009 CONT CCKENNJA Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on Richard D. Greenwood 
08/03/200902:30 PM: Continued Plaintiff to 
initiate call 
7/1612009 NOHG CCTOWNRD Notice Of Hearing Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCTOWNHD Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Richard D. Greenwood 
08/14/200909:00 AM) 
7/1712009 NOHG CCRANDJD Notice Of Hearing re Motion for Certification Richard D. Greenwood 
(9.9.09@3pm) 
HRSC CCRANDJD Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/09/2009 03:00 Richard D. Greenwood 
PM) Motion for Certification 
7/2012009 ORDR CCKENNJA Order Denying Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
JDMT CCKENNJA Judgment Dismissing Plaintiff's Claims only Richard D. Greenwood 
CDIS CCKENNJA Civil Disposition entered for: Clark And Feeney, Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendant; Clark, Paul T, Defendant; Taylor, 
Connie Wright, Defendant; Taylor, Dallan, 
Defendant; Taylor, R. John, Defendant; Theodore 
L Johnson Revocable Trust, Defendant; 
Berkshire Investments Lie, Plaintiff; Birch Maile, 
Colleen, Plaintiff; Maile, Thomas G IV, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 7/20/2009 








Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01:17 PM ROA Report 
Page 6 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments L1c, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
7/22/2009 NOTC CCAMESLC Notice of Compliance (2) Richard D. Greenwood 
8/3/2009 MOTN CCHOLMEE Amended Motion Re: Judgment Dismissing Richard D. Greenwood 
Plaintiffs Claims/Motion for Permissive Appeal 
NOHG CCHOLMEE Amended Notice Of Hearing Re: Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Memorandum Decision and Order & Judgment 
9.9.09@3:00PM 
8/13/2009 AFFD CCWRIGRM Second Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Richard D. Greenwood 
Amended Motion for Certification 
8/14/2009 HRHD CCKENNJA Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on Richard D. Greenwood 
08/14/200909:00 AM: Hearing Held 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Richard D. Greenwood 
10/18/2010 03:45 PM) Counterclaim 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/01/201009:00 Richard D. Greenwood 
AM) 4 Days on Counterclaim 
8/21/2009 NOTC MCBIEHK.J Notice of Non Opposition to Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
8/27/2009 NOSV CCGARDAL Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
9/1/2009 NOTS MCBIEHK.J Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
9/10/2009 DCHH CCKENNJA Hearing result for Motion held on 09/09/2009 Richard D. Greenwood 
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion for Certification, Motion for 
Memorandum Decision and Order & Judgment 
less than 100 
9/28/2009 HRVC CCKENNJA Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 11/01/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00AM: Hearing Vacated 4 Days on 
Counterclaim 
HRVC CCKENNJA Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Richard D. Greenwood 
10/18/201003:45 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Counterclaim 
ORDR CCKENNJA Order re: Motion for Certification / Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Permissive Appeal 
11/12/2009 HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Richard D. Greenwood 
01/04/201002:00 PM) Phone 
11/16/2009 RQST CCBOYIDR Request for Scheduling Conference and Trial Richard D. Greenwood 
Setting 
12/3/2009 MOTN CCLATICJ Renewed Motion for Certification Pursuant to Richard D. Greenwood 
I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) re Judgment Entered July 20, 
2009 
AFSM CCLATICJ Affidavit In Support Of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
NOHG CCLATICJ Notice Of Hearing re Renewed Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Certification Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) re 
Judgment Entered July 20,2009 (01/27/10 @ 3 
pm) 
HRSC CCLATICJ Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/27/201003:00 Richard D. Greenwood 
PM) 
12/17/2009 NOTC CCBOURPT Notice of Association Richard D. Greenwood 000007
l
Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01 :17 PM ROA Report 
Page 7 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments Lie, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User JUdge 
12/21/2009 OBJE MCBIEHK,J Objection to Renewed Motion for Certification Richard D. Greenwood 
AFFD MCBIEHK,J Affidavit of Connie W Taylor Richard D. Greenwood 
12/30/2009 STIP MCBIEHK,J Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Richard D. Greenwood 
1/4/2010 HRVC CCKENNJA Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on Richard D. Greenwood 
01/04/201002:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Phone 
HRSC CCKENNJ.A Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Richard D. Greenwood 
01/10/2011 03:30 PM) 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/31/2011 09:00 Richard D. Greenwood 
AM) 
1/8/2010 MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum Brief in Support of Renewed Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion for Certification Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 
54(B) RE: Judgment Entered July 20, 2009 
AFFD CCBOYIDR Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Renewed Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion for Certification Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 
54(B) RE: Judgment Entered July 20, 2009 
1/14/2010 MOTN CCHOLMEE Motion to Disqualify Alternative Judge Richard D. Greenwood 
1/15/2010 MOTN CCLATICJ Motion to Disqualify Alternate Judge Richard D. Greenwood 
1/21/2010 ORDR CCRANDJD Order Disqualifying Alternate Judge (McKee) Richard D. Greenwood 
CDIS CCRANDJD Civil Disposition entered for: Clark And Feeney, Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendant; Clark, Paul T, Defendant; Taylor, 
Connie Wright, Defendant; Taylor, Dallan, 
Defendant; Taylor, R. John, Defendant; Theodore 
L Johnson Revocable Trust, Defendant; 
Berkshire Investments Lie, Plaintiff; Birch Maile, 
Colleen, Plaintiff; Maile, Thomas G IV, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 1/21/2010 
1/27/2010 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Motion held on 01/27/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 50 pages 
2/12/2010 NOTC CCGARDAL Notice of Substitution of Attorney (Clark for Richard D. Greenwood 
Prusynski for Connie Wright Taylor) 
2/16/2010 ORDR TCJOHNKA Order Disqualifying Alternate JUdge Richard D. Greenwood 
3/3/2010 MOSJ CCBOURPT Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary JUdgment on Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendants' Counterclaim 
MEMO CCBOURPT Memorandum in Support of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
AFSM CCBOURPT Affidavit In Support Of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
3/4/2010 NOHG CCGARDJl.L Notice Of Hearing 5.13.10 @ 3 pm Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCGARDAL Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 05/13/2010 03:00 PM) 
4/23/2010 AFFD CCHOLMEE Affidavit of Connie Shannahan Richard D. Greenwood 
4/27/2010 AFFD CCMASTLW Affidavit of Mark Prusynski Richard D. Greenwood 
4/29/2010 MEMO CCMASTLW Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 2nd Richard D. Greenwood 












Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01 :17 PM ROA Report 
Page 8 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments Lie, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
4/29/2010 AFFD CCTOWNRD Affidavit of R. John Taylor in Opposition to Richard D. Greenwood 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
Defendant's Counterclaims 
AFFD CCTOWNRD Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Second Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCTOWNRD Memorandum in Opposition to Second Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Smmary Judgment 
AFFD CCTOWNRD Affidavit of Mailing Richard D. Greenwood 
MOTN CCWRIGRM Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaims Richard D. Greenwood 
NOTH CCWRIGRM Notice Of Hearing (05/13/10 @ 3:00pm) Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCWRIGR.M Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Richard D. Greenwood 
05/13/201003:00 PM) Motion for Leave to 
Amend Counterclaims 
5/4/2010 MOTN CCLATICJ Motion to Strike Richard D. Greenwood 
AFFD CCLATICJ Affidavit of Chris Troupis in Support of Motion to Richard D. Greenwood 
Strike 
MEMO CCLATICJ Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition 
to Counter-Claimants Motion to Amend the 
Counter-Claim 
NOHG CCLATICJ Notice Of Hearing re Motion to Strike (05/13/10 @ Richard D. Greenwood 
3 pm) 
5/10/2010 NOTS MCBIEHK.' Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
5/13/2010 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Richard D. Greenwood 
05/13/2010 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 60 pages 
DCHH TCJOHNK.A Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
held on 05/13/2010 03:00 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 60 pages 
5/26/2010 NOTC MCBIEHK.I Notice of Compliance Richard D. Greenwood 
6/23/2010 ORDR TCJOHNK.A Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment on the Defendants' Counterclaims 
ORDR TCJOHNK.A Order Granting Motion for Leave to Amend Richard D. Greenwood 
Counterclaims 
6/28/2010 CNTR CCHOLMEE Amended Counterclaim Richard D. Greenwood 
7/8/2010 MISC CCAMESLC Counterclaimants Status Report Richard D. Greenwood 
7/12/2010 MISC CCMASTLW Plaintiffs' Status Report Richard D. Greenwood 
8/4/2010 RPLY CCRANDJD Reply to Amended Counterclaim Richard D. Greenwood 
9/29/2010 MOTN CCHOLMEE Motion to Reconsider Richard D. Greenwood 





Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01 :17 PM ROA Report 
Page 9 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments Lie, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
9/29/2010 MEMO CCHOLMEE Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
NOHG CCHOLMEE Notice Of Hearing Re Motion to Reconsider Richard D. Greenwood 
10.29.10@1130AM 
HRSC CCHOLMEE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/29/2010 11 :30 Richard D. Greenwood 
AM) 
10/7/2010 NOSC CCWRIGRM Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel (Mark Richard D. Greenwood 
Prusynski, atty for Defendants) 
10/13/2010 MEMO CCRANDJD Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Richard D. Greenwood 
Reconsider 
10/21/2010 RPLY CCRANDJD Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Richard D. Greenwood 
Reconsider 
10/26/2010 MISC CCAMESLC Correction to Reply Memorandum Brief in Richard D. Greenwood 
Support of Motion to Reconsider 
10/27/2010 NOTS CCWATSCL Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
10/29/2010 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Motion held on 10/29/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
11:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 50 pages 
MOTN CCCHILER Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Motion to Reply to Richard D. Greenwood 
Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial 
AFFD CCCHILER Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of Richard D. Greenwood 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Motion to Reply to 
Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial 
11/2/2010 MOTN CCMASTLW Motion to Dismiss Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCMASTLW Memorandum in Support Richard D. Greenwood 
NOHG CCMASTLW Notice Of Hearing re Pending Motions Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCMASTLW Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Richard D. Greenwood 
11/30/2010 11 :30 AM) Mo/Amend Reply to 
Counterclaims; Mo/Dismiss 
11/10/2010 MOTN CCMASTLW Motion for Protective Order Richard D. Greenwood 
AFFD CCMASTLW Affidavit of Mark Prusynski Richard D. Greenwood 
NOHG CCMASTLW Notice Of Hearing (11/30/10 @ 11 :30AM) Richard D. Greenwood 
11/19/2010 MEMO MCBIEHKJ Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Protective Order 
MISC MCBIEHKJ Certificate to Opposing Counsel of Expert and Richard D. Greenwood 
Lay Witnesses 
11/22/2010 OBJT CCGARDAL Objection to Counterdefendant's Motion for Leave Richard D. Greenwood 
to Amend Reply to Counterclaims 
AFFD CCGARDAL Affidavit in Opposition Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCGARDAL Memorandum in Opposition Richard D. Greenwood 
11/24/2010 REPL CCSULLJA Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Richard D. Greenwood 
Dismiss &/or Motion in Limine RE: Litigation 
Privilege 
RPLY CCJOYCCN Reply Brief Regarding Motion for Protective Order Richard D. Greenwood 000010
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Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01:17 PM ROA Report 
Page 10 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments L1c, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
11/29/2010 MOTN CCHOLMEE Joinder in Co Defendants Opposition to Motion to Richard D. Greenwood 
Dismiss and or Motion in Limine and Objection to 
Motion for Leave to Amend Reply to 
Counterclaims 
11/30/2010 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Richard D. Greenwood 
11/30/2010 11 :30 AM: District Court Hearing Helc 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 50 pages 
HRSC TCJOHNKA Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine Richard D. Greenwood 
01/18/2011 03:00 PM) 
12/2/2010 STIP CCRAND.ID Stipulation to Dismiss Counterclaim of Clark and Richard D. Greenwood 
Feeney Defendants 
12/6/2010 MOTN CCLATICJ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim of Clark and Richard D. Greenwood 
Feeney Defendants 
12/13/2010 NOSV CCHOLMEE Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
12/15/2010 NOTD CCHOLMEE Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Richard D. Greenwood 
Tecum of Reed Taylor 
12/22/2010 NOTC CCSIMMSM Notice of Vacating Deposition Duces Tecum of Richard D. Greenwood 
Tamara Crane 
12/30/2010 MISC CCJOYCCN Counterclaimants' Rebuttal Witness Disclosure Richard D. Greenwood 
NOTS CCJOYCCN Notice Of Service of Rebuttal Witness Disclosure Richard D. Greenwood 
1/3/2011 MOTN CCLATICJ Motion for Limited Admission Richard D. Greenwood 
MOTN CCLATICJ Motion in Limine With Supporting Authority Richard D. Greenwood 
NOTC CCKINGA.J Notice of Vacating Amended Notice of Taking Richard D. Greenwood 
Deposition Duces Tecum of Reed Taylor 
MOTN CCKINGA.' Motion to Exclude Expert &Lay Testimony RE: Richard D. Greenwood 
Claims Against Counter-Defendant 
MEMO CCKINGA.I Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Memorandum Brief Richard D. Greenwood 
in Support of Motion to Exclude Expert & Lay 
Testimony RE: Claims Against 
Counter-Defendants 
NOHG CCKINGAI Notice of Hearing RE: Motion to Exclude Expert Richard D. Greenwood 
& Lay Testimony RE: Claims Against 
Counter-Defendants (01/18/2010 @ 3:00 PM) 
NOTS CCMASTLW Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
MOTN CCKINGAI Motion in Limine RE: Testimony Concerning Richard D. Greenwood 
Helen Taylor 
MEMO CCKINGA.I Memorandum Brief in Support of motion in Limine Richard D. Greenwood 
RE: Testimony concerning Helen Taylor 
NOHG CCKINGA.J Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion in Limine Richard D. Greenwood 
Regarding Tesimony Concerning Helen Taylor 
(01/18/2010 @ 3:00 PM) 
MOTN CCKINGA.J Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Exclude Richard D. Greenwood 









Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01 :17 PM ROA Report 
Page 11 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments L1c, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
1/3/2011 MEMO CCKINGAJ Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Memorandum Brief Richard D. Greenwood 
in Support of Motion to Exclude Testimony of 
Sam Langston 
NOHG CCKINGAJ Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion in Limine RE: Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion to Exclude Testimony of Sam Langston 
MOTN CCKINGAJ Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Exclude Richard D. Greenwood 
Testimony of Connie Shannahan 
MEMO CCKINGA.J Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Memorandum Brief Richard D. Greenwood 
in Support of Motion to Exclude Testimony of 
Connie Shannahan 
NOHG CCKINGAI Notice Of Hearing RE: Richard D. Greenwood 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Exclude 
Testimony of Connie Shannahan (01/18/2011 @ 
3:00 PM) 
MOTN CCKINGAJ Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Exclude Richard D. Greenwood 
Testimony of Bob Debolt 
MEMO CCKINGAI Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Memorandum Richard D. Greenwood 
Brief in Support of Motion to Exclude Testimony 
of Bob Debolt 
NOHG CCKINGAI Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion in Limine RE: Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion to Exclude Testimony of Bob Debolt 
(01/18/2011 @ 3:00 PM) 
MOTN CCKINGA.I Motion in Limine RE: Idaho State Bar Complaint Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCKINGAI Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion in Limine Richard D. Greenwood 
RE: Idaho State Bar Complaint 
NOHG CCKINGAJ Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion in Limine RE: Richard D. Greenwood 
Idaho State Bar Complaint (01/18/2011 @ 3:00 
PM) 
MOTN CCKINGAJ Motion in Limine RE: Damages Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCKINGAJ Memorandum in Support of Counter-Defendants' Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion in Limine RE: Damages 
NOHG CCKINGAJ Notice Of Hearing: Motion in Limine RE: Richard D. Greenwood 
Damages (01/18/2011 @ 3:00 PM) 
MOTN CCKINGAJ Motion in Limine RE: Relevance of Prior Richard D. Greenwood 
Allegations 
MEMO CCKINGAJ Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion in Limine Richard D. Greenwood 
RE: Relevance of Prior Allegations 
NOHG CCKINGAJ Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion in Limine RE: Richard D. Greenwood 
Relevance of Prior Allegations (01/18/2011 @ 
3:00 PM) 
AFFD CCKINGAJ Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of Motions in Richard D. Greenwood 
Limine 
1/7/2011 AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of Sam Landston Richard D. Greenwood 
1/10/2011 AFSM CCAMESLC Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Exclude Richard D. Greenwood 
Testimony of Sam Langston, Bob Debolt 
REQU CCHOLMEE Requested Jury Instructions Richard D. Greenwood 
000012
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Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01 :17 PM ROA Report 
Page 12 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments LIe, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
1/10/2011 MISC CCHOLMEE Counterclaimants' Witness List Richard D. Greenwood 
MISC CCHOLMEE Counterclaimants' Exhibit List Richard D. Greenwood 
MISC CCLATICJ Counter-Defendants' Witness List and Exhibit List Richard D. Greenwood 
MISC CCLATICJ Counter-Defendants' Requested Jury Instructions Richard D. Greenwood 
and Proposed Special Verdict Form 
MEMO CCSULLJA Memorandum in Opposition to Richard D. Greenwood 
Counter-Claimants' Motion in Limine and 
Supplemental Motion in Limine 
DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Richard D. Greenwood 
01/10/2011 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: No Court Reporter 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: held in chambers 
1/11/2011 MEMO CCMASTLW Memorandum Opposing Counterdefendants' Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion In Limine 
1/12/2011 AFFD MCBIEHKJ Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of Motin in Richard D. Greenwood 
Limine 
REPL MCBIEHKJ Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motions in Richard D. Greenwood 
Limine 
1/14/2011 BREF CCSWEECE Brief In Support Of Motion In Limine To Preclude Richard D. Greenwood 
Connie Taylors Testimony 
1/18/2011 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on Richard D. Greenwood 
01/18/2011 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel( 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
AFOS CCJOYCCN (2) Affidavit of Service (12/09/2010) Richard D. Greenwood 
AFOS CCJOYCCN Affidavit Of Service (12/15/2010) Richard D. Greenwood 
AFOS CCJOYCCN Affidavit Of Service (12/20/2010) Richard D. Greenwood 
AFOS CCJOYCCN Affidavit Of Service (01/07/2011) Richard D. Greenwood 
AMEN CCJOYCCN Counter-Defendants' Amended Witness List Richard D. Greenwood 
1/20/2011 AFFD MCBIEHKJ Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Richard D. Greenwood 
1/21/2011 ORDR DCLYKEMA Summary Order Re Motions in Limine Richard D. Greenwood 
ORDR TCJOHNKA Order for limited Admission Richard D. Greenwood 
1/26/2011 MEMO MCBIEHKJ Pretrial Memorandum Richard D. Greenwood 
MOTN MCBIEHKJ Motion and Memo in Support of Motion to Prohibit Richard D. Greenwood 
CounterCLaimants from Calling Thomas Maile as 
a Witness 
1/31/2011 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01/31/2011 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Fran Morris 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 300 pages 
HRSC TCJOHNKA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/02/2011 09:00 Richard D. Greenwood 
AM) 2nd day 
000013
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Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01:17 PM ROA Report 
Page 13 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments Lie, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
1/31/2011 HRSC TCJOHNKA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/03/2011 09:00 Richard D. Greenwood 
AM) 3rd day 
2/1/2011 MOTN CCCHILER Counterdefendants' Motion and Memorandum in Richard D. Greenwood 
Support of Motion to Prohibit Counterclaimants 
from Introducing or Referring to November 2006 
Order, C-C Exhibit 11 and 2005 Purchase and 
Land Sale Agreement, C-C Exhibit 5, or the 
Issues Raised Therein 
MOTN CCRAND.ID Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Richard D. Greenwood 
Prohibit From Refering to Order 
2/2/2011 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 02/02/2011 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Fran Morris 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 300 pages 
2/3/2011 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 02/03/2011 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Fran Morris 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 300 pages 
HRSC TCJOHNKA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/04/2011 09:00 Richard D. Greenwood 
AM) 4th day of trial 
2/4/2011 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 02/04/2011 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tiffany Fisher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 600 pages 
CDIS TCJOHNKA Civil Disposition entered for: Taylor, Dallan, Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendant; Taylor, R. John, Defendant; Theodore 
L Johnson Revocable Trust, Defendant; 
Berkshire Investments Lie, Plaintiff. Filing date: 
2/4/2011 
STAT TCJOHNKA STATUS CHANGED: Closed Richard D. Greenwood 
JRYI TCJOHNKJ~ Jury Instructions Richard D. Greenwood 
VERD TCJOHNKA Verdict Form Richard D. Greenwood 
2/11/2011 MOTN CCHOLMEE Motion for Judgment not Withstanding the Verdict Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCHOLMEE Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
2/18/2011 MEMC CCDWONCP Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees Richard D. Greenwood 
AFFD CCDWONCP Affidavit of Mark S Prusynski in Support of Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees 
AFFD CCVIDASL Affidavit of Thomas Maile Re Offer of Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMC CCVIDASL Memorandum Of Costs Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCVIDASL Memorandum in Support of Counter Defendants Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion for Costs and Opposition to Counter 
Claimants Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees 




Date: 5/19/2011 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01:17 PM ROA Report 
Page 14 of 15 Case: CV-OC-2007-23232 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
Berkshire Investments Lie, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
2/25/2011 AFFD MCBIEHK.J Affidavit of Christ Troupis Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO MCBIEHK.J Memorandum in Support of Objection Richard D. Greenwood 
2/28/2011 JDMT TCJOHNKA Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
CDIS TCJOHNKA Civil Disposition entered for: Taylor, Dallan, Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendant; Taylor, R. John, Defendant; Berkshire 
Investments Lie, Plaintiff; Birch Maile, Colleen, 
Plaintiff; Maile, Thomas G IV, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 2/28/2011 
3/2/2011 OBJE MCBIEHK.1 Objection to Mailes Memorandum of Costs Richard D. Greenwood 
OBJE CCMASSSL Supplemental Objection to Mailes' Memorandum Richard D. Greenwood 
of Costs 
3/3/2011 AFFD CCAMESLC Supplimental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re: Richard D. Greenwood 
Memo of Costs 
3/4/2011 NOHG CCGARDAL Notice Of Hearing 4.14.11 @ 3 pm Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCGARDAL Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Richard D. Greenwood 
04/14/2011 03:00 PM) Objection to Memo of 
Costs and Fees 
STAT CCGARDAL STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Richard D. Greenwood 
action 
3/7/2011 MEMO CCLATICJ Counterclaimants' Memorandum of Costs Richard D. Greenwood 
CCLUNDMJ Notice of Appeal (Thomas Maile, IV for: Berkshire Richard D. Greenwood 
Inv, Thomas Maile, IV and Colleen Birch-Mail) 
3/10/2011 AFFD CCGARDAL Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Richard D. Greenwood 
RE memo of Costs 
3/11/2011 OBJT CCVIDASL Objection to Motion for Costs Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCVIDASL Reply Memorandum in Support of Counter Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendants Motion for Costs and Reply to 
Objection to Memorandum of Costs 
BREF CCDWONCP Reply Brief Re Memorandum of Costs and Richard D. Greenwood 
Attorney Fees 
3/16/2011 REPL MCBIEHKJ Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Costs and Opposition to Counter Claimants 
Motion for Costs and Fees 
OBJT CCGARDAL Second Supplemental Objection to Memorandum Richard D. Greenwood 
of Costs 
3/17/2011 NOHG CCSWEECE Notice Of Hearing (04-14-11 @ 3:00 PM) Richard D. Greenwood 
3/22/2011 REPL CCNELSRF Taylors' Reply Memeorandum RE: Memoranda of Richard D. Greenwood 
Costs 
3/24/2011 AFFD CCAMESLC Supplimental Affidavit of Mark S Prusynski Richard D. Greenwood 
Regarding Fees and Costs 
3/28/2011 MEMO MCBIEHKJ Memorandum Brief Re: Supplemental Affd of Richard D. Greenwood 
Mark Prusynski 
4/6/2011 MEMO CCHOLMEE Memorandum in Opposition to Richard D. Greenwood 
Counterdefendants Motion for Judgment 
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Berkshire Investments Lie, eta!. vs. Connie Wright Taylor, eta!. 
Date Code User Judge 
4/14/2011 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Richard D. Greenwood 
04/14/2011 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hell 
Court Reporter: Fran Morris 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 60 pages 
4/2612011 MOTN CCNELSRF Motion for Stay of Excution of Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment/Orders-Motion to Deposit Money in 
Court 
NOHG CCNELSRF Notice Of Hearing Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCNELSRF Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/29/2011 04:00 Richard D. Greenwood 
PM) Motion for Stay 
5/2/2011 OBJT CCVIDASL. Objection to Motion for Stay of Execution of Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 
5/9/2011 ORDR TCJOHNKA Order Denying Motion for Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
Notwithstanding the Verdict 
ORDR TCJOHI\IKA Order on Motions for Costs and Fees Richard D. Greenwood 
JDMT TCJOHNKA Amended Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE l'AYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
~V oC 07 :23232 
Case No. CV OC 
COMPLAThTT AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs, THOMAS G. MAILE appearing Pro Se, & COLLEEN 










MAILE, husband and wife, and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, an Idaho limited liability company, 
by and through their attorney, Thomas G. Maile, IV, and for their complaint and for a caUSI~ ofaction 
against Defendants, complains and alleges as follows: 
COMMON ALLEGATIONS TO ALL COUNTS 
1.	 THOMAS G. MAILE and COLLEEN MAILE, are husband and wife and reside in the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho; BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, L.L.C. is an Idaho limited 
liability company, lawfully transacting business in the State ofIdaho; that Clark and Feeney, 
is an Idaho partnership; PAUL T. CLARK is an individual; that the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust, is a revocable trust which at all relevant times owned certain real property 
in the County of Ada, in the State of Idaho and/or claims an interest in real prope:rty that is 
the subject of these proceedings (hereinafter referred to as the "trust"); that Dallan Taylor, 
R. John Taylor and Reed Taylor were at one time beneficiaries of the trust and thereafter 
disclaimed their interests in trust and became court appointed trustees of the trust; that 
defendant DALLAN TAYLOR is an individual, who resides in the County of Ada, State of 
Idaho; 
2.	 That the defendants, Clark and Feeney, Paul T. Clark and Connie Taylor, were at all relevant 
times licensed Idaho attorneys and/or were conducting business in the State ofIdaho and at 
all times was agent of the co-defendants, the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and/or 
the agents ofReed Taylor, defendant Dallan Taylor and R. John Taylor, and all acts of said 
attorneys hereinafter complained of, were committed in their individual capacities and in 








addition are imputed against the co-defendants, Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, 
and/or the defendant, Dallan Taylor, under the doctrine of "Respondent Superior" and/or 
agency, and all said defendants are individually responsible for said actions complained of 
and/or are the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the damages to the plaintiffs. 
That defendant attorney Connie Taylor at all relevant times was an employee and/or agent 
ofthe co-defendant Clark and Feeney, and co-counsel Paul T. Clark and all acts ofdefendant 
Connie Taylor hereinafter complained of, are imputed against the co-defendants, Paul T. 
Clark and/or Clark & Feeney under the doctrine of "Respondent Superior" and/or agency, 
and said defendants are individually responsible for said actions complained ofand/or all the 
defendants are jointly and severally liable for the damages to the plaintiffs and leave ofcourt 
is requested to amend this complaint once the legal capacities of all defendants are 
determined. All acts complained ofherein occurred in the State ofIdaho and, sp,ecifically, 
within the County ofAda, where the subject real property is located. 
3.	 Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and Theodore Johnson, as trustee ofthe Theodore Johnson 
Revocable Trust (hereinafter referred to as the trust), entered into a certain real estate 
contract, and a subsequent assignment was entered into wherein Berkshire Investments, 
L.L.C., acquired certain real property owned by the trust and the Theodore Johnson 
Revocable Trust, was to receive payment from the sale of the property. 
4.	 Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and Berkshire Investments, L.L.C., and Theodore L. 
Johnson, as Trustee, Beth Rogers and Andy Rogers, as Co-Trustees, of the Theodore L. 
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Johnson Revocable Trust, (hereinafter referred to at times collectively as "trust"), entered 
into a certain real estate contract, and subsequent assignment, wherein Berkshire Investment 
was to receive certain real property and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Tmst, was to 
convey title and was to receive payment from the sale ofthe subject property. 
5.	 At all relevant times herein, the individual defendants, and/or the trustee and/or the trustees, 
ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust knew and/or had imputed knowledge from the 
"Trust" and/or the prior trustees ofthe "Trust" that the plaintiffs intended to purchase the real 
property for the purposes of establishing a home-site for Thomas Maile and Collt:en Maile, 
and further knew that the plaintiffs intended to develop the real property consistent with Ada 
County zoning law and other regulatory rules and laws for the creation ofa subdivision. That 
all such facts were known to the "trust" prior to closing the real estate transaction. 
6.	 The individual Taylors, and thereafter acting as alleged successor trustees ofthe tmst, and/or 
acting as appointed trustees, by and through it's co-trustees, and/or by and through the 
individual defendants and/or by and through the co-defendant attorneys undertook a course 
ofaction to interfere with and an attempt to interfere with the plaintiffs' peaceful and quiet 
enjoyment of the subject property and/or attempt to cause a breach of contract between the 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lending institution and/or tortiuously interfere with the plaintiffs' 
prospective business advantages relating to the subject real property. 
7.	 The Defendants, were informed that the plaintiffs would be re-financing the loans on the 
subject real property and would pay the balance of the deed of trust due and owing to the 





           
 
    







"trust" and further knew that the plaintiffs were planning on subdividing the subject real 
property for a business advantage and profit. The plaintiffs informed the co-trustees of the 
Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust, that the plaintiffs would be re-financing, unless the 
Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust would like to maintain the loan and release lots in the 
seven (7) lot subdivision as sales developed. That in order to obtain lot releases in the 
proposed subdivision, the defendants knew and/or with reasonable diligence should have 
known, that the plaintiffs would enter into a commercial loan with another lender, for the 
purposes offulfilling the plaintiffs' obligation with the "trust" and would be acquiring a new 
commercial loan to eontinue to develop a subdivision on the subject real property. 
8.	 The plaintiffs incurred expenses and costs associated with securing financing on the subject 
real property to pay offthe obligation to the trust, on or about January 4,2004. The loan 
required plaintiffs to avoid the placement of any liens or encumbrances on the subject real 
property, to convey clear title to potential purchasers, to construct and finalize the 
subdivision within six (6) months, and such facts were made known to all defendants via a 
public recorded deed oftrust on the subject real property and as a result of the filing of the 
complaints filed by the defendants and allowing the recording oftwo (2) "Lis Pendens" to 
be filed in the cases initiated by the defendants, the plaintiffs were unable to pmceed with 
the improvement of the subject property and were forced to re-finance plaintiffs' real 
properties and/or incur additional credit increasing the costs associated with the development 
ofthe subject real property all a result to avoid the default under the terms and conditions of 
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the real estate commercial loan. 
9.	 The Defendants, and/or it's agent, and/or it's co-trustees, and acting in concert and 
conspiring with each other, maliciously and intentionally undertook a course ofaction in the 
filing the two actions consolidated in the district court action and/or the filing of the 
complaints and the "Lis Pendens" in both the two cases, and/or pursued a course of action 
hereinafter alleged in providing false verifications to the courts, that were calculated and 
determined to adversely affect the interests of the plaintiffs in the prior the litigation and to 
tortiuously interfere with the contract between the plaintiffs ' and the new commercial lender, 
and/or the plaintiffs' right to quiet and peaceful enjoyment ofthe subject real propE:rty and/or 
amounted to conduct that tortiuously interfered with the plaintiffs' prospectiv{~ business 
advantages relating to the subject real property. 
10.	 That litigation was filed by the individual Taylors and defendant Dallan Taylor and the 
litigation was filed by the co-defendant attorneys in January 2004. Subsequently, the 
individual Taylors by and through defendant Connie Taylor, while the first litigation was 
dismissed by the district court and while the first suit was pending on appeal, and while the 
plaintiffs undertook the required construction of the subdivision, the individual Taylors, 
Beth and Andy Rogers as successor trustees, and the beneficiaries of the trust entered into 
a global "Disclaimer., Release & Indemnification Agreement" in July 2004. Under the terms 
of the Agreement the Taylors released the trustees Beth and Andy Rogers from all liability 
relating to the administration of the trust. The Agreement further provided that the Taylors 





           







would be appointed as successor trustees. The Taylors did not obtain court approval oftheir 
alleged appointment as successor trustees. The trust, by and through its alleged successor 
trustees, and the co-defendant attorneys and the Taylors filed litigation on July 19th, 2004 
on behalf of the trust against the plaintiffs. 
11.	 Thereafter, On October 20, 2004, the plaintiffs filed their motion to dismiss complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial relating to the "trust's" complaint. That one of the issues raised by 
the plaintiffs, in their motion to dismiss was the issue ofthe legitimacy ofthe complaint filed 
by the "trust" since the alleged successor trustees, (the individual Taylors) had not received 
the required Court appointment making them successor trustees, pursuant to I.C. 68-101 & 
I.C. 68-107. That the defendants initially denied any court appointment was necessary for 
their appointment as successor trustees. Then, after receiving the plaintiffs' Motion to 
Dismiss, the Taylors, by and through the co-defendant attorneys obtained an ex-parte order 
from the probate order on November 17, 2004, appointing them as successor trustees, 
retroactively to June 10, 2004. 
12.	 The defendant Dallan Taylor and the other Taylors, by and through the co-defendant 
attorneys filed their verified petition in the probate court on November 12, 2004, requesting 
the probate court to appoint the Taylors as trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust. The petition was executed by R. John Taylor as a verification of the facts contained 
in the petition and was signed by the attorney of record, his wife, defendant Connie Taylor. 
The petition excluding the attachment thereto is annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" and is made 














a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. Page 2 of the verified petition states under oath, 
"the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this 
trust by virtue ofth€:: terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement." That the 
individual Taylor defendants had renounced and disclaimed their interests in the trust and 
were no longer residual beneficiaries ofthe trust effective in July 2004. 
13.	 On February 28, 2005, the plaintiffs filed appropriate pleadings before the probate court 
requesting that the €::x-parte Order dated November 17, 2004 be set aside. In the probate 
court proceeding, the parties provided extensive briefing regarding the ex-parte order entered 
on November 17,2004. OnApril 18,2005, the probate court, through the Honorable Judge 
Christopher M. Bieter, entered its Order declaring the ex-parte Order entered on November 
17, 2004 void. On May 2,2005, the Honorable Judge Christopher M. Bieter, mtered an 
Order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed J. Taylor and Dallan J. Taylor as successor trustees 
of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. 
14.	 That in December 2005 the Idaho Supreme Court entered its decision in the case ,captioned 
Taylor v.s Maile, and provided a ruling that stated under the allegations set forth in the 
individual Taylors' complaint filed in January 2004, sufficient inferences could be afforded 
the Taylors to allow the individual Taylors as beneficiaries to pursue claims against the 
plaintiffs. 
15.	 That on January 13, 2006, R. John Taylor, acting on behalf of all defendants, and by and 
through his wife, defendant Connie Taylor, who was acting on behalf of the co-defendant 
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attorneys executed a proposed amended complaint after the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. 
On March 9, 2006, the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, and by and 
through the co-defendant attorneys. Page 1 ofthe Verified Amended Complaint states under 
oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is 
a resident of Ada County Idaho. All of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust." That said verified amended complaint is annexed hereto as 
Exhibit "B" and is made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
16.	 That such statements contained in the verified amended complaint were false and 
intentionally deceitful. The verified amended complaint executed under oath on January 13, 
2006, by R. John Taylor and filed on March 9, 2006, and signed by the co-defendant 
attorneys was an attempt to take improper advantage ofthe Idaho Supreme Court's decision 
in Taylor 1. The district court entered "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim" on June 7, 2006, 
which was entered by the district court pursuant to the misrepresentation of the Taylors as 
to their status as beneficiaries in January 2006 and their attorneys of record, co-defendant 
attorneys. 
17.	 That a sole and direct result ofthe filing of the verified amended complaint the Honorable 
Ronald Wilper entered the court's Judgment on June 7,2006. That a true and COlTect copy 
ofthe Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim is annexed hereto as Exhibit "c" and is made a part 
hereof as if set forth in full herein. That pursuant to the Judgment the plaintiff Berkshire 
Investment was deprived ofits real property and a constructive trust should be imposed upon 
COMPLAINT AND DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 9
 
000025








     
 
the subject real prop,erty that is described in Exhibit "c" and the other plaintiffs were denied 
their improvements made on the subject real property. 
18.	 That the co-defendant attorneys had entered into a fee agreement with the Taylors and co­
defendant DaHan Taylor which was initially based upon a hourly rate and thereafter became 
a contingent fee agreement, wherein the co-defendant attorneys would receive a percentage 
ofthe judgment entered against the plaintiffs. That based upon such agreement between the 
party defendants it was in their collective best interests to increase the judgment to include 
a declaration from the court that the plaintiffs lost all rights and title to real property, 
including all their improvements on the real property. 
19.	 That all said defendants actively and collectively and for the benefit of each other and 
obtained the judgment set forth in Exhibit "c" by wrongfully obtaining the title to the real 
property which was the subject ofthe contract and the conveyance between the plaintiffs and 
trust. The action and the wrongful conduct on the part of the defendants and/or the 
defendants' agents, demonstrated an intentional course of action to seek to increase profits 
and/or income to tht: defendants and/or to obtain the title to the real property based upon 
wrongful motives and design, including but not limited to the following: (a.) wrongfully 
pursuing a course of conduct between the beneficiaries and/or the residual benefilciaries of 
the Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust, to cause the filing ofthe actions and filing of the 
"Lis Pendens" above alleged; (b) undertaking a course of action to cause a breach by the 
plaintiffs with the commercial lender on the subject real property, for personal gain and/or 
COMPLAINT AND DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 10 
000026
 -
            
 
C




benefit of the defendants, their agents and/or their principals and/or co-trustees, and/or the 
trust's sole beneficiary, and/or the individual defendants; (c) wrongfully conspiring to 
circumvent the plaintiffs' rights to future profits and share in the future gains associated with 
the real property in which Theodore Johnson 1. Revocable Trust previously had an interest; 
(d) using their position as co-trustees, and/or prior residual beneficiaries and/or assignees of 
other beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust to promote profiting at the 
expense of the plaintiffs; (e) misrepresenting the nature ofthe individual Taylors' status as 
beneficiaries, before the district court in January 2006, when the individual Taylors had 
disclaimed and/or renounced their interests in the trust by the settlement agreement in July 
2004 and/or further by the judicial admissions contained in Exhibit "A", which caused a 
judgment to entered against the plaintiffs causing the plaintiffs to lose the real property, and 
all benefits associated thereto, and all improvements made on the real property_ 
20.	 That the actions ofthe defendants in misrepresenting the status ofthe their benefici ary status 
in January 2006 amounted to misrepresentations made by the defendants. The defendants 
by verified pleadings represented to the district court that the individual Taylors were 
beneficiaries of the trust and had a legitimate interest in the litigation in January 2006 as 
beneficiaries. That such statements were made to the district court by defendants as 
inducement for the court to enter its judgment contained in Exhibit "C". That the defendants 
having previously judicially admitted in prior verified pleadings that the individual Taylors 
were no longer beneficiaries of trust as Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary of trust. 





             
Defendant attorney Connie Taylor signed pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 11, that the individual 
Taylors had no interest in the trust as of July 2004 (exhibit "A"). Such facts were well 
known by the defendants at the time ofthe misrepresentations and/or verification ofpleading 
in January 2006. That the defendants' statement that the individual Taylor defendants had 
a beneficial interest in the trust in January 2006 was false and was known to be false and was 
intended by the defendants to be acted upon by the court, which the court did rely upon and 
the court so acted according to such statements; that the court was relying upon the 
verification of the pleadings of the defendants' misrepresentation when made by the 
defendants; such statement was made to induce the court to enter its judgment referenced 
above and were intentionally made by defendants for the purpose to have the court act by 
executing the judgment in which it ultimately did above referenced. That said statt:ment was 
false and was made by defendants intentionally to deceive the court and/or was made in a 
reckless manner and careless manner, and the defendants knew and/or should have known 
the statement was false and/or knew and/or should have known that court would act thereon 
and further knew the court in reliance ofsuch statements did not know the true status ofthe 
individual Taylors' true status with the trust. That such statement was a material inducement 
to the court's execution ofthe judgment above referenced. The defendants intendtld that the 
court act in executing the judgment based upon such false assurances which were reasonably 
calculated by the defc~ndants that the court would rely upon such assurances and execute the 
ultimate judgment. That the defendants knew and/or in the exercise should have known, the 








court would so act and further knew and/or should have known the court would be ignorant 
of the truth, that the individual Taylors did not have a legitimate interest in the trust and/or 
the corpus of the trust in January 2006. The court relied upon the truthfulness of the 
defendants' statements and such reliance was reasonable. That the court had a right to reply 
upon such statements as the same constituted verified facts and were executed pursuant to 
I..R.C.P. Rule!!. That such action amount to fraud by the defendants to wit (1) a 
representation of fact: that the defendant affirmatively stated they had a legitimate interest 
as beneficiaries ofthe trust; (2) Its falsity: that the defendants and the co-defendant attorneys 
had previously filed verified pleadings before a probate court which were contrary to the 
verified pleading in January 2006; (3) Its materiality: The court relied upon the 
representations that the individual Taylors were legitimately beneficiaries and were real 
parties in interests in the trust and/or its corpus and that is was a proximate cause for the 
district court to award the real property to the trust in light of the district court's prior 
decision that the trust had waived and/or was estopped to seek recision of the r,eal estate 
contract between the plaintiffs and the trust; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity: the 
defendants knew at the time of executing the verified pleadings the individual Taylors did 
not have any interest in the trust and/or its corpus; (5) The speaker's intent that the 
representation will be acted upon in a reasonably contemplated manner: the defendants 
intended that the court would act upon such statement and execute the ultimate judgment as 
presented by defendants to the district court prepared by the defendant attorneys which the 





court ultimately in fact did; (6) the listener's ignorance of its falsity; The court had no 
information or knowledge which would have contradicted the defendants based upon the 
verified pleadings of January 2006; (7) the listener's reliance on the truth of the 
representation; the court was relying upon such verified statements by the defendants in 
ultimately executing the judgments as requested; (8) the listener's right to rely on the truth 
ofthe representation: the court relied upon the statement by defendants pursuant to Rule 11 
of the I..R.C.P. and by the verification of facts by the defendants; and (9) The listener's 
consequent and proximate injury: That as a result of the defendants not providing the true 
status oftheir interest in the trust and/or its corpus the plaintiffs herein sustained the loss of 
their real property and their improvements thereto. That the Plaintiffs have sustained 
damages as a result ofsuch statement. That the plaintiffs lack an adequate remedy at law and 
equity requires that the judgment procured by the defendants be declared null and void and/or 
voidable and the real property subject thereto be restored to the plaintiff Berkshire 
Investments. 
21.	 The acts of the defendants, and/or their agents, and/or their principals, and/or the trust' co­
trustees, having devised such scheme, motive or artifice to cause a default and foreclosure 
of the contract between the plaintiffs and the new commercial lender and/or the interference 
with the prospective economic advantages of the plaintiffs, and/or misrepresmting the 
material facts above alleged, causing the real property to be re-conveyed to the trust, knew 
would cause irreparable damage to the plaintiffs and unjust enrichment to the defendants, to 
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wit: in addition to having caused the plaintiffs to lose their equity in the subject property, the 
plaintiffs were damaged with other costs and fees associated with the development ofthe real 
property, and other costs and interest expenses associated with paying off the new 
commercial lender, and causing delays in the sale of certain lots thereby increasing the 
damages of the plaintiffs for increased interest, loss of profits from delays, loss of capital 
investments on the subject real property, loss ofinterest on invested capital, increased taxes, 
increased assessment, unpaid taxes and penalties, loss ofprofits from the real property, and 
the ultimate profits trom the sale of subject real property, while the defendants sought to 
unjustly benefit from the plaintiffs' labor and efforts. 
22.	 That with the execution ofthe real estate contract, and after the purchase ofthe real property 
by the plaintiff Berkshire Investment, the plaintiffs made down payment and ultimate full 
payment on the purchase price, including costs, taxes, interest payments. That the plaintiffs 
provided materials, services, improvements affecting the real propertywhich was undertaken 
by the plaintiffs during periods of time wherein, the legal title remained in Berkshire 
Investments and the defendants knew of such improvements and payments and allowed the 
plaintiffs to proceed with the full payment and improvements on the real property. That said 
services, and improvements enhanced the value ofthe real property and the defendants took 
such payments, and improvements for their benefit. That the defendants further knew that 
the plaintiffs had incurred a new commercial lender which required that the improvements 
be completed within 6 months ofthe new debt and further knew and/or should have known 
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that purchase ofthe real property and the improvements thereon would result in an economic 
advantage to the plaintiffs. 
23.	 That plaintiffs, as a sole, direct and proximate result of the action above alleged, have 
sustained damages and will sustain damages in the following manner: (a) the loss of the 
subject real property in which plaintiffs were obligated to pay the new commercial lender for 
and/or preventing the plaintiffs from continued marketing of the property which has now 
been clouded by th(~ defendants' judgment (Exhibit "C") and the prior Lis Pendents, all 
perpetrated by the dc:::fendants collectively and/or their agents' actions; the plaintiffs' loss of 
equity in the real property thereon and further incurring additional expenses above set forth 
including but not limited to increased interest costs on capital and re-financing debt, loss of 
profits and loss of interest and/or profits on capital contributions to development, incurring 
additional appraisal fees and points associated with new mortgages, costs and attomeys fees 
incurred; (b) the plaintiffs' loss ofopportunity to obtain revenues and profits associated with 
the real property and loss income associated with lot sales; © the plaintiffs' expenses 
incurred and/or paid to date for engineering, architectural fees, interest expense, loan fees, 
fees and costs associated with various governmental agencies, professional services, 
materials purchased for the construction to date on the property, services and labor paid to 
date on the subject real property, assessment fees, taxes, penalties for unpaid taxes, cost of 
interest paid to the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and other institutions and entities; 
increased continued costs ofinterest, taxes, assessments, the cost ofappraisals, loan fees and 




   
 




          
 
costs, closing fees for refinancing, title reports, closing fees, attorneys fees ete.; (d) the 
plaintiffs' loss of the opportunity to retain portions ofthe subject to allow the plaintiffs to 
build their homes on the subject property and to the enjoy the peace and enjoyment of the 
subject real property; (e.) the plaintiffs' incurring costs and attorneys fees to defend against 
the defendants' complaints and the accompanying "Lis Pendens" in the two cases, including 
the appeal costs including attorneys fees and costs all as a proximate result of the filing of 
the litigation and obtaining the judgment set forth in Exhibit "C" by the defendants, and/or 
their agents, and the costs and attorney fees to quiet title to the subject real propel1y; (f) the 
plaintiffs' loss of income and/or profits associated with the time taken for the development 
ofthe property and the loss ofopportunity to obtain revenues and profits associated with the 
real property from the date of the subdivision finalization to the current date, including 
interest on the gains thereof; (g) the plaintiffs' payments to the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust for the purchase price paid, and the interest paid pursuant to the promissory 
note and deed of trust that the defendants have wrongfully obtained title too, in an amount, 
based upon information and belief, in the amount of $465,000.00, or such greater sums as 
established, and leave of court is requested to amend said amount as the actual amount is 
made known; (I) the plaintiffs' improvements on the real property relating to devdopment, 
construction costs, and other services all ofwhich has increased the value ofthe reaJ[ property 
in amount, greater than the purchase price paid, and leave ofcourt is requested to amend said 
amount as the actual amount is made known: (k) for the appreciation in the real property and 
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the value of the real property at the time the real property was wrongfully taken by the 
defendants' actions and the profits thereto associated with the potential sales of said real 
property, and leave ofcourt is requested to amend said amount as the actual amount is made 
known. 
24.	 That all defendants, acted with oppressive, fraudulent, wanton, malicious or outrageous 
conduct as alleged above. That defendants acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation 
from reasonable standards ofconduct, and that the act was performed by the defendants with 
an understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences" and that the defendants acted 
with an extremely harmful state ofmind, whether that be termed "malice, oppression, fraud 
or gross negligence", "malice, oppression, wantonness;" or simply "deliberate and willful." 
That defendants well knew that the above conduct would be oppressive as to the plaintiffs 
and others. 
25.	 As a result of the aforementioned, plaintiffs have sustained such losses and have been 
damaged in a principal sum which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the District Court, 
together with interest at the rate oftwelve (12) percent per annum from the date ofloss to the 
date of Judgment, as set forth herein. 
26.	 Plaintiffs have been forced to retain the professional legal services, to prosecute this claim 
and are entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred pursuant to Idaho Code, 
Sections 12-120,12··213, and 12-121, of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and further 
pursuant to Rule 11 of the LR.C.P., and further pursuant to the real estate contrad between 
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the plaintiffs and the trust. That the sum of $5,000.00 is a reasonable sum ifthis matter is 
uncontested, and a greater sum if contested. 
COUNT ONE 
QUIET TITLE 
27.	 Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all paragraphs of Common Allegations above 
reference of the Complaint herein as if set forth in full herein. 
28.	 That the defendants have obtained the title to the subject real property from the plaintiff 
Berkshire Investments by committing fraud upon the court and/or fraud and/or presented 
claims which were moot in the proceedings above described and/or lacked standing in said 
proceedings. That each and every defendant above named may claim an interestln the real 
property above described. 
29.	 The plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, and no remedy to strike from the public 
records the Judgment contained in exhibit "C" and the equitable powers ofthe Court should 
be employed to strike said public record which is annexed hereto as Exhibit "C" and made 
a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
30.	 That an Order should be entered by this Court striking Exhibit "C" from the pubhc records 
and declaring it has no affect as to PlaintiffBerkshire Investment's right to the subject real 
property. 
31.	 That an Order should be entered declaring the respective rights and liabilities of the parties 





















32.	 That plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all paragraphs numbered 1 through 31 
contained in this complaint as if set forth in full herein. 
33.	 That defendant Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, continues to hold legal title to the 
subject property and has further conspired with the co-defendants in violation of the 
plaintiffs' rights and interests, and it is anticipated that said defendants may cause the 
property to be sold and/or other develop the property and increase their profits and income 
at the expense ofthe: plaintiffs. That the plaintiffs are unprotected with out the benefit of a 
"constructive trust". 
34.	 That a constructive trust should be imposed upon defendant Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust and/or all co-defendants who claim an interest thereto, and the real property subject 
to exhibit "C" and thl~ other co-defendants pending a final resolution ofthe current litigation. 
COUNT THREE 
TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
35.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Two as ifset forth 
in full herein. 
36.	 That defendants set upon a course of conduct and intentionally interfered with plaintiffs' 
contract with the new lender on the subject real property. 
37.	 As a result of the aforementioned, plaintiffs have sustained such losses and have been 
damaged in a principal sum which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the District Court, 
together with interest at the rate oftwelve (12) percent per annum from the date ofloss to the 







       
   
 
 
             
date ofJudgment, as set forth, and leave ofcourt is requested to amend said complaint as the 
actual amount is made known. 
COUNT FOUR 




38.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Three as if set 
forth in full herein. 
39.	 That defendants set upon a course ofconduct and intentionally interfered with a prospective 
economic advantage ofthe plaintiffs to secure profits and income relating to the real property 
titled by plaintiff Berkshire Investments. 
40.	 That defendants intentionally and/or with reckless, wanton, disregard to plaintiffs' rights to 
the real property interfered with the plaintiffs' rights to enjoy profits and benefits to the real 
property. 
41.	 That the defendants knew or should have known ofthe existence ofthe plaintiffs' economic 
expectancy related to the development ofthe subdivision ofthe subject real property and/or 
the ownership of the same. 
42.	 That the conduct on the part of the defendants were done in such a manner that amounts to 
intentionally interfering and/or were done in such a manner as to constitute reckless, wanton 
disregard to plaintiffs' rights and were done to induce termination ofthe plaintiffs' economic 
expectancy. 
43.	 That defendants are interfering for an improper purpose and/or for improper means. 
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44.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT FIVE 
ABUSE OF PROCESS 
45.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Four as ifset forth 
in full herein. 
46.	 That the actions ofthe defendants above alleged were done in a manner that constitutes an 
abuse ofprocess in the prior the litigation, misrepresenting material facts in January 2006 to 
achieve the judgment in the judicial process of the prior litigation which amounted to 
restoring the real property to the trust in which the alleged beneficiaries no longer had an 
interest in and/or too. 
47.	 That such actions above alleged were undertaken by the defendants with an ulterior, 
improper purpose to obtain a judgment which they were not entitled too and to cause the 
court to quiet title in the trust in which the Taylors had no interest in and/or too. 
48.	 That such actions constitute a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular 
course of the proceeding. 
49.	 That said defendants used a legal process, in a civil matter, against the plaintiffs primarily 
to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed and the defendants are subject to 
liability to the plaintiffs for damages caused by the abuse ofprocess. 
50.	 The "ulterior, improper purpose" included the above referenced allegations, including the 
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following: The defendants from the time that they caused the two (2) complaints to be filed 
against the plaintiffs and continuing through the appellate process, and up to the present time 
and the date ofthe filing ofthis complaint, demonstrate the defendants engaged in a wrongful 
and abusive course of action with the sole purpose of delaying, stalling and subverting the 
Plaintiffs' defense and claims in the prior litigation and further fabricating the Taylors 
illegitimate status as beneficiaries which caused the district court to void the legal title held 
by Berkshire Investments and to gain collateral advantages in that proceeding that are not 
authorized by law. Defendants' course of action was not intended to advance the litigation, 
but rather, to delay and/or hinder the litigation and to obtain an improper result by their 
misrepresentation. 
51.	 The above facts constitute a malicious misuse and/or misapplication ofregularly issued civil 
process to accomplish purposes not permitted by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, any 
Idaho statute or any case law decided by the Idaho Appellate Courts. 
52.	 This course of action included, but was not limited to, intentionally delaying the orderly 
administration ofjustice, intentionally and/or recklessly causing the judicial system to quiet 
title in real property owned by Berkshire Investment and causing a judgment to be: recorded 
with the Ada County Recorder's Office which was based upon misrepresentations and 
presenting false and perjured testimony, presenting false and perjured verifications to the 
Court, which were not intended to advance the litigation, but rather, to delay and/or hinder 
the litigation and making sworn statements to the Court which were false and/or misleading. 
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53.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT SIX 
NEGLIGENCE 
54.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Five as ifset forth 
in full herein. 
55.	 That the defendants owed a duty to conform to the standard of care applicable to litigation 
in the prior proceedings. That defendants, were negligent, careless, and reckless manner, to 
wit: (a) by failing to properly advise the district court of the Taylors' expired and/or 
illegitimate relationship to the trust as beneficiaries; (b) by advancing verified petitions and 
verified pleadings that were contrary to the true state of facts; (c) by causing injuries and 
damages to the plaintiffs. 
The actions of defendants resulted plaintiffs sustaining the above described damages. 
56.	 That the actions of the defendants constitute a breach of the standard of care owed to the 
plaintiffs and the same amount to negligent acts. 
57.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT SEVEN 
NEGLIGENCE PER SE 








58.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Six as if set forth 
in full herein. 
59.	 That the defendants committed negligence per se, by the acts above referenced and by 
violating the following standards: I.R.C.P. Rule 11, Idaho Code 12-121, 12-123, I.c. 18­
5401, 18-5410, 18-5406, 18-5408. 
60.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 





61.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Seven as if set 
forth in full herein. 
62.	 That the defendants actions above described amount to action that constitutes gross 
negligence. 
63.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT NINE 
EOUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
64.	 That the Plaintiffs re·-allege the allegations of all the paragraphs of Count Eight herein as if 
set forth in full herein. 














65.	 The conduct ofDefendants above-alleged constitutes a course of conduct to interfere with 
Plaintiffs rights and title to real property. Defendants, should be estopped from asserting 
rights inconsistent therewith and for not allowing the plaintiff Berkshire Investments clear 
title to the real property subject to these proceedings. 
66.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT TEN 
QUASI ESTOPPEL 
67.	 That the Plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the paragraphs of Count Nine herein as if 
set forth in full herein. 
68.	 The conduct ofDefendants, demonstrates they entered into a course ofconduct ineonsistent 
with the intention of the commitments and legal rights between the plaintiff and trust. The 
defendants actions wl~re undertaken to cause a breach between the plaintiffs and the trust, and 
plaintiffs relied to the:ir determent upon such assurances ofthe sanctity ofthe contractual and 
conditions, and the defendants should be estopped from asserting rights inconsistent 
therewith. 
69.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
RESERVATION TO AMEND PLEADINGS 
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That by reason ofthe acts complained herein ofplaintiffs, leave of Court will be requested 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1604, for the Court's ruling on the alleged issue of 
exemplary/punitive damages in light ofthe pleadings, affidavits, depositions, etc., filed ofrecord or 
as may hereinafter be provided to the Court. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs herewith demands a trial by jury on all triable issues in this matter. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffprays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1.	 That Plaintiffs, be granted Judgment against Defendants for a sum which exceeds the 
jurisdictional basis of the District Court, together with interest thereon at the rate oftwelve 
(12) percent per annum from September 17, 2002, to and including the date ofJudgment and 
thereafter at the highest legal rate until paid in full and leave ofcourt is requested to amend 
this complaint as soon as the same becomes known to the plaintiffs. 
2.	 That the defendants be required to set forth herein by proper pleading the nature of their 
claims in and to real property which is the subject ofthese proceedings and as described in 
Exhibit "C" thereof. 
3.	 That plaintiffs' inten::st in and to the subject property be declared senior and superior and that 
any other claim, right, title, or interest ofDefendants (or any other interested party or person 
in and to the subject property, if such right, title, claim or interest exists) be declared junior 
and subservient to the interest ofplaintiffs in the subject property. 
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4.	 That a Decree be entered adjudging and decreeing that PlaintiffBerkshire Investments is the 
owner and is entitled to possession of the subject property, and further ordering that 
defendants, have no right, title or interest or claim in and to the subject real property or any 
part thereof and that each of them, and further, that any person claiming under them and all 
persons having any lien, claim, judgment or decree on or against said real property or any 
part, parcel or portion thereof (either as purchaser, encumbrancer, or otherwise) be barred 
and foreclosed from all equity of redemption in and to the said real property and in and to 
every part, parcel and portion thereof. 
5.	 That this Court order a constructive trust be imposed upon the subject real property according 
to law and that the any and all proceeds of the same be subject to such constructive trust. 
6.	 For plaintiffs' attorneys fees to be incurred and the costs incurred. 






DATED This ~ day of December, 2007.
 
--"
pro se and attorney for 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
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He is one ofthe above named Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, he has read the foregoing 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, knows the contents thereof, and 
believe the same to be true and correct to the best ofhis knowledge and belief and acknowledges he 
executed the same upon behalf of the Plaintiffs. 
DATED This E. day of December, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
Jf- day of December, 2007. 
","I.'ft", 
......... 
"" \\i\EL k{."" "" 
.... ,L (c. '" 
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County of Ada )
 
THOMAS G. MAILE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
He is one ofthe managing member for Berkshire Investments LLC., one ofthe above named 
Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, he has read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, knows the contents thereof, and believe the same to be true and 
correct to the best ofhis knowledge and belief and acknowledges he executed the same upon behalf 
of Berkshire Investments LLC. 
DATED This 'J-7 day of December, 2007. 
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THOMAS MA: LE, managing member for Berkshire 
Investments LL . 
07 daySUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, this ofDecember, 2007. 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
ISB No. 4837 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF 
THE THEODORE L. JOItNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST 
) Case No. 
------­) 
) PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT 
) OF TRUSTEES 
) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner and pursuant to Idaho Code 68-101 petitions this court for an 
order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed J. Taylor, and DaHan Taylor as Successor Co-Tmstees to the 
above-entitled Trust, effective as of June 10, 2004. 
This Petition is filed on the grounds and for the reason that the Successor Trustees, Beth J. 
Rogers and Andrew T. Rogers, resigned as Trustees on June 10,2004, and nominated as Successor 
Co-Trustees R. John Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor, and DaHan 1. Taylor. In addition, the person designated 
as Successor Trustee ofthe Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust, Garth J. Fisher, also declined and 
refused to serve as Trustee, joining in the nomination ofR. John Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor, and DaHan 
1. Taylor. That declination was also effective as of June 10,2004. 
A copy ofthe Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust is attached as Exhibit A to this Petition. 
A copy of the resignation and declination are attached as Exhibit B to this Petition. 
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, , The petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this 
Trust by viltue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit C. Paragraph 4 of said agreement provided for the resignation of Rogers and 
Fisher and the appointment of John, Reed, and DaHan Taylor as successor co-trustees of the trust. 
WHEREFORE Petitioner prays for an order of this court appointing R.. John Taylor, Reed 
1. Taylor, and DaHan 1. Taylor as Trustees effective as ofJune 10,2004. 
"""I 
DATED this ¥ day ofNovember, 2004. 
By----d~~~'-'--_-I-+_ __,__---.--­
Connie W. Taylor, a me 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
VERlFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF Nez Perce ) 
are true, 
, . John Taylor . '" ( 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this JL day ofNovember, 2004. 
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. , CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Ji day ofNovember, 2004, I caused to be served atrue 
and correct copy of the above document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
foHowing: 
Helen Taylor o U.S. Mail 
8483 W Hannonica Way o Hand Delivered 
Boise, ID 83709 o Overnight Mail 
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REED TAYLOR, JDALLAN TAYLOR, 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Case No. CV OC 0400473D 
CONNIE W. TAYLOR 







Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1229 Main Street 













 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 

















THOMAS MAILE" N and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, and 



































COME NOVI the Plaintiffs by and through their undersigned counsel of record, COilllie 
W. Taylor of the Law Offices of Clark and Feeney, and for a cause of action and claim for relief 
against the Defendants, complain, state, and allege as follows: 
1. PARTIES 
1.1 Reed and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez Perce County, Idaho:, Dallan Taylor 
is a resident of Ada County Idaho. All of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the Theodore 
L. Jolmson Trust. They bring this action on their own behalfand also as assignees ofcertain other 
beneficiaries or residual beneficiaries of said trust. 
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1.2 Thomas Maile, N (herein after Thomas Maile) is engaged in the practice of law 
at 380 W. State Street, Eagle, Ada County, Idaho. Defendant Thomas Maile is a licensed real 
estate broker DIBIA Thomas Maile Real Estate Company. Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile are 
husband and wife and all acts complained ofherein were for the benefit ofthe marital community. 
They were at all times relevant hereto believed to be residents ofAda County, Idaho. 
1.3 The Defendant Berkshire Investments, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company 
which was formed by the Defendant Thomas G. Maile. 
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
2.1 This court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of the above­
captioned matter by virtue ofthe fact that all ofthe acts and/or omissions complained ofoccurred 
within Ada County, Idaho and relate to real property located in Ada County. 
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
3.1. The Defendant Thomas Maile, acting in his capacity as an attorney with offices in 
Eagle, Idaho, represented Theodore Johnson on a variety of matters for a period ofmany years. 
The attorney client relationship continued until Mr. Johnson's death on September 14, 2002. 
After Mr. Johnson's death, the Defendant Thomas Maile continued to act as the attorney for the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Theodore L. Johnson Estate. 
3.2. During the course ofthe attorney client relationship, Thomas Maile represented and 
advised Mr. Johnson in relation to the potential sale of 40 acres of property near Eagle, Idaho. 
Mr. Maile, as attomey for the Johnson Trust, rejected an offer to purchase the property for 
$400,000, stating it: was "extremely low" based on comparable sales in the area. Within 
approximately two months Thomas and Colleen Maile entered into an earnest money agreement 
to purchase the 40 acres for the price of$400,000.00, on terms which were nearly identical to the 
prior offer which was rejected. 
3.3 The Defendants Maile formed a limited liability company, Berkshire Investments, 
LLC, and assigned their rights under the earnest money agreement to Berkshire Investments, LLC, 
which subsequently purchased the property from the Johnson Trust. 
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3.4 Theodore Johnson died on September 14, 2002. The successor trustees of the 
Theodore Jolmson Trust (Beth and Andy Rogers) closed the transaction selling the property to 
Berkshire Investments, LLC on September 16, 2002. 
3.5 The Rogers had a conflict of interest with other beneficiaries, in that they were also 
beneficiaries of the Trust. Under the ternlS of the trust, the Rogers would receive their share 
immediately, as opposed to the majority ofother beneficiaries who would either receive income 
only for their lives, or would receive nothing until the death of their mother. 
3.6 Defendants acquired the Linder Road real property with knowledge of the Rogers' 
conflict of interest, and with knowledge that the Rogers had failed to carry out their fiduciary 
responsibility by: 
3.6.1 Failing to carefully examining the fairness and propriety ofthe transaction 
before closing it. 
3.6.2 Failing to obtain court approval prior to consummating Ithe sale. 
3.7 Beneficiaries demanded that Defendants restore the Linder Road property to the 
beneficiaries, but the Defendants have refused to do so. 
IV. AIDING IN BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
4.1 The Defendants aided the trustees in disposing of trust property in violation oftheir 
fiduciary responsibilities and duty of loyalty, and received the trust property with knowledge of 
the same, including knowledge that the sale had not been approved by a court as required by I.e. 
68-108(b). 
4.2 Plaintiffs seek imposition of a constructive trust, and an order quieting title to the 
real property in the Theodore L. Jolmson Revocable Trust, together with interest thereon from 
September 16, 2002. 
4.3 In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek money dat11ages for the difference between the 
amount paid and the fair market value of the property at the time of trial. 
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The Defendants should take notice that the Plaintiffs may file a pretrial motion pursuant 
to statute to amend the complaint to include a prayer for punitive damages. The Defendants 
should conduct their trial preparation accordingly. 
VI. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
As a direclt result ofthe Defendants' actions, the Plaintiffs have been required to institute 
and prosecute th][s action and have incurred costs and attorney fees. The Plaintiffs have 
employed the law firm of Clark and Feeney and have agreed to pay said firm a reasonable 
attorneys fee and are entitled to be reimbursed for said fees under the statutes and case law ofthe 
state ofIdaho, specifically Idaho Code 12-120(3), 12-121 and 12-123, as well as under the terms 
ofthe contract for purchase of the real property which is at issue in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and for judgment, order and decree of this cOUli 
against Defendants as follows: 
1. For imposition of a constructive trust; 
2. For an order restoring the real property to the Trust and quieting title to the real 
property in the name of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust; 
3. In the alternative, for an order awarding money damages for the difference between 
the atll0Wlt Defendants paid and the fair market value of the property at the time of trial. 
4. For pre and post judgment interest at the statutory rate until fully paid; 
5. For all costs of this action; 
6. For attorneys fees incurred by the plaintiffs in prosecuting this action under Idaho
 
Code 12-120, 12-121, 12-123;
 
7. For attomeys fees under the Earnest Money Offer and Acceptance contract dated July 
27,2002; 
8. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable. 
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DATED this/. day of January, 2006. 
BY~:::::::::1~ J....::::::=--/---'-.J../--b------­
Connie . Taylor, a member/At,-'tIfl'''/ 
Attomeys for Plaintiffs. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
COWlty of Nez Perce ) 
R. John Taylor, being first duly swom on oath, deposes and says: 
That I am one of the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing 
Amended Complaint, know the contents thereo , and believe the same to be true. 
R. John Ta or 
~llh 
SIJBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /:5 day of anuary, 2006. 
Notary Public' 1 and fQr the State ofIdaho 
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CERTlFICATE OF SERVICE 
. I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1'~ay ofMarch, 2006, I caused to be served a true 






































































































C?Imie W. Taylor 
OO'.zC5
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J Ll ,II U (';1 ""'1","1'1 I i:JU') 
J. D/WID NAV,L\nr-1<:). C-Imt. 
By INCAA .K)i·II\l2<~of'J 
rA-:Pt.n't 
IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
16 11---------. 
HEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE ) 






HOMAS MAILE IV, and COLLEEN ) 
20 
21 AILE, husband and wife, and ) 
ERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC., )22 ) 




26 UDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS 
ED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, )
 












HOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN )
 
AILE, husband and wife, THOMAS )
 
AILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, )
 








Case No. CV OC 0400473D 
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This cause came on before the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper for hearing on a Motion for 
ummary Judgment on the Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions 
flaw contained within this Court's May 15,2006 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
udgment on Beneficiaries' Claim, 
NOW,	 THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
ollows: 
1. The July 22, 2002 Earnest Money Agreement between The Theodore L. Johnson 
evocable Trust and defendants Thomas Maile IV and Colleen Maile for the purchast:: ofthe Linder 
oad property which is more fully described in paragraph 3 of this Judgment, and all subsequent 
ocuments relating to that transaction, are void as a matter of law. 
2.	 The title to the property commonly referred to as "the Linder Road property" and 
ore particularly described in Paragraph 3 of this Judgment shall be quieted to the Theodore L. 
ohnson Revocable Trust, in fee simple. 
3.	 The Linder Road property is more particularly described as follows: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, 
Range I West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho 
4.	 The Defendants' remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses, all ofwhich were 
ased on either equitable claims or the assertion that the Plaintiffs were wrongfully interfering with 
he Defendants' right to possess the Linder Road Property, are hereby dismissed. Specifically, those 
laims are as follows: 
A.	 Counterclaim I (tortious interference with contract between Defendants and 
their lending institution) 
B. Counterclaims VII and VIII (equitable estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel) 
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C.	 Counterclaim X (fraudulent transfer) 
D.	 Counterclaim XI (unjust enrichment) 
E.	 Affilmative defenses of Laches, Failure to Mitigate, and Uncllean Hands. 
5.	 The Plaintiff Be,neficiaries are the prevailing parties in this matter. 
DATED this to day of June, 2006. 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the l day of June, 2006, I caused to be served a true and 
OITect copy of the for1egoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
ollowing: 
Thomas Maile, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Connie W. Taylor 
Clark and Feeney 
PO Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Jack S. Gjording 
Gjording & Fouster 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, ID 83702 
Dennis M. Charney 
Attorney at Law 
951 E. Plaza Drive, Suite 140 
Eagle, ID 83616 
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MAR 25 ZOud 
J. DAVID NAVAHHO, Clerk 
13y M. STROMER 
DEPUTY 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs, THOMAS G. MAILE & COLLEEN MAILE, husband and 
wife, and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, an Idaho limited liability company, by and through their 





attorney, Thomas G. Maile, IV, and for their complaint and for a cause ofaction against Defendants, 
complains and alleges as foHows: 
COMMON ALLEGAnONS TO ALL COUNTS 
1.	 THOMAS G. MAILE and COLLEEN MAILE, are husband and wife and reside in the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho; BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, L.L.C. is an Idaho limited 
liability company, lawfully transacting business in the State ofIdaho; that Clark and Feeney, 
is an Idaho partnership; PAUL T. CLARK is an individual; that the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust, is a revocable trust which at all relevant times owned certain real property 
in the County of Ada, in the State ofIdaho and/or claims an interest in real prop<:::rty that is 
the subject of these proceedings (hereinafter referred to as the "trust"); that Dallan Taylor, 
R. John Taylor and Reed Taylor were at one time beneficiaries of the trust and thereafter 
disclaimed their interests in trust and became court appointed trustees of the trust; that 
defendant R. JOHN TAYLOR is an individual, who resides in the County of Nez Perce, 
State of Idaho; that defendant DALLAN T AYLOR is an individual, who resides in the 
County of Ada, State of Idaho; 
2.	 That the defendants, Clark and Feeney, Paul T. Clark and Connie Taylor, were at an relevant 
times licensed Idaho attorneys and/or were conducting business in the State ofIdaho and at 
all times was agent ofthe co-defendants, the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and/or 
the agents of Reed Taylor, defendant Dallan Taylor and defendant R. John Taylor, and all 
acts of said attorneys hereinafter complained of, were committed in their individual 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 2 
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capacities and in addition are imputed against the co-defendants, Theodore L Johnson 
Revocable Trust, and/or the defendant, Dallan Taylor, under the doctrine of "Respondent 
Superior" and/or age:ncy, and all said defendants are individually responsible for said actions 
complained of and/or are the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the damages to 
the plaintiffs. That defendant attorney Connie Taylor at all relevant times was an employee 
and/or agent ofthe co-defendant Clark and Feeney, and co-counsel Paul T. Clark and all acts 
of defendant Connie Taylor hereinafter complained of, are imputed against the co­
defendants, Paul T. Clark and/or Clark & Feeney under the doctrine of "RI~spondent 
Superior" and/or agency, and said defendants are individually responsible for said actions 
complained ofand/or all the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the damages to the 
plaintiffs and leave of court is requested to amend this complaint once the legal capacities 
of all defendants are determined. All acts complained of herein occurred in the State of 
Idaho and, specifically, within the County ofAda, where the subject real property is located. 
3.	 Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and Theodore Johnson, as trustee ofthe Theodore Johnson 
Revocable Trust (hereinafter referred to as the trust), entered into a certain real estate 
contract, and a subsequent assignment was entered into wherein Berkshire Investments, 
L.L.C., acquired certain real property owned by the trust and the Theodore: Johnson 
Revocable Trust, was to receive payment from the sale of the property. 
4.	 Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and Berkshire Investments, L.L.C., and Theodore L. 
Johnson, as Trustee" Beth Rogers and Andy Rogers, as Co-Trustees, of the Theodore L. 
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Johnson Revocable Trust, (hereinafter referred to at times collectively as "trust"), entered 
into a certain real estate contract, and subsequent assignment, wherein Berkshire Investment 
was to receive certain real property and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, was to 
convey title and was: to receive payment from the sale of the subject property. 
5.	 At all relevant times herein, the individual defendants, and/or the trustee and/or the trustees, 
ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust knew and/or had imputed knowledge from the 
"Trust" and/or the prior trustees ofthe "Trust" that the plaintiffs intended to purchase the real 
property for the purposes ofestablishing a home-site for Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, 
and further knew that the plaintiffs intended to develop the real property consistent with Ada 
County zoning law and other regulatory rules and laws for the creation ofa subdivision. That 
all such facts were known to the "trust" prior to closing the real estate transaction. 
6.	 The individual Taylors, and thereafter acting as alleged successor trustees ofthe trust, and/or 
acting as appointed trustees, by and through its co-trustees, and/or by and through the 
individual defendants and/or by and through the co-defendant attorneys undertook a course 
of action to interfere with and an attempt to interfere with the plaintiffs' peaceful and quiet 
enjoyment of the subject property and/or attempt to cause a breach of contract between the 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lending institution and/or tortiuously interfere with the plaintiffs' 
prospective business advantages relating to the subject real property. 
7.	 The Defendants, were informed that the plaintiffs would be re-financing the loans on the 
subject real property and would pay the balance of the deed of trust due and owing to the 








            







"trust" and further knew that the plaintiffs were planning on subdividing the subject real 
property for a business advantage and profit. The plaintiffs infonned the co-trustees of the 
Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust, that the plaintiffs would be re-financing, unless the 
Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust would like to maintain the loan and release lots in the 
seven (7) lot subdivision as sales developed. That in order to obtain lot releases in the 
proposed subdivision, the defendants knew and/or with reasonable diligence should have 
known, that the plaintiffs would enter into a commercial loan with another lender, for the 
purposes offulfilling the plaintiffs' obligation with the "trust" and would be acquiJing anew 
commercial loan to continue to develop a subdivision on the subject real property. 
8.	 The plaintiffs incum~d expenses and costs associated with securing financing on the subject 
real property to pay off the obligation to the trust, on or about January 4,2004. The loan 
required plaintiffs to avoid the placement of any liens or encumbrances on the subject real 
property, to convey clear title to potential purchasers, to construct and finalize the 
subdivision within six (6) months, and such facts were made known to all defendants via a 
public recorded deed of trust on the subject real property and as a result of the filing of the 
complaints filed by the defendants and allowing the recording of two (2) "Lis Pendens" to 
be filed in the cases initiated by the defendants, the plaintiffs were unable to proceed with 
the improvement of the subject property and were forced to re-finance plaintiffs' real 
properties and/or incur additional credit increasing the costs associated with the development 
ofthe subject real property all a result to avoid the default under the tenns and conditions of 
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the real estate commercial loan. 
9.	 The Defendants, and/or its agent, and/or its co-trustees, and acting in concert and conspiring 
with each other, maliciously and intentionally undertook a course of action in thE: filing the 
two actions consolidated in the district court action and/or the filing of the complaints and 
the "Lis Pendens" in both the two cases, and/or pursued a course ofaction hereinafter alleged 
in providing false verifications to the courts, that were calculated and detennined to 
adversely affect the interests of the plaintiffs in the prior the litigation and to tortiuously 
interfere with the contract between the plaintiffs' and the new commercial lender, and/or the 
plaintiffs' right to quiet and peaceful enjoyment ofthe subject real property and/or amounted 
to conduct that tortiuously interfered with the plaintiffs' prospective business advantages 
relating to the subject real property. 
10.	 That litigation was filed by the individual Taylors and defendant Dallan Taylor and the 
litigation was filed by the co-defendant attorneys in January 2004. Subsequently, the 
individual Taylors by and through defendant Connie Taylor, while the first litigation was 
dismissed by the district court and while the first suit was pending on appeal, and while the 
plaintiffs undertook the required construction of the subdivision, the individual Taylors, 
Beth and Andy Rogers as successor trustees, and the beneficiaries of the trust entered into 
a global "Disclaimer., Release & Indemnification Agreement" in July 2004. Under the terms 
of the Agreement the Taylors released the trustees Beth and Andy Rogers from all liability 
relating to the administration of the trust. The Agreement further provided that the Taylors 












would be appointed as successor trustees. The Taylors did not obtain court approval oftheir 
alleged appointment as successor trustees. The trust, by and through its alleged successor 
trustees, and the co-defendant attorneys and the Taylors filed litigation on July 19th, 2004 
on behalf of the trust against the plaintiffs. 
11.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about July 19th, 2004, improperly filed a 
complaint and demand for jury trial on behalfofthe trust. The complaint verified under oath 
by R. John Taylor and executed by Connie Wright Taylor, set forth that the Taylors were 
successor trustees ofthe trust. That defendants knew that they had failed to obtain failed to 
obtain court approval as specifically required under 1.C. 68-101 & 68-107. The trust, by and 
through its alleged successor trustees, and acting in unison and collectively with and for the 
benefit ofthe other defendants falsely stated in their complaint, that the Taylors were trustees 
of the Theodore Johnson Trust. That such action by co-defendants was false and known to 
be false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor and R. John Taylor and which caused damage 
to plaintiffs' property, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of their position as public 
servants by engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by failing or 
refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the 
same resulted in damages to the plaintiffs. 
12.	 Thereafter, On October 20, 2004, the plaintiffs filed their motion to dismiss complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial relating to the "trust's" complaint. That one of the issues raised by 
the plaintiffs, in their motion to dismiss was the issue ofthe legitimacy ofthe complaint filed 




          









by the "trust" since the alleged successor trustees, (the individual Taylors) had not received 
the required Court appointment making them successor trustees, pursuant to I.C. 68-101 & 
I.C. 68-107. That the defendants initially denied any court appointment was necessary for 
their appointment as successor trustees. Then, after receiving the plaintiffs' Motion to 
Dismiss, the Taylors, by and through the co-defendant attorneys obtained an ex-parte order 
from the probate order on November 17, 2004, appointing them as successor trustees, 
retroactively to June 10, 2004. 
13.	 The defendant Dallan Taylor and the other Taylors, by and through the co-defendant 
attorneys filed their verified petition in the probate court on November 12,2004, requesting 
the probate court to appoint the Taylors as trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust. The petition was executed by defendant R. John Taylor, a licensed Idaho attorney as 
a verification of the facts contained in the petition and was signed by an attorney ofrecord, 
his wife, defendant Connie Taylor. The petition excluding the attachment thereto is annexed 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and is made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. Page 2 of the 
verified petition states under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the 
sole remaining bene:ficiary of this trust by virtue of the tenns of a Disclaimer, Release and 
Indemnity Agreement." That the individual Taylor defendants had renounced and 
disclaimed their interests in the trust and were no longer residual beneficiaries of the trust 
effective in July 2004. 
14.	 On February 28, 2005, the plaintiffs filed appropriate pleadings before the probate court 









requesting that the ex-parte Order dated November 17, 2004 be set aside. In the probate 
court proceeding, the parties provided extensivebriefing regarding the ex-parte order entered 
on November 17,2004. On April 18,2005, the probate court, through the Honorable Judge 
Christopher M. Bieter, entered its Order declaring the ex-parte Order entered on November 
17, 2004 void. On May 2, 2005, the Honorable Judge Christopher M. Bieter, entered an 
Order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed J. Taylor and Dallan J. Taylor as successor trustees 
ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. That at the hearing on May 2,2005, before the 
Honorable Judge Christopher M. Bieter, the Defendant R. John Taylor was placed under oath 
and provided testimony in that Court proceeding that Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary 
of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. That in addition thereto defendant Paul T. 
Clark, a licensed Idaho attorney made statements to the probate court during the May 2, 2005 
hearing that Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust. 
15.	 That in December 2005 the Idaho Supreme Court entered its decision in the case captioned 
Taylor V.s Maile, and provided a ruling that stated under the allegations set forth in the 
individual Taylors' complaint filed in January 2004, sufficient inferences could he afforded 
the Taylors to allow the individual Taylors as beneficiaries to pursue claims against the 
plaintiffs. 
16.	 That on January 13, 2006, defendant R. John Taylor, acting on behalf of all defendants, as 
a licensed Idaho attorney (an officer ofthe court, who used or abused his position as a public 
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servant by engaging in conduct within or related to his official duties) and by and through 
his wife, defendant Connie Taylor, a licensed Idaho attorney (an officer of the court, who 
used or abused her position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to 
his official duties), who was acting on behalf of the co-defendant attorneys executed a 
proposed amended complaint after the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. On March 9, 2006, 
the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, and by and through the co­
defendant attorneys. Page I of the Verified Amended Complaint states under oath, "Reed 
and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a resident of 
Ada County Idaho. All ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe Theodore 1.. Johnson 
Trust." That said verified amended complaint is annexed hereto as Exhibit "B" and is made 
a part hereofas ifset forth in full herein. That Exhibit B" was executed by defendant R. John 
Taylor, under oath and as a verified complaint, who was acting on behalf of all defendants, 
and was executed by him while he was a licensed Idaho attorney (an officer ofthe court, who 
used or abused his position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to 
his official duties) and by and through his wife, defendant Connie Taylor, a licensed Idaho 
attorney (an officer of the court, who used or abused her position as a public servant by 
engaging in conduct within or related to his official duties), who was acting on behalfofthe 
co-defendant attorn(~ys executed a proposed amended complaint after the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision. 
17. That such statements contained in the verified amended complaint contained in exhibit "B" 
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were false, intentionally and/or willfully undertaken to constitute false pretenses, that were 
contrary to the known facts previously set forth in verified pleadings and/or were contrary 
to the testimony ofdefendant R. John Taylor made under oath in the probate proct:edings on 
May 2,2005 and/or were false as represented by Paul T. Clark during the hearing before the 
probate court on May 2,2005 and/or were false as represented by Paul T. Clark before the 
Idaho Supreme Court during oral argument to the Court and/or in briefing before the Idaho 
Supreme Court to the true facts, and/or intentionally deceitful. The verified amended 
complaint executed under oath on January 13, 2006, by defendant R. John Taylor and filed 
on March 9, 2006, and signed by the co-defendant attorneys was an attempt to take improper 
advantage of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Taylor I. The district court entered 
"Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim" on June 7, 2006, which was entered by the district court 
pursuant to the misn:presentation ofthe Taylors as to their status as beneficiaries in January 
2006 and their attorneys of record, co-defendant attorneys. 
18.	 That a sole and direct result of the filing of the verified amended complaint the Honorable 
Ronald Wilper entered the court's Judgment on June 7,2006. That a true and correct copy 
ofthe Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim is annexed hereto as Exhibit "C" and is made a part 
hereof as if set forth in full herein. That pursuant to the Judgment the plaintiff Berkshire 
Investment was deprived ofits real property and a constructive trust should be imposed upon 
the subject real property that is described in Exhibit "c" and the other plaintiffs were denied 
their improvements made on the subject real property. 




             
    
   
             





19.	 That the co-defendant attorneys had entered into a fee agreement with the Taylors and co­
defendant Dallan Taylor which was initially based upon a hourly rate and thereafter became 
a contingent fee agrt~ement, wherein the co-defendant attorneys would receive a percentage 
of the judgment ente:red against the plaintiffs. That based upon such agreement bt~tween the 
party defendants it was in their collective best interests to increase the judgment to include 
a declaration from the court that the plaintiffs lost all rights and title to real property, 
including all their improvements on the real property. 
20.	 That all said defendants actively and collectively and for the benefit of each other and 
obtained the judgmt:::nt set forth in Exhibit "C" by wrongfully obtaining the title to the real 
property which was the subject ofthe contract and the conveyance between the plaintiffs and 
trust. The action and the wrongful conduct on the part of the defendants and/or the 
defendants' agents, demonstrated an intentional course of action to seek to increase profits 
and/or income to thl~ defendants and/or to obtain the title to the real property based upon 
wrongful motives and design, including but not limited to the following: (a.) wrongfully 
pursuing a course of conduct between the beneficiaries and/or the residual beneficiaries of 
the Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust, to cause the filing of the actions and filing ofthe 
"Lis Pendens" abovle alleged; (b) undertaking a course of action to cause a breach by the 
plaintiffs with the commercial lender on the subject real property, for personal gain and/or 
benefit of the defendants, their agents and/or their principals and/or co-trustees, and/or the 
trust's sole beneficiary, and/or the individual defendants; (c) wrongfully conspiring to 
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circumvent the plaintiffs' rights to future profits and share in the future gains associated with 
the real property in which Theodore Johnson 1. Revocable Trust previously had an interest; 
(d) using their position as co-trustees, and/or prior residual beneficiaries and/or assignees of 
other beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust to promote profiting at the 
expense of the plaintiffs; (e) misrepresenting the nature of the individual Taylors' status as 
beneficiaries, befon~ the district court in January 2006, when the individual Taylors had 
disclaimed and/or renounced their interests in the trust by the settlement agreement in July 
2004 and/or further by the judicial admissions contained in Exhibit "A", which caused a 
judgment to entered against the plaintiffs causing the plaintiffs to lose the real property, and 
all benefits associat<;~d thereto, and all improvements made on the real property. 
21.	 That the actions ofthe defendants in misrepresenting the status ofthe their beneficiary status 
in January 2006 amounted to misrepresentations made by the defendants. The defendants 
by verified pleadings represented to the district court that the individual Taylors were 
beneficiaries of the trust and had a legitimate interest in the litigation in January 2006 as 
beneficiaries. That such statements were made to the district court by defendants as 
inducement for the court to enter its judgment contained in Exhibit "C". That the defendants 
having previously judicially admitted in prior verified pleadings that the individual Taylors 
were no longer bem~ficiaries of trust as Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary of trust. 
Defendant attorney Connie Taylor signed pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 11, that the individual 
Taylors had no interest in the trust as of July 2004 (exhibit "A"). Such facts were well 
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known by the defendants at the time ofthe misrepresentations and/or verification ofpleading 
in January 2006. That the defendants' statement that the individual Taylor defendants had 
a beneficial interest in the trust in January 2006 was false and was known to be false and was 
intended by the defendants to be acted upon by the court, which the court did rely upon and 
the court so acted according to such statements; that the court was relying upon the 
verification of the pleadings of the defendants' misrepresentation when made by the 
defendants; such statement was made to induce the court to enter its judgment referenced 
above and were intentionally made by defendants for the purpose to have the court act by 
executing the judgment in which it ultimately did above referenced. That said statement was 
false and was made by defendants intentionally to deceive the court and/or was made in a 
reckless manner and careless manner, and the defendants knew and/or should have known 
the statement was false and/or knew and/or should have known that court would act thereon 
and further knew the court in reliance of such statements did not know the true status ofthe 
individual Taylors' tJrue status with the trust. That such staten1ent was a ll1aterial inducell1ent 
to the court's execution ofthe judgment above referenced. The defendants intended that the 
court act in executing the judgment based upon such false assurances which were rleasonably 
calculated by the defendants that the court would rely upon such assurances and execute the 
ultimate judgment. That the defendants knew and/or in the exercise should have known, the 
court would so act and further knew and/or should have known the court would be ignorant 
of the truth, that the individual Taylors did not have a legitimate interest in the tmst and/or 








            
 
the corpus of the trust in January 2006. The court relied upon the truthfulm~ss of the 
defendants' statements and such reliance was reasonable. That the court had a right to reply 
upon such statements as the same constituted verified facts and were executed pursuant to 
I..R.C.P. Rulel1. That such action amount to fraud by the defendants to wit (1) a 
representation of fact: that the defendant affirmatively stated they had a legitimate interest 
as beneficiaries ofthe trust; (2) Its falsity: that the defendants and the co-defendant attorneys 
had previously filed verified pleadings before a probate court which were contrary to the 
verified pleading in January 2006; (3) Its materiality: The court relied upon the 
representations that the individual Taylors were legitimately beneficiaries and were real 
parties in interests in the trust and/or its corpus and that is was a proximate cause for the 
district court to award the real property to the trust in light of the district court's prior 
decision that the trust had waived and/or was estopped to seek recision of the real estate 
contract between the plaintiffs and the trust; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its faJsity: the 
defendants knew at the time of executing the verified pleadings the individual Taylors did 
not have any intere:st in the trust and/or its corpus; (5) The speaker's intent that the 
representation will be acted upon in a reasonably contemplated manner: the defendants 
intended that the court would act upon such statement and execute the ultimate judgment as 
presented by defendants to the district court prepared by the defendant attorneys which the 
court ultimately in fact did; (6) the listener's ignorance of its falsity; The court had no 
information or knowledge which would have contradicted the defendants based upon the 
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verified pleadings of January 2006; (7) the listener's reliance on the truth of the 
representation; the court was relying upon such verified statements by the defendants in 
ultimately executing the judgments as requested; (8) the listener's right to rely on the truth 
of the representation: the court relied upon the statement by defendants pursuant to Rule 11 
of the I..R.C.P. and by the verification of facts by the defendants; and (9) Tht:: listener's 
consequent and proximate injury: That as a result of the defendants not providing the true 
status oftheir interest in the trust and/or its corpus the plaintiffs herein sustained the loss of 
their real property and their improvements thereto. That the Plaintiffs have sustained 
damages as a result ofsuch statement. That the plaintiffs lack an adequate remedy at law and 
equity requires that the judgment procured by the defendants be declared null and void and/or 
voidable and the real property subject thereto be restored to the plaintiff Berkshire 
Investments. 
22.	 That the co-defendants' actions in entering into a Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity 
Agreement with the: trustees and beneficiaries of the trust in June 2004, and thereafter 
misrepresenting the Taylors' status as beneficiaries in continued court proceedings before 
the district court, the Idaho Supreme Court, by their pleadings, arguments, and briefing 
constituted improper continuous activity from June 2004 to the present. That the defendants 
on October 15, 2004, acting in unison and collectively stated in their Appellants' Briefin the 
Idaho Supreme Court case number 30817, "The Taylors are beneficiaries of the Theodore 
Johnson Trust.. ..". That such action together with other action taken before the courts, 





              







together the execution of Exhibit "B" annexed hereto amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 
violation and in addition amounted to a violation under LA.R. Rule 11.1., based upon the 
defendants' inconsistent judicial admissions before the probate court. That such actions on 
the part ofR. John Taylor and the co-defendant attorneys were in violation oflaw including 
but mot limited to, defendants engaged in multiple instances ofperjury and false pretenses 
in violation ofIdaho Code Sections 18-2401, 18-2403, 18-2407(1 )(a)(2)(3)(b)(1), 18-7803, 
18-5401, 18-5410, 18-5406, 18-5408, (perjury) and Idaho Code Sections 18-3401 18-2403, 
18-2407(1 )(a)(2)(3)(b)(1), and Section 19-2116 (obtaining property by false pretense) and 
that such action constituted an enterprise, to wit: a group of individuals associated in fact 
planning in unison to deprive Berkshire Investment of the real property and such action 
constitutes an agreement either explicit or implied to engage in the predicate acts above 
described and the co-defendants shared a common purpose to engage in the predicate act in 
an effort to wrongfully obtain real property subject to these proceedings and/or has obtained 
money, personal property, or valuable thing from the plaintiffs herein. That the enterprise 
consists of the law firm of Clark & Feeney and all named co-defendant attorneys who are 
within the law firm and/or the enterprise further consists of all named defendants acting by 
and through their contract and business relationship to acquire the title to the real property 
and/or obtaining damages from the plaintiffs. That such enterprise constitutes an entity, for 
the purpose to allow the group of co-defendants to become associated together for a 
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct above described which is sufficient to 






satisfY the requireffil~nts of Idaho Code § 18-7804(c). 
23.	 . The acts of the defendants, and/or their agents, and/or their principals, and/or the trust' co­
trustees, having devised such scheme, motive or artifice to cause a default and f()reclosure 
ofthe contract betw(~en the plaintiffs and the new commercial lender and/or the interference 
with the prospective economic advantages of the plaintiffs, and/or misrepresenting the 
material facts above alleged, causing the real property to be re-conveyed to the tl1lst, knew 
would cause irreparable damage to the plaintiffs and unjust enrichment to the deft:ndants, to 
wit: in addition to having caused the plaintiffs to lose their equity in the subject property, the 
plaintiffs were damaged with other costs and fees associated with the development ofthe real 
property, and other costs and interest expenses associated with paying off the new 
commercial lender, and causing delays in the sale of certain lots thereby increasing the 
damages of the plaintiffs for increased interest, loss of profits from delays, loss of capital 
investments on the subject real property, loss ofinterest on invested capital, increased taxes, 
increased assessment, unpaid taxes and penalties, loss ofprofits from the real property, and 
the ultimate profits from the sale of subject real property, while the defendants sought to 
unjustly benefit from the plaintiffs' labor and efforts. 
24.	 That with the execution ofthe real estate contract, and after the purchase ofthe real property 
by the plaintiff Berkshire Investment, the plaintiffs made down payment and ultimate full 
payment on the purchase price, including costs, taxes, interest payments. That the plaintiffs 
provided materials, services, improvements affecting the real property which was undertaken 
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by the plaintiffs during periods of time wherein, the legal title remained in Berkshire 
Investments and the defendants knew ofsuch improvements and payments and allowed the 
plaintiffs to proceed with the full payment and improvements on the real property. That said 
services, and improvements enhanced the value ofthe real property and the defendants took 
such payments, and improvements for their benefit. That the defendants further knew that 
the plaintiffs had incurred a new commercial lender which required that the improvements 
be completed within 6 months ofthe new debt and further knew and/or should have known 
that purchase ofthe real property and the improvements thereon would result in an economic 
advantage to the plaintiffs. 
25.	 That plaintiffs, as a sole, direct and proximate result of the action above alleged, have 
sustained damages and will sustain damages in the following manner: (a) the loss of the 
subject real property in which plaintiffs were obligated to pay the new commercial lender for 
and/or preventing the plaintiffs from continued marketing of the property which has now 
been clouded by th(: defendants' judgment (Exhibit "e") and the prior Lis Pendents, all 
perpetrated by the d~:fendants collectively and/or their agents' actions; the plaintiffs' loss of 
equity in the real property thereon and further incurring additional expenses above set forth 
including but not limited to increased interest costs on capital and re-financing debt, loss of 
profits and loss of interest and/or profits on capital contributions to development, incurring 
additional appraisal fees and points associated with new mortgages, costs and attorneys fees 
incurred; (b) the plaintiffs' loss ofopportunity to obtain revenues and profits associated with 




         






the real property and loss income associated with lot sales; (c) the plaintiffs' expenses 
incurred and/or paid to date for engineering, architectural fees, interest expense, loan fees, 
fees and costs associated with various governmental agencies, professional services, 
materials purchased for the construction to date on the property, services and labor paid to 
date on the subject real property, assessment fees, taxes, penalties for unpaid taxies, cost of 
interest paid to the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and other institutions and entities; 
increased continued costs ofinterest, taxes, assessments, the cost ofappraisals, loan fees and 
costs, closing fees for refinancing, title reports, closing fees, attorneys fees etc.; (d) the 
plaintiffs' loss ofthl~ opportunity to retain portions ofthe subject to allow the plaintiffs to 
build their homes on the subject property and to the enjoy the peace and enjoyment of the 
subject real property; (e.) the plaintiffs' incurring costs and attorneys fees to defend against 
the defendants' complaints and the accompanying "Lis Pendens" in the two cases, including 
the appeal costs including attorneys fees and costs all as a proximate result of the filing of 
the litigation and obtaining the judgment set forth in Exhibit "e" by the defendants, and/or 
their agents, and the costs and attorney fees to quiet title to the subject real propeliy; (f) the 
plaintiffs' loss of income and/or profits associated with the time taken for the development 
ofthe property and the loss ofopportunity to obtain revenues and profits associated with the 
real property from the date of the subdivision finalization to the current date, including 
interest on the gains thereof; (g) the plaintiffs' payments to the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust for the purchase price paid, and the interest paid pursuant to the promissory 
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note and deed oftrust that the defendants have wrongfully obtained title too, in an amount, 
based upon information and belief, in the amount of $465,000.00, or such greater sums as 
established, and leave of court is requested to amend said amount as the actual amount is 
made known; (I) the plaintiffs' improvements on the real property relating to development, 
construction costs, and other services all ofwhich has increased the value ofthe real property 
in amount, greater than the purchase price paid, and leave ofcourt is requested to amend said 
amount as the actual amount is made known: (k) for the appreciation in the real property and 
the value of the real property at the time the real property was wrongfully taken by the 
defendants' actions and the profits thereto associated with the potential sales of said real 
property, and leave ofcourt is requested to amend said amount as the actual amount is made 
known. 
26.	 That all defendants, acted with oppressive, fraudulent, wanton, malicious or outrageous 
conduct as alleged above. That defendants acted in a manner that was"an extreme deviation 
from reasonable standards ofconduct, and that the act was perfonned by the defendants with 
an understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences" and that the defendants acted 
with an extremely harmful state ofmind, whether that be termed "malice, oppression, fraud 
or gross negligence", "malice, oppression, wantonness;" or simply "deliberate and willfu1." 
That defendants well knew that the above conduct would be oppressive as to the plaintiffs 
and others. 
27.	 As a result of the aforementioned, plaintiffs have sustained such losses and have been 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 21
 
000080
    
            
 
 
            
            




damaged in a principal sum which exceeds the jurisdictiona11imits of the District Court, 
together with interest at the rate oftwelve (12) percent per annum from the date ofloss to the 
date of Judgment, as set forth herein. 
28.	 Plaintiffs have been forced to retain the professiona11ega1 services, to prosecute this claim 
and are entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred pursuant to Idaho Code, 
Sections 12-120, 12-213, and 12-121, of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and further 
pursuant to Rule 11 of the LR.C.P., and further pursuant to the real estate contract between 
the plaintiffs and the trust. That the sum of $12,500.00 is a reasonable sum if this matter is 
uncontested, and a greater sum if contested. 
COUNT ONE 
QUIET TITLE 
29.	 Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all paragraphs of Common Allegations above 
reference of the Complaint herein as if set forth in full herein. 
30.	 That the defendants have obtained the title to the subject real property from the plaintiff 
Berkshire Investments by committing fraud upon the court and/or fraud and/or presented 
claims which were moot in the proceedings above described and/or lacked standing in said 
proceedings. That each and every defendant above named may claim an interest in the real 
property above described. 
31.	 The plaintiffs have lIlO adequate remedy at law, and no remedy to strike from the public 
records the Judgment contained in exhibit "C" and the equitable powers ofthe Court should 
be employed to strike said public record which is annexed hereto as Exhibit "C" and made 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 22 
000081
l l







           
a part hereof as if se:t forth in full herein. 
32.	 That an Order should be entered by this Court striking Exhibit "c" from the public records 
and declaring it has no affect as to Plaintiff Berkshire Investment's right to the subject real 
property. 
33.	 That an Order should be entered declaring the respective rights and liabilities ofthe parties 





34.	 That plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all paragraphs numbered 1 through 31 
contained in this complaint as if set forth in full herein. 
35.	 That defendant Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, continues to hold legal title to the 
subject property and has further conspired with the co-defendants in violation of the 
plaintiffs' rights and interests, and it is anticipated that said defendants may cause the 
property to be sold and/or other develop the property and increase their profits and income 
at the expense of the: plaintiffs. That the plaintiffs are unprotected with out the bl~nefit of a 
"constructive trust". 
36.	 That a constructive bust should be imposed upon defendant Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust and/or all co-defendants who claim an interest thereto, and the real property subject 
to exhibit "c" and the other co-defendants pending a final resolution ofthe current litigation. 
COUNT THREE 
TORTIUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 









         
37.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Two as ifset forth 
in full herein. 
38.	 That defendants set upon a course of conduct and intentionally interfered with plaintiffs' 
contract with the new lender on the subject real property. 
39.	 As a result of the aforementioned, plaintiffs have sustained such losses and have been 
damaged in a principal sum which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the Disttict Court, 
together with interest at the rate oftwelve (12) percent per annum from the date ofloss to the 
date ofJudgment, as set forth, and leave ofcourt is requested to amend said complaint as the 
actual amount is made known. 
COUNT FOUR 




40.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Three as if set 
forth in full herein. 
41.	 That defendants set upon a course ofconduct and intentionally interfered with a prospective 
economic advantage ofthe plaintiffs to secure profits and income relating to the real property 
titled by plaintiff Berkshire Investments. 
42.	 That defendants intentionally and/or with reckless, wanton, disregard to plaintiffs.' rights to 
the real property interfered with the plaintiffs' rights to enjoy profits and benefits to the real 
property. 
43.	 That the defendants Imew or should have known ofthe existence ofthe plaintiffs' economic 
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expectancy related to the development of the subdivision of the subject real property and/or 
the ownership of the same. 
44.	 That the conduct on the part of the defendants were done in such a manner that amounts to 
intentionally interfering and/or were done in such a manner as to constitute reckless, wanton 
disregard to plaintiffs' rights and were done to induce termination ofthe plaintiffs' economic 
expectancy. 
45.	 That defendants are interfering for an improper purpose and/or for improper means. 
46.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT FIVE 
ABUSE OF PROCESS 
47.	 That the plaintiffs n~-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Four as ifset forth 
in full herein. 
48.	 That the actions of the defendants above alleged were done in a manner that constitutes an 
abuse ofprocess in the prior the litigation, misrepresenting material facts in January 2006 to 
achieve the judgment in the judicial process of the prior litigation which amounted to 
restoring the real property to the trust in which the alleged beneficiaries no longer had an 
interest in and/or too. 
49.	 That such actions above alleged were undertaken by the defendants with an ulterior, 
improper purpose to obtain a judgment which they were not entitled too and to cause the 
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court to quiet title in the trust in which the Taylors had no interest in and/or too. 
50.	 That such actions constitute a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular 
course of the proceeding. 
51.	 That said defendants used a legal process, in a civil matter, against the plaintiffs primarily 
to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed and the defendants are subject to 
liability to the plaintiffs for damages caused by the abuse of process. 
52.	 The "ulterior, improper purpose" included the above referenced allegations, including the 
following: The defendants from the time that they caused the two (2) complaints to be filed 
against the plaintiffs and continuing through the appellate process, and up to the present time 
and the date ofthe filing ofthis complaint, demonstrate the defendants engaged in a wrongful 
and abusive course of action with the sole purpose of delaying, stalling and subverting the 
Plaintiffs' defense and claims in the prior litigation and further fabricating the Taylors 
illegitimate status as beneficiaries which caused the district court to void the legal title held 
by Berkshire Investments and to gain collateral advantages in that proceeding that are not 
authorized by law. Defendants' course of action was not intended to advance the litigation, 
but rather, to delay and/or hinder the litigation and to obtain an improper result by their 
misrepresentation. 
53.	 The above facts constitute a malicious misuse and/or misapplication ofregularly issued civil 
process to accomplish purposes not permitted by the Idaho Rules of Civil Proc(ldure, any 
Idaho statute or any case law decided by the Idaho Appellate Courts. 
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54.	 This course of action included, but was not limited to, intentionally delaying the orderly 
administration ofjustice, intentionally and/or recklessly causing the judicial system to quiet 
title in real property owned by Berkshire Investment and causing a judgment to be recorded 
with the Ada County Recorder's Office which was based upon misrepresentations and 
presenting false and perjured testimony, presenting false and perjured verifications to the 
Court, which were not intended to advance the litigation, but rather, to delay and/or hinder 
the litigation and making sworn statements to the Court which were false and/or misleading. 
55.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT SIX 
NEGLIGENCE 
56.	 That the plaintiffs rt:-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Five as if set forth 
in full herein. 
57.	 That the defendants owed a duty to confonn to the standard of care applicable to litigation 
in the prior proceedings. That defendants, were negligent, careless, and reckless manner, to 
wit: (a) by failing to properly advise the district court of the Taylors' disclaimer of interests 
in the trust and/or illegitimate relationship to the trust as beneficiaries; (b) by advancing 
verified petitions and verified pleadings that were contrary to the true state of facts; (c) by 
causing injuries and damages to the plaintiffs. 
The actions of defendants resulted plaintiffs sustaining the above described damages. 
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58.	 That the actions of the defendants constitute a breach of the standard of care owed to the 
plaintiffs and the same amount to negligent acts, and in addition violated the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rules, 3.1, & 3.3, as a further breach of the standard of care. 
59.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT SEVEN 
NEGLIGENCE PER SE 
60.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Six as if set forth 
in full herein. 
61.	 That the defendants committed negligence per se, by the acts above referenced and by 
violating the following standards: I.R.C.P. Rule 11, Idaho Code 12-121, 12-123, I.C. 18­
5401, 18-5410, 18-5406, 18-5408, and 19-2116. 
62.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 





63.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Seven as if set 
forth in full herein. 
64.	 That the defendants actions above described amount to action that constitutes gross 


















65.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT NINE 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
66.	 That the Plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the paragraphs of Count Eight herein as if 
set forth in full herein. 
67.	 The conduct of Defmdants above-alleged constitutes a course of conduct to interfere with 
Plaintiffs rights and title to real property. Defendants, should be estopped from asserting 
rights inconsistent therewith and for not allowing the plaintiff Berkshire Investments clear 
title to the real property subject to these proceedings. 
68.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT TEN 
QUASI ESTOPPEL 
69.	 That the Plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the paragraphs of Count Nine herein as if 
set forth in full herein. 
70.	 The conduct ofDefendants, demonstrates they entered into a course ofconduct inconsistent 
with the intention of the commitments and legal rights between the plaintiff and trust. The 
defendants actions were undertaken to cause a breach between the plaintiffs and the trust, and 
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plaintiffs relied to their determent upon such assurances ofthe sanctity ofthe contractual and 
conditions, and tht: defendants should be estopped from asserting rights inconsistent 
therewith. 
71.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT ELEVEN
 
VIOLATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 18 TITLE 78 OF THE IDAHO CODE
 
72.	 That the Plaintiffs re-allege the allegations ofall the paragraphs ofCount Ten here:in as if set 
forth in full herein. 
73.	 The actions of Defendants above described constitute conduct in violation ofIdaho Code 
Chapter 18 Title 78 generally and specifically I.C. section 18-7803. 
74.	 The defendants Connie Wright Taylor's and R. John Taylor's actions above referenced 
violated the provisions of sections 18-5401 and 18-5410 of the Idaho Code. 
75.	 John Taylor and the co-defendant attorneys were in violation of law including but mot 
limited to, defendants engaged in multiple instances of perjury and false pretenses in 
violation ofIdaho Code Sections 18-2401, 18-2403, 18-2407(1 )(a)(2)(3)(b)(1), 18··7803, 18­
5401,18-5410, 18-5406, 18-5408, (perjury) and Idaho Code Sections 18-340118··2403, 18­
2407(1)(a)(2)(3)(b)(1), and Section 19-2116 (obtaining property by false pretense) and that 
such action constituted an enterprise, to wit: a group of individuals associated in fact 
planning in unison to deprive Berkshire Investment of the real property and such action 
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constitutes an agreement either explicit or implied to engage in the predicate acts above 
described and the co-defendants shared a common purpose to engage in the predicate act in 
an effort to wrongfully obtain real property subject to these proceedings and/or has obtained 
money, personal property, or valuable thing from the plaintiffs herein. That the enterprise 
consists of the law firm of Clark & Feeney and all named co-defendant attorneys who are 
within the law firm and/or the enterprise further consists of all named defendants. acting by 
and through their contract and business relationship to acquire the title to the real property 
and/or obtaining damages from the defendants. That such enterprise constitutes an entity, 
for the purpose to allow the group of co-defendants to become associated together for a 
common purpose ofengaging in a course ofconduct above described which is sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code § 18-7804(c) and is an "enterprise" within the 
meaning ofIdaho Code Section 18-7803(c). 
76.	 The Defendants, CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f!kla CONNIE TAYLOR, and PAUL T. 
CLARK, at all relevant times were employed by or associated with CLARK and FEENEY, 
a partnership and did conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the 
affairs of CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership through a pattern of racketeering activity 
within the meaning ofIdaho Code Section 18-7803(d). Specifically, the Defendants engaged 
in multiple instances of "theft", "false pretense", and "perjury"in violation ofIdaho Code 
Sections 18-2403. 
77.	 That Defendant, CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership, is a "person" within the meaning of 
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Idaho Code Section 18-7803(b); The defendants, CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla 
CONNIE TAYLOR, and DALLAN TAYLOR, and R. JOHN TAYLOR, and PAUL T. 
CLARK, are a "person" within the meaning of Idaho Code Section 18-7803(b); that 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust, is a "person" 
within the meaning of Idaho Code Section 18-7803(b). 
78.	 That Defendant, CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership, is an "enterprise" within the meaning 
ofIdaho Code Section 18-7803(c); that the defendants, CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla 
CONNIE TAYLOR, and DALLAN TAYLOR, and R. JOHN TAYLOR, and PAUL T. 
CLARK, compromise an "enterprise" within the meaning ofIdaho Code Section 18-7803©; 
that THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust, is an 
"enterprise" within the meaning of Idaho Code Section 18-7803(c). 
79.	 The Defendants, CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla CONNIE TAYLOR, and PAUL T. 
CLARK, at all relevant times were employed byor associated with CLARK and FEENEY, 
a partnership and did conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the 
affairs of CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership through a pattern of racketeering activity 
within the meaning ofIdaho Code Section 18-7803(d). Specifically, the Defendants engaged 
in multiple instances of "false pretense", "theft" and "peIjury" in violation of Idaho Code 
Sections 18-2403 and 19-2116. Idaho Code Sections 18-2401, 18-2403, 18­
2407(1)(a)(2)(3)(b)(1), 18-7803, 18-5401, 18-5410, 18-5406, 18-5408, I.C. 19-1430, 19­
1431 (peIjury) and Idaho Code Sections 18-3401 18-2403,18-2407(1)(a)(2)(3)0))(1), and 












Section 19-2116 (theft-obtaining property by false pretense). The pattern ofraeketeering 
activity was committed as follows: 




80.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on October 15, 2004, acting in unison and 
collectively with and for the benefit of the other defendants falsely executed and stated in 
their Appellants' Brief filed in the Idaho Supreme Court case number 30817, "The Taylors 
are beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson Trust.. ..". That such action together with other 
action taken before the courts, together the execution of Exhibit "B" annexed hereto 
amounted to an I.R.C.P., Rule 11 violation and in addition amounted to a violation under 
I.A.R. Rule 11.1., based upon the defendants' inconsistent judicial admissions before the 
probate court and sp1ecifically the facts signed under oath by R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A"& 
was specifically involved in the drafting and/or modification ofthe "Disclaimer, Release and 
Indemnity Agreement" above referenced and further knew that the beneficiaries were not the 
real parties in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no longer beneficiaries under 
the trust. That such actions on the part ofdefendant Connie Taylor was false and known to 
be false by defendant Connie Taylor and defendant committed the offense ofgrand theft and 
the offense offalse pretense. That such action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which 
caused damage to plaintiffs' property and/or was conduct by said defendant Connie Taylor 
and the other members within the enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of 






   
 
 
            
their position as public servants by engaging in conduct within or related to their official 
duties, and/or by failing or refusing to perfonn an official duty, in such manner as to affect 
the plaintiffs herein and the same resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss of property 





81.	 That the defendant Paul T. Clark on or about May 6, 2005, acting in unison and collectively 
with and for the benefit of the other defendants falsely stated in their oral argument before 
the Idaho Supreme Court case number 30817, that the Taylors are beneficiaries of the 
Theodore Johnson Trust. That such action together with other action taken before the courts, 
together the execution of Exhibit "B" annexed hereto amounted to an I.R.C.P" Rule II 
violation and in addition amounted to a violation under I.A.R. Rule 11.1., based upon the 
defendants' inconsistent judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the 
facts signed under oath by R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A". That such actions on the part of 
defendant Paul T. Clark was false and known to be false by defendant Paul T. Clark and 
defendant committed the offense ofgrand theft and the offense offalse pretense. That such 
action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property 
and/or was conduct by defendant Paul T. Clark and the other members within the (~nterprise, 
which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of their position as public servants by engaging 
in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to perfonn 









an official duty, in such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same resulted in 
damages to the plaintiffs by loss of property which was taken with a value which exceeds 





82.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about January 13, 2006, acting in unison and 
collectively with and for the benefit of the other defendants falsely executed and stated in 
the proposed amendled verified complaint, contained on page 1, executed by R. John Taylor 
under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan 
Taylor is a resident of Ada County Idaho. All of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of 
the Theodore L. Johnson Trust." That said verified amended complaint is annexed hereto 
as Exhibit "B" and is made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. That Exhibit B" was 
executed by defendant R. John Taylor, under oath and as a verified complaint, who was 
acting on behalfof all defendants. That such action together with other action taken before 
the courts, amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 violation, based upon the co-defendants' 
inconsistent judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the faets signed 
under oath by R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A" and further executed by defendant Connie 
Wright Taylor & was specifically involved in the drafting and/or modification of the 
"Disclaimer, Releas(~ and Indemnity Agreement" above referenced and further knEW that the 
beneficiaries were not the real parties in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no 
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longer beneficiaries under the trust. That such actions on the part of defendants Connie 
Taylor and defendant R. John Taylor were false and known to be false by defendants Connie 
Taylor & defendant R. John Taylor, and defendants committed the offense ofgrand theft, the 
offense of false pretense, and the offense of petjury. That in addition thereto defendant 
Connie Wright Taylor, acted as accessory to criminal action ofR. John Taylor, pursuant to 
I.C. 19-1430,19-1431, and such committed the offense and crime ofpetjury. That such 
action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property 
and/or was conduct by said defendant Connie Taylor and defendant R. John Taylor and the 
other members within the enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of their 
position as public servants by engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, 
and/or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect the 
plaintiffs herein and the same resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss ofproperty which 





83.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about February 2,2007 during oral argument 
before the Fourth Judicial District In and For the County ofAda, State of Idaho, stated that 
"I believe based upon the Supreme Court ruling that the beneficiaries are the real parties in 
interest under this contract. .." That said statement was made to the court after defendant 
Connie Wright Taylor had previously executed Exhibit "A" hereto & was specifically 
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involved in the drafting and/or modification of the "Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity 
Agreement" above referenced and further knew that the beneficiaries were not the real parties 
in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no longer beneficiaries under the trust. 
That defendant Connie Wright Taylor, acting in unison and collectively with and for the 
benefit of the other eo-defendants falsely represented the status of the beneficiari es and the 
real parties in interest and that such action together with other action taken before the courts, 
amounted to an I.R.C.P., Rule 11 violation, based upon the co-defendants' inconsistent 
judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the facts signed under oath by 
R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A" and further executed by defendant Connie Wright Taylor. That 
such actions on the part of defendants Connie Wright Taylor and the co-defendants were 
false and known to be false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor & and defendants committed 
the offense ofgrand theft, the offense offalse pretense. That such action amounted to a theft 
by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property and/or was conduct by said 
defendant Connie Taylor and the other members within the enterprise, which amounted to 
a misuse and/or abuse oftheir position as public servants by engaging in conduct within or 
related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in 
such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same resulted in damages to the 
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84.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on December 3, 2004, acting in unison and 
collectively with and for the benefit of the other defendants falsely executed and stated in 
their Appellants' Reply Brief filed in the Idaho Supreme Court case number 30817, "The 
Mailes are not entitled to attorneys fees under the contract because the Taylors are not parties 
to the contract and they are not acting as the Trust. The Taylors are acting as bem:ficiaries." 
That such assertions were known to be false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor. That such 
action together with other action taken before the courts, together the execution of Exhibit 
"B" annexed hereto amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 violation and in addition amounted to 
a violation under LA.R. Rule 11.1., and further based upon the defendants' inconsistent 
judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the facts signed under oath by 
R. John Taylor and executed by defendant Connie Wright Taylor, in Exhibit "A" & 
defendant Connie Wright Taylor was specifically involved in the drafting and/or 
modification of the "Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement" above referenced and 
further knew that th~: beneficiaries were not the real parties in interest and further knew that 
the Taylors were no longer beneficiaries under the trust. That such actions on the part of 
defendant Connie Taylor was false and known to be false by defendant Connie Taylor and 
defendant committed the offense ofgrand theft and the offense of false pretense. That such 
action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property 
and/or was conduct by said defendant Connie Taylor and the other members within the 







enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of their position as public servants by 
engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to 
perfonn an official duty, in such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same 
resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss ofproperty which was taken with a value which 





85.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about April 3, 2006 during oral argument 
before the Fourth Judicial District In and For the County of Ada, State of Idaho, stated that 
" ...what we are asking this court to do is find that this property needs to be titled in the names 
of these beneficiaries with appropriate protections that assure that they can't sell it out from 
under, that money will be set aside and be available". That said statement was made to the 
court after defendant Connie Wright Taylor had previously executed Exhibit "A" hereto & 
was specifically involved in the drafting and/or modification ofthe "Disclaimer, Release and 
Indemnity Agreement" above referenced and further knew that the beneficiaries were not the 
real parties in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no longer beneficiaries under 
the trust. That defendant Connie Wright Taylor, acting in unison and collectively with and 
for the benefit of the other co-defendants falsely represented the status of the beneficiaries 
and the real parties in interest and that such action together with other action taken before the 
courts, amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 violation, based upon the co-defendants' 












inconsistent judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the facts signed 
under oath by R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A" and further executed by defendant Connie 
Wright Taylor. That such actions on the part ofdefendants Connie Wright Taylor ,md the co­
defendants were false and known to be false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor & and 
defendants committed the offense of grand theft, the offense of false pretense. That such 
action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property 
and/or was conduct by said defendant Connie Taylor and the other members within the 
enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of their position as public servants by 
engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to 
perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same 
resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss ofproperty which was taken with a value which 





86.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about June 7, 2006 wrongfully submitted a 
form ofjudgment, captioned, " Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". That said pleading was 
prepared by defendant Connie Wright Taylor and submitted to the Fourth Judicial District 
In and For the County ofAda, State ofIdaho. That the judgment was entered and additional 
amended judgments and/or corrected judgments were submitted to the court by defendant 
Connie Wright Tayllor divesting Berkshire Investments' of its real property and further 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 40
 
000099







             
 
resulting injudgment to be entered against the plaintiffs based upon the beneficiaries' claims. 
That said judgment and the amendments thereto was made to the court after defendant 
Connie Wright Taylor had previously executed Exhibit "A" hereto & was specifically 
involved in the drafting and/or modification of the "Disclaimer, Release and lndemnity 
Agreement" above referenced and further knew that the beneficiaries were not the real parties 
in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no longer beneficiaries under the trust. 
That defendant Connie Wright Taylor, acting in unison and collectively with and for the 
benefit ofthe other co-defendants falsely represented the status ofthe beneficiaries and the 
real parties in interest and that such action together with other action taken before 1the courts, 
amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 violation, based upon the co-defendants' inconsistent 
judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the facts signed under oath by 
R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A" and further executed by defendant Connie Wright Taylor. That 
such actions on the part of defendants Connie Wright Taylor and the co-defendants were 
false and known to he false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor & and defendants committed 
the offense ofgrand theft, the offense offalse pretense. That such action amounted to a theft 
by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property and/or was conduct by said 
defendant Connie Taylor and the other members within the enterprise, which amounted to 
a misuse and/or abuse oftheir position as public servants by engaging in conduct within or 
related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to perfonn an official duty, in 
such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same resulted in damages to the 









plaintiffs by loss of property which was taken with a value which exceeds One Thousand 
Dollars ($1,000.00). 
Predicate Offense No.8 
FALSE PRETENSE-THEFT 
87.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about June 15, 2006 wrongfully submitted 
a Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs, based upon the judgment, captioned, " 
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". That thereafter defendant Connie Wright Taylor on 
or about June 30, 2006 wrongfully submitted an Amended Memorandum ofAttorneys Fees 
and Costs, based upon the judgment, captioned, " Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". That 
said pleading was prepared by defendant Connie Wright Taylor and submitted to the Fourth 
Judicial District In and For the County ofAda, State ofIdaho. That the pleadings submitted 
resulted in an additional amended judgment which was submitted to the court by defendant 
Connie Wright Taylor resulting in judgment to be entered against the plaintiffs based upon 
the beneficiaries' claims for a certain sum ofmoney. That said amended judgment awarding 
costs entered by the court after defendant Connie Wright Taylor had previously executed 
Exhibit "A" hereto & was specifically involved in the drafting and/or modification of the 
"Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement" above referenced and further km:w that the 
beneficiaries were not the real parties in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no 
longer beneficiaries under the trust. That defendant Connie Wright Taylor, acting in unison 
and collectively with and for the benefit of the other co-defendants falsely represented the 
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status of the beneficiaries and the real parties in interest and that such action together with 
other action taken b(~fore the courts, amounted to an I.R.C.P., Rule 11 violation, based upon 
the co-defendants' inconsistent judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically 
the facts signed under oath by R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A" and further executed by 
defendant Connie W'right Taylor. That such actions on the part ofdefendants Connie Wright 
Taylor and the co-defendants were false and known to be false by defendant Connie Wright 
Taylor & and defendants committed the offense ofgrand theft, the offense offalse pretense. 
That such action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs 
and/or was conduct by said defendant Connie Taylor and the other members within the 
enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse oftheir position as public slervants by 
engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to 
perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same 
resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss ofproperty which was taken with a value which 





88.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about July 19th, 2004, improperly filed a 
complaint and demand for jury trial on behalfofthe trust. The complaint verified under oath 
by R. John Taylor and executed by Connie Wright Taylor, set forth that the Taylors were 
successor trustees of the trust. That defendants knew that they had failed to obtain failed to 










           
 
 
obtain court approval as specifically required under I.C. 68-101 & 68-107. The tmst, by and 
through its alleged successor trustees, and acting in unison and collectively with and for the 
benefit ofthe other defendants falsely stated in their complaint, that the Taylors were trustees 
of the Theodore Johnson Trust. That such action by co-defendants was false and known to 
be false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor and R. John Taylor and defendants eommitted 
the offense ofgrand theft, the offense offalse pretense and the offense ofperjury. That such 
action amounted to perjury and a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' 
property and/or was conduct by defendant Connie Wright and R. John Taylor and the other 
members within the enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse ofthe:lr position 
as public servants by engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by 
failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein 
and the same resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss ofproperty which was taken with 
a value which exceeds One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00). 
89.	 That as a result of such violations, the real property which was wrongfully taken by the 
defendants above described must be restored to the plaintiffBerkshire Investment consistent 
with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 (C) (D)(l). 
90.	 That as a result of such violations, the real property which was wrongfully taken by the 
defendants above described must be restored to the plaintiffBerkshire Investment consistent 
with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 (C) (D)(l). 
91.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 














of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
92.	 That Plaintiffs, be granted Judgment against Defendants for a sum which exceeds the 
jurisdictional basis of the District Court, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve 
(12) percent per annum from September 17,2002, to and including the date ofJudgment and 
thereafter at the highest legal rate until paid in full and leave of court is requested to amend 
this complaint as soon as the same becomes known to the plaintiffs, together with treble 
damages consistent with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 
(a), together with costs and attorneys fees incurred. 
93.	 That the plaintiffs, be granted Judgment against Defendants for a sum which exceeds the 
jurisdictional basis of the District Court, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve 
(12) percent per annum from September 17, 2002, to and including the date ofJudgment and 
thereafter at the highest legal rate until paid in full and leave ofcourt is requested to amend 
this complaint as soon as the same becomes known to the plaintiffs, together with treble 
damages consistent with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 
(a), together with costs and attorneys fees incurred 
94.	 Plaintiffs have been forced to retain the professional legal services, to prosecute this claim 
and are entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred pursuant to Idaho Code, 
Sections 18-7805, of the Idaho Rules ofCivil Procedure, and further pursuant to Rule 11 of 
the LR.C.P., and further pursuant to the real estate contract between the plaintiffs and the 













trust. That the sum of $12,500.00, is a reasonable sum if this matter is uncontested, and a 
greater sum if contested. 
COUNT TWELVE 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
95.	 That the Plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the paragraphs of Count Eleven herein as 
if set forth in full herein. 
96.	 The conduct ofDefendants, above described demonstrate that they should be estopped from 
the benefits of the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims" as the same constitutes judicial 
estoppel. 
RE:SERVATION TO AMEND PLEADINGS 
That by reason of the acts complained herein ofplaintiffs, leave of Court will be requested 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1604, for the Court's ruling on the alleged issue of 
exemplary/punitive damages in light ofthe pleadings, affidavits, depositions, etc., filed ofrecord or 
as may hereinafter be provided to the Court. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs herewith demands a trial by jury on all triable issues in this matter. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1.	 That Plaintiffs, be granted Judgment against Defendants for a sum which exceeds the 
jurisdictional basis of the District Court, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve 
(12) percent per annum from September 17,2002, to and including the date ofJudgment and 














thereafter at the highest legal rate until paid in full and leave of court is requested to amend 
this complaint as soon as the same becomes known to the plaintiffs. 
2.	 That Plaintiffs, be granted Judgment against Defendants for a sum which exceeds the 
jurisdictional basis ofthe District Court, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve 
(12) percent per annum from September 17,2002, to and including the date ofJudgment and 
thereafter at the highest legal rate until paid in full and leave ofcourt is requested to amend 
this complaint as soon as the same becomes known to the plaintiffs. 
3.	 That Plaintiffs, be granted Judgment against Defendants for a sum which exceeds the 
jurisdictional basis of the District Court, together with interest thereon at the rate oftwelve 
(12) percent per annum from September 17,2002, to and including the date ofJudgment and 
thereafter at the highest legal rate until paid in full and leave ofcourt is requested to amend 
this complaint as soon as the same becomes known to the plaintiffs, together with treble 
damages consistent with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 
(a), together with costs and attorneys fees incurred. 
4.	 That the defendants be required to set forth herein by proper pleading the nature of their 
claims in and to real property which is the subject of these proceedings and as described in 
Exhibit "C" thereof. 
5.	 That an Order be entered against the defendants ordering them to divest themselves of any 
interest, direct or indirect, in the real property subject to these proceedings consistent with 
Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 (c) (d)(l). 















6.	 That plaintiffs' interest in and to the subject propertybe declared senior and superior and that 
any other claim, right, title, or interest ofDefendants (or any other interested party or person 
in and to the subject property, if such right, title, claim or interest exists) be declared junior 
and subservient to the interest of plaintiffs in the subject property. 
7.	 That a Decree be entered adjudging and decreeing that PlaintiffBerkshire Investments is the 
owner and is entitled to possession of the subject property, and further ordering that 
defendants, have no right, title or interest or claim in and to the subject real property or any 
part thereof and that each of them, and further, that any person claiming under them and all 
persons having any lien, claim, judgment or decree on or against said real prop(:rty or any 
part, parcel or portion thereof (either as purchaser, encumbrancer, or otherwise) be barred 
and foreclosed from all equity of redemption in and to the said real property and in and to 
every part, parcel and portion thereof. 
8.	 That this Court order a constructive trust be imposed upon the subject real property according 
to law and that the any and all proceeds of the same be subject to such constructive trust. 
9.	 For plaintiffs' attorneys fees to be incurred and the costs incurred. 
10.	 For such other and further relief in law or equity that the Court may deem proper in the 
premIses. 




                
           







THOMAS G. MA: LE IV,/counsel, for 
Plaintiffs 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as £)llows: 
He is one ofthe above named Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, he has read the: foregoing 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, knows the contents thereof, and 
believe the same to be true and correct to the best ofhis knowledge and belief and acknowledges he 
executed the same upon behalf of the Plaintiffs. 
DATED: this 2(~YOfMarCh, 2008. 
-- • ..'-1 _...f....L:....-~------l......--~_
THOMAS MAILE 
Z7 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
__ day ofMarch, 2008 
Notary Public for Ida)w 
Residing at Eo qll , Idaho 7-Z Ill- 7/7/ :2) 
My Commission I(xpires: L V ../ 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 




      
. ....L:. ---~----- <. ...~_'-1 _  
z 5" 
  
   2 l/
--
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as fi)llows: 
He is one ofthe managing member for Berkshire Investments LLC., one ofthe above named 
Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, he has read the foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, knows the contents thereof, and believe the same to he true and 
correct to the best ofhis knowledge and beliefand acknowledges he executed the same upon behalf 
ofBerkshire Investments LJ7
-->1£ 
DATED This ~~day of March, 2008. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
I 5 day of March, 2008. 
Notary Public for Id~ho
 
Residing at EoqlC 
, Idah?/"2-.

My Commission 'Expires: 7erd/I_/'
 















CONNIE W. TAYLOR1 
CLARK and FEENEY 
2 Attorneys for Petitioners 
1229 Main Street 
3 P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 8350 I4 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
5 ISB No. 4837 
6 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE7 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
8 
IN THE MATTER OF ) Case No. 
------­9 ) 
10 THE THEODORE L. JOHNSON ) PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT 
REVOCABLE TRUST ) OF TRUSTEES 
11 ._---~) 
12 CONIES NOW the Petitioner and pursuant to Idaho Code 68~ 101 petitions this cowt for an 
order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor, and DaHan Taylor as Successor Co-Trustees to the 
14 
above-entitled Trust, effective as of June 10,2004. 
15 
This Petition is filed on the grounds and for the reason that the Successor Trustees, Beth 1.16 
17 Rogers and Andrew T. Rogers, resigned as Trustees on June 10,2004, and nominated as Successor 
18 Co-Trustees R. Jolm Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor, and DaHan 1. Taylor. In addition, the person designated 
19 
as Successor Trustee ofthe Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust, Garth J. Fisher, also declined and 
20 
refused to serve as Trustee,joining in the nomination ofR. John Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor, and DaHan 
21 
1. Taylor. That declination was also effective as of June 10,2004.22 
23 A copy ofthe Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust is attached as Exhibit A to this Petition, 




PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEES 1 
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, , The petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sale remaining beneficiary afthis 
Tmst by virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement, a copy of which is 
at1acbed as Exhibit C. Paragraph 4 of said agreement provided for the resignation of Rogers and 
Fisher and the appointment of John, Reed, and DaHan Taylor as successor co-trustees of the tmst 
WHEREFORE Petitioner prays for an order of this court appointing R,. John Taylor, Reed 
1. Taylor, and DaHan 1. Taylor as Trustees effective as of June 10, 2004. 
DATED this.-J;;l~ day of November, 2004. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF Nez Perce 
CLARK qFEENEY 
BY---=~~~~_--,L~I--- _ 
Connie W. Taylor, a me of the finn. 







; : John Taylor . '" ( . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this JL day ofNovember, 2004. 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEES 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, I 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theA- day ofNovember, 2004, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the above document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
o u.s. MailHelen Taylor 
o Hand Delivered 8483 W Harmonica Way 
o Overnight Mail Boise, ID 83709
 
o Telecopy (FAX) 
Connie Taylor J 
Attorney for Petitioner 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEES 3
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, (' ) 
CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1229 Main Street /P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
ISB No. 4837 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
. STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, ) 






THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN )
 
MAILE, husband and wife, and )
 








COME NOW the Plaintiffs by and through their undersigned counsel of record, Connie 
W. Taylor ofthe Law Offices ofClark and Feeney, and for a cause ofaction and claim for relief 
against the Defendants, complain, state, and allege as follows: 
I. PARTIES 
1.1 Reed and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor 
is a resident ofAda County Idaho. All ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe Theodo re 
L. Johnson Trust. They bring this action on their own behalfand also as assignees ofcertain 0(11 er 
beneficiaries or residual beneficiaries of said trust. 
AI\IENDED COMPLAINT 
-1- 002:GO 
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1.2 Thomas Maile, N (herein after Thomas Maile) is engaged in the practice of law 
at 380 W. State Street, Eagle, Ada County, Idaho. Defendant Thomas Maile is a licensed real 
estate broker D/B/A Thomas Maile Real Estate Company. Thomas Maile and Colleen Mai 1e are 
husband and wife and all acts complained ofherein were for the benefit of the marital community. 
They were at all times relevant hereto believed to be residents ofAda County, Idaho. 
1.3 The Defendant Berkshire Investments, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company 
which was fanned by the Defendant Thomas G. Maile. 
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
2.1 This court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of the above-
captioned matter by vi11ue ofthe fact that all of the acts and/or omissions complained ofOCCUTI'ed 
within Ada County, Idaho and relate to real property located in Ada County. 
Ill. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
3.1. The Defendant Thomas Maile, acting in his capacity as an attorney with offices in 
Eagle, Idaho, represented Theodore Johnson on a variety ofmatters for a period ofmany years. 
The attorney client relationship continued untll Mr. Johnson's death on Septen:ber 14, 2002. 
After Mr. Johnson's death, the Defendant Thomas Maile continued to act as the allorney for the 
Theodore L. Jolmson Trust mid the Theodore L. Johnson Estate. 
3.2. DUling the course ofthe attorney client relationship, Thomas Maile represented an d 
advised Mr. Johnson ill relation to the potential sale of 40 acres of property near Eagle, Idaho. 
Mr. Maile, as attorney for the Jolmson Trust, rejected an offer to purchase the property for 
$400,000, stating it was "extremely low" based on comparable sales in the area. Witb.in 
approximately two months Thomas and Colleen Maile entered into an eamest money agreemen t 
to purchase the 40 acres for the price of$400,000.00, 011 telms which were nearly identical to tl1t:~ 
prior offer which was rejected. 
3.3 The Defendants Maile fonned a limited liability company, Berkshire 1westments:> 
LLC, and assigned their rights under the eameslmoney agreement to Berkshire Investments, LiC, 
which subsequently purchased the propeliy from the Johnson Trust. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
-2­
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEE~\JEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
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3.4 Theodore Jolmson died on September 14, 2002. The successor trustees of the 
Theodore Joh11son Trust (Beth and Andy Rogers) closed the transaction selling the property to 
Berkshire Investments, LLC on September 16, 2002. 
3.5 The Rogers had a conflict of interest with other beneficiaries, in that they were also 
beneficiaries of the Trust. Under the terms of the trust, the Rogers would receive their share 
immediately, as opposed to the majority ofother beneficiaries who would either receive income 
only for their lives, or would receive nothing until the death of their mother. 
3.6 Defendants acquired the Linder Road real property with Imowledge ofthe Rogers' 
conflict of interest, and with Imowleclge that the Rogers had failed to carry out their fiduciary 
responsibility by: 
3.6.1 Failing to carefully examining the faimess and propriety ofthe transae tion 
before closing it. 
3.6.2 Failing to obtain court approval prior to consummating the sale. 
3.7 Beneficiaries demanded that Defendants restore the Linder Road property to the 
beneficiaries, but the Defendants have refused to do so. 
IV. AIDING IN BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
4.1 The Deftmdants aided the tmstees in disposing oftrust property in violation oftheir 
fiduciary responsibilities and duty ofloyalty, and received the trust property with knowledge of 
the same, including knowledge that the sale had not been approved by a court as required by 1. C. 
68-108(b). 
4.2 Plaintiff:, seek imposition ofa constructive trust, and an order quieting title to tb~e
 




4.3 In the alternative, Plaintiffs seek money damages for the difference between t11 e 
amount paid and the fair market value of the property at the time of triaL 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
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The Defendants should take notice that the Plaintiffs may file a pretrial motion pursuant 
to statute to amend the complaint to include a prayer for punitive damages. The Defendants 





As a direct result ofthe Defendants' actions, the Plaintiffs have been required to institute 
and prosecute this action and have incurred costs and attomey fees. The Plaintiffs have 
employed the law firnl of Clark and Feeney and have agreed to pay said firm a reasonable· 
attorneys fee and are entitled to be reimbursed for said fees under the statutes and case law ofthe 
state ofIdaho, specifically Idaho Code 12-120(3), 12-121 and 12-123, as well as under the teffilS 
of the contract for purchase of the real propeliy which is at issue in tlus matter. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and for judgment, order and decree of this couli 
against Defendants as follows: 
1. For imposition of a constructive tmst; 
2. For an order restoring the real property to the Tmst and quieting title to the real 
property in the name of the Theodore L. Jolmson Revocable Trust; 
3. In the alternative, for an order awarding money damages for the difference betwe en 
the amount Defendants paid and the fair market value of the property at the time of tria1. 
4. For pre and post judgment interest at the statutory rate until fully paid; 
5. For all costs of this action; 
6. For attorneys fees incurred by the plaintiffs inprosecuting this action under Idaho
 
Code 12-120, 12-121, 12-123;
 
7. For attorneys fees under the Earnest Money Offer and Acceptance contract dated Jut y 
27,2002;
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DATED thisL day o[ January, 2006. 
CLARK a FEENEY 
__...>.,=- ----"""""-_+--++--f-c 
COlmie W. Taylor, a member '
By _ 
Attomeys [or Plaintiffs. 




County of Nez Perce )
 
R. 101m Taylor, being tirst duly swom on oath, deposes and says: 
That I am one of the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing 
Amended Complaint, know the conlents(ereo , and believe the same to be true. 
'-I!!7 ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /6 day of anuary, 2006. 
Notary Public' 1 and fQr the State ofIdaho 
Residing at {' JA, (- IV therein. 
My Commission expires:---'~=_...."-'-"'--(-U-"··_4_r----_ 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
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CERTJI?ICATE Oli' SERVICE 
. I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1,Ift~y ofMarch, 2006, I causcd to be served a true 












































































U.S. Mail ~	 I-land Delivered 
Overnight Mailo 
Te1ecopy (FAX)o 
U.S. Mail~ I-land Deliveredo 
Overnight Mailo 
Telecopy (FAX)o 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
._----}16 11--_------­
HEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE) 
17 RUST, )) 
18 )Plaintiff, )
19 )





26 TUDGMENT ON 13ENEFICIARlES' CLAIMS 
):<-ED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, )
nd R. JOlm TAYLOR, ) 
)Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) ) 
)THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN )MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS )MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, )nd BERl(SHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
) 
)Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 04004730 
JUDGMENT ON BENEFICIAR1ES' 
CLAIMS 
LAW OFFICES OF 
000119
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This cause came on before the Honorable Ronald 1. Wilper for hearing on a Motion for 
'ummary Judgment on the Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions 
1 
,flaw contained within this Court's May 15,2006 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary2 











1. The July 22, 2002 Earnest Money Agreement between The Theodore L. Johnson 
7 
~evocable Trust and defendants Thomas Maile IV and Colleen Maile for the purchase ofthe Linder8 
~oad property which is more fully described in paragraph 3 of this Judgment, and all subsequent9 
10 iocuments relating to that transaction, are void as a matter of law. 
11 2. The title to the property commonly referred to as "the Linder Road property" and 
12 
110re particularly described in Paragraph 3 of this Judgment shall be quieted to the Theodore L. 
13 
ohnson Revocable Trust, in fee simple. 
14 
3. The Linder Road property is more particularly described as follows:15 
16 The Northwest Qum1er of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, 
Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho 
17 
4. The Defendants' remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses, all ofwhich were18 
19 ased on either equitable claims or the assertion that the Plaintiffs were wrongfully interfering witb 
20 he Defendants' right to possess the Linder Road Property, are hereby dismissed. Specifically, those 




A. Counterclaim I (tortious interference with contract between Defendants and 
23 
their lending institution) 
24 
B. Counterclaims VII and VIIl (equitable estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel) 25 
26 TUDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS 2 
LAW oFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 











































C.	 Counterclaim X (fraudulent transfer)
 
Counterclaim XI (unjust enrichment)
 D. 
Affirmative defenses of Laches, Failure to Mitigate, and Unclean I-lands. E.
 
The Plaintiff B~neficiaries are the prevailing parties in this matter.
 5. 
DATED this. it) day of June, 2006. 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper 
3JUDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS 
LAW OFFiCES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 





































CLEIU(IS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 HEREI3Y CERTIFY that on the .~/ day of June, 2006, I caused to be served a true and 
'onect copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
allowing: 
Thomas Maile, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, ID 83616 
COImie W. Taylor 
Clark and Feeney 
PO Box 285 









Dermis M. Charney 
Attorney at Law 
951 E. Plaza Drive, Suite 140 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Deputy Clerk 
4
UDGMENT ON BENEFICIARJES' CLAIMS 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
d' U.S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 Telecopy (FAX) 
J U.S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 Telecopy (FAX) 
d U.S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 Telecopy (FAX) 
ri U.S. Mail 
0 Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 Telecopy (FAX) 
J. rH\VW) I".j Wlfki ~:lfiC,' 






































































CONNIE W, TAYLOR 











John Taylor, DaHan Taylor
 






J. DAViD NA\f!~;;.i·~'I'O C')[', .\", mn~ 
By KAThY J. rW::HL . 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OJ? THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
 






CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual;; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK. and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOI-IN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
ANSWER OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN 
TAYLOR, AND JOHNSON TRUST 
Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trost, by and through 
their attorney of record, answer the Complaint as follows: 
ANSWER 1
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1. Defendants deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs' Complaint which is not 
specifically admitted herc~in. 
2. Defendants admit the allegations as to the residence of the respective parties. 
3. With reference to the multitude ofallegations relating to documents and/or pleadings 
filed with the Court, those documents speak for themselves and require no admission or denial; 
however, Defendants do ,not accept and specifically deny the Plaintiffs' characterizations of such 
documents. 
4. Defendants admit that the Plaintiffs attempted to purchase property from the 
Theodore Johnson trust, admit that the purchase was found to be improper by The Honorable Ronald 
1. Wilper, and admit tha.t judgment was entered returning the property to the Johnson Trust. 
Defendants deny any impropriety on their part in the conduct of said lawsuit. 
5. Defendants deny the Plaintiffs' allegation that they were not beneficiaries ofthe 
Johnson Trust as it relates to the Linder Road property. The Release and Disclaimer executed by the 
successor trustees and all beneficiaries specifically reserved to the Taylors all rights to the lawsuit 
against these Plaintiffs se(~king recovery of the property they had acquired wrongfully. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a cause of action against these Defendants upon which relief 
may be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs failed to take reasonable steps to 
mitigate their claimed or alleged damages, if any. 
ANSWER 2
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THIRD AFFIRMArIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs' claims are barred by I.R.C,P. 12(b)(8) because there is another i~ction 
pending between the sam.e parties on the same cause. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Plaintiffs' clacims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, 
waiver, laches, and unclean hands, 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that the Court enter an order granting the following 
relief: 
1.	 That the Complaint be dismissed and that the Plaintiffs take nothing thereby. 
2.	 That Rule 11 sanctions be imposed on the attorney for the Plaintiffs for bringing 
this frivolous action. 
3.	 That the Defendants be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in 
responding to the Complaint pursuant to I.e. 12-123 and I.R.C,P 11. 




-- \I B ~	 ~~~~=-- .........~_--I- _ 
Connie W. Taylor, a member of the fi 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
ANSWER	 3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of May, 2008 I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addn~ss.ed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV o U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street o Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, ID 83616 o Overnight Mail
 
5 Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1'001 
Mark Prusynski o U.S, Mail 
MOFFATT THOMAS o Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10lh Floor o Overnight Mail
 




bnie W. Taylor 
Attorney for Defendants 
ANSWER 4
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1 CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 2 
P.O. Drawer 285 
3 Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone (208) 743-9516 
4 ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
5 John Taylor, DaHan Taylor 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust 6 
7 
()D~? 
M.A y 1 ,i 2008 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
8 STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
9 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
10 limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, 






15	 CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k1a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
16 an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual;17 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
18	 TRUST, n Idaho revocabk trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
19 POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 20 
Defendants.21 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
22 Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trust, by and through 
23 
their attorney of record, move the Court for entry of an order dismissing this action in its entirety 
24 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). 
25 
26 MOTION TO DISMISS 
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This motion is made on the grounds and for the reason that there is an action pending 
between these parties relating to the same cause. After years of litigation before the Honorable 
Ronald Wilper, the Taylors and the Johnson Trust prevailed on all issues, and the matter is currently 
on appeal. The current action is therefore barred by I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). 
The Defendants will submit a memorandum in support of this motion within 14 days of the 
hearing on this matter, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3)(E). Oral argument is requested. 




C nnie W. Taylor, a member of the fi 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of May, 2008 I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV 
380 West State Street 





Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mark Prusynski U.S. Mail 
MOFFATT THOMAS Hand Delivered 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor D O~emig~t Mail 
PO Box 829 [] elecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384 
Boise, 10 83701 
~
 
Connie W. Taylor ) 
Attorney for Defendants / 
MOTION TO DISMISS 2 
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John Taylor, DaHan Taylor
 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF' THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho
 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
 






CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE 1. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 










AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501
 000129
    
 
1 . 2008 






































































CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state of Idaho and a member of 
Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson 
Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy ofMr. Maile's Last Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim in Ada County Case No CV OC 0723232. 
3. I am attaching hereto as Exhibits Band C respectively, true and correct copic~s of Judge 
Wilper's Orders on Summary Judgment dated 02113/06 and 05115/06. 
4. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit D, a true and correct copy of Judge Wilper's decision 
on the Unjust Enrichment. 
/./-,/­vI?)
DATED this ~_ day of May, 2008 /--,-, 
, ~/ 
~-.//l-
C ie Taylor ( ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this e day of May, 2008. / 
Notary P blicIn and for the State of Idaho. 
, I 
Residing; t jil/ ()CV!, (~v' tc J therein. 
My commission expires: .) -10\./( 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of May, 2008 I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV fir U.S. Mail 
380 West State Street D Hand Delivered 
Eagle, ID 83616 D Overnight Mail 
D Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mark Prusynski U.S. Mail 
MOFFATT THOMAS ~ Hand Delivered 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor D Overnight Mail 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
3 SO West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE,' IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs, THOMAS G. MAILE & COLLEEN MAILE, husband and 
wife, and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, an Idaho limited liability company, by and through their 










attorney, Thomas G. Maile, IV, and for their complaint and for a cause ofaction against Defendants, 
complains and alleges as follows: 
COMMON ALLEGATIONS TO ALL COUNTS 
1.	 THOMAS G. MAILE and COLLEEN MAILE, are husband and wife and reside in the 
County of Ada, State ofIdaho; BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, L.L.C. is an Idaho limited 
liability company, lawfully transacting business in the State ofIdaho; that Clark and Feeney, 
is an Idaho partnership; PAUL T. CLARK is an individual; that the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust, is a revocable trust which at all relevant times owned certain real property 
in the County of Ada, in the State ofIdaho and/or claims an interest in real propeliy that is 
the subject of these proceedings (hereinafter referred to as the "trust"); that Dallan Taylor, 
R. John Taylor and Reed Taylor were at one time beneficiaries of the trust and thereafter 
disclaimed their interests in trust and became court appointed trustees of the trust; that 
defendant R. JOHN TAYLOR is an individual, who resides in the County of Nez Perce, 
State of Idaho; that defendant DALLAN TAYLOR is an individual, who resides in the 
County ofAda, State ofIdaho; 
2.	 That the defendants, Clark and Feeney, Paul T. Clark and Connie Taylor, were at all relevant 
times licensed Idaho attorneys and/or were conducting business in the State ofIdaho and at 
all times was agent of the co-defendants, the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and/or 
the agents ofReed Taylor, defendant DaHan Taylor and defendant R. John Taylor, and all 
acts of said attorneys hereinafter complained of, were committed in their individual 
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capacities and in addition are imputed against the co-defendants, Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust, and/or the defendant, Dallan Taylor, under the doctrine of "Respondent 
Superior" and/or agency, and all said defendants are individually responsible for said actions 
complained of and/or are the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the damages to 
the plaintiffs. That defendant attorney Connie Taylor at all relevant times was an employee 
and/or agent ofthe co-defendant Clark and Feeney, and co-counsel Paul T. Clark and all acts 
of defendant Connie Taylor hereinafter complained of, are imputed against the co­
defendants, Paul T. Clark and/or Clark & Feeney under the doctrine of "Respondent 
Superior" and/or agency, and said defendants are individually responsible for said actions 
complained ofand/or all the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the damages to the 
plaintiffs and leave of court is requested to amend this complaint once the legal capacities 
of all defendants are determined. All acts complained of herein occurred in the State of 
Idaho and, specifically, within the County ofAda, where the subject real property is located. 
3.	 Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and Theodore Johnson, as trustee ofthe Theodore Johnsan 
Revocable Trust (hereinafter referred to as the trust), entered into a certain real estate 
contract, and a subsequent assignment was entered into wherein Berkshire Investments, 
L.L.C., acquired certain real property owned by the trust and the Theodore Johnson 
Revocable Trust, was to receive payment from the sale of the property. 
4.	 Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and Berkshire Investments, L.L.C., and Theodore L. 
Johnson, as Trustee, Beth Rogers and Andy Rogers, as Co-Trustees, of the Theodore L. 
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Johnson Revocable Trust, (hereinafter referred to at times collectively as "trust"), entered 
into a certain real estate contract, and subsequent assignment, wherein Berkshire Investment 
was to receive certain real property and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Tmst, was to 
convey title and was to receive payment from the sale of the subject property. 
5.	 At all relevant times herein, the individual defendants, and/or the trustee and/or the trustees, 
ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust knew and/or had imputed knowledge from the 
"Trust" and/or the prior trustees ofthe "Trust" that the plaintiffs intended to purchase the real 
property for the purposes ofestablishing a home-site for Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, 
and further knew that the plaintiffs intended to develop the real property consistent with Ada 
County zoning law and other regulatory rules and laws for the creation ofa subdivision. That 
all such facts were known to the "trust" prior to closing the real estate transaction. 
6.	 The individual Taylors, and thereafter acting as alleged successor trustees ofthe trust, and/or 
acting as appointed trustees, by and through its co-trustees, and/or by and through the 
individual defendants and/or by and through the co-defendant attorneys undertook a course 
of action to interfere with and an attempt to interfere with the plaintiffs' peaceful and quiet 
enjoyment ofthe subject property and/or attempt to cause a breach of contract between the 
plaintiffs and plaintiffs' lending institution and/or tortiuously interfere with the plaintiffs' 
prospective business advantages relating to the subject real property. 
7.	 The Defendants, were informed that the plaintiffs would be re-financing the loans on the 
subject real property and would pay the balance ofthe deed oftrust due and owing to the 







         




"trust" and further knew that the plaintiffs were planning on subdividing the subject real 
property for a business advantage and profit. The plaintiffs infonned the co-trus.tees of the 
Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust, that the plaintiffs would be re-financing, unless the 
Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust would like to maintain the loan and release lots in the 
seven (7) lot subdivision as sales developed. That in order to obtain lot releases in the 
proposed subdivision, the defendants knew and/or with reasonable diligence should have 
known, that the plaintiffs would enter into a commercial loan with another lender, for the 
purposes offulfilling the plaintiffs' obligation with the "trust" and would be acquiring a new 
commercial loan to continue to develop a subdivision on the subject real property. 
8.	 The plaintiffs incurred expenses and costs associated with securing financing on the subject 
real property to payoff the obligation to the trust, on or about January 4, 2004. The loan 
required plaintiffs to avoid the placement of any liens or encumbrances on the subject real 
property, to convey clear title to potential purchasers, to construct and finalize the 
subdivision within six (6) months, and such facts were made known to all defendants via a 
public recorded deed of trust on the subject real property and as a result of the filing of the 
complaints filed by the defendants and allowing the recording of two (2) "Lis Pendens" to 
be filed in the cases initiated by the defendants, the plaintiffs were unable to proceed with 
the improverrient of the subject property and were forced to re-finance plaintiffs' real 
properties and/or incur additional credit increasing the costs associated with the development 
ofthe subj ect real property all a result to avoid the default under the tenns and conditions of 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- 5 
000137
 





the real estate commercial loan. 
9.	 The Defendants, and/or its agent, and/or its co-trustees, and acting in concert lmd conspiring 
with each other, maliciously and intentionally undertook a course ofaction in the filing the 
two actions consolidated in the district court action and/or the filing ofthe complaints and 
the "Lis Pendens" in both the two cases, and/or pursued a course ofaction hereinafter alleged 
in providing false verifications to the courts, that were calculated and detennined to 
adversely affect the interests of the plaintiffs in the prior the litigation and to tortiuously 
interfere with the contract between the plaintiffs' and the new commercial lender, and/or the 
plaintiffs' right to quiet and peaceful enjoyment ofthe subject real property and/or amounted 
to conduct that tortiuously interfered with the plaintiffs' prospective business advantages 
relating to the subject real property. 
10.	 That litigation was filed by the individual Taylors and defendant Dallan Taylor and the 
litigation was filed by the co-defendant attorneys in January 2004. Subsequently, the 
individual Taylors by and through defendant Connie Taylor, while the first ]Iitigation was 
dismissed by the district court and while the first suit was pending on appeal, and while the 
plaintiffs undertook the required construction of the subdivision, the individual Taylors, 
Beth and Andy Rogers as successor trustees, and the beneficiaries of the trust entered into 
a global "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement" in July 2004. Under the tenns 
ofthe Agreement the Taylors released the trustees Beth and Andy Rogers from all liability 
relating to the administration ofthe trust. The Agreement further provided that the Taylors 
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would be appointed as successor trustees. The Taylors did not obtain court approval of their 
alleged appointment as successor trustees. The trust, by and through its alleged successor 
trustees, and the co-defendant attorneys and the Taylors filed litigation on July 19th, 2004 
on behalf of the trust against the plaintiffs. 
11.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about July 19th, 2004, improperly filed a 
complaint and demand for jury trial on behalfofthe trust. The complaint verified under oath 
by R. John Taylor and executed by Connie Wright Taylor, set forth that the Taylors were 
successor trustees of the trust. That defendants knew that they had failed to obtain failed to 
obtain court approval as specifically required under I.C. 68-101 & 68-107. The trust, by and 
through its alleged successor trustees, and acting in unison and collectively with and for the 
benefit ofthe other defendants falsely stated in their complaint, that the Taylors were trustees 
of the Theodore Johnson Trust. That such action by co-defendants was false and known to 
be false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor and R. John Taylor and which caused damage 
to plaintiffs' property, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of their position as public 
servants by engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by failing or 
refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the 
same resulted in damages to the plaintiffs. 
12.	 Thereafter, On October 20,2004, the plaintiffs filed their motion to dismiss complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial relating to the "trust's" complaint. That one of the issues raised by 
the plaintiffs, in their motion to dismiss was the issue ofthe legitimacy ofthe complaint filed 





         
 
            




         
by the "trust" since the alleged successor trustees, (the individual Taylors) had not received 
the required Court appointment making them successor trustees, pursuant to I.e. 68-101 & 
1. C. 68-107. That the defendants initially denied any court appointment was necessary for 
their appointment as successor trustees. Then, after receiving the plaintiffs' Motion to 
Dismiss, the Taylors, by and through the co-defendant attorneys obtained an ex·-parte order 
from the probate order on November 17, 2004, appointing them as successor trustees, 
retroactively to June 10,2004. 
13.	 The defendant DaHan Taylor and the other Taylors, by and through the co-defendant 
attorneys filed their verified petition in the probate court on November 12,2004, requesting 
the probate court to appoint the Taylors as trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust. The petition was executed by defendant R. John Taylor, a licensed Idaho attorney as 
a verification of the facts contained in the petition and was signed by an attorney of record, 
his wife, defendant Connie Taylor. The petition excluding the attachment thereto is annexed 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and is made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. Page 2 of the 
verified petition states under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the 
sole remaining beneficiary ofthis trust by virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and 
Indemnity Agreement." That the individual Taylor defendants had renounced and 
disclaimed their interests in the trust and were no longer residual beneficiaries 0 f the trust 
effective in July 2004. 
14.	 On February 28, 2005, the plaintiffs filed appropriate pleadings before the probate court 
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requesting that the ex-parte Order dated November 17, 2004 be set aside. In the probate 
court proceeding, the parties provided extensive briefing regarding the ex-parte order entered 
on November 17,2004. On April 18,2005, the probate court, through the Honorable Judge 
Christopher M. Bieter, entered its Order declaring the ex-parte Order entered on November 
17, 2004 void. On May 2, 2005, the Honorable Judge Christopher M. Bieter, entered an 
Order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed J. Taylor and DaHan J. Taylor as successor trustees 
of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. That at the hearing on May 2, 2005, before the 
Honorable Judge Christopher M. Bieter, the Defendant R. John Taylor was placed under oath 
and provided testimony in that Court proceeding that Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary 
of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. That in addition thereto defendant Paul T. 
Clark, a licensed Idaho attorney made statements to the probate court during the May 2,2005 
hearing that Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust. 
15.	 That in December 2005 the Idaho Supreme Court entered its decision in the case captioned 
Taylor v.s Maile, and provided a ruling that stated under the allegations set forth in the 
individual Taylors' complaint filed in January 2004, sufficient inferences could be afforded 
the Taylors to allow the individual Taylors as beneficiaries to pursue claims against the 
plaintiffs. 
16.	 That on January 13, 2006, defendant R. John Taylor, acting on behalf of all defendants, as 
a licensed Idaho attorney (an officer ofthe court, who used or abused his position as a public 










servant by engaging in conduct within or related to his official duties) and by and through 
his wife, defendant Connie Taylor, a licensed Idaho attorney (an officer of the court, who 
used or abused her position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to 
his official duties), who was acting on behalf of the co-defendant attorneys executed a 
proposed amended complaint after the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. On March 9, 2006, 
the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, and by and through the co­
defendant attorneys. Page 1 of the Verified Amended Complaint states under oath, "Reed 
and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a resident of 
Ada County Idaho. All ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson 
Trust." Thatsaid verified amended complaint is annexed hereto as Exhibit "B" and is made 
a part hereofas ifset forth in full herein. That Exhibit B" was executed by defendant R. John 
Taylor, under oath and as a verified complaint, who was acting on behalfof all defendants, 
and was executed byhim while he was a licensed Idaho attorney (an officer ofthe court, who 
used or abused his position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to 
his official duties) and by and through his wife, defendant Connie Taylor, a licensed Idaho 
attorney (an officer of the court, who used or abused her position as a public servant by 
engaging in conduct within or related to his official duties), who was acting on behalfof the 
co-defendant attorneys executed a proposed amended complaint after the Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision. 
17. That such statements contained in the verified amended complaint contained in exhibit "B" 





         
  
  
         
  
were false, intentionally and/or willfully undertaken to constitute false pretenses, that were 
contrary to the known facts previously set forth in verified pleadings and/or were contrary 
to the testimony ofdefendant R. John Taylor made under oath in the probate proceedings on 
May 2, 2005 and/or were false as represented by Paul T. Clark during the hearing before the 
probate court on May 2,2005 and/or were false as represented by Paul T. Clark before the 
Idaho Supreme Court during oral argument to the Court and/or in briefing before the Idaho 
Supreme Comi to the true facts, and/or intentionally deceitful. The verified amended 
complaint executed under oath on January 13, 2006, by defendant R. John Taylor and filed 
on March 9, 2006, and signed by the co-defendant attorneys was an attempt to take improper 
advantage of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Taylor I. The district court entered 
"Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim" on June 7, 2006, which was entered by the district comi 
pursuant to the misrepresentation of the Taylors as to their status as beneficiaries in January 
2006 and their attorneys of record, co-defendant attorneys. 
18.	 That a sole and direct result of the filing of the verified amended complaint the Honorable 
Ronald Wilper entered the court's Judgment on June 7,2006. That a true and correct copy 
ofthe Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim is annexed hereto as Exhibit "c" and is made a part 
hereof as if set forth in full herein. That pursuant to the Judgment the plaintiff Berkshire 
Investment was deprived of its real property and a constructive trust should be imposed upon 
the subject real property that is described in Exhibit "c" and the other plaintiffs were denied 
their improvements made on the subject real property. 










] 9. That the co-defendant attorneys had entered into a fee agreement with the Taylors and co­
defendant Dallan Taylor which was initially based upon a hourly rate and thereafter became 
a contingent fee agreement, wherein the co-defendant attorneys would receive a percentage 
ofthe judgment entered against the plaintiffs. That based upon such agreement between the 
party defendants it was in their collective best interests to increase the judgment to include 
a declaration from the court that the plaintiffs lost all rights and title to real property, 
including all their improvements on the real property. 
20.	 That all said defendants actively and collectively and for the benefit of each other and 
obtained the judgment set forth in Exhibit "C" by wrongfully obtaining the title to the real 
property which was the subject ofthe contract and the conveyance between the plaintiffs and 
trust. The action and the wrongful conduct on the part of the defendants and/or the 
defendants' agents, demonstrated an intentional course of action to seek to increase profits 
and/or income to the defendants and/or to obtain the title to the real property based upon 
wrongful motives and design, including but not limited to the following: (a.) wrongfully 
pursuing a course of conduct between the beneficiaries and/or the residual beneficiaries of 
the Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust, to cause the filing ofthe actions and filing ofthe 
"Lis Pendens" above alleged; (b) undertaking a course of action to cause a breach by the 
plaintiffs with the commercial lender on the subject real property, for personal gain and/or 
benefit of the defendants, their agents and/or their principals and/or co-trustees, and/or the 
trust's sole beneficiary, and/or the individual defendants; (c) wrongfully conspiring to 
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circumvent the plaintiffs' rights to future profits and share in the future gains associated with 
the real property in which Theodore Johnson 1. Revocable Trust previously had an interest; 
(d) using their position as co-trustees, and/or prior residual beneficiaries and/or assignees of 
other beneficiaries ofthe Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust to promote profiting at the 
expense of the plaintiffs; (e) misrepresenting the nature of the individual Taylors' status as 
beneficiaries, before the district court in January 2006, when the individual Taylors had 
disclaimed and/or renounced their interests in the trust by the settlement agreement in July 
2004 and/or further by the judicial admissions contained in Exhibit "A", which caused a 
judgment to entered against the plaintiffs causing the plaintiffs to lose the real property, and 
all benefits associated thereto, and all improvements made on the real property. 
21.	 That the actions ofthe defendants in misrepresenting the status ofthe their beneficiary status 
in January 2006 amounted to misrepresentations made by the defendants. The defendants 
by verified pleadings represented to the district court that the individual Taylors were 
beneficiaries of the trust and had a legitimate interest in the litigation in January 2006 as 
beneficiaries. That such statements were made to the district court by defendants as 
inducement for the court to enter its judgment contained in Exhibit "C". That the defendants 
having previously judicially admitted in prior verified pleadings that the individual Taylors 
were no longer beneficiaries of trust as Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary of trust. 
Defendant attorney Connie Taylor signed pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 11, that the individual 
Taylors had no interest in the trust as of July 2004 (exhibit "A"). Such facts were well 
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known by the defendants at the time ofthe misrepresentations and/or verification ofpleading 
in January 2006. That the defendants' statement that the individual Taylor defendants had 
a beneficial interest in the trust in January 2006 was false and was known to be false and was 
intended by the defendants to be acted upon by the court, which the court did rely upon and 
the court so acted according to such statements; that the court was relying upon the 
verification of the pleadings of the defendants' misrepresentation when made by the 
defendants; such statement was made to induce the court to enter its judgment referenced 
above and were intentionally made by defendants for the purpose to have the court act by 
executing the judgment in which it ultimately did above referenced. That said statement was 
false and was made by defendants intentionally to deceive the court and/or was made in a 
reckless manner and careless manner, and the defendants knew and/or should have known 
the statement was false and/or knew and/or should have known that court would act thereon 
and further knew the court in reliance of such statements did not know the true status ofthe 
individual Taylors' true status with the trust. That such statelnent was a material inducement 
to the court's execution ofthe judgment above referenced. The defendants intended that the 
court act in executing the judgment based upon such false assurances which were reasonably 
calculated by the defendants that the court would rely upon such assurances and execute the 
ultimate judgment. That the defendants knew and/or in the exercise should have known, the 
comi would so act and further knew and/or should have known the court would be ignorant 
of the truth, that the individual Taylors did not have a legitimate interest in the trust and/or 






           
            
 
the corpus of the trust in January 2006. The court relied upon the truthfulness of the 
defendants' statements and such reliance was reasonable. That the court had a right to reply 
upon such statements as the same constituted verified facts and were executed pursuant to 
I..R.C.P. Rule!!. That such action amount to fraud by the defendants to wit (1) a 
representation of fact: that the defendant affinnatively stated they had a legitimate interest 
as beneficiaries ofthe trust; (2) Its falsity: that the defendants and the co-defendant attorneys 
had previously filed verified pleadings before a probate court which were contrary to the 
verified pleading in January 2006; (3) Its materiality: The court relied upon the 
representations that the individual Taylors were legitimately beneficiaries and were real 
parties in iriterests in the trust and/or its corpus and that is was a proximate cause for the 
district court to award the real property to the trust in light of the district court's prior 
decision that the trust had waived and/or was estopped to seek recision of the real estate 
contract between the plaintiffs and the trust; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity: the 
defendants knew at the time of executing the verified pleadings the individual Taylors did 
not have any interest in the trust and/or its corpus; (5) The speaker's intent that the 
representation will be acted upon in a reasonably contemplated manner: the defendants 
intended that the court would act upon such statement and execute the ultimate judgment as 
presented by defendants to the district court prepared by the defendant attorneys which the 
court ultimately in fact did; (6) the listener's ignorance of its falsity; The court had no 
infonnation or knowledge which would have contradicted the defendants based upon the 





verified pleadings of January 2006; (7) the listener's reliance on the truth of the 
representation; the court was relying upon such verified statements by the defendants in 
ultimately executing the judgments as requested; (8) the listener's right to rely on the truth 
ofthe representation: the court relied upon the statement by defendants pursuant to Rule] ] 
of the LR.C.P. and by the verification of facts by the defendants; and (9) The listener's 
consequent and proximate injury: That as a result of the defendants not providing the true 
status oftheir interest in the trust and/or its corpus the plaintiffs herein sustained the loss of 
their real property and their improvements thereto. That the Plaintiffs have sustained 
damages as a result ofsuch statement. That the plaintiffs lack an adequate remedy at law and 
equi ty requires that the judgment procured by the defendants be declared null and void and/or 
voidable and the real property subject thereto be restored to the plaintiff Berkshire 
Investments. 
22.	 That the co-defendants' actions in entering into a Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity 
Agreement with the trustees and beneficiaries of the trust in June 2004, and thereafter 
misrepresenting the Taylors' status as beneficiaries in continued court proceedings before 
the district court, the Idaho Supreme Court, by their pleadings, arguments, and briefing 
constituted improper continuous activity from June 2004 to the present. That the defendants 
on October] 5,2004, acting in unison and collectively stated in their Appellants' Briefin the 
Idaho Supreme Court case number 30817, "The Taylors are beneficiaries of the Theodore 
Johnson Trust. ...". That such action together with other action taken before the courts, 
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together the execution of Exhibit "B" annexed hereto amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 
violation and in addition amounted to a violation under LA.R. Rule 11.1., based upon the 
defendants' inconsistent judicial admissions before the probate court. That such actions on 
the part ofR. John Taylor and the co-defendant attorneys were in violation oflaw including 
but mot limited to, defendants engaged in multiple instances ofperjury and false pretenses 
in violation ofIdaho Code Sections 18-2401, 18-2403, 18-2407(1 )(a)(2)(3)(b)(1), 18-7803, 
18-5401, 18-5410, 18-5406, 18-5408, (perjury) and Idaho Code Sections 18-3401 18-2403, 
18-2407(1 )(a)(2)(3)(b)(1), and Section 19-2116 (obtaining property by false pretense) and 
that such actjon constituted an enterprise, to wit: a group of individuals associated in fact 
planning in unison to deprive Berkshire Investment of the real property and such action 
constitutes an agreement either explicit or implied to engage in the predicate acts above 
described and the co-defendants shared a common purpose to engage in the predicate act in 
an effort to wrongfully obtain real property subject to these proceedings and/or has obtained 
money, personal property, or valuable thing from the plaintiffs herein. That the enterprise 
consists of the law finn of Clark & Feeney and all named co-defendant attorneys who are 
within the law firm and/or the enterprise further consists of all named defendants acting by 
and through their contract and business relationship to acquire the title to the real property 
and/or obtaining damages from the plaintiffs. That such enterprise constitutes an entity, for 
the purpose to allow the group of co-defendants to become associated together for a 
common purpose ofengaging in a course of conduct above described which is sufficient to 





    
 
satisfy the requirements ofIdaho Code § 18-7804(c). 
23.	 The acts of the defendants, and/or their agents, and/or their principals, and/or the trust' co­
trustees, having devised such scheme, motive or artifice to cause a default and foreclosure 
ofthe contract between the plaintiffs and the new commercial lender and/or the interference 
with the prospective economic advantages of the plaintiffs, and/or misrepresenting the 
mateIial facts above alleged, causing the real property to be re-conveyed to the trust, knew 
would cause irreparable damage to the plaintiffs and unjust enrichment to the defendants, to 
wit: in addition to having caused the plaintiffs to lose their equity in the subject property, the 
plaintiffs were damaged with other costs and fees associated with the development ofthe real 
property, and other costs and interest expenses associated with paying off the new 
commercial lender, and causing delays in the sale of certain lots thereby increasing the 
damages of the plaintiffs for increased interest, loss of profits from delays, loss of capital 
investments on the subject real property, loss ofinterest on invested capital, increased taxes, 
increased assessment, unpaid taxes and penalties, loss ofprofits from the real property, and 
the ultimate profits from the sale of subject real property, while the defendants sought to 
unjustly benefit from the plaintiffs' labor and efforts. 
24.	 That with the execution of the real estate contract, and after the purchase ofthe real property 
by the plaintiff Berkshire Investment, the plaintiffs made down payment and ultimate full 
payment on the purchase price, including costs, taxes, interest payments. That the plaintiffs 
provided materials, services, improvements affecting the real property which was undertaken 
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by the plaintiffs during periods of time wherein, the legal title remained in Berkshire 
Investments and the defendants knew of such improvements and payments and allowed the 
plaintiffs to proceed with the full payment and improvements on the real property. That said 
services, and improvements enhanced the value of the real property and the defendants took 
such payments, and improvements for their benefit. That the defendants further knew that 
the plaintiffs had incurred a new commercial lender which required that the improvements 
be completed within 6 months ofthe new debt and further knew and/or should have known 
that purchase ofthe real property and the improvements thereon would result in an economic 
advantage to the plaintiffs. 
25.	 That plaintiffs, as a sole, direct and proximate result of the action above alleged, have 
sustained damages and will sustain damages in the following manner: (a) the loss of the 
subject real property in which plaintiffs were obligated to pay the new commercial lender for 
and/or preventing the plaintiffs from continued marketing of the property which has now 
been clouded by the defendants' judgment (Exhibit "C") and the prior Lis Pendents, all 
perpetrated by the defendants collectively and/or their agents' actions; the plaintiffs' loss of 
equity in the real property thereon and further incurring additional expenses above set forth 
including but not limited to increased interest costs on capital and re-financing debt, loss of 
profits and loss of interest and/or profits on capital contributions to development, incurring 
additional appraisal fees and points associated with new mortgages, costs and attorneys fees 
incurred; (b) the plaintiffs' loss ofopportunity to obtain revenues and profits associated with 












the real propeliy and loss income associated with lot sales; (c) the plaintiff;;' expenses 
inculTed and/or paid to date for engineering, architectural fees, interest expense, loan fees, 
fees and costs associated with various governmental agencies, professional services, 
materials purchased for the construction to date on the property, services and labor paid to 
date on the subject real property, assessment fees, taxes, penalties for unpaid taxes, cost of 
interest paid to the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and other institutions and entities; 
increased continued costs ofinterest, taxes, assessments, the cost ofappraisals, loan fees and 
costs, closing fees for refinancing, title reports, closing fees, attorneys fees etc.; (d) the 
plaintiffs' loss of the opportunity to retain portions of the subject to allow the plaintiffs to 
build their homes on the subject property and to the enjoy the peace and enjoyment of the 
subject real property; (e.) the plaintiffs' incurring costs and attorneys fees to defend against 
the defendants' complaints and the accompanying "Lis Pendens" in the two cases,. including 
the appeal costs including attorneys fees and costs all as a proximate result of the filing of 
the litigation and obtaining the judgment set forth in Exhibit "e" by the defendants, and/or 
their agents, and the costs and attorney fees to quiet title to the subject real property; (f) the 
plaintiffs' loss of income and/or profits associated with the time taken for the development 
of the property and the loss ofopportunity to obtain revenues and profits associated with the 
real property from the date of the subdivision finalization to the current date, including 
interest on the gains thereof; (g) the plaintiffs' payments to the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust fur the purchase price paid, and the interest paid pursuant to the promissOly 
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note and deed of trust that the defendants have wrongfully obtained title too, in an amount, 
based upon information and belief, in the amount of $465,000.00, or such greater sums as 
established, and leave of court is requested to amend said amount as the actual amount is 
made known; (1) the plaintiffs' improvements on the real property relating to development, 
construction costs, and other services all ofwhich has increased the value ofthe real property 
in amount, greater than the purchase price paid, and leave ofcourt is requested to amend said 
amount as the actual amount is made known: (k) for the appreciation in the real property and 
the value of the real property at the time the real property was wrongfully taken by the 
defendants' actions and the profits thereto associated with the potential sales of said real 
property, and leave ofcourt is requested to amend said amount as the actual amount is made 
known. 
26.	 That all defendants, acted with oppressive, fraudulent, wanton, malicious or outrageous 
conduct as alleged above. That defendants acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation 
from reasonable standards ofconduct, and that the act was performed by the defendants with 
an understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences" and that the defendants acted 
with an extremely harmful state ofmind, whether that be tenned "malice, oppression, fraud 
or gross negligence", "malice, oppression, wantonness;" or simply "deliberate and willful." 
That defendants well knew that the above conduct would be oppressive as to the plaintiffs 
and others. 
27.	 As a result of the aforementioned, plaintiffs have sustained such losses and have been 
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damaged in a principal sum which exceeds the jurisdictiona11imits of the District Court, 
together with interest at the rate oftwe1ve (12) percent per annum from the date ofloss to the 
date of Judgment, as set forth herein. 
28.	 Plaintiffs have been forced to retain the professiona11ega1 services, to prosecute this claim 
and are entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred pursuant to Idaho Code, 
Sections 12-120, 12-213, and 12-121, of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and further 
pursuant to Rule 11 ofthe I.R.C.P., and further pursuant to the real estate contract between 
the plaintiffs and the trust. That the sum of$12,500.00 is a reasonable sum if this matter is 
uncontested, and a greater sum if contested. 
COUNT ONE 
QUIET TITLE 
29.	 Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all paragraphs of Common Allegations above 
reference of the Complaint herein as if set forth in full herein. 
30.	 That the defendants have obtained the title to the subject real property from the plaintiff 
Berkshire Investments by committing fraud upon the court and/or fraud and/or presented 
claims which were moot in the proceedings above described and/or lacked standing in said 
proceedings. That each and every defendant above named may claim an interest in the real 
property above described. 
31.	 The plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, and no remedy to strike from the public 
records the Judgment contained in exhibit "C" and the equitable powers ofthe Court should 
be employed to strike said public record which is annexed hereto as Exhibit "C" and made 












a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
32.	 That an Order should be entered by this Court striking Exhibit "C" from the public records 
and declaring it has no affect as to Plaintiff Berkshire Investment's right to the subject real 
property. 
33.	 That an Order should be entered declaring the respective rights and liabilities ofthe parties 
herein as to the subject real property. 
COUNT TWO 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
34.	 That plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference all paragraphs numbered 1 through 31 
contained in this complaint as if set forth in full herein. 
35.	 That defendant Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, continues to hold legal title to the 
subject property and has further conspired with the co-defendants in violation of the 
plaintiffs' rights and interests, and it is anticipated that said defendants may cause the 
property to be sold and/or other develop the property and increase their profits and income 
at the expense of the plaintiffs. That the plaintiffs are unprotected with out the benefit of a 
"constructive trust". 
36.	 That a constructive trust should be imposed upon defendant Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust and/or all co-defendants who claim an interest thereto, and the real property subject 
to exhibit "C" and the other co-defendants pending a final resolution ofthe current litigation. 
COUNT THREE 
TORTIUOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 








       
37.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Two as ifset f011h 
in full herein. 
38.	 That defendants set upon a course of conduct and intentionally interfered with plaintiffs' 
contract with the new lender on the subject real property. 
39.	 As a result of the aforementioned, plaintiffs have sustained such losses and have been 
damaged in a principal sum which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the District Court, 
together with interest at the rate oftwelve (12) percent per annum from the date ofloss to the 
date ofJudgment, as set forth, and leave ofcourt is requested to amend said complaint as the 








40.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Three as if set 
forth in full herein. 
41.	 That defendants set upon a course ofconduct and intentionally interfered with a prospective 
economic advantage ofthe plaintiffs to secure profits and income relating to the real property 
titled by plaintiff Berkshire Investments. 
42.	 That defendants intentionally and/or with reckless, wanton, disregard to plaintiffs' rights to 
the real property interfered with the plaintiffs' rights to enjoy profits and benefits to the real 
property. 
43.	 That the defendants knew or should have known of the existence ofthe plaintiffs' economic 
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expectancy related to the development of the subdivision ofthe subject real propeliy and/or 
the ownership of the same. 
44.	 That the conduct on the part ofthe defendants were done in such a manner that amounts to 
intentionally interfering and/or were done in such a manner as to constitute reckless, wanton 
disregard to plaintiffs' rights and were done to induce tennination ofthe plaintiffs' economic 
expectancy. 
45.	 That defendants are interfering for an improper purpose and/or for improper means. 
46.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT FIVE 
ABUSE OF PROCESS 
47.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Four as ifset forth 
in full herein. 
48.	 That the actions of the defendants above alleged were done in a manner that constitutes an 
abuse ofprocess in the prior the litigation, misrepresenting material facts in January 2006 to 
achieve the judgment in the judicial process of the prior litigation which amounted to 
restoring the real property to the trust in which the alleged beneficiaries no longer had an 
interest in and/or too. 
49.	 That such actions above alleged were undertaken by the defendants with an ulterior, 
improper purpose to obtain a judgment which they were not entitled too and to cause the 
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court to quiet title in the trust in which the Taylors had no interest in and/or too. 
50.	 That such actions constitute a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular 
course of the proceeding. 
51.	 That said defendants used a legal process, in a civil matter, against the plaintiffs primarily 
to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed and the defendants are subject to 
liability to the plaintiffs for damages caused by the abuse of process. 
52.	 The "ulterior, improper purpose" included the above referenced allegations, including the 
following: The defendants from the time that they caused the two (2) complaints to be filed 
against the plaintiffs and continuing through the appellate process, and up to the present time 
and the date ofthe filing ofthis complaint, demonstrate the defendants engaged in a wrongful 
and abusive course of action with the sole purpose of delaying, stalling and subverting the 
Plaintiffs' defense and claims in the prior litigation and further fabricating the Taylors 
illegitimate status as beneficiaries which caused the district court to void the legal title held 
by Berkshire Investments and to gain collateral advantages in that proceeding that are not 
authorized by law. Defendants' course of action was not intended to advance the litigation, 
but rather, to delay and/or hinder the litigation and to obtain an improper result by their 
misrepresentation. 
53.	 The above facts constitute a malicious misuse and/or misapplication ofregularly issued civil 
process to accomplish purposes not permitted by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, any 
Idaho statute or any case law decided by the Idaho Appellate Courts. 
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54.	 This course of action included, but was not limited to, intentionally delaying the orderly 
administration ofjustice, intentionally and/or recklessly causing the judicial system to quiet 
title in real property owned by Berkshire Investment and causing a judgment to be recorded 
with the Ada County Recorder's Office which was based upon misrepresentations and 
presenting false and perjured testimony, presenting false and perjured verifications to the 
Court, which were not intended to advance the litigation, but rather, to delay and/or hinder 
the litigation and making sworn statements to the Court which were false and/or misleading. 
55.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT SIX 
NEGLIGENCE 
56.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Five as if set forth 
in full herein. 
57.	 That the defendants owed a duty to conform to the standard of care applicable to litigation 
in the prior proceedings. That defendants, were negligent, careless, and reckless manner, to 
wit: (a) by failing to properly advise the district court of the Taylors' disclaimer of interests 
in the trust and/or illegitimate relationship to the trust as beneficiaries; (b) by advancing 
verified petitions and verified pleadings that were contrary to the true state of facts; (c) by 
causing injuries and damages to the plaintiffs. 
The actions of defendants resulted plaintiffs sustaining the above described damages. 







    





58.	 That the actions of the defendants constitute a breach of the standard of care owed to the 
plaintiffs and the same amount to negligent acts, and in addition violated the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rules, 3.1, & 3.3, as a further breach of the standard of care. 
59.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT SEVEN 
NEGLIGENCE PER SE 
60.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Six as ifset forth 
in full herein. 
61.	 That the defendants committed negligence per se, by the acts above referenced and by 
violating the following standards: I.R.C.P. Rule 11, Idaho Code 12-121,12-123, I.C. 18­
5401,18-5410,18-5406,18-5408, and 19-2116. 
62.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 





63.	 That the plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Sevt:ll as if set 
forth in full herein. 
64.	 That the defendants actions above described amount to action that constitutes gross 













65.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district cOUli, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT NINE 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
66.	 That the Plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the paragraphs of Count Eight herein as if 
set forth in full herein. 
67.	 The conduct of Defendants above-alleged constitutes a course of conduct to interfere with 
Plaintiffs rights and title to real property. Defendants, should be estopped from asserting 
rights inconsistent therewith and for not allowing the plaintiff Berkshire Investments clear 
title to the real property subject to these proceedings. 
68.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT TEN 
QUASI ESTOPPEL 
69.	 That the Plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the paragraphs of Count Nine herein as if 
set forth in full herein. 
70.	 The conduct ofDefendants, demonstrates they entered into a course of conduct inconsistent 
with the intention of the commitments and legal rights between the plaintiff and trust. The 
defendants actions were undeliaken to cause a breach between the plaintiffs and the trust, and 













plaintiffs relied to their detennent upon such assurances ofthe sanctity ofthe contractual and 
conditions, and the defendants should be estopped from asserting rights inconsistent 
therewith. 
71.	 That the plainti ffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
of the district comt, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
COUNT ELEVEN
 
VIOLATIONS UNDER CHAPTER 18 TITLE 78 OF THE IDAHO COnE
 
72.	 That the Plaintiffs re-allege the allegations ofall the paragraphs ofCount Ten herein as ifset 
forth in full herein. 
73.	 The actions of Defendants above described constitute conduct in violation of Idaho Code 
Chapter 18 Title 78 generally and specifically I.e. section 18-7803. 
74.	 The defendants Connie Wright Taylor's and R. John Taylor's actions above referenced 
violated the provisions of sections 18-5401 and 18-5410 of the Idaho Code. 
75.	 John Taylor and the co-defendant attorneys were in violation of law including but mot 
limited to, defendants engaged in multiple instances of perjury and false pretenses in 
violationofIdaho Code Sections 18-2401,18-2403, 18-2407(1)(a)(2)(3)(b)(1), 18-7803, 18­
5401, 18-5410, 18-5406, 18-5408, (perjury) and Idaho Code Sections 18-3401 18-2403, 18­
2407(1)(a)(2)(3)(b)(1), and Section 19-2116 (obtaining property by false pretense) and that 
such action constituted an enterprise, to wit: a group of individuals associated in fact 
planning in unison to deprive Berkshire Investment of the real property and such action 












constitutes an agreement either explicit or implied to engage in the predicat,~ acts above 
described and the co-defendants shared a common purpose to engage in the predicate act in 
an effort to wrongfully obtain real property subject to these proceedings and/or has obtained 
money, personal property, or valuable thing from the plaintiffs herein. That the enterprise 
consists of the law finn of Clark & Feeney and all named co-defendant attorneys who are 
within the law finn and/or the enterprise fuliher consists of all named defendants acting by 
and through their contract and business relationship to acquire the title to the real property 
and/or obtaining damages from the defendants. That such enterprise constitutes an entity, 
for the purpose to allow the group of co-defendants to become associated together for a 
common purpose ofengaging in a course of conduct above described which is sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of Idaho Code § 18-7804(c) and is an "enterprise" within the 
meaning ofIdaho Code Section 18-7803(c). 
76.	 The Defendants, CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE TAYLOR, and PAUL T. 
CLARK, at all relevant times were employed byor associated with CLARK and FEENEY, 
a paIinership and did conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the 
affairs of CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership through a pattern of racketeering activity 
within the meaning ofIdaho Code Section 18-7803(d). Specifically, the Defendants engaged 
in multiple instances of "theft", "false pretense", and "perjury"in violation of Idaho Code 
Sections 18-2403. 
77.	 That Defendant, CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership, is a "person" within the meaning of 
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Idaho Code Section 18-7803(b); The defendants, CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, and DALLAN TAYLOR, and R. JOHN TAYLOR, and PAUL T. 
CLARK, are a "person" within the meaning of Idaho Code Section 18-7803(b); that 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust, is a "person" 
within the meaning of Idaho Code Section 18-7803(b). 
78.	 That Defendant, CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership, is an "enterprise" within the meaning 
ofIdaho Code Section 18-7803(c); that the defendants, CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, and DALLAN TAYLOR, and R. JOHN TAYLOR, and PAUL T. 
CLARK, compromise an "enterprise" within the meaning ofIdaho Code Section 18-7803©; 
that THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust, is an 
"enterprise" within the meaning ofIdaho Code Section 18-7803(c). 
79.	 The Defendants, CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE TAYLOR, and PAUL T. 
CLARK, at all relevant times were employed by or associated with CLARK and FEENEY, 
a partnership and did conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the 
affairs of CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership through a pattern of racketeering activity 
within the meaning ofIdaho Code Section 18-7803(d). Specifically, the Defendants engaged 
in multiple instances of "false pretense", "theft" and "perjury" in violation of Idaho Code 
Sections 18-2403 and 19-21 16. Idaho Code Sections 18-2401, 18-2403, 18­
2407(1)(a)(2)(3)(b)(1), 18-7803, 18-5401, 18-5410, 18-5406, 18-5408, I.C. 19··1430, 19­
1431 (perjury) and Idaho Code Sections 18-3401 18-2403,18-2407(1)(a)(2)(3)(b)(1), and 
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Section 19-2116 (theft-obtaining property by false pretense). The pattern of racketeering 





80.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on October 15, 2004, acting in unison and 
collectively with and for the benefit of the other defendants falsely executed and stated in 
their Appellants' Brief filed in the Idaho Supreme Court case number 30817, "The Taylors 
are beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson Trust.. ..". That such action together with other 
action taken before the courts, together the execution of Exhibit "B" annexed hereto 
amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 violation and in addition amounted to a violation under 
I.A.R. Rule 11.1., based upon the defendants' inconsistent judicial admissions before the 
probate court and specifically the facts signed under oath by R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A"& 
was specifically involved in the drafting and/or modification ofthe "Disclaimer, Release and 
Indemnity Agreement" above referenced and further knew that the beneficiaries were not the 
real parties in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no longer beneficiaries under 
the trust. That such actions on the part of defendant Connie Taylor was false and known to 
be false by defendant Connie Taylor and defendant committed the offense ofgrand theft and 
the offense of false pretense. That such action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which 
caused damage to plaintiffs' property and/or was conduct by said defendant Connie Taylor 
and the other members within the enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of 





   
 
 
         
 
their position as public servants by engaging in conduct within or related to their official 
duties, and/or by failing or refusing to perfonn an official duty, in such manner as to affect 
the plainti ffs herein and the same resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss of property 





81. That the defendant Paul T. Clark on or about May 6, 2005, acting in unison and collectively 
with and for the benefit of the other defendants falsely stated in their oral argument before 
the Idaho Supreme Court case number 30817, that the Taylors are beneficiaries of the 
Theodore Johnson Trust. That such action together with other action taken before the courts, 
together the execution of Exhibit "B" annexed hereto amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 
violation and in addition amounted to a violation under LA.R. Rule 11.1., based upon the 
defendants' inconsistent judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the 
facts signed under oath by R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A". That such actions on the part of 
defendant Paul T. Clark was false and known to be false by defendant Paul T. Clark and 
defendant committed the offense ofgrand theft and the offense offalse pretense. That such 
action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property 
and/or was conduct by defendant Paul T. Clark and the other members within the I~nterprise, 
which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of their position as public servants by engaging 
in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to perfOlm 












an official duty, in such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same resulted in 
damages to the plaintiffs by loss of property which was taken with a value which exceeds 





82.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about January 13, 2006, acting in unison and 
collectively with and for the benefit of the other defendants falsely executed and stated in 
the proposed amended verified complaint, contained on page 1, executed by R. John Taylor 
under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan 
Taylor is a resident of Ada County Idaho. All of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of 
the Theodore L. Johnson Trust." That said verified amended complaint is annexed hereto 
as Exhibit "B" and is made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. That Exhibit B" was 
executed by defendant R. John Taylor, under oath and as a verified complaint, who was 
acting on behalfof all defendants. That such action together with other action taken before 
the courts, amounted to an I.R.C.P., Rule II violation, based upon the co-defendants' 
inconsistent judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the facts signed 
under oath by R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A" and further executed by defendant Connie 
Wright Taylor & was specifically involved in the drafting and/or modification of the 
"Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement" above referenced and further knew that the 
beneficiaries were not the real parties in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no 








            
longer beneficiaries under the trust. That such actions on the part of defendants Connie 
Taylor and defendant R. John Taylor were false and known to be false by defendants Connie 
Taylor & defendant R. John Taylor, and defendants committed the offense ofgrand theft, the 
offense of false pretense, and the offense of perjury. That in addition thereto defendant 
Connie Wright Taylor, acted as accessory to criminal action ofR. John Taylor, pursuant to 
I.C. 19-1430, 19-1431, and such committed the offense and crime of perjury, That such 
action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property 
and/or was conduct by said defendant Connie Taylor and defendant R. John Taylor and the 
other members within the enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of their 
position as public servants by engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, 
and/or by failing or refusing to perfonn an official duty, in such manner as to affect the 
plaintiffs herein and the same resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss ofproperty which 
was taken with a value which exceeds One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00). 
Predicate Offense No.4 
FALSE PRETENSE-THEFT 
83.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about February 2,2007 during oral argument 
before the Fourth Judicial District In and For the County of Ada, State ofIdaho, stated that 
"I believe based upon the Supreme Court ruling that the beneficiaries are the real parties in 
interest under this contract..." That said statement was made to the court after defendant 
Connie Wright Taylor had previously executed Exhibit "A" hereto & was specifically 








involved in the drafting and/or modification of the "Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity 
Agreement" above referenced and further knew that the beneficiari es were not the real parties 
in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no longer beneficimies under the trust. 
That defendant Connie Wright Taylor, acting in unison and collectively with and for the 
benefit of the other co-defendants falsely represented the status ofthe beneficiaries and the 
real parties in interest and that such action together with other action taken before the courts, 
amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 violation, based upon the co-defendants' inconsistent 
judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the facts signed under oath by 
R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A" and further executed by defendant Connie Wright Taylor. That 
such actions on the part of defendants Connie Wright Taylor and the co-defendants were 
false and known to be false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor &. and defendants committed 
the offense ofgrand theft, the offense of false pretense. That such action amounted to a theft 
by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property and/or was conduct by said 
defendant Connie Taylor and the other members within the enterprise, which amounted to 
a misuse and/or abuse of their position as public servants by engaging in conduct within or 
related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in 
such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same resulted in damages to the 
plaintiffs by loss of property which was taken with a value which exceeds One Thousand 
Dollars ($1,000.00). 
Predicate Offense No.5 
FALSE PRETENSE-THEFT 







             
 
 
84.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on December 3, 2004, acting in unison and 
collectively with and for the benefit of the other defendants falsely executed and stated in 
their Appellants' Reply Brief filed in the Idaho Supreme Court case number 30817, "The 
Mailes are not entitled to attorneys fees under the contract because the Taylors are not parties 
to the contraCt and they are not acting as the Trust. The Taylors are acting as beneficiaries." 
That such assertions were known to be false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor. That such 
action together with other action taken before the courts, together the execution of Exhibit 
"B" annexed hereto amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 violation and in addition amounted to 
a violation under LA.R. Rule 11.1., and further based upon the defendants' inconsistent 
judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the facts signed under oath by 
R. John Taylor and executed by defendant Connie Wright Taylor, in Exhibit "A" & 
defendant Connie Wright Taylor was specifically involved in the drafting and/or 
modification of the "Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement" above referenced and 
further knew that the beneficiaries were not the real parties in interest and further knew that 
the Taylors were no longer beneficiaries under the trust. That such actions on the part of 
defendant Connie Taylor was false and known to be false by defendant Connie Taylor and 
defendant committed the offense ofgrand theft and the offense offalse pretense. That such 
action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property 
and/or was conduct by said defendant Connie Taylor and the other members within the 




          
enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of their position as public servants by 
engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to 
perfonn an official duty, in such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same 
resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss ofproperty which was taken with a value which 





85.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about April 3, 2006 during oral argument 
before the Fourth Judicial District In and For the County of Ada, State ofIdaho" stated that 
" ...what we are asking this court to do is find that this property needs to be titled in the names 
of these beneficiaries with appropriate protections that assure that they can't sell it out from 
under, that money will be set aside and be available". That said statement was made to the 
court after defendant Connie Wright Taylor had previously executed Exhibit "A" hereto & 
was specifically involved in the drafting and/or modification ofthe "Disclaimer, Release and 
Indemnity Agreement" above referenced and further knew that the beneficiaries were not the 
real parties in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no longer beneficiaries under 
the trust. That defendant Connie Wright Taylor, acting in unison and collectively with and 
for the benefit of the other co-defendants falsely represented the status of the beneficiaries 
and the real parties in interest and that such action together with other action taken before the 
courts, amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 violation, based upon the co-defendants' 









             
 
 
inconsistent judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the facts signed 
under oath by R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A" and fmiher executed by defendant Connie 
Wright Taylor. That such actions on the part ofdefendants Connie Wright Taylor and the co­
defendants were false and known to be false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor & and 
defendants committed the offense of grand theft, the offense of false pretense.. That such 
action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property 
and/or was conduct by said defendant Connie Taylor and the other members within the 
enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of their position as public servants by 
engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to 
perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same 
resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss ofproperty which was taken with a value which 





86.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about June 7, 2006 wrongfully submitted a 
form ofjudgment, captioned, " Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". That said pleading was 
prepared by defendant Connie Wright Taylor and submitted to the Fourth Judicial District 
In and For the County ofAda, State ofIdaho. That the judgment was entered and additional 
amended judgments and/or corrected judgments were submitted to the court by defendant 
Connie Wright Taylor divesting Berkshire Investments' of its real property and further 









             
resulting injudgment to be entered against the plaintiffs based upon the beneficiaries' claims. 
That said judgment and the amendments thereto was made to the court after defendant 
Connie Wright Taylor had previously executed Exhibit "A" hereto & was specifically 
involved in the drafting and/or modification of the "Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity 
Agreement" above referenced and further knew that the beneficiaries were not the real parties 
in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no longer beneficiaries under the trust. 
That defendant Connie Wright Taylor, acting in unison and collectively with and for the 
benefit ofthe other co-defendants falsely represented the status of the beneficiaries and the 
real parties in interest and that such action together with other action taken before the courts, 
amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 violation, based upon the co-defendants' inconsistent 
judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically the facts signed under oath by 
R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A" and fuliher executed by defendant Connie Wright Taylor. That 
such actions on the part of defendants Connie Wright Taylor and the co-defendants were 
false and known to be false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor & and defendants committed 
the offense ofgrand theft, the offense offalse pretense. That such action amounted to a theft 
by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' property and/or was conduct by said 
defendant Connie Taylor and the other members within the enterprise, which amounted to 
a misuse and/or abuse of their position as public servants by engaging in conduct within or 
related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to perfonTI an official duty, in 
such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same resulted in damages to the 
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plaintiffs by loss of property which was taken with a value which exceeds One Thousand 
Dollars ($1,000.00). 
Predicate Offense No.8 
FALSE PRETENSE-THEFT 
87.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about June 15,2006 wrongfully submitted 
a Memorandum of Attorneys Fees and Costs, based upon the judgment, captioned, " 
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". That thereafter defendant Connie Wright Taylor on 
or about June 30,2006 wrongfully submitted an Amended Memorandum ofAttorneys Fees 
and Costs, based upon the judgment, captioned, " Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". That 
said pleading was prepared by defendant Connie Wright Taylor and submitted to the Fourth 
Judicial District In and For the County ofAda, State ofIdaho. That the pleadings submitted 
resulted in an additional amended judgment which was submitted to the court by defendant 
Connie Wright Taylor resulting in judgment to be entered against the plaintiffs based upon 
the beneficiaries' claims for a certain sum ofmoney. That said amended judgment awarding 
costs entered by the court after defendant Connie Wright Taylor had previously executed 
Exhibit "A" hereto & was specifically involved in the drafting and/or modification of the 
"Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement" above referenced and further knew that the 
beneficiaries were not the real parties in interest and further knew that the Taylors were no 
longer beneficiaries under the trust. That defendant Connie Wright Taylor, acting in unison 
and collectively with and for the benefit of the other co-defendants falsely represented the 





            
      
status of the beneficiaries and the real parties in interest and that such action together with 
other action taken before the courts, amounted to an LR.C.P., Rule 11 violation, based upon 
the co-defendants' inconsistent judicial admissions before the probate court and specifically 
the facts signed under oath by R. John Taylor in Exhibit "A" and further executed by 
defendant Connie Wright Taylor. That such actions on the part ofdefendants Connie Wright 
Taylor and the co-defendants were false and known to be false by defendant Connie Wright 
Taylor & and defendants committed the offense ofgrand theft, the offense offalse pretense. 
That such action amounted to a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs 
and/or was conduct by said defendant Connie Taylor and the other members within the 
enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse oftheir position as public servants by 
engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to 
perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect the plaintiffs herein and the same 
resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss ofproperty which was taken with a value which 





88.	 That the defendant Connie Wright Taylor on or about July 19th, 2004, improperly filed a 
complaint and demand for jury trial on behalfofthe trust. The complaint verified under oath 
by R. John Taylor and executed by Connie Wright Taylor, set forth that the Taylors were 
successor trustees of the trust. That defendants knew that they had failed to obtain failed to 











obtain court approval as specifically required under I.C. 68-101 & 68-107. The trust, by and 
through its alleged successor trustees, and acting in unison and collectively with and for the 
benefit ofthe other defendants falsely stated in their complaint, that the Taylors were trustees 
ofthe Theodore Johnson Trust. That such action by co-defendants was false and known to 
be false by defendant Connie Wright Taylor and R. John Taylor and defendants committed 
the offense ofgrand theft, the offense offalse pretense and the offense ofperjury. That such 
action amounted to peljury and a theft by co-defendants, which caused damage to plaintiffs' 
property and/or was conduct by defendant Connie Wright and R. John Taylor and the other 
members within the enterprise, which amounted to a misuse and/or abuse oftheirposition 
as public servants by engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by 
failing or refusing to perfonn an official duty, in such manner as to affect the pI aintiffs herein 
and the same resulted in damages to the plaintiffs by loss ofproperty which was taken with 
a value which exceeds One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00). 
89.	 That as a result of such violations, the real property which was wrongfully taken by the 
defendants above described must be restored to the plaintiffBerkshire Investment consistent 
with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 (C) (D)(l). 
90.	 That as a result of such violations, the real property which was wrongfully taken by the 
defendants above described must be restored to the plaintiffBerkshire Investment consistent 
with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 (C) (D)(l). 
91.	 That the plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount that exceeds the jurisdictional amount 
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of the district court, and leave of court is requested to amend said complaint as the actual 
amount is made known. 
92.	 That Plaintiffs, be granted Judgment against Defendants for a sum which exceeds the 
jurisdictional basis of the District Court, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve 
(12) percent per annum from September 17, 2002, to and including the date ofJudgment and 
thereafter at the highest legal rate until paid in full and leave of court is requested to amend 
this complaint as soon as the same becomes known to the plaintiffs, together with treble 
damages consistent with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 
(a), together with costs and attorneys fees incurred. 
93.	 That the plaintiffs, be granted Judgment against Defendants for a sum which exceeds the 
jurisdictional basis ofthe District Court, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve 
(12) percent per annum from September 17, 2002, to and including the date ofJuclgment and 
thereafterat the highest legal rate until paid in full and leave of court is requested to amend 
this complaint as soon as the same becomes known to the plaintiffs, together with treble 
damages consistent with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 
(a), together with costs and attorneys fees incurred 
94.	 Plaintiffs have been forced to retain the professional legal services, to prosecute this claim 
and are entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred pursuant to Idaho Code, 
Sections 18-7805, ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and further pursuant to Rule 11 of 
the LR.C.P., and further pursuant to the real estate contract between the plaintiffs and the 
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Ct
trust. That the sum of$12,500.00, is a reasonable sum if this matter is uncontested, and a 
greater sum if contested. 
COUNT TWELVE 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
95.	 That the Plaintiffs re-allege the allegations of all the paragraphs of Count Eleven herein as 
if set forth in full herein. 
96.	 The conduct ofDefendants, above described demonstrate that they should be estopped from 
the benefits of the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims" as the same constitutes judicial 
estoppel. 
RESERVATION TO AMEND PLEADINGS 
That by reason of the acts complained herein of plaintiffs, leave of Court will he requested 
pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1604, for the Court's ruling on the alleged issue of 
exemplary/punitive damages in light ofthe pleadings, affidavits, depositions, etc., filed ofrecord or 
as may hereinafter be provided to the Court. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs herewith demands a trial by jury on all triable issues in this matter. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffprays for judgment against Defendants as follows: 
1.	 That Plaintiffs, be granted Judgment against Defendants for a sum which exceeds the 
jurisdictional basis of the District Court, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve 
(12) percent per annum from September 17,2002, to and including the date ofJudgment and 








          
thereafter at the highest legal rate until paid in full and leave of court is requested to amend 
this complaint as soon as the same becomes known to the plaintiffs. 
2.	 That Plaintiffs, be granted Judgment against Defendants for a sum which exceeds the 
jurisdictional basis ofthe District Court, together with interest thereon at the rate oftwelve 
(12) percent per annum from September 17,2002, to and including the date ofJudgment and 
thereafter at the highest legal rate until paid in full and leave of court is requested to amend 
this complaint as soon as the same becomes known to the plaintiffs. 
3.	 That Plaintiffs, be granted Judgment against Defendants for a sum which exceeds the 
jurisdictional basis of the District Court, together with interest thereon at the rate of twelve 
(12) percent per annum from September 17,2002, to and including the date ofJudgment and 
thereafter at the highest legal rate until paid in full and leave of court is requested to amend 
this complaint as soon as the same becomes known to the plaintiffs, together with treble 
damages consistent with Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 
(a), together with costs and attorneys fees incurred. 
4.	 That the defendants be required to set forth herein by proper pleading the nature of their 
claims in and to real property which is the subject of these proceedings and as described in 
Exhibit "COl thereof. 
5.	 That an Order be entered against the defendants ordering them to divest themselves of any 
interest, direct or indirect, in the real property subject to these proceedings consistent with 
Idaho Code Chapter 18 Title 78, and specifically section 18-7805 (c) (d)(1). 















6.	 That plaintiffs' interest in and to the subject property be declared senior and superior and that 
any other claim, right, title, or interest ofDefendants (or any other interested paliy or person 
in and to the subject property, if such right, title, claim or interest exists) be declared junior 
and subservient to the interest ofplaintiffs in the subject property. 
7.	 That a Decree be entered adjudging and decreeing that PlaintiffBerkshire Investments is the 
owner and is entitled to possession of the subject propeIiY, and further ordering that 
defendants, have no right, title or interest or claim in and to the subject real property or any 
part thereof and that each of them, and further, that any person claiming under them and all 
persons having any lien, claim, judgment or decree on or against said real property or any 
pati, parcel or portion thereof (either as purchaser, encumbrancer, or otherwise) be baITed 
and foreclosed from all equity of redemption in and to the said real property and in and to 
every part, parcel and portion thereof. 
8.	 That this COUli order a constructive trust be imposed upon the subject real property according 
to law and that the any and all proceeds of the same be subject to such constructive trust. 
9.	 For plaintiffs' attorneys fees to be incurred and the costs incurred. 
10.	 For such other and further relief in law or equity that the Court may deem proper in the 
premIses. 
rJ.-<;:; 
DATED This6')--\ day of March, 2008. 






















County of Ada )
 
THOMAS G. MAILE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
He is one ofthe above named Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, he has read the foregoing 
AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, knows the contents thereof: and 
believe the same to be true and correct to the best ofhis knowledge and beliefand acknowledges he 
executed the same upon behalf of the Plaintiffs. 
DATED: this 2 t::~ ofMarch, 2008: 
C~ /A?:ft~ 
THOMAS MAILE 
'7 <!-- SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
C 7 day of March, 2008 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at toqlC ,Iclaho 1._ ?... il-7/:(/(i ~ My Commission i&pires: I- 1 CV .../ 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 




















THOMAS G. MAILE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
He is one ofthe managing member for Berkshire Investments LLC., one ofthe above named 
Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action, he has read the foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, knows the contents thereof, and believe the same to be true and 
correct to the best ofhis knowledge and beliefand acknowledges he executed the same upon behalf 
of Berkshire Investmen~ ~p' 
DATED This~dayofMarch,2008. 
- SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
_1_)_ day of March, 2008. 
~.. 
Notary Public for Idaho
 
Residing at [oq/(' , Idah?f ... --:>
 
My Commission 'EXpires: 7(:~ ~c?t/I :;
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IN THE MATTER OF ) Case No. -----~ 9 ) .:.l. 
THE THEODORE 1. JOHNSON ) PETITION FOR APPOINT.lVIIINT10 




12 COIvrES NOW the Petitioner and pursuant to Idaho Code 68-101 petitions this 80lU1: for an 
:"3 
'-_0-1 order appointing R. Jolm Taylor, Reed J. Taylor, and DaHan Taylor as Successor Co-Trustees to the 
14 
above-entitled Trust, effective as of June 10, 2004. 
15 
This Petition is filed on the grounds and for the reason that the Successor Trustees, Beth 1.16 
Rogers and Andrew T. Rogers, resigned as Trustees on June 10,2004, and nominated as Successor 17 




as Successor Trustee ofthe Tbeodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust, Garth J. Fisher, also decL'ned and 
20 
rdusecl to serve as Trustee, joining in the nomination ofR. John Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor, and Dallan 
21 
1. Taylor. That declination was also effective as of June 10,2004.22 
23 A copy ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust is attached as Exhibit A to this Petition, 
24 A copy of the resignation and declination are attached as Exhibit B to this Petition. 
~5 
o 
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LAW OFFIC~S OF 
. CLARK AND FEEN EY. 
Exhihit "A" to Complaint & Demand for JlIr.Y.Mi~1!ON. IDP-.HO 83501 000183
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\ '. John Taylor ", ( . 
, I The petitioner's 88-year-old mother, I-Ielen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary ofthis 





attached as Exhibit C. Paragraph 4 of said agreement provided for the resignation of Rogers and 
Fisher and the appointment of 101111, Reed, and Dallan Taylor as successor co-trustees oftl1e trust. 
WHEREFORE Petitioner prays for an order of this court appointing R ]ol~n Taylor, Reed 





















DATED this ~ day of November, 2004. 
CLARK 
By-----'~~~~_---I-':...-'l--_ 
Connie W. Taylor, a me 1b ofthe firm. 
Attomeys for Petitioner. 
VERlFICATION 




COUNTY OF Nez Perce ) 
are true, R. Jolm Taylor, being swam, says that the facts s~ 
accurate, and complete to the best of applicant's lcno(vle 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this L day of November, 2004. 
NOTARY Pl113.1fIC	 1 
Residing at: !\, !,e J.AJf;.-ft7/1.	 I! 
My Commissiol1 Expires:	 Z; / I yJ D).­
, f
, 
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. I ,~, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, I 
I HEREBYCERTIFY that on the J!/- day ofNovember, 2004, rcaused to be served El true 
and correct copy of the above document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
1 
following: 
o US. Mail2 















8483 W Harmonica Way 
Boise,ID 83709 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEES 
o Overnight Mail 
o Telecopy (FAX) 
~~~--

Carmie Taylor  
Attomey for Petitioner 
3 
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2 CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
3 Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1229 M ajJ1 Street 










COME NOW the Plaintiffs by and through their undersigned counsel of record, Connie 
W. Taylor of the Law Offices of Clark and Feeney, and for a cause o[actioll and claim for relief 
against the Defendants, complain, state, and allege as follows: 
1. PARTIES 
1.1 Reed and R. Jolm Taylor are residents ofNez Perce County, IdallO; Dallan T[Wlor 
is a resident of Ada County JdallO. All ofthe plaintiffs are residual benefici8ries oftbe Theodo re 
L. Johnson Trust. TIley bring this action 011 tlleir own behalfand also as assignees ofccrtain 0111 er 
beneficiaries or residual beneficiaries of said trust. 
AI\IENDED COI\'!l)LAfNT 
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CLARK AND FBE.~BY 
Exhibit "[l" to Complnint & DCOlnlld I'or Jury TdnlEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI-TE
 
STATE OF IDAI-lO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF ADA
 
REED TAYLOR, DALLANTAYLOR, ) 






THOMAS MAlLE, N and COLLEEN ) 
MAILE, husband and wi fe, and ) 
BERKSI-IIRB INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendan ts. ) 
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1.2 Thomas Maile, N (herein ailer Thomas Maile) is engaged in the practice of law 
at 380 W. Slale Street, Eagle, Ada County, Idaho. Defendant Thomas Mai:e is a licenseu real 
estale broker D/B/A Thomas Maile Real Estate Company. Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile are 
husband and wife and all acts complained ofherein were for [be benefit oflbe marilal community. 
They were at all limes relevant herelo believed to be residents ofAda Counly, Idaho. 
1.3 TIle Defendant Berkshire Investments, LLC is an Idaho limited liability comp8ny 
which W,lS formed by lbe Defendant Thomas G. Maile. 
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
2.1 This court has jurisdiclion over the person and subject matter ofllle above-
captioned malter by virtue orthe facllhat all ofthe acts and/or omissions complained ofoccLtrrec1 
within Ada County, Idaho and relate to real properly located in Ada Counly . 
III. FACTUAL AJJLEGATJONS 
3.1. The Defendant Thomas Mai Ie, acting in his capacity as an attorney wi lh offt ces In 
Eagle, Idaho, represenled Theodore Johnson on a variety ofmatters for a period ofmany years. 
The allorney client relationship continued until Mr. Johnson's death on September 14, 2002. 
After Mr. Jol111son's death, the Defendanl Thomas Maile continued to act as the attorney for the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Theodore L. Johnson Eslale. 
3.2. During the course of/he attomeyclient relationship, Thomas Maile represenled and 
advised Mr. Johnson in relation to the potential sale of 40 acres ofproperty near Eagle, Idaho_ 
Mr. Maile, as attomey for the Johnson Trust, rejected an ofIer lo purchase the property for 
$400,000, staling it was "extremely low" based on comparable sales in the area. Witbin
 
approximately two months Thomas and Colleen Maile entered into an earnest money agreement:
 
lo purchase the 40 acres for the price oI$400,000.00, 011 temlS which were nearly idenlicallo tlle
 
prior oIrer which was rejected.
 
3.3 The Defendanls Maile fonned a limited liability compauy, Berkshire Investments", 
LLC, and assigned their rights under the eamestmoney agreement to Berkshjre Investments, LLC" 
which subsequently purchased the propelty iI'om the Johnson Tmst. 
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3.4 Theodore Johnson died on September 14, 2002. The successor trustees of the 
Theodore Johnson Trust (Beth and Andy Rogers) closed the transaction seJ'Jing the propeliy to 
Berkshire Investments, LLC on September 16, 2002. 
3.5 The Rogers had a connict o[interest with other beneficiDries, in that they were also 
beneficiaries of the Trust. Under tbe terms o[ the trust, the Rogers would receive their share 
immediu tely, as opposed to the maj ori ty of otller beneficiaries who would ei ther recei ve inc orne 
only [or their lives, or would receive nothing until the death of their mother, 
3.6 Defendants acquired the Linder Road real property with knowledge of the Rogers' 
connict of interest, and with knowledge that the Rogers had failed to carry out their fiduciary 
responsibility by: 
3.6.1 Failing to carefully examining the fairness and propriety ofthe lransae Lion 
before closing it. 
3.6.2 Failing to obtain court approval prior to consummating (he sale. 
3.7 Benef1cinries demanded that Defendants restore the Linder Road property to tile 
beneficiaries, but the Defendants have refused to do so. 
IV. AIDING IN nREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
4.1 The Defendants aided the tmstees in disposing oftrust property in violation oftlJ eir 
fiduciary responsibilities and duty of loyalty, and received ille trust propmiy with knowledge 0 f 
the same, includi ng Imowledge that the sale had not been approved by a court as required by 1. C . 
68-108(b), 
4.2 Plaintiffs seek imposition ofa constructive trust, and an order quieting tille to the
 




4.3 In the aJtemative, Plaintiffs seek money damages for the difference between tJl e
 
amount paid and the fair market val ue of the property at the time of trial.
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The Defendants should take notice that the Plaintiffs may iile a prelrial mOlion pursuant 
to statute to amend the complaint to include a prayer for punilive damages. The Defendants 
should conduct their lrial preparation accordingly. 
VI. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
As a direct result ofthe Defendants' actions, the Plaintiffs have been required to institule 
und prosecute this action and have incurred costs and attorney fees. The Plaintiffs have 
employed the law finn of Clark and Feeney and have agreed to pay said firm a reasonable 
attomeys fee and are entitled to be reimbursed far said fees under the statutes and case law of the 
state afIdaho, specifically Idaho Code 12-120(3), 12-121 and 12-123, as well as under the lerms 
of the conlract for purchase of the real properly which is at issue in this matter. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and forjudgmenl, order and decree ofthis COl-Jrt 
against Defendants as follows: 
1. J:<or imposition of a conslructive trust; 
2. Por an order restoring the real property to the Trust and quieting title to the real 
property in the name ort]le Theodore L. Johnson Revocable TnIst; 
3. In the alternative, ior an order awarding money damages for {he difference between 
the alTlOllnt Defendants paid and the [air market valLie of the propeliy at the tin1c o[trial. 
4. For pre and postjlldgmenl interest al the statutOly rate until fully paid; 
5. For all costs of this action; 
6. For attorneys fees incllrred by the plaintif[s inprosecllting this action uncler Idaho
 
Code 12-120, 12-121, 12-123;
 




8. For such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable. 
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5 STATE OF IDAHO )I 
I )ss. 6 County of Nez Perce ) 
7 R. John Taylor, being first duJy sworn on oath, deposes and says: 













Notmy Public 'n and fqr the Stale ofldabo
 

















LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
By--"""'=-:------,-------'-""-:--f----:c-f~t:_------­
Connie W. Taylor, a member 











By ___ ~~~ ____ ~~-+~~r. ___________ --
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICI~ 
I HElUlBY CERTIFY thaI on the _ ~ay ofMarch, 2006, I caused to be served " trlle 




Thomas Maile, IV ~ Hand Delivered
 Overnight MailAttorney at Law o 
380 West State Street Telecopy (FAX)o 
Eugle, 10 83616
 U.S. Mail 





Dennis M. Charney ~ I-land Delivered
 Overnight MailAttorney at Law o 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
::cEO TAYLOR, DALLAN TA YLOR, 
mel R. JOI-IN TA YLOR, 
Plaintiffs, 
Ys. 
fHOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
13 MAILE, Imsband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, 




THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE) 








21 I-lOMAS MAILE IV, and COLLEEN ) 
MAILE, husband and wife, and ) 
22 BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC., ) 
) 
23 Defendants. ) 
-----~)24 
25 
26 JUDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS 
) 









JUDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' 
CLAIMS 
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,). DAVID NA'v'/\n ~1'':), (>kH!~ 
Hy 11\1(,,::" ')()i\I\1~·~,:(jf! 
DI;"II I '( 
4 
5 
6 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF TilE 
7 STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
8 :<.,ED TAYLOR, DALLAN TA YLOR, 
9 lnd R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
10 Plaintiffs, 
11 vs. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
13 AlLE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMP ANY, 

















16 THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE) 





I-lOMAS MArLE IV, and COLLEEN 
21 MAILE, husband and wife, and 















26 JUDGMENT ON 13ENEFICIARJES' CLAIMS 
Case No. CV OC 0400473D 
JUDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' 
CL I S 
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LAW OFFICES Or 
Tllis cause came on before the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper for hearing on a Motion for 
'un1mary Judgment on tIle Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the findings offact and conclusions 
1 
Ifla"\y contained within this Court's May 15,2006 Oreler Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary2 











1. The July 22, 2002 Earnest Money Agreement between The Theodore L. Johnson 
7 
Zevocable Trust and defendants Thomas Maile IV and Colleen Maile for the purchase of the Linder8 
{oael properly which is more fully described in paragraph 3 of this Judgment,and all subsequent9 
10 IOcu111ents relating to that transaction, are void as a matter of law.
 
11








lohnson Revocable Trust, ill fee simple.

14 
3. TIle Linder Road property is more particularly described as follows:15 
16 The N0I1hwest QUaJ1er of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, 
Range I West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho 
17 
4. The Defendants' remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses, all ofwhich were18 
19 Jased on either equitable claims or the assertion that the Plaintiffs were wrongfully interfering with 
20 he Defendants' right to possess the Linder Road Property, are hereby dismissed. Specifi cally, those 








B. Coun1erclaims VII and VIII (equitable estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel)25 
26 IUDGMENT ON BENEFICIARlES' CLAIMS 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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C.	 Counterclaim X (fraudulent transfer)
 
Counterclaim XI (unjust enrichment)
 D. 
Affirmative defenses of Laches, Failure to Mitigate, and Unclean I-lands. 
E. 
The Plaintiff Be;neficiaries are the prevailing parties in this matter. 
5. 
DATED 'his It) day of June, 2006. 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper 
3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH runICIAL DjiCI'-'1I'-'­
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0
 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/ Counter-Defendants, 
THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/ Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENT, LLC, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court 
motion was argued before the Court on November 10, 2005. On December 23, 2005 the Idaho
 
Supreme Court issued its decision in the companion case of Taylor v. Maile (2205 Opinion No.
 
135) and remanded that case. On the same day, this Court ordered the parties to submit
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supplemental briefing on the effect of the remanded case on the entire litigation. On January 23, 
2006 the parties filed supplemental briefing. The Court considered the matter fully under 
advisement on that date. The defendants/counterclaimants ("Defendants") take the position that the 
remand has no effect on the issues pending before the Court in the instant case. The 
plaintiffs/counterdefendants ("Plaintiffs") have now moved to amend their Complaint in this case 
so as to conform it to the Supreme Court decision. 
After considering the briefs and arguments of the parties, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is hereby granted in part and denied in part. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Thomas Maile, IV was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included 
drafting the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and overseeing the 
administration of the trust. After Johnson's death, Maile represented Johnson's estate. The 
underlying transaction in this case is a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson entered into an earnest 
money agreement for the purchase of 40 acres in Eagle, Idaho. 
On January 23, 2004, Plaintiffs, certain residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson 
Trust, filed a lawsuit, alleging three causes of action and seeking damages andlor rescission of the 
sale. On April 23, 2004, this Court dismissed the claims of the Plaintiffs based upon a lack of 
standing. That case was remanded by the Idaho Supreme Court as mentioned above. 
On July 22, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a new action against Defendants after the original trustees 
purportedly transferred their status as trustees to the Plaintiffs. On November 10, 2005, this Court 
heard oral arguments on Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, in which Plaintiffs sought to 
summary judgment on all of Defendants' counterclaims and affirmative defenses. 

















































































II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is "rendered forthwith
 
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if ,my, show that
 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
 
as a matter of law." See also First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964
 
P.2d 654, 657 (1998). I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that an adverse party may not simply rely upon mere
 
allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a genuine
 
issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stuffs, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The
 
affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set forth facts that would be admissible in
 
evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify. See id.; LR.C.P. 56(e).
 
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be
 
anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
 
genuine issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagon ofAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69
 
(1996). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the court to draw
 
all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Williams v. Blakley, 114
 




A.	 Counterclaim I - Tortious Interference 
with Contract 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. set forth 
the elements for tortious interference with contract: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of 
the contract on the part of the defendant; (3) intentional interference causing a breach of the
 
contract; and (4) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. 121 Idaho 266, 283-284, 824 P.2d
 



































































































841, 858-859 (1991). After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, "the burden is on the
 
defendant to prove justification." Id.
 
In regard to the land sale contract between Defendants and the Trust, the Court finds that the 
Defendants have failed to set forth any evidence that the land sale contract was breached. 
Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to that portion of 
Counterclaim I. 
In regard to the commercial loan contract between Defendants and their lending institution, 
the Court finds there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Plaintiffs interfered 
with this loan contract. Therefore, the motion for summary jUd~th respect to that 
portion of Counterclaim I. 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Counterclaim I is granted in part ,md denied in 
part. 
B.	 Counterclaim II - Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage
 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. defined
 
the elements of the tort of interference with a prospective economic advantage as follows:
 
A plaintiff, in order to establish a prima facie case, must show that any claimed
 
intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage resulting in injury to
 
the plaintiff "is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference
 
itself." The plaintiff must establish that the intentional interference resulting in
 
injury was wrongful, which may be shown by proof that either: (I) the defendant
 
had an improper objective or purpose to hann the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used
 
a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business relationship.
 
121 Idaho 266, 286, 824 P.2d 841,861 (1991) (citations omitted).
 
The Court finds that the Defendants have failed to set forth more than a scintilla of evidence
 
that Plaintiffs' conduct in this case was "wrongful," and therefore, summary judgment on
 
Counterclaim II is granted.
 

































































































C. Counterclaims III - Slander of Title 
Defendants claim that Plaintiffs slandered the title of the Linder Road Property by filing the
 
lis pendens in connection with the two above-entitled actions. A cause of action for slander of title
 
requires Defendants to prove the following: (1) uttering or publishing of slanderous statements; (2)
 
wh.en the statements were false; (3) with malice; and (4) resulting in special damages. Weaver v.
 
Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 701, 8 P.3d 1234, 1244 (2000) (citation omitted). "Malice has been
 
generally defined by Idaho courts as a recldess disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement. An
 
action will not lie where a statement in slander of title, although false, was made in good faith with
 
probable cause for believing it." Id
 
The Court finds that Defendants have set forth no more than a scintilla of evidence showing 
that Plaintiffs have maliciously asserted an interest in the Linder Road Property, ,md therefore, 
summary judgment on Counterclaim III is granted. 
D. Counterclaim IV - Wrongful Cloud of Title 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp. described the nature of an 
action to remove a cloud of title as follows: 
An action to remove a cloud upon a title is an equitable one and is intended to 
remove a particular instrument or documentary evidence of title or encumbrance 
against the title which is hanging over or threatening a plaintiffs title therein. "It 
may broadly be stated that a cloud on title is an outstanding instrument, record, 
claim, or encumbrance which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may 
nevertheless impair the title to property." 
99 Idaho 662, 667, 586 P.2d 1378, 1383 (1978) (citations omitted),
 
The Court finds that Defendants have set forth no more than a scintilla of evidence showing 
that Plaintiffs asserted interest in the Linder Road Property is actually invalid or inoperative, and 
therefore, summary judgment on Counterclaim IV is granted 






















































































E. Counterclaim V - Civil Conspiracy 
The Court finds that civil conspiracy is not itself a claim for relief. See McPheters v. Maile,
 
138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317,321 (2003) ("Civil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief.")
 
(citations omitted). Summary judgment on Defendants' Counterclaim V is therefore granted.
 
F. Counterclaim VI - Breach of Contract 
Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence that Plaintiffs have breached 
the terms of the land sale contract, and therefore, summary judgment on Defendants' Counterclaim 
VI is granted. 
G. Counterclaim VII and VIII - Equitable Estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel 
Consistent with its earlier findings in its Memorandum Decision & Order addressing 
Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the Court finds that there remains a genuine 
issue of fact as to the availability of the equitable claims brought in Counterclaims VII and VIII. 
H. Counterclaim IX - Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied into every contract. Luzar v. W
 
Surety, 107 Idaho 693, 696, 692 P.2d 337, 340 (1984). However, "[a] violation of the implied
 
covenant is a breach of the contract. It does not result in a cause of action separate from the breach
 
of contract claims." Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289, 824
 
P.2d 841, 864 (1991 ) (citations omitted).
 
Accordingly, summary judgment on Counterclaim IX is granted. 
I. Counterclaim X - Fraudulent Transfer 
Counterclaim X alleges that Plaintiffs fraudulently distributed the corpus of the Theodore 
Johnson Trust in order to subvert any award that Defendants may ultimately receive in this dispute. 
See generally I.e. § 55-913. 




























































































The Court finds that the Defendants, as tort claimants, are "creditors" of the TlUst as defined 
under Idaho's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. See I.C. § 55-910(3), (4) (stating that a person has 
a "claim" if they have any "right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment"). The 
Court finds further that there remains a genuine issue of material fact regarding Plaintiffs' alleged 
fraudulent intent. See I.C. § 55-908 (stating that the question of fraudulent intent "is one offact, and 
J. Counterclaim XI - Unjust Enrichment 
Count XI of the Defendants' counterclaims alleges unjust enrichment. Defendants claim that 
if the Plaintiffs prevail in this lawsuit entitling them to recover the Linder Road Property, it would 
be inequitable to allow Plaintiffs to retain the benefits of Defendants labor, time, and expenses 
spent to enhance the value of the Property. 
The Court finds that there remains a genuine issue of material fact with re:spect to this 
K. Counterclaim XII - Indemnification Agreement 
Counterclaim XII challenges the tenns of the Disclaimer, Release and Indemnification 
Agreement in which the Plaintiffs agreed to indemnify all the trust beneficiaries from any and all 
claims or damages that might arise from this litigation. 
The Court fmds that this issue is not ripe for judicial intervention, and therefore, summary 
judgment on Counterclaim XII is granted. 
L. Counterclaim XIII - Breach of Peace and Quiet Enjoyment 
Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence that Plaintiffs have interfered 
with their right to use their property; instead, Defendants allege only that they have not been able to 


















































































f ( ( 
sell the property or build on it. The Court finds that this is not the kind of interference that amounts 
to a nuisance. Summary Judgment on Counterclaim XIII is therefore granted. 
M. Counterclaim XIV - Breach of Warranty Deed
 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Koelker v. Turnbull described the nature of an action for breach
 
of covenants of title as follows:
 
[I]t is axiomatic that the plaintiff in an action for breach of covenants of title has
 
the burden of proving that he was evicted or prevented from using the conveyed
 
property by a person asserting title paramount to that of the plaintiffs.... "[A]
 
covenant of warranty of title does not extend to apparent or unfounded titles in
 
land, but only against hostile titles, superior in fact to those of the grantor."
 
127 Idaho 262, 265, 899 P.2d 972, 975 (1995) (citations omitted).
 
The Court finds that Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence that 
Plaintiffs have asserted a claim of superior title, and therefore, summary judgment on Counterclaim 
XIV is granted. 
N. Counterclaim XV - Continuing Tort 
The Court finds that there is no separate cause of action for a "continued tort," and 
therefore, summary judgment on Counterclaim :xv is granted. 
O. Affirmative Defenses 
In addition to the above counterclaims, Plaintiffs also seek rulings on the following 
affirmative defenses asserted by Defendants. 
i. Failure to Join Indispensable Parties 
The burden of demonstrating the indispensability of a party rests on the moving party.
 
Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 705, 496 P.2d 939, 942 (1972). Defendants initially asserted
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Because the Trust is a party in the second lawsuit, which has been consolidated with the 
original lawsuit, the Court fInds that Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence 
2
 
that an indispensable party has not been joined in this litigation. Plaintiffs' motion to strike this
 3
 









 The necessary elements of a laches claim are:
 
7
 (1) defendant's invasion of plaintiff's rights, (2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights,
 
8
 the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit, (3) lack of 
knowledge by defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights, and (4) injury or 
9




Finucane v. Village ofHayden, 86 Idaho 199,206,384 P.2d 236,240 (1963).11
 






 iii. Failure to Mitigate
 
15











vi. Release and Reconveyance/Accord and Satisfaction20
 
21
 Defendants assert that the Accord and Satisfaction and the Release of Reconveyance
 
22
 provisions of the Linder Road Property purchase agreement bar's any tort claims brought by or on
 
23
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In accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in this litigation, this Court 
finds that the terms of the purchase agreement do not bar Plaintiffs' fiduciary duty claim as a matter 
of law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to some of the 
Defendants' counterclaims; therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is dl~nied in part. 
With respect to several other counterclaims, the Court finds that there are not genuine issues of 
material fact and that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
Dated this / 3 ~ of February 2006.
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MAY 15 2006 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN MAll..,E, 
husband and wife, THOMAS MAll..,E REAL 
ESTATE COMPANY, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/ Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN MAILE, 
husband and wife, THOMAS MAll..,E REAL 
ESTATE COMPA.l\lY, ::h"1d BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENT, LLC, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claim. The Court heard oral arguments on the motion on April 3, 2006 and took the 
matter fully under advisement at that time. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ruDGMENT ON BENEFICIAlUES' CLAIM 
-Page 1 
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Thomas Maile, IV was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included 
drafting the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and overseeing the 
administration of the trust. After Johnson's death, Maile represented Johnson's estate. 
The underlying transaction in this case is a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor 
of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson entered into an earnest 
money agreement for the purchase of 40 acres in Eagle, ID. The purchase price was $400,000. Maile 
later assigned his interest in the purchase money agreement to Berkshire Investments, LLC. The 
assignment was approved by Beth Rogers acting for Theodore Johnson through a power of attorney. 
Johnson died of cancer before title was conveyed. After Johnson's death, co-trustl~es Beth Rogers 
and Andrew Rogers conveyed title to Berkshire Investments and executed a warranty deed on behalf 
of the trust as seller. The title was subject to a deed of trust, which was paid in full on January 04, 
2004. 
On January 22, 2004, Plaintiffs, certain residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson 
Trust, filed a lis pendens against the 40 acres in Eagle. On January 23, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a 
lawsuit, alleging three causes of action and seeking damages and/or rescission of the sale. Plaintiffs 
claimed the property at the time Maile entered into the earnest money agreement with Johnson was 
worth at least $1.2 million. Plaintiffs asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Maile, arguing 
Maile owed Theodore Johnson a fiduciary duty by virtue of their attorney client relationship and that 
Maile breached this duty by not dealing fairly with Johnson, not advising Johnson to consult 
independent counsel, paying less than fair market value for the property, and offering to purchase the 
property on tenns unfavorable to Johnson. Plaintiffs also asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim 






















































































against Maile in his capacity as a realtor/broker, alleging he breached his fiduciary duty by failing to 
deal honestly with Johnson and by purchasing the property for less than fair market value. Finally, 
Plaintiffs asserted professional negligence claims against Maile in his capacity as attorney and as real 
estate broker. 
Maile answered the complaint and then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the residual 
beneficiaries lacked standing to bring every asserted cause of action. On April 23, 2004, the Court 
dismissed the claims of the Plaintiffs based upon a lack of standing. The Court found that the 
Plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the trust and only the trustee could bring a claim. The Plaintiffs 
appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court. 
On July 22, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a new action against Defendants. Plaintiffs were believed to 
be the new co-trustees of the trust. The original trustees supposedly transferred their status as trustees 
to the Plaintiffs. On September 29, 2004 the Court ordered that the two cases be consolidated. On 
November 17, 2004, the Honorable Christopher Bieter entered an order appointing the Plaintiffs as 
co-successor trustees of the Trust. On April 13, 2005, Judge Bieter set aside the November 17, 2004 
order. On May 2, 2005, Judge Bieter allowed the Plaintiffs to be appointed as successor trustees, but 
denied their request to be appointed retroactively. 
On December 30, 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court released its decision regarding the 
Plaintiffs' original claims. On March 9, 2006, this Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to amend their 
complaint, bringing it in line with the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 
As it currently stands, Plaintiffs' complaint contains a single cause of action:
 
The Defendants aided the trustees in disposing of trust property in violation of their 
fiduciary responsibilities and duty of loyalty, and received the trust property with 

























































































knowledge of the same, including knowledge that the sale had not been approved by a 
court as required by I. C. 68-1 08(b). 
Amended Complaint at 3. 
A. Standard of Review 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is "rendered forthwith if
 
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
 
matter of law." See also First Sec. Bank ofIdaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654,
 
657 (1998). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that an adverse party may not simply rely
 
upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is
 
a genuine issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994).
 
The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set forth facts that would be admissible
 
in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify. See id.; I.R.C.P. 56(e).
 
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be anchored
 
in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
 
issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69 (1996).
 
Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the court to draw all
 
reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Williams v. Blakley, 114 Idaho
 
323,324,757 P.2d 186,187 (1988); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 255, 698 P.2d 315,317 (1985).
 
B. Analysis 
Plaintiffs argue that Beth Rogers' decision, as a co-trustee, to close the sale of the Linder 
Road Property involved a conflict of interest. Plaintiffs argue that the conflict of interest arose as a 
result of the fact that Beth Rogers, as an income beneficiary, stood to receive a benefit from the sale 








































































of the corpus of the trust (the Linder Road Property) to the detriment of the Plaintiffs as residual 
beneficiaries. It is Plaintiffs' argument that this conflict of interest gave rise to an unrebuttable 
necessity for court approval. Absent such approval, Plaintiffs argue that a constructive trust should be 
imposed upon the Linder Road Property as a matter of law. 
Defendants argue that no such conflict arose because the Trust and the Rogers were already 
bound to perform under the terms of the purchase agreement. Defendants argue in the alternative that 
the transaction, completed in spite of the conflict of interest, should be subject to the prudent investor 
rule rather than declared void as a matter of law. 
First, the Court finds that Beth Rogers' dual role as trustee and beneficiary created a conflict 
of interest as a matter of law. See I.C. § 68-108(b) ("If the duty of the trustee and his individual 
interest or his interest as trustee of another trust, conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the power 
may be exercised only by court authorization ...."); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 79, cmt. b(l) 
(draft 2005) ("In many modem trust situations, the trustee (or one or more co-trustee:s) will be a life 
beneficiary or perhaps a remainder beneficiary. In a case of this type, there will inevitably be some 
conflicts of interest ....") (citations omitted). 
Second, the Court finds that the scope of the trustee's power subject to judicial oversight 
under Idaho Code section 68-1 08(b) applies not only to the power to enter into a contract for the sale 
of real property but also to the power to close a sale of real property. See Taylor v. AI/aile, 142 Idaho 
253, _, 127 P.3d 156, 162 (2005) ("Where a trustee has an individual interest in the trust that poses a 
conflict in the exercise of a trust power, such as the power to close a sale ofreal property, 'the power 
may be exercised only by court authorization .... ' I.C. § 68-1 08(b).") (emphasis added). 
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Third, the Court finds that the existence of the conflict of interest necessitated prior court
 
approval of the closing of the sale. See I.C. § 68-108(b) ("If the duty of the trustee and his individual
 
interest or his interest as trustee of another trust, conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the power
 
may be exercised only by court authorization . ...") (emphasis added). Deficient of such approval,
 
the Court finds that the contract for the sale of the Linder Road Property was void as a matter of law.
 
See id. at _, 127 P.3d at 163, 164 (recognizing "a trust beneficiary's right to pursue redress where
 
trust property has wrongfully made its way into the hands of a third party" through th~ "imposition of
 
a constructive trust or, if that is not available, recovery of the proceeds from the sale of the property").
 
Fourth, the Court finds that the Defendants had actual knowledge that the Rogers were
 
exceeding or improperly exercising their powers as a matter of law. See I.e. § 68·,110 (protecting
 
third persons dealing with a trustee or assisting a trustee with a transaction from liability unless the
 
third person has "actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly exercising
 
them"); Fenton v. King Hill Irrigation Dist., 67 Idaho 456, 466-67, 186 P.2d 477, 483 (1947)
 
("Where a fiduciary wrongfully transfers to a third person property which he holds as fiduciary, the
 
third person is chargeable as constructive trustee of the property unless he is a bona fide purchaser.")
 
(citation omitted). This conclusion is based on the finding that there is no genuine issue of fact that
 
Defendant Thomas G. Maile prepared the trust agreement creating the conflict of interest. See R. John
 




Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.
 
The Court hereby orders the Plaintiffs to prepare a proposed judgment consistent with the 
findings set forth above. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A A 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plainti ffs/Counter-Defendants, 
vs. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC., 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAlLE, husband and wife, mOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC. 
Defendants. 








DAMAGES GROUNDED ON THE
 
THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
 
This matter came before the Court on the only remaining claim in this action. For the 
reasons stated below, the Court hereby declines to award damages to the Counterclaimants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING COUNTERCLAIMANTS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 








































































(hereinafter referred to as "Maile") and finds in favor of the Counter-Defendants, (hen::inafter 
referred to as "the Taylors"). This decision shall constitute the Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Attorney Thomas Maile purchased forty (40) acres of land in Ada County, Idaho, from the
 
Trust which he had established for his client, Theodore L. "Ted" Johnson. Following protracted
 
litigation, this Court ruled that the purchase and sale of the land was void and ordered that the
 
property be held in constructive trust for the benefit of the true owner, namely the Theodore L.
 
Johnson Revocable Trust. I
 
On October 11 th and 12th, 2006, the only remaining factual issue was tried to the Court. 
That is, whether or not, and if so, to what extent, was Maile entitled to recover damages from the 
Trust on the theory of unjust enriclunent. 
Following the evidentiary portion of the trial, the Court directed counsel for the parties to 
submit written closing arguments, proposed Findings ofFact and Conclusions of Law and finally, 
written rebuttal closing arguments. The Court considered the matter fully under advisement on 
October 27, 2006. 
Maile's original client, Ted Johnson, was an elderly man with whom Maile had an 
attorney/client relationship previously. Johnson received an offer to purchase property he owned 
which is the subject matter of this dispute. The offer was for four hundred thousand doUars 
($400,000.00). Mr. Johnson brought the offer to Mr. Maile and asked for his advice. Mr. Maile 
1 relY/or v. Maile. CV OC 04004730 (4th Oist. Idaho May, 15,2006) (Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim). The Court also previously ordered the Taylors to return th(: purchase 
money, $400,000.00, less any amount Maile could establish he was entitled to under a theory ofunju5t enrichment. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING COUNTERCLAIMANT'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 







































































made some inquiries and concluded that $400,000 was too Iowan offer for the property. He 
communicated this fact to the offeror on behalf ofhis client. Subsequently, Mr. Johnson brought 
Mr. Maile a copy of an independent appraisal that he had had done which said that the property 
was in fact worth only $400,000. Mr. Maile then offered to purchase the property for that sum. 
Mr. Johnson, acting in his capacity as Trustee of the Ted Johnson Revocable Trust, accepted the 
offer. He died shortly thereafter so Mr. Maile began to deal with the successor Trustees, 
including Beth Rogers who was also a beneficiary of the Trust. In her capacity as Trustee, Ms. 
Rogers agreed to the sale without seeking court approval in violation ofldaho Code § 68-108(b) 
(2004).2 This Court previously ruled that the purchase and sale was void.3 This was based on the 
fact that Mr. Maile himself had drafted the documents effectuating the sale of the property to 
himself. and he had drafted the Trust docu~ents that created the conflict of interest between Beth 
Rogers as co-trustee and beneficiary. Maile was not a good faith purchaser without notice of the 
Trustees' violation of her fiduciary duties to the Trust. 
If the Trustees had sought judicial approval before selling the property, a court mayor may 
not have approved of the sale. There is evidence in the record to support Mr. Maile's claiim that 
the property really was worth only $400.000 at the time he purchased it from the Trust ifl(~luding 
the unsolicited offer to purchase the property for exactly that amount and an independent 
appraisal obtained by Mr. Johnson which also said the property was worth $400,000. On the 
other hand, Mr. Maile also knew that the property might be worth considerably more than 




2 "If the duty of the trustee and his individual interest or his interest as trustee of another trust, conflict in the exercise
 
of a trust power, the power may be exercised only by court authorization ...."
 
J Taylor v. Maile, CV OC 0400473 D (4th Dis!. Idaho May. 15,2006) (Order Granting PlaintiWs Motion for
 
Summary judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim).
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$400,000 at the time he offered to purchase it for this amount. In any event, Mr. Maile apparently 
thought it would be a good buy at $400,000. In hindsight, Mr. Maile's professional judgment, 
which he had a duty to exercise for the benefit of his client, may have been obscured by his 
personal desire to take advantage of what he believed to be an attractive business transaction. Mr. 
Maile should have advised Mr. Johnson to seek independent advice about selling him the land for 
$400,000. Indeed, Mr. Maile testified at trial that he did exactly that. The Court is not persuaded 
that Mr. Maile so advised Mr. Johnson.4 
There is also ample evidence in the record to support the contention that Mr. Maile 
engaged in sharp practices in drafting the documents connected to the transaction. For example, 
Mr. Maile included a clause in the contract that would have barred any cause of action against 
himself after only one year. This is an unusual deviation from the statutory limitation 0111 causes 
of action of this type. Mr. Maile claimed that this was a scrivener's error; however, this claim is 
belied by the fact that he pled it as an affinnative defense in this lawsuit. This is the type of self-
dealing that has led to the claim that Mr. Maile has unclean hands and should not be granted any 
equitable relief. 
The doctrine of unclean hands says that one seeking equitable relief must come to the 
Court with clean hands.5 In this case, Maile is accused of self-dealing, in violation of his 
fiduciary duty to his client. Contrary to Maile's assertion, an attorney's duty of fairness, honor, 
honesty, loyalty, and fidelity owed to his client is a fiduciary duty. See Blough v. Wellman, 132 
4 The Court has reached this conclusion and makes this finding without regard to the deposition testimony of Beth 
Rogers. 
I The doctrine of"unclean hands" is based on the maxim that, "he who comes into equity must come with clean 
hands." Gi/berl v. Nampa School Disi. No. 131. 104 Idaho 137, 145,651 P.2d 1, 9 (1983). It allows a courtto deny 
equitable relief to a litigant on the ground that his or her conduct has been "inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or 
fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy at issue." Id 
MEMORANDUM DECJSION AND ORDER DENYING COUNTERCLAIMANT'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 

































Idaho 424, 426,974 P.2d 70.72 (1999); see also Matter o/Lutz, ]00 Idaho 45, 49,592 P.2d 1362, 
1366 (1979) ("The relationship between an attorney and client is one of the highest character. It is 
a fiduciary relationship binding the attorney with the strictest accountability and fidelity to his 
client's interest."); In re Carter, 59 Idaho 547, -,86 P.2d 162, 163 (1938) (holding that 
attorney/client relationship was "fiduciary relationship of the highest character, binding [the 
attorneyJ with the strictest accountability and fidelity to his client's interests."). Nevertheless, the 
Court believes that this case can be decided on its merits by analyzing the elements of the unjust 
enrichment claim, without proclaiming that Mr. Maile is barred from seeking equitable relief 
based on the doctrine of unclean hands. 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment sounds in quasi-contract or implied-in­
law contract. Beeo Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 
466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The theory is based upon the defendant having 
received a benefit which wouJd be inequitable to retain at least without 
compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention of the benefit is unjust. Id. 
In order to establish the prima facie case for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must 
show that there was: (I) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; 
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit 
under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the 
benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof. Idaho Lumber, Inc. 
v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 745, 710 P.2d 647,655 (Ct.App.1985). 
Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378,382,941 P.2d 350,354 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The Court finds that the Trust was not unjustly enriched by Maile's expenditures after the 
purchase. Maile's expenditures conferred no benefit upon the Johnson Trust, the trustees, nor the 
beneficiaries. Even if the Trust had received a benefit, they certainly did not do so under 
circumstances that would make it inequitable for it to retain the benefit without paying Mr. Maile. 
While it is true that Mr. Maile and his related entities invested a substantial amount of 
time and money in attempting to develop the property, the Court finds. based upon substantial and 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING COUNTERCLAIMANT'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 



































































competent evidence, the amount of time and effort spent did not increase the value of the 
property. The Court finds that the fair market value of the property is $1.8 million dollars 
presently, which is the same fair market value of the property with or without any expenditures or 
improvements made by Mr. Maile. 
CONCLUSION 
As previously ordered, the Trust must pay Mr. Maile the $400,000 he paid for the 
property. However, the Court declines to order the Trust to reimburse Maile for costs incurred in 
developing the property. 
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants are the prevailing parties on the 
Defendantlcounterclaimants' claim of unjust enrichment and will award costs accordingly. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
'f'­
Dated this 1:i day of November, 2006. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1,1. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, by 
United States Mail, on this 2-1 day of November 2006, one copy ofthe foregoing as notice 
pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes 
addressed as follows: 
Paul Thomas Clark ((J U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Drawer 285 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Lewiston,ID 83501 ( ) Facsimile 
Thomas G. Maile lfJ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
ATIORNEY AT LAW ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State Street ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 ( ) Facsimile 
Jack S. Gjording (y) U.S. Mail, Postage Pmpaid 
GJORDlNG & FOUSER ( ) Hand Delivered 
PO Box 2837 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83702 ( ) Facsimile 
Dennis M. Charney If) U.S. Mail, Postage Pr(:paid 
951 East Plaza Drive, Ste. 140 ( ) Hand Delivered 
Eagle, ID 83616 ( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District COUI1 




MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING COUNT (CLAIMANT'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 












/;~uty Cler  
t
7....(" , r i r I () 1\ i l~; I t'( f':" LEllEt;E1VED \I. 
MAY y 32008 
Ada County Clerk 
Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349
 




101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
 












Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka 
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT 
TAYLOR, CLARK AND FEENEY AND 
PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED 
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COME NOW the defendants, Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul 
T. Clark, by and through the undersigned counsel, and answer plaintiffs' amended complaint as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. 
2. These defendants deny each and every allegation of plaintiffs' complaint 
not specifically admitted herein. 
3. Responding to paragraph 1 of plaintiffs' complaint, defendants admit that 
the Mailes are husband and wife and reside in Ada County, that Berkshire Investments is an 
Idaho limited liability company, that Clark and Feeney is an Idaho partnership, that Paul T. Clark 
is an individual, but deny the remaining allegations of said paragraph. 
4. Responding to paragraph 2 of plaintiffs' amended complaint, defendants 
admit that Clark and Feeney, Paul T. Clark and Connie Wright Taylor were at all relevant times 
licensed Idaho attorneys and were conducting business in the state of Idaho, but deny the 
remaining allegations of said paragraph. 
5. Defendants admit paragraph 3 of plaintiffs' amended complaint. 
6. Responding to a multitude of references in plaintiffs' amended complaint 
to documents and pleadings, those documents or pleadings speak for themselves and require no 
admission or denial; but defendants do not accept and specifically deny the plaintiffs' 
characterizations of such documents. 
7. Defendant admit that the plaintiffs attempted to purchase property from 
the Theodore Johnson Trust, admit that the purchase was found to be improper by The 
ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND 





Honorable Ronald J. Roper, and admit that judgment was entered returning the property to the 
Johnson Trust. Defendants deny any impropriety on their part in the conduct of said Iawsuit. 
8. Defendants deny the plaintiffs' allegation that they were not beneficiaries 
of the Johnson Trust as it relates to the Linder Road property. The Release and Disclaimer 
executed by the successor trustees and all beneficiaries specifically reserved to the Taylors all 
rights to the lawsuit against plaintiffs seeking recovery of the property they had acquired 
wrongfully. 
9. Defendants deny the remaining allegations ofplaintiffs , amended 
complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
10. Plaintiffs' claims are barred pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(8) because there is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
11. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata. collateral 
estoppel, waiver, laches and unclean hands. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
12. Plaintiffs had no attorney-client relationship with these defendants and 
therefore lack standing to bring their negligence claims or breach of fiduciary duty claims. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
13. Plaintiffs' tort claims are barred by the economic loss rule. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
14. This action was brought frivolously and without foundation, in violation 
ofRule 11 of the Idaho Rules ofCivil Procedure. 
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Now, therefore, defendants pray for judgment as follows: 
1. That plaintiffs' amended complaint be dismissed and plaintiffs take 
nothing thereby; 
2. For costs and attorney fees incurred herein; and 
3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just, including 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this !4day ofMay, 2008. 





Mark . Prusynski - Of t e inn 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright 
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9ft day of May, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND 
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK TO AMENDED COMPLAINT to be served by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State St. ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616-4902 ( 1i'acsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
Connie W. Taylor ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK AND FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Drawer 285 ( ) 9vernight Mail 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 (~acsimile 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Jolm Taylor, DaHan Taylor 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust 
ANSWER OF CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK AND 




Mark S. ruSynSkl 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
.'1'-'._____ FILED 2r'~ 
.\.M_. ~ .~~.P/l1_._ _. . 
MAY 132008 
..I. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
DEFENDANT TAYLORS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS ANn/OR 
CONSIDER THE SAME A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord, Thomas G. Maile, and 
hereby move this Court to strike the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants John Taylor, DaHan 
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Taylor and Theodore L. Johnson Trust, as the pleading and the accompanying Affidavit in Support 
ofthe Motion to Dismiss, has attachments thereto, beyond the complaint and/or amended complaint 
filed by the plaintiffs. 
That claims and/or issues raised in the Motion to Dismiss, should be considered a.s a motion 
for summary judgment, since the motion relies upon an accompanying affidavit and attachments 
thereto. 
This motion is based on the records, papers, pleadings, and an affidavit and a Memorandum 
Briefwhich will be filed at such later date as required under the LR.C.P., and the files ofthis action, 
and further pursuant to LR.C.P. Rules 12(B) & 56. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED thisbayofMay, 2008. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 13 day ofMay, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE/MOTION TO CONVERT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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() U. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() U. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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comUE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 8350 I 
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ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
John Taylor, DaHan Taylor 
and the Theodore Johnson Trust 
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CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k1a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, n Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES 
I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSON IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
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CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state of Idaho and a member of 
Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson 
Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my o\'m personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of Mr. Maile's Answer to 
Amend Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial dated March 15,2006 and Verified Amended Answer 
and Counter-Claim and Demand for Jury Trial dated September 7, 2005 filed in Ada County Case 
No CV OC 0400473D. 
3. I am attaching hereto as Exhibits Band C respectively, true and correct copies of Judge 
Wilper's Orders on Summary Judgment dated 02/13/06 and 05/15/06. 
4. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit D, a true and correct copy of Judge Wilper's decision 
on the Unjust Enrichment. 
rh 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /L/~ay of May, 2008. 
Notary Public in and for the State ofIdaho. 
Residing at UtutJ!1JY) therein. 
My commission expires: ~3.b/"j2t?/'i 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J.!f!!! day of May, 2008 I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV U.S. Mail 
380 West State Street Hand Delivered 
Eagle, 10 83616 o Overnight Mail 
o Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mark Prusynski 
MOFFATT THOMAS : U.S. Mail Hand Delivered 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor o Overnight Mail 
PO Box 829 o Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384 
Boise, ID 83701 
Connie W. Taylor 
Attorney for Defendants 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 3 
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~ Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 1105 
Elaine H. Lee, ISB No. 6217 
Q) GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC
 509 W. Hays Street
 P.O. Box 2837
 
Boise, Idaho 83701
 ~~ Telephone: (208)336-9777 
Facsimile: (208)336~9l77 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and ) Case No. CV OC 0400473D 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, )
 
( )
 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, ) ANSWER TO AMENDED COtvlPLAINT 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN )
 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS )
 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and )
 














THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN ) 
MAILE, husband and wife, and ) 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 

























TheDefendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Gjording & Fouser, in response to 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, hereby admit, deny and affirmatively allege as follows: 
1. Defendants deny each and every allegation ofPlaintiffs ' Amended Complaint which 
is not specifically admitted herein. 
2. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 1.1 ofPlaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint, with the exception that Defendants has insufficient knowledge that Plaintiffs are 
assignees ofcertain other beneficiaries or residual beneficiaries of the trust and therefore deny the 
same.( 
3. Defendants admit the allegations contained in paragraph 1.2 ofPlaintiffs , Amended 
Complaint, with the exception that Defendants deny the actions complained ofwere for the benefit 
of the marital community. 
4. Defendants admit paragraphs 1.3, 2.1, and 3.4, of the Plaintiffs' Amended 
Complaint. 
5. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6 
(including subparagraphs), 3.7,4.1,4.2,4.3, as well as paragraphs V and VI and the prayer of 
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. 
6. That the allegations hereinafter set forth are alleged as to all Party Plaintiffs, 
collectively, either in their individual capacity andlor in their capacity as trustees ofthe Theodore L. 
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Johnson Revocable Trust. 
7. The affirmative defenses, request for attorney fees, prayer for relief and counterclaims 
contained in all Defendants/Counter-Claimants' previous answers to the various complaints and 
amended complaints filed in the matter ofTaylor v. Maile, et aI, and in the matter ofthe Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust v. Thomas Maile, et aI., are incorporated herein by reference. 
8. In addition, Defendants specifically allege the following additional affirmative defenses with 
respect to the new clil.ims alleged in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint in Taylor v. Maile, et. aI., the 
lawsuit brought by the Taylors in their individual capacities. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
9. Plaintiffs have failed to join indispensable parties. ( 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
10. The Plaintiffs claims are barred under the law of Trusts and by the doctrines of Release 
and/or Accord and Satisfaction, in that therelease ofthe Successor Trustees from liability is a bar to 
the present proceedings. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
11. Plaintiffs claims are barred because the Defendants were bona fide purchasers for value 
of the Linder Road Property. In pleading this as an affirmative defense, Defendants in no way 
admit that the Successor Trustees breached any duty they owed to the Trust. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
12. The majority ofthe beneficiaries ofthe Theodore JohnsonTrust collectively consented to the 
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sale of the Linder Road property to Defendants. 
-~. 
DATED this ~ day of March, 2006. 
OJORDINO & FaUSER, PLLC 
1 CK S. GJORD 0
'-""----.~ ~~ 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE( =t---. . . 
I hereby certify that on the 15day ofMarch, 2006, a true and correct copy ofthe foregoing 
was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
Connie W. Taylor ~ U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
Paul Thomas Clark _ express mail 
CLARK. and FEENEY _ hand delivery 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
" ~_.". ,,'" -"-{ ~'.(";~ .~~ 
Attorney at Law Jl ·\jG li.380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
~ Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
~ Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 ,,' -~~ ~i: GL':....'~i( 
, :) i·\ ';;:: t.ii:V .@:::a Idaho State Bar No. 2378 ;:ti'~7~U1S 
.
© Attorney for Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments 
y
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUJ\JTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN ) 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,) 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON ) 
REVOCABLE TRUST, ) 
) Case No. CV OC 04-05656D 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. ) 
VS. ) VERIFIED AMENDED 
) ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM 
THOMAS MAILE IV. and COLLEEN ) AND DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL 
MAILE, husband and wife, and ) 




The Defendants/Counter-Claimants, THOMAS G. MAILE and COLLEEN MAILE, husband 
and wife, and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., by and through their attorney, Jack Gjording 
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amended answer and respond to the Plaintiff's Complaint and, as an Amended Counter-Claim 
against the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, complain and allege as follows: 
AMENDED ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
The Defendants, by and through their attorney, JACK GJORDING, in response to Plaintiff's 
Complaint, hereby admit, deny an affirmative allege, as follows: 
1. Defendants' deny each and every allegation of Plaintiff's Complaint which is net 
specifically admitted herein. 
2. Defendants' admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1.2, with the exception that 
Defendants' deny the actions complained of were for the benefit of the marital community, and 
further admit paragraph 1.3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
3. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 1.1,2.1,3.1,3.2,3.3,4.1,4.2, 
4.3, 5.1, 5.2, 6.1, 6.2 (and all sub-paragraphs thereunder paragraphs VII & VIII., of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.). 
4. That the allegations hereinafter set forth are alleged as to all Party Plairtiffs, collectively, 
either in their individual capacity and/or in their capactity as trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the claims alleged set forth in the Plaintiff's Complaint 
arise from a certain Earnest Money Agreement to Purchase Real Property, dated July 25,2002, by 







and between Defendants Thomas Maile & Colleen Maile, husband and wife, as buyer, and tiE 
Trustee and/or the Trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable and/or the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Trust"), as seller, which is annexed 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affinnatively allege that the Plaintiffs have failed to join an indispensable parties 
to these proceedings and as such is barred from pursing the present action. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affinnatively allege that the Plaintiff's claims are barred based upon the doctrire 
of "Latches" to wit: The Plaintiff was provided all infonnation and facts relating to that certain 
Earnest Money Agreement to Purchase Real Property, dated July 25, 2002, by and between 
Defendants Thomas Maile & Colleen Maile, husband and wife, as buyer, and the Co-Trusteles of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller. In addition the Plaintiff had knowledge of a 
subsequent assignment of interests from the Mailes to Berkshire Investments, L.L.C., captioned 
"Assignment ofEarnest Money Agreement to Purchase Real Property," dated August20, 2002, and 
specifically approved to by the Co-Trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller. 
Said assignment is annexed hereto as Exhibit "B" and made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein 
Thereafter the Plaintiffs, individually, and/or as successor trustees, and/or through the PlaintiffS' 
predecessor Trustee, and/or through Plaintiffs' attorney Connie Taylor, obtained infonnation tha 
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indicated that Berkshire Investments 1.1.C., was undertaking to acquire new construction financing 
for the subject real property which would result in paying off the Deed of Trust, payable to the 
Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust. That Plaintiffs chose not to pursue any litigation until tIE 
PlaintiffTrust was paid in full on or about January 4,2004 and thereafter in attempt to seek leverage 
and "cloud title" to Berkshire Investments' legal ownership to the real property, filed previous 
litigation, and the present litigation and caused to be filed two (2) Lis Pendens affecting the real 
property in the previous litigation. The Plaintiffs have plead for a rescission of the contract an:l 
imposition of a constructive trust on the real property. That Plaintiffs actions in delaying the filing 
of it's Complaint and the Lis Pendens after the purchase price was paid in full constitutes "Laches. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred based upon the doctrines 
of Equitable Estoppel and/or Quasi-Estoppel, based upon the allegations herein set forth. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the PlaintiffS failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate 
their claimed or alleged damages, if any. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred based upon the doctrire 
of "Unclean Hands" and Plaintiffs herein should forfeit any rights to monies alleged owing. Tre 
allegations relating to the requested rescission of the contract and the restoration of the title to the 










Plaintiffs constitutes "Unclean Hands," and any alleged damages due and owing to Plaintiffs should 
be offset by Defendants/Counter-Claimants' damages set forth hereinafter. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affinnatively allege that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred because there is a binding 
Release & Reconveyance whereby the Defendants/Counter-Claimants and the "Trust" released one 
another from any and all claims and demands, which is binding upon the Plaintiffs. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affinnatively allege that the Plaintiff's claims are barred because there is an Accord 
and Satisfaction by and between the Defendants and the "Trust". 
NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affinnatively allege that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred because the individual 
Plaintiffs and/or the "Trust", failed to obtain Court appointed status as "Trustees" and as such the 
"Trust" and/or the purported "Trustees" had no legal standing to pursue the Complaintand Demand 
for Jury Trial filed herein and the same must be dismissed by Order of Court as the same: is Voil 
and/or Voidable as against Public Policy and/or by Idaho Law. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
As a result of the filing ofPlaintiffs' Complaints,Defendants have been required to retain legal 
counsel to defend said action, and are entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs by reason of the 
provisions contained in Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121, and 12-123 and Rule 11 ofthe Idaho Rules 




   
 
of Civil Procedure. Also, Defendants are entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs by reasons of 
the provisions contained in Exhibits "A" and "B", from the "Trust" and the individual Plaintiffs 
The sum of $25,000.00 is a reasonable amount for attorneys fees if this matter is uncontested ani 
a greater reasonable fee is warranted if contested. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, these answering Defendants pray that Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with 
prejudice, that Plaintiffs' take nothing hereby, that Defendants be awarded their costs and attorney's 
fees incurred, and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premIses. 
COUNTER-CLAIM 
The Defendants, THOMAS G. MAILE and COLLEEN MAILE, husband and wife, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, L.L.C. (hereinafter referred to as "Counter-Claimants"), by and 
through their attorney, Thomas Maile, Attorney at Law, without waiving their right/or the Court 
to consider Motions to be filed herein and/or Motions which have been filed, and as and for a 
Counter-Claim against Counter-Defendants, the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust ("'Trust'') 
and the individual Plaintiffs, Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and R. John Taylor, and each of them, 
complains and alleges as follows: 
GENERAL STATEMENT FOR COUNTER-CLAIM 
That the Defendants/Counter-Claimants hereinafter allege actions against all Plaintiffs both in 








their individual capacity and in their capacity as "purported" trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust (hereinafter referred to as "Trust") and against the "Trust". That the actions 
committed by the individual Plaintiffs, Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and R. John Taylm; 
demonstrated wrongful action submitting themselves to individual responsibility for the CounteF-
Claimants' damages sustained as well as committing wrongful acts on the part of "Trust" which 
subjects the ~'Trust" for liability for the Counter-Claimants damages. 
All allegations of factual matters ofthe Answer are included herein as additional facts to support 
the allegations herein set forth. 
COUNT ONE 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT 
1. Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations contained in all of the paragraphs of above 
referenced Verified Answer herein. 
2. Counter-Claimants, Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile are husband and wife and reside in fre 
County ofAda, State ofIdaho; Berkshire Investments L.L.C., is an Idaho limited liability company, 
lawfully transacting business in the State of Idaho and is lawfully the titled owner of certain rea 
property which is the subject of the Counter-Defendants' claims herein. All acts complained of 
herein occurred in the State ofIdaho and, specifically, within the County ofAda. 
3. Counter-Defendant Dallen Taylor is an individual, who resides in the County ofAda, State of 
Idaho; Counter-Defendant R. John Taylor is an individual, who resides in the County ofClark, State 
of Idaho; Counter-Defendant Reed is an individual, who resides in the County of Clark, State cf 
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Idaho; The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust ("Trust"), is a revocable trust which at a time 
owned certain real property in the County ofAda, in the State of Idaho. 
4. Counter-Claimants, Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and Berkshire Investments, L.L.C., and 
Theodore L. Johnson, as Trustee, Beth Rogers and Andy Rogers, as Co-Trustees, of the Theodore 
L. Johnson Revocable Trust, (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Trust"), entered into a certain 
real estate contract, and subsequent assignment, wherein the Counter-Claimants were to receive 
certain real property and Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, was to receive payment from the 
sale of the subject property. 
5. At all relevant times herein, the individual Plaintiffs, and/or the Trustee and/or the Trustees, of 
the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust knew and/or had imputed knowledge from the "Trusf' 
and/or prior Trustees of the "Trust" that the Counter-Claimants intended to purchase the real 
property for the purposes of establishing a home-site for Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and the 
children of the Mailes, and further knew that to do so, would require that the subject real property 
be developed consistent with Ada County zoning law and other regulatory rules and laws for fu: 
creation of a subdivision. That all such facts were known to the "Trust" prior to closing the real 
estate transaction. 
6. The Counter-Defendants, by and through it's co-trustees, and/or the individual Counter­
Defendants and/or through it's attorney undertook a course ofaction to interfere with and an attempt 
to cause a breach of contract between the Counter-Claimants and the Theodore Johnson L. 
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Revocable Trust relating to the subject property and/or attempt to cause a breachofcontract between 
the Counter-Claimants and Counter-Claimants' new lending institution. 
7. The Counter-Defendants, and/or through it's attorney, were informed that the Counter-Claimants 
would be re-financing the loans on the subject real p-operty and would pay the balance of the Deed 
of Trust due and owing to the "Trust". The Counter-Claimants informed the Co-Trustees of the 
Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust, that the Counter-Claimants would be re-financing, unless tre 
Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust would like to maintain the loan and release lots in the seven 
(7) lot subdivision as sales developed. That in order to obtain lot releases in the proposoo 
subdivision, the Counter-Defendants knew or with reasonable diligence should have known, that 
the Counter-Claimants would enter into a commercial loan with another lender, for the purposes of 
fulfilling the Counter-Claimants' obligation with the "Trust" and would be acquiring a new 
commercial loan to continue to develop a subdivision on the subject real property. 
8. The Counter-Claimants incurred expenses and costs associated with securing financing on the 
subject real property to pay offthe obligation to the Trust, on or about January 4,2004. The loan 
required Counter-Claimants to avoid the placement ofany liens or encumbrances on the sul:~ect real 
property, to convey clear title to potential purchasers, and as a result of the filing of the Complaints 
filed of record herein and allowing the "Lis Pendens" to be filed in a companion case, the Counter­
Claimants were unable to proceed with the improvement of the subject property and were :fi)rced to 
re-finance counter-claimants real properties and/or incur additional credit increasing the costs 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 9 
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associated with the development of the subject real property all a result to avoid the default under 
the terms and conditions of the real estate commercial loan. 
9. The Counter-Defendants, and/or it's agent, and/or it's co-trustees, and acting in concert and 
conspiring with each other, maliciously and intentionally undertook a course of action in the filing 
the present action and the filing of the Complaints and the "Lis Pendens" in the companion cases, 
that was calculated and determined to adversely affect the interests of the Crunter-Claimants and to 
tortiously interfere with the contract between the Counter-Claimants andthe new commerciaJ lender, 
and/or the contract between Counter-Claimants and the "Trust". 
10. The action and the wrongful conduct on the part of the Counter-Defendants and/or the Counter­
Defendants' agents and/or co-trustees, and/or the individual Counter-Defendants, demonstrated an 
intentional course of action to seek to increase profits and/or income to the Counter-Defendants 
and/or to obtain the real property at a foreclosure sale based upon wrongful motives and design, 
including but not limited to the following: 
a. wrongfully pursuing a course of conduct between the beneficiaries and/or the residual 
beneficiaries ofthe Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust, to cause the filing ofthe actions and fili~ 
of the "Lis Pendens" above alleged; 
b. Undertaking a course of action to cause a breach by the Counter-Claimants with the commcrcial 
lender on the subject real property, for personal gain and/or benefit of the Counter-Defendcmts, it's 
agents and/or it's co-trustees, and/or it's beneficiaries, and/or the individual Counter-Defendants; 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 10 
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c. wrongfully conspiring to circumvent the Counter-Claimants' rights to future profits and share in 
the future gains associated with the real property in which Theodore Johnson 1. Revocable Trust 
previously had an interest; 
d. using their position as co-trustees, and/or residual beneficiaries and/or assignees of other 
beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust to promote self dealing and profiting at 
the expense of the Counter-Claimants. 
11. The acts of the Counter-Defendants, and/or it's agents, and/or it's co-trustees, and/or it's 
beneficiaries, having devised such scheme, motive or artifice to cause a default and foreclosure of 
the contract between the Counter-Claimants and the new commercial lender and/or the interference 
ofthe contract between the Counter-Claimants and the Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust, which 
would cause irreparable damage to the Counter claimants and unjust emichment to the Counter­
Defendants, to wit: In addition to having caused the Counter-Claimants to lose their equity in the 
subject property, the Counter-Claimants will be damaged with other costs and fees associated with 
the development of the real property, and other costs and interest expenses associated with paying 
off the new commercial lender, and causing delays in the sale ofcertain lots thereby increa.sing the 
damages of the Counter-Claimants for increased interest, loss ofprofits from relays, loss of interest 
on invested capital, increased taxes, increased assessment, loss ofprofits from the real property, arrl 
the ultimate profits from the sale of subject real property, while the Counter-Defendants. seek 10 
unjustly benefit from the Counter-Claimants' labor and efforts. 
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12. That Counter-Claimants, as a sole, direct and proximate result of the action above alleged, 
sustained damages and will sustain damages in the following manner: 
a. The expected loss ofthe subject real property in which Counter-Claimants are 
obligated to pay the new commercial lender for and/or preventing the Counter·­
Claimants from continued marketing ofthe propertywhich has now been clouded 
by the Counter-Defendants and/or it's agents' , and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries' action; the Counter-Claimants' loss ofequity in the real property 
thereon and further incurring additional development expenses above itemized 
including but not limited to increased interest costs on capital and re-financing 
debt, loss ofprofits and loss of interest and/or profits on capital contributions to 
development, incurring additional appraisal fees and points associated with new 
mortgages; 
b. The Counter-Claimants' loss of opportunity to obtain revenues and profits 
associated with the real property and loss income associated with lot sales; 
c. The Counter-Claimants' expenses incurred and/or paid to date for 
engineering, architectural fees, interest expense, loan fees, fees and costs 
associated with various governmental agencies, professional services, materials 
purchased for the construction to date on the property, labor paid to date on th~~ 
subject real property, assessment fees, taxes, cost of interest paid to the Theodore 
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L. Johnson Revocable Trust and other institutions and entities; increased 
continued costs of interest, taxes, assessments, the cost of appraisals, loan fees 
and costs, closing fees for refinancing, title reports, closing fees, attorneys fees 
etc. 
d. The Counter-Claimants loss of the opportunity to retain portions of th~ 
subject to allow the Counter-Claimants to build their homes on the subject 
property and to the enjoy the peace and enjoyment of the subject real property; 
e. The Counter-Claimants' incurring costs and attorneys fees to defend against 
the Complaint and the accompanying "Lis Pendens" in the companion case, filed 
by the Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries', and the costs and attorney fees to quiet title to the subject real 
property; 
f. The Counter-Claimants' loss of income and/or profits associated with the 
time taken for the development of the property and the loss of opportunity to 
obtain revenues and profits associated with the real property. 
13. As a result of the aforementioned, Counter-Claimants have sustained such losses and have 
been damaged in a principal sum which exceeds the jurisdictional limits of the Distri(:t Court 
together with interest at the rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from the date ofloss to the date 
of Judgment, as set forth herein. 









14. Counter-Claimants have been forced to retain the professional legal services, to prosecute 
this claim and are entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred pursuant to Exhibits "A" 
& "B" annexed hereto and pursuant to Idaho Code, Sections 12-120 and 12-121, 12-123, Rule 11 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That the sum of$25,000.00 is a reasonable sum if this matter 
is uncontested, and a greater sum if contested. 
COUNT TWO
 




1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs, ofCount One: as if set 
forth in full herein. 
2. The Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or 
it's beneficiaries', set upon a course of conduct and intentionally interfered with a prospective 
economic advantage ofthe Counter-Claimants to secure profits and income relating to the re:al estate 
contract between the Counter-Claimants and the Theodore Johnson L. Revocable Trust and/or the 
Counter-Claimants and the new commercial lender of the subject real property. 
3. The Counter-Defendants, together with it's agents', and/or it's co-trustees', andlor it's 
beneficiaries', maliciously, deliberately and intentionally interfered with the Counter-Claimants' 
rights set forth in paragraph 2 herein. 
4. The Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or 
it's beneficiaries', knew of the existence of the Defendants/Counter-Claimants' economic 
expectancy related to the development of the subdivision of the subject real property. 
5. The conduct on the part of the Counter-Defendants and/or the Counter-Defendant's agents', 
and/or it's co-trustees' , and/or it's beneficiaries', is intentionally interfering and inducing terrninatim 
of the Counter-Claimants' prospective economic advantage and/or opportunity.. 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 14 
000254
 




           
           
         
 
           
  
6. The Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or 
it's beneficiaries', are interfering for an improper purpose and/or for improper means. 
7. That Counter-Claimants have sustained damages and will continue to sustain damages due 
to the Counter-Defendants' and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries', intentional interference with the Counter-Claimants prospective economic advanta~ 





1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Two herein 
as if set forth in full herein. 
2. All the Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', 
and/or it's beneficiaries', caused two (2) "Lis Pendens" against the subject real propeliy to be 
recorded and published in the Ada County Recorder's Office based upon allegations which are false 
and frivolous and in violation of Counter-Claimants' rights. 
3. The Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or 
it's beneficiaries', recorded the "Lis Pendens" with malice and/or reckless disregard for the truth, 
which Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries', knew or should have known with reasonable diligence that such statements were false 
and frivolous, because attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of a certain letter 
transmitted from the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by Beth Rogers, co-trustee, instructing 
the agent attorney for the Counter-Defendants that the trust was carryingout the wishes of the trustor 
in selling the subject real property to the Counter-Claimants, that there was no merit to the claims 
of the Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries' claims, and the Trustee did not desire to pursue any claims against the Counter­
Claimants. Said letter is incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in full herein. 
4. The Defendants/Counter-Claimants have been damaged as herein set forth. 










WRONGFUL CLOUD ON TITLE
 
PRELIMINARY & PERMANENT INJUNCTION - QUIET TITLE
 
1. The Counter-Claimant BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS L.L.c., re-alleges the allegations of 
all the Paragraphs of Count Three herein as if set forth in full herein. 
2. The actions of the Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendant's agents', and/or it's co­
trustees', and/or it's beneficiaries' action in filing the Complaint and the recording of the two (2) 
"Lis Pendens" amount to a wrongful "cloud on the title" on the title held by Berkshire Investments 
L.L.C. 
3. By virtue of the filing of the Complaints and recording of the two "Lis Pendens," tIc 
Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries', have alleged that the property is subject to litigation and/or the potential of re­
classifying the legal title holder to the real property is in litigation. By virtue of the same, tre 
Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries', claim an interest in and to the subject property, and that any right, title, claim II 
interest of Counter-Claimants and/or potential subsequent purchasers (or any other interested party 
or person claiming and interest in and/or to the subject property), may be junior and/or subservient 
to the interests of Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', 
and/or it's beneficiaries' in the subject property. 
4. The Counter-Claimants have no adequate remedy at law. 
5. The Court should enter a Preliminary Injunction and Pennanent Injunction to strike the "LE 
Pendens" and enjoining the Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co­
trustees', and/or it's beneficiaries', from filing another or defining the legitimate rights and interes1s 
ofthe Counter-Claimants and/or the Counter-Defendants in the subject property and establishing that 
Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries', and each of them, have no interest in the property. 










6. The Court should enter a declaratory judgment affirming and quieting the title to the subject 
real property to Counter-Claimant Berkshire Investments L.L.C., establishing its' title ani 
ownership, and enter an Order that Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or 






1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Four herein 
as if set forth in full herein. 
2. The predecessor Co-Trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust denounced the 
attempts by the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co­
trustees', and/or it's beneficiaries', to pursue the current action, as shown in Exhibit "C." 
3. The Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or 
it's beneficiaries', and not the "Real Parties in Interest," and "lack standing" to pursue the remedies 
which Counter-Defendants allege are available. That the Counter-Defendants engaged collectively 
in wrongfully filing and continued in pursuing legal action against the Counter-Claimants allegedly 
acting as "trustees" when in fact and in law the Counter-Defendants were not properly acting under 
the established Law in the State of Idaho in pursuing legal action against the Counter-Claimants. 
4. The Counter-Defendants and/or Counter:"Defendfults' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or 
it's beneficiaries' wrongful conduct in opposition to the wishes of the Co-Trustees andthe unlawful 
action above alleged demonstrate an improper purpose and unjust proceeding. 
5. The actions of the Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co­
trustees', and/or it's beneficiaries' constitute a civil conspiracy against the rights andinterests of the 
Counter-Claimants, which demonstrate that an agreement between two or more of the Counter­
Defendants, and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's beneficiaries', 
and/or the Counter-Defendants' agent and/or assignors, existed to accomplish an unlawful objectiw 











and/or an attempt to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner. 
6. The Counter-Claimants have incurred damages, as previously alleged, as a resultofthe civil 
conspiracy and concerted action of the Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', 
and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's beneficiaries', and each ofthem, and their agents and assignors, 
resulting in joint and several liability of each Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defl~ndants' 
agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's beneficiaries', their agents and assignors, for the whole 
of the damages caused. 
COUNT SIX 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Five herein 
as if set forth in full herein. 
2. The conduct ofCounter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', 
and/or it's beneficiaries', above-alleged constitutes a breach of contract as to the terms and 
conditions contained in Exhibits "A" , "B." and "C" 
3. Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries' breached the terms of the contracts and have failed to allow the terms and conditions 






1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs of Count Six herein as if 
set forth in full herein. 
2. The conduct ofCounter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', 
and/or it's beneficiaries' was a course of conduct to induce Counter-Claimants to enter into a 
contractual relationship with a new commercial lender to pay off the amount owed to the "'Trust", 












which the Counter-Claimants have now done. 
3. Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries', should be equitably estopped from asserting rights inconsistent therewith andfor not 
allowing the title to the real property to remain in the legal holder, Berkshire Investments L.L.C. 
COUNT EIGHT 
OUASI ESTOPPEL 
1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs ofCount Seven herein as 
if set forth in full herein. 
2. The Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees", and/or 
it's beneficiaries' have engaged in a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the intention of the 
Counter-Claimants and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. 
3. In entering into the contractual relationship with the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust 
and/or entering into a contractual relationship with a new commercial lender, the Counter-Claimants 
relied to their determent upon such assurances ofthe sanctity ofthe contractual terms and conditions, 
and the Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries' should be estopped from asserting rights inconsistent therewith. 
COUNT NINE
 
BREACH OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
 
1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs of Count Eight herein as 
if set forth in full herein. 
2. The conduct ofCounter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', 
and/or it's beneficiaries', above-referenced constitute a breach of the covenant ofgood faith and fair 















       







1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Nine herein as 
if set forth in full herein.. 
Counter-Defendants entered into a course of action commencing on or about May 2003, 
proceeding to take control of the "Trust" and/or pursuing a course of action to "bleed" thl~ corpus 
of the "Trust" and structuring an agreement with other beneficiaries and/or trustees of the "Trust" 
on or about July 14,2004, whereby all assets ofthe trust were transferred from the trust, knowing 
that in February 2004, a claim was made for damages by the Counter-Claimants for damages relating 
to the complaint filed on behalf of the "Trust" by·the individual Counter-Defendants. That the 
Counter-Defendants, individually and the "Trust", knew ofthe claim ofdamages and further knew 
or should have known that by the continuation oflitigation and the filing of two (2) Lis Pendens, the 
Counter-Claimants had legitimate claims for damages against the Counter-Defendants. 
3. That Counter-Defendants, undertook a course of action that was fraudulent as to their creditors 
by conveying and structuring an agreement known as the"Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity 
Agreement" dated July 15,2004. That the Counter-Defendants "bleed" the assets and distributed 
the assets and/or corpus of the "Trust" leaving only the claim against the Counter-Deferrlants. That 
all assets were distributed by agreement to 'the other beneficiaries with the Counter-Defendants 
agreeing to indemnify any and all damages as to any beneficiary of the "Trust" if the beneficiaries 
would agree that the proceeds of any potential judgment would belong to the Counter-Defendants 
and/or Counter-Defendants' mother. 
4. That the alleged transfers to the beneficiaries were done to protect the beneficiaries from any 
claims by the Counter-Defendants as to the corpus of trust and were further done in violation of the 
terms and conditions of the "Trust" and were fraudulent as to the claims of the Counter-Claimants 
claim ofdamages. 
5. Counter-Defendants jointly and severally conspired to defraud creditors, including Counter­
Claimants, by transferring assets and incurring debt associated with retaining legal servic(~s of the 
Counter-Defendant R. John Taylor's wife, Connie Taylor for the purpose of sheltering assets and/or 
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incurring additional debt as purported overset against Counter-Claimants' damages. 
6. Counter-Defendants entered into a course ofconduct with wantonness and recklessness ~md with 
the intention to defraud their creditors, including Counter-Claiman1s, by wantonly and intentionally 
transferring assets and incurring non-existing debt for the purpose of sheltering assets to avoid 
payment from the reaches ofcreditors, including the proper claims ofCounter-Claimants, both pricr 
to and subsequent to the time ofCounter-Claimants obtaining Judgment against Counter-Defendan1s 
7. That such transferring of assets was done wanton disregard of the rights others and with tre 
intention to defraud the true and proper creditors ofCounter-Defendant "Trust" and by the terms and 






Counter-Claimants hereby incorporate and re-allege by this reference all Paragraphs of Count 
TEN. herein as if set forth in full herein. 
2. Based upon the foregoing allegations, Counter-Claimants are entitled to recover from tre 
Counter- Defendants' the sums which have been transferred to other beneficiaries of the: trust in 
which the Counter-Defendants structured the agreement above referenced., together with interest 
thereon at the maximum legal rate from the date thereof, as a result of UNJUST ENRICHMENT 






1. Counter-Claimants reallege the allegations contained in all the Paragraphs of Count Eleven 
herein as if set forth in full herein. 
2.	 The above named individual named Counter-Defendants have entered into an agreement with 
beneficiiaries of the "Trust" whereby the Counter-Defendants agreed to indemnify all beneficiaries 



















of the "Trust" any claims asserted against the "Trust" as a result of this litigaiton. That as a result 
thereto the Counter-Claimants have a direct claim against the individual Counter-Defendants for 
damages which otherwise would have been paid by the "Trust" but for the depletion and wrongful! 
transfer ofthe "Trust" corpus but are now required to be paid by the individual Counter-Defendants. 
COUNT THIRTEEN
 
BREACH OF PEACE AND QUIET ENJOYMENT OF DEEDED PROPERTY
 
1. Counter-Claimants reallege the allegations contained in all of the Paragraphs of Count Twelve 
herein as if set forth in full herein. 
2. The above action complained herein by the Counter-Defendants have amounted to a breach of 
the Counter-Claimants rightful possession and the peace and quite of the title conveyed by t~ 
"Trust". 
COUNT FOURTEEN 
BREACH OF WARRANTY DEED 
1. Counter-Claimants reallege the allegations contained in all of the Paragraphs ofCount 'Thirteen 
herein as if set forth in full herein. 
2. The above named Counter-Defendants have knowingly and malicious intention have committed 
acts which amount to a breach of the warranty deed provided by the "Trust" and have now asserted 
claims against the title in which the Counter-Defendants warranted to defend against and as such 





1. Counter-Claimants reallege the allegations contained in all of the Paragraphs ofCount Fourteen 
herein as if set forth in full herein. 
2. The above named Counter-Defendants have committed certain acts of a continuing nature and 
a continuing wrongful pattern and such actions based upon information and beliefwill continue until 


















the date of trial herein and beyond. 
RESERVATION TO AMEND PLEADINGS 
That by reason ofthe acts complained herein by the Counter-Claimants, leave of Court will be 
requested pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1604, for the Court's ruling on the alleged issue of 
exemplary/punitive damages in light of the pleadings, affidavits, deposi1ions, etc., filed of record or 
as may hereinafter be provided to the Court. 
COUNTER-CLAIMANTS DEMAND A JURY TRIAL ON ALL MATTERS TRIABLE BY A 
JURY. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ON COUNTERCLAIMS 
WHEREFORE, Counter-Claimants pray for Judgment against each and everyone of the 
Counter-Defendants, and/or it's co-trustees, and each of them, as follows: 
1. For danlages in excess of the jurisdictional amount of the District Court for items of damages 
set forth above, together with twelve (12) percent interest from the date of loss to the date of 
Judgment, and thereafter at a highest legal rate until paid in full, or such additional sums as may later 
be proved, and leave of Court is requested to amend said Complaint as soon as the same becomes 
known to Counter-Claimants. 
2. That a Declaratory Judgment be entered by this Court quieting the title as to the legitimate rights 
and interests of Counter-Claimant Berkshire Investments L.L.C. in the subject property and tha 
Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', and/or it's 
beneficiaries', and each ofthem, have no interest in said real property. 
3. For an Interim Order and/or a Preliminary Injunction and/or a Permanent Injunction, affirming 
Berkshire Investments L.L.C.'s title and ownership of the above-referenced real property and 
affirming that Counter-Defendants and/or Counter-Defendants' agents', and/or it's co-trustees', 
and/or it's beneficiaries' and each of them, have no interest in said real property. 
4. For Counter-Claimants' reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $50,000.00 if this matter is 
uncontested, pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-120, 12-121, 12-123, I.R.C.P. Rule 11, and further pmsuant to 




       





Exhibits "A" and "B" attached hereto, and a further amount as may be awarded by the Court ifthis 
matter is contested, together with such costs as may be awarded by the Court pursuant bRule 54(e) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 




DATED this (p ItL day of ?efti-iU~ ,2005.
 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
THOMAS MAILE AND COLLEEN MAILE, husband and wife, being first duly sworn upon 
oath, depose and state that they are the Defendants/Counter-Claimants in the above-entitled action, 
they have read the foregoing AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM AND DEMAJ~D 
FOR JURY TRIAL, know the contents thereof, and believe the same to be true and correct to the 
best of their knowledge and belief 
DATED This / day o~~~~~~ 
COLLEEN MAILE? 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, 
this btday of¥-' 2005. 
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'd' 211ft' ,''it V1ReSI mg at ,ano 
My Commission Expires: q IZb / ZD[D 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County ofAda ) 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC., an Idaho limited. liability company, by and through 
it's manager, THOMAS MAILE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that it is one 
ofthe Defendants/Counter-Claimants in the above-entitled action, that the undersigned as manager 
has read the foregoing ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM, knows the contents thereof, and 
believes the same to be true and correct to the best ofhis knowledge and belief, 
DATED Thisj2 day O~005. 
SUBSCRIBlA~~~WORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, 
this JiL.. day of 2005.\'\',,,,,,,,, ffnJM fwMuJ

,,\\ "MBE)? II" 
" c9:"" ~. . . ~ ~ s / NOt. ~-:. ~ ( '. ~~.,L. \ ~ ~ Not1lI)TPublic for Idaho 
~ ~ \. ~b " I g Residing at Star, Idaho I ~~"'" {Ie ••••• 11- ~ My Commission Expires: ~I {2,10
~ O;e- •••••••••••• ....' ~~" IDAHO "",11'1/1"""" CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2S 
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DATED this ~ day 0" ~~~~----=---+ 
Thomas Maile, Pro Se d 
Attorney for Counter-Cla'm~ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY cERTIFY that on tbe 'F""'- . day of S~..200o, I served tbe 
foregoing VERIFIED AMENDED ANSWER AND AMENDED ~TER-CLAIM by having 
a true and complete copy personally delivered or by facsimile and/or by depositing the same in 
the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor 
Clark al1d Feeney 
1229 Main Street 
Post Office Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 8350 t 
Fax # (208) 746-9160 
Mr. Jack s. Gjordirlg 
Gjording and Fouser 
509 West Hays Street 
Post Office Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 8370 l' 
Fax # (208) 336-9177 
Mr. Phillip ColJaer 
Anderson & Julian 
250 South 5th Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Fax # (208) 344-5510 
(X) U. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
() Ha.nd Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() U. S. M.ait 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
() u. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
~~#r
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FEB f 3 2006 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH runICIAL D 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, 
andR. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Case No. CVOC0400473D Plaintiffs/ Counter-Defendants, 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAlLE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
VS. 
Defendants/ Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENT, LLC, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
motion was argued before the Court on November 10, 2005. On December 23, 2005 the Idaho 
Supreme Court issued its decision in the companion case of Taylor v. Maile (2205 Opinion No. 
135) and remanded that case. On the same day, this Court ordered the parties to submit 
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supplemental briefing on the effect of the remanded case on the entire litigation. On January 23, 
2006 the parties filed supplemental briefmg. The Court considered the matter fully under 
advisement on that date. The defendants/counterclaimants ("Defendants") take the position that the 
remand has no effect on the issues pending before the Court in the instant case. The 
plaintiffs/counterdefendants ("Plaintiffs") have now moved to amend their Complaint in this case 
so as to conform it to the Supreme Court decision. 
After considering the briefs and argwnents of the parties, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is hereby granted in part and denied in part. 
Ie BACKGROUND 
Thomas Maile, IV was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included 
drafting the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and overseeing the 
administration of the trust. After Johnson's death, Maile represented Johnson's estate. The 
underlying transaction in this case is a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson entered into an earnest 
money agreement for the purchase of 40 acres in Eagle, Idaho. 
On January 23, 2004, Plaintiffs, certain residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson 
Trust, filed a lawsuit, alleging three causes of action and seeking damages and/or rescission of the 
sale. On April 23, 2004, this Court dismissed the claims of the Plaintiffs based upon a lack of 
standing. That case was remanded by the Idaho Supreme Court as mentioned above. 
On July 22, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a new action against Defendants after the original trustees
 
purportedly transferred their status as trustees to the Plaintiffs. On November 10, 2005, this Court
 
heard oral argwnents on Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, in which Plaintiffs sought to
 
summary judgment on all ofDefendants' counterclaims and affmnative defenses.
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II. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is "rendered forthwith
 
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
 
as a matter of law." See also First Sec. Bank ofIdaho, N.A. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964
 
P.2d 654,657 (1998). I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that an adverse party may not simply rely upon mere
 
allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a genuine
 
issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The
 
affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set forth facts that would b(: admissible in
 
evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify. See id.; I.R.C.P. 56(e).
 
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be
 
anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
 
genuine issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagon ofAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69
 
(1996). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the court to draw
 
all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Williams v. Blakley, 114
 




A.	 Counterclaim I - Tortious Interference 
with Contract 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. set forth 
the elements for tortious interference with contract: (1) the existence ofa contract; (2) knowledge of 
the contract on the part of the defendant; (3) intentional interference causing a breach of the
 
contract; and (4) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. 121 Idaho 266, 283-284, 824 P.2d
 






































































































841, 858-859 (1991). After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, "the burden is on the
 
defendant to prove justification." Id.
 
In regard to the land sale contract between Defendants and the Trust, the Court finds that the 
Defendants have failed to set forth any evidence that the land sale contract was breached. 
Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to that portion of 
Counterclaim I. 
In regard to the commercial loan contract between Defendants and their lending institution, 
the Court finds there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Plaintiffs interfered 
with this loan contract. Therefore, the motion for snmmary jU~ respect to that 
portion ofCounterclaim I. 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Counterclaim I is granted in part and denied in 
part. 
B.	 Counterclaim II - Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. defined 
the elements of the tort ofinterference with a prospective economic advantage as follows; 
A plaintiff, in order to establish a prima facie case, must show that any claimed 
intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage resulting in injury to 
the plaintiff "is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference 
itself." The plaintiff must establish that the intentional interference resulting in 
injury was wrongful, which may be shown by proof that either: (I) the deftendant 
had an improper objective or purpose to harm the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used 
a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business relationship. 
121 Idaho 266,286,824 P.2d 841, 861 (1991) (citations omitted). 
The Court finds that the Defendants have failed to set forth more than a scintilla of evidence
 
that Plaintiffs' conduct in this case was "wrongful," and therefore, summary judgment on
 
Counterclaim II is granted.
 




























































































C. Counterclaims III - Slander of Title 
Defendants claim that Plaintiffs slandered the title of the Linder Road Property by filing the
 
lis pendens in connection with the two above-entitled actions. A cause of action for slander of title
 
requires Defendants to prove the following: (1) uttering or publishing of slanderous statements; (2)
 
when the statements were false; (3) with malice; and (4) resulting in special damages. Weaver v.
 
Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 70 I, 8 P.3d 1234, 1244 (2000) (citation omitted). "Malice has been
 
generally defined by Idaho courts as a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement. An
 
action will not lie where a statement in slander of title, although false, was made in good faith with
 
probable cause for believing it." Id
 
The Court finds that Defendants have set forth no more than a scintilla of evidence showing 
that Plaintiffs have maliciously asserted an interest in the Linder Road Property, and therefore, 
swnmary judgment on Counterclaim III is granted. 
D.· Counterclaim IV - Wrongful Cloud of Title 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Real v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp. described the nature of an 
action to remove a cloud of title as follows: 
An action to remove a cloud upon a title is an equitable one and is intended to 
remove a particular instrument or documentary evidence of title or encumbnUlce 
against the title which is hanging over or threatening a plaintiffs title therein. "It 
may broadly be stated that a cloud on title is an outstanding instrument, record, 
claim, or encumbrance which is actually invalid or inoperative, but which may 
nevertheless impair the title to property." 
99 Idaho 662, 667, 586 P.2d 1378, 1383 (1978) (citations omitted).
 
The Court finds that Defendants have set forth no more than a scintilla ofevidence showing 
that Plaintiffs asserted interest in the Linder Road Property is actually invalid or inoperative, and 
therefore, summary judgment on Counterclaim IV is granted 





























































































E. Counterclaim V - Civil Conspiracy 
The Court finds that civil conspiracy is not itself a claim for relief. See McPheters v. Maile,
 
138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 PJd 317, 321 (2003) ("Civil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief.")
 
(citations omitted). Summary judgment on Defendants' Counterclaim V is therefore granted.
 
F. Counterclaim VI - Breach of Contract 
Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence that Plaintiffs have breached 
the terms of the land sale contract, and therefore, summary judgment on Defendants' Counterclaim 
VI is granted. 
G. Counterclaim VII and VIII - Equitable Estoppel and Quasi-EstoPJlel 
Consistent with its earlier fmdings in its Memorandum Decision & Order addressing 
Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the Court finds that there remains a genuine 
issue of fact as to the availability of the equitable claims brought in Counterclaims VII and VIII. 
H. Counterclaim IX - Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied into every contract. Luzar v. W.
 
Surety, 107 Idaho 693, 696, 692 P.2d 337, 340 (1984). However, "[a] violation of the implied
 
covenant is a breach of the contract. It does not result in a cause of action separate from the breach
 
of contract claims." Idaho First Nat 'I Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289, 824
 
P.2d 841, 864 (1991) (citations omitted).
 
Accordingly, summary judgment on Counterclaim IX is granted. 
I. Counterclaim X - Fraudulent Transfer 
Counterclaim X alleges that Plaintiffs fraudulently distributed the corpus of the Theodore 
Johnson Trust in order to subvert any award that Defendants may ultimately receive in this dispute. 
See generally I.e. § 55-913. 
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sell the property or build on it. The Court finds that this is not the kind of interferencl~that amounts 
to a nuisance. Summary Judgment on Counterclaim XIII is therefore granted. 
M. Counterclaim XIV - Breach of Warranty Deed 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Koelker v. Turnbull described the nature of an action for breach 
of covenants of title as follows: . 
[I]t is axiomatic that the plaintiff in an action for breach of covenants of title has 
the burden of proving that he was evicted or prevented from using the conv(:yed 
property by a person asserting title paramount to that of the plaintiffs.... "[A] 
covenant of warranty of title does not extend to apparent or unfounded titles in 
land, but only against hostile titles, superior in fact to those of the grantor." 
127 Idaho 262, 265,899 P.2d 972,975 (1995) (citations omitted). 
The Court finds that Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence that 
Plaintiffs have asserted a claim of superior title, and therefore, summary judgment on Counterclaim 
XIV is granted. 
N. Counterclaim XV - Continuing Tort 
The Court finds that there is no separate cause of action for a "continued tort," and 
therefore, summary judgment on Counterclaim XV is granted. 
o. Affirmative Defenses 
In addition to the above counterclaims, Plaintiffs also seek rulings on the following 
affirmative defenses asserted by Defendants. 
i. Failure to Join Indispensable Parties 
The burden of demonstr~ting the indispensability of a party rests on the moving party. 
Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 705, 496 P.2d 939, 942 (1972). Defendants initially asserted 
this affinnative defense in the original lawsuit, arguing that the Trust was an indispensable party in 
the litigation. 






























































Because the Trust is a party in the second lawsuit, which has been consolidated with the 
original lawsuit, the Court fmds that Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence 
that an indispensable party has not been joined in this litigation. Plaintiffs' motion to strike this 
affirmative defense is therefore granted. 
ii. Laches
 
The necessary elements of a laches claim are:
 
(1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights, (2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, 
the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit, (3) lack of 
knowledge by defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights, and (4) injury or 
prejudice to defendant in event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to 
be barred. 
Finucane v. Village a/Hayden, 86 Idaho 199,206,384 P.2d 236,240 (1963). 
The Court finds there remains a genuine issue of fact on the issue of laches, and therefore, 
iii. Failure to Mitigate 
The Court finds that there remains a genuine issue of fact on the affirmative defense of 
failure to mitigate damages; 
v. Unclean Hands 
The motion to strike tb".if~.~ 
vi. Release and Reconveyance!Accord and Satisfaction 
Defendants assert that the Accord and Satisfaction and the Release of Reconveyance 
provisions of the Linder Road Property purchase agreement bar's any tort claims brought by or on 
behalfofthe Trust. 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 9
 


























































































In accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in this litigation, this Court 
finds that the terms of the purchase agreement do not bar Plaintiffs' fiduciary duty cla.im as a matter 
of law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to some of the 
Defendants' counterclaims; therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied in part. 
With respect to several other counterclaims, the Court finds that there are not genuine issues of 
material fact and that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
Dated this /3 ~ofFebruary2006.
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OFUTY IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST . 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 




THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN MAILE, 








THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN MAIT...E, 
husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE REAL 
ESTATE COMPANY, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTMENT, LLC, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CVOC0400473D 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
 




This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claim. The Court heard oral arguments on the motion on April 3, 2006 and took the 
matter fully under advisement at that time. 
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Thomas Maile, IV was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included 
drafting the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and overseeing the 
administration of the trust. After Johnson's death, Maile represented Johnson's estate. 
The underlying transaction in this case is a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor 
of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson entered into an earnest 
money agreement for the purchase of40 acres in Eagle, ID. The purchase price was $400,000. Maile 
later assigned his interest in the purchase money agreement to Berkshire Investments, LLC. The 
assignment was approved by Beth Rogers acting for Theodore Johnson through a power of attorney. 
Johnson died of cancer before title was conveyed. After Johnson's death, co-trustees Beth Rogers 
and Andrew Rogers conveyed title to Berkshire Investments and executed a warranty deed on behalf 
of the trust as seller. The title was subject to a deed of trust, which was paid in full on January 04, 
2004. 
On January 22, 2004, Plaintiffs, certain residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson 
Trust, filed a lis pendens against the 40 acres in Eagle. On January 23, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a 
lawsuit, alleging three causes of action and seeking damages and/or rescission of th~: sale. Plaintiffs 
claimed the property at the time Maile entered into the earnest money agreement with Johnson was 
worth at least $1.2 million. Plaintiffs asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Maile, arguing 
Maile owed Theodore Johnson a fiduciary duty by virtue of their attorney client relationship and that 
Maile breached this duty by not dealing fairly with Johnson, not advising Johnson to consult 
independent counsel, paying less than fair market value for the property, and offering to purchase the 
property on terms unfavorable to Johnson. Plaintiffs also asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
























































































against Maile in his capacity as a realtor/broker, alleging he breached his fiduciary duty by failing to 
deal honestly with Johnson and by purchasing the property for less than fair mark{:t value. Finally, 
Plaintiffs asserted professional negligence claims against Maile in his capacity as attorney and as real 
estate broker. 
Maile answered the complaint and then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the residual 
beneficiaries lacked standing to bring every asserted cause of action. On April 23,. 2004, the Court 
dismissed the claims of the Plaintiffs based upon a lack of standing. The Court found that the 
Plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the trust and only the trustee could bring a claim. The Plaintiffs 
appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court. 
On July 22, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a new action against Defendants. Plaintiffs were believed to 
be the new co-trustees of the trust. The original trustees supposedly transferred their status as trustees 
to the Plaintiffs. On September 29, 2004 the Court ordered that the two cases be consolidated. On 
November 17, 2004, the Honorable Christopher Bieter entered an order appointing the Plaintiffs as 
co-successor trustees of the Trust. On April 13, 2005, Jud~e Bieter set aside the November 17,2004 
order. On May 2, 2005, Judge Bieter allowed the Plaintiffs to be appointed as successor trustees, but 
denied their request to be appointed retroactively. 
On December 30, 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court released its decision regarding the 
Plaintiffs' original claims. On March 9, 2006, this Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to amend their 
complaint, bringing it in line with the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
As it currently stands, Plaintiffs'.complaint contains a single cause ofaction: 
The Defendants aided the trustees in disposing of trust property in violation of their 
fiduciary responsibilities and duty of loyalty, and received the trust proplerty with
 

























































































knowledge of the same, including knowledge that the sale had not been approved by a 
court as required by I.C. 68-108(b). 
Amended Complaint at 3. 
A. Standard of Review 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is "rendered forthwith if
 
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
 
matter of law." See also First Sec. Bank ofIdaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964 P.2d 654,
 
657 (1998). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) provides that an adverse party may not simply rely
 
upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is
 
a genuine issue for trial. See Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 211, 868 P.2d 12:24, 1227 (1994).
 
The affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set forth facts that would be admissible
 
in evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify. See id.; I.R.C.P. 56(e).
 
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be anchored 
in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine
 
issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69 (1996).
 
Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the c:ourt to draw all
 
reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Williams v. Blakley, 114 Idaho
 
323,324,757 P.2d 186, 187 (1988); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 255, 698 P.2d 315,317 (1985).
 
B. Analysis 
Plaintiffs argue that Beth Rogers' decision, as a co-trustee, to close the sale of the Linder 
Road Property involved a conflict of interest. Plaintiffs argue that the conflict of interest arose as a 
result of the fact that Beth Rogers, as an income beneficiary, stood to receive a benefit from the sale 

































































































of the corpus of the trust (the Linder Road Property) to the detriment of the Plaintiffs as residual 
beneficiaries. It is Plaintiffs' argument that this conflict of interest gave rise to an unrebuttable 
necessity for court approval. Absent such approval, Plaintiffs argue that a constructive trust should be 
imposed upon the Linder Road Property as a matter of law. 
Defendants argue that no such conflict arose because the Trust and the Rogers were already 
bound to perform under the terms of the purchase agreement. Defendants argue in the alternative that 
the transaction, completed in spite of the conflict of interest, should be subject to the prudent investor 
rule rather than declared void as a matter of law. 
First, the Court fmds that Beth Rogers' dual role as trustee and beneficiary c:reated a conflict 
of interest as a matter of law. See I.C. § 68-108(b) ("If the duty of the trustee and his individual 
interest or his interest as trustee of another trust, conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the power 
may be exercised only by court authorization ...."); Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 79, cmt. b(l) 
(draft 2005) ("In many modern trust situations, the trustee (or one or more co-truste1es) will be a life 
beneficiary or perhaps a remainder beneficiary. In a case of this type, there will inevitably be some 
conflicts of interest ....") (citations omitted). 
Second, the Court finds that the scope of the trustee's power subject to judicial oversight
 
under Idaho Code section 68-108(b) applies not only to the power to enter into a contract for the sale
 
of real property but also to the power to close a sale of real property. See Taylor v. A/aile, 142 Idaho
 
253, _, 127 P.3d 156, 162 (2005) ("Where a trustee has an individual interest in the trust that poses a
 
conflict in the exercise of a trust power, such as the power to close a sale ofreal property, 'the power
 
may be exercised only by court authorization ....' I.C. § 68-1 08(b).") (emphasis added).
 







































            
 
 





















































Third, the Court finds that the existence of the conflict of interest necessitated prior court
 
approval of the closing of the sale. See I.C. § 68-1 08(b) ("If the duty of the trustee ~md his individual
 
interest or his interest as trustee of another trust, conflict in the exercise of a trust power, the power
 
may be exercised only by court authorization . ...") (emphasis added). Deficient of such approval,
 
the Court finds that the contract for the sale of the Linder Road Property was void as a matter of law.
 
See id. at -' 127 P.3d at 163, 164 (recognizing "a trust beneficiary's right to pursue redress where
 
trust property has wrongfully made its way into the hands of a third party" through the "imposition of
 
a constructive trust 01', if that is not available, recovery of the proceeds from the sale of the property").
 
Fourth, the Court finds that the Defendants had actual knowledge that the Rogers were
 
exceeding or improperly exercising their powers as a matter of law. See I.C. § 68-110 (protecting
 
third persons dealing with a trustee or assisting a trustee with a transaction from liability unless the
 
third person has "actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his powers or improperly exercising
 
them"); Fenton v. King Hill Irrigation Dist., 67 Idaho 456, 466-67, 186 P.2d 477, 483 (1947)
 
("Where a fiduciary wrongfully transfers to a third person property which he holds as fiduciary, the
 
third person is chargeable as constructive trustee of the property unless he is a bona fide purchaser.")
 
(citation omitted). This conclusion is based on the finding that there is no genuine issue of fact that
 
Defendant Thomas G. Maile prepared the trust agreement creating the conflict of interest. See R. John
 
Taylor Aff., Ex. A, Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust Agreement.
 
ill. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is hereby granted. 
The Court hereby orders the Plaintiffs to prepare a proposed judgment consistent with the 
findings set forth above. 











































































































~ Y, ,.., 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
Dated this I ,~ of May 2006.
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DAMAGES GROUNDED ON THE
 
THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
 
This matter came before the Court on the only remaining claim in this action. For the 
reasons stated below, the Court hereby declines to award damages to the Counterciaimants 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING COUNTERCLAIMANT'S CLAJM FOR DAMAGES 
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(hereinafter referred to as "Maile") and finds in favor of the Counter-Defendants, (hereinafter 
referred to as "the Taylors"). This decision shall constitute the Court's Findings ofF:act and 
Conclusions ofLaw. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Attorney Thomas Maile purchased forty (40) acres ofland in Ada County, Idaho, from the 
Trust which he had established for his client, Theodore L. "Ted" Johnson. Following protracted 
litigation, this Court ruled that the purchase and sale of the land was void and ordered. that the 
property be held in constructive trust for the benefit of the true owner, namely the Tht:odore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust. I 
On October 11 th and 12th, 2006, the only remaining factual issue was tried to the Court. 
That is, whether or not. and if so, to what extent, was Maile entitled to recover damag1es from the 
Trust on the theory of unjust enriclunent. 
Following the evidentiary portion ofthe trial, the Court directed counsel for the parties to 
submit written closing arguments, proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and finally, 
written rebuttal closing arguments. The Court considered the matter fully under advislernent on 
October 27, 2006. 
Maile's original client, Ted Johnson. was an elderly man with whom Maile had an 
attorney/client relationship previously. Johnson received an offer to purchase property he owned 
which is the subject matter of this dispute. The offer was for four hundred thousand dollars 
($400,000.00). Mr. Johnson brought the offer to Mr. Maile and asked for his advice. Mr. Maile 
I Tay/or v. Maile, CV OC 0400473D (4th Dist. Idaho May, 15,2006) (Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim). The Court also previously ordered the Taylors to return the purchase 
money, $400,000.00, less any amount Maile could establish he was entitled to under a theory of unjust enrichment. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING COUNTERCLAIMANT'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 





































































made some inquiries and concluded that $400,000 was too Iowan offer for the property. He 
communicated this fact to the offeror on behalfof his client. Subsequently, Mr. Johnson brought 
Mr. Maile a copy of an independent appraisal that he had had done which said that the property 
was in fact worth only $400,000. Mr. Maile then offered to purchase the property for that sum. 
Mr. Johnson, acting in his capacity as Trustee of the Ted Johnson Revocable Trust, accepted the 
offer. He died shortly thereafter so Mr. Maile began to deal with the successor Trustees, 
including Beth Rogers who was also a beneficiary of the Trust. In her capacity as Trustee, Ms. 
Rogers agreed to the sale without seeking court approval in violation of Idaho Code § 68-1 08(b) 
(2004).2 This Court previously ruled that the purchase and sale was void.) This was based on the 
fact that Mr. Maile himself had drafted the documents effectuating the sale of the property to 
himself, and he had drafted the Trust docu~ents that created the conflict of interest bet\veen Beth 
Rogers as co-trustee and beneficiary. Maile was not a good faith purchaser without notice ofthe 
Trustees' violation of her fiduciary duties to the Trust. 
Ifthe Trustees had sought judicial approval before selling the property, a court mayor may 
not have approved of the sale. There is evidence in the record to support Mr. Maile's claim that 
the property really was worth only $400,000 at the time he purchased it from the Trust including 
the unsolicited offer to purchase the property for exactly that amount and an independent 
appraisal obtained by Mr. Johnson which also said the property was worth $400,000. On the 
other hand, Mr. Maile also knew that the property might be worth considerably more than 




2 "rfthe duty of the trustee and his individual interest or his interest as trustee of another trust, conflict in the exercise
 
ora trust power, the power may be exercised only by court authorization......
 
) Taylor v. Maile, CV OC 04004730 (4th Dist. Idaho May, 15,2006) (Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for
 
Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim).
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$400,000 at the time he offered to purchase it for this amount. In any event, Mr. Maile apparently 
thought it would be a good buy at $400,000, In hindsight, Mr. Maile's professional judgment, 
which he had a duty to exercise for the benefit of his client, may have been obscured by his 
personal desire to take advantage of what he believed to be an attractive business transaction. Mr, 
Maile should have advised Mr. Johnson to seek independent advice about selling him the land for 
$400,000. Indeed, Mr. Maile testified at trial that he did exactly that. The Court is not persuaded 
that Mr. Maile so advised Mr. JoOOson.4 
There is also ample evidence in the record to support the contention that Mr. Maile 
engaged in sharp practices in drafting the documents connected to the transaction. For example, 
Mr. Maile included a clause in the contract that would have barred any cause ofaction against 
himself after only one year. This is an unusual deviation from the statutory limitation on causes 
of action of this type. Mr. Maile claimed that this was a scrivener's error; however, this claim is 
belied by the fact that he pled it as an affirmative defense in this lawsuit. This is the type of self-
dealing that has led to the claim that Mr. Maile has unclean hands and should not be granted any 
equitable relief. 
The doctrine of unclean hands says that one seeking equitable relief must come ito the
 
Court with clean hands.S In this case, Maile is accused of self-dealing, in violation of hiis
 
fiduciary duty to his client. Contrary to Maile's assertion, an attorney's duty of fairness" honor,
 
honesty, loyalty, and fidelity owed to his client is a fiduciary duty. See Blough v, Wellm.an, 132
 




$ The doctrine of"unclean hands" is based on the maxim that, "he who comes into equity must come with clean
 
hands," Gi/berl Y. Nampa School D/si. No, HI. 104 Idaho 137, 145, 657 P.2d 1,9 (1983). It allows a COUlrt to deny
 
equitable relief to a litigant on the ground that his or her conduct has been "inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
 
fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy at issue," Id.
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Idaho 424~ 426, 974 P.2d 70. 72 (1999); see aiso Matter ofLutz, 100 Idaho 45, 49, 592 P.2d 1362,
 
1366 (1979) ("The relationship between an attorney and client is one of the highest character. It is
 
a fiduciary relationship binding the attorney with the strictest accountability and fidelity to his
 
client's interest."); In re Carter, 59 Idaho 547, ----J 86 P.2d 162,163 (1938) (holding that
 
attorney/client relationship was "fiduciary relationship of the highest character, binding [the
 
attorney) with the strictest accountability and fidelity to his client's interests."). Nevertlheless, the
 
Court believes that this case can be decided on its merits by analyzing the elements of the unjust
 
enrichment claim. without proclaiming that Mr. Maile is barred from seeking equitable relief
 
based on the doctrine of unclean hands.
 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The doctrine of unjust enrichment sounds in quasi-contract or implied-in-­

law contract. Beeo Constr. Co.• Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463,
 
466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The theory is based upon the defendant having
 
received a benefit which would be inequitable to retain at least without
 
compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention of the benefit is unjust. Id.
 
In order to establish the prima facie case for unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must
 
show that there was: (1) a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff:
 
(2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit 
under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the 
benefit without payment to the plaintiff of the value thereof. Idaho Lumber. Inc. 
v. Buck. 109 Idaho 737,745,710 P.2d 647. 655 (Ct.App.198S).
 
Curtis v. Becker, 130 Idaho 378, 382, 941 P.2d 350,354 (Cl. App. 1997).
 
The Court finds that the Trust was not unjustly enriched by Maile's expenditures after the
 
purchase. Maile's expenditures conferred no benefit upon the Johnson Trust, the trustees,. nor the
 
beneficiaries. Even if the Trust had received a benefit, they certainly did not do so under 
circumstances that would make it inequitable for it to retain the benefit without paying Mr. Maile. 
While it is true that Mr. Maile and his related entities invested a substantial amount of 
time and money in attempting to develop the property, the Court finds, based upon substantial and 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING COUNTBRCLAIMANT'S CLAIM FOR DAMAGES 







































          
 
 
          
























































competent evidence, the amount of time and effort spent did not increase the value of Ithe 
property. The Court finds that the fair market value of the property is $1.8 million dollars 
presently, which is the same fair market value of the property with or without any expenditures or 
improvements made by Mr. Maile. 
CONCLUSION 
As previously ordered, the Trust must pay Mr. Maile the $400,000 he paid for the 
property. However, the Court declines to order the Trust to reimburse Maile for costs incurred in 
developing the property. 
The Court finds that the PlaintiffslCounterdefendants are the prevailing parties on the 
Defendantlcounterc1aimants' claim of unjust enrichment and wilJ award costs accordingly. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
/{\­
Dated this .li day ofNovember, 2006. 
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Defendants John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trust, by and through 
their attorney of record, move the Court for entry of an order dismissing this action in its entirety 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8), as well as through the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reason that there is an action pending 
between these parties relating to the same cause. After years of litigation before the Honorable 
Ronald Wilper, the Taylors and the Johnson Trust prevailed on all issues, and the matter is currently 
on appeal. The current action is therefore barred by I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8), res judicata and collateral 
estoppel. 
The Defendants also request Rule 11 Sanctions for filing of a frivolous lawsuit. 
The Defendants memorandum in support accompanies this motion. Oral argument is 
requested. 
;'1" 
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CONNIE TAYLOR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law within the state of Idaho and a member of 
Clark and Feeney, attorneys for the Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor and Theodore Johnson 
Trust in the above entitled matter. The information contained herein is of my own personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit E, a true and correct copy of the Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claim dated 06/07/06, the First Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim dated 
07/21/06, the Correction to First Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims dated 12/27/06, and 
the Second Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims dated 05/1 0/07. 
3. I am attaching hereto as Exhibit F, a true and correct copy of Judgment Denying 
Counterclaimants' Unjust Enrichment Claim entered December 11,2006. 
I(;r 
DATED this ---/-- day of October 008. 
~ (\, 
_ \ C? /X--­
C nnie Taylor.. ;7) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this {J I day of October, ~ 
...- , {"" j I ~ i (.~ I(! I !)/ 
Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho. 
Residing at . (c.t.?· c)' (I therein. 
, • ''> ,­
My commission expires: , ,'; / i... i.{ " / '7 __ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, ) 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, ) Case No. CV OC 0400473D 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
vs. ) ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS 
) 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN ) 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS ) 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, ) 
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MAILE, husband and wife, and )
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This cause came on before the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper for hearing on a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions 
oflawcontained within this Court's May 15,2006 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims, a Judgment was entered on the Beneficiaries' Claims on June 
7,2006, and was subsequently amended on July 21, 2006 and corrected on December 27, 2006. 
Based upon the Court's April 6, 2007 order awarding costs to the Plaintiffs, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. The Trustees' failure to obtain judicial approval in this case pursuant to Idaho Code 
section 68-108(b) rendered by the closing of the sale and the sales contract as a whole void rather 
than voidable, as a matter of law 
2. The property commonly referred to as ''the Linder Road property" also n~ferred to as 
Lots 1-7 of Fairfield Estates Subdivision to the City of Eagle, Ada County, Idaho, is more 
particularly described as follows: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North. 
Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
3. The Linder Road property is currently being held in a constructive trust by the current 
title holders for the benefit of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. 
4. In relation to the interests asserted by the Defendants therein, the title to the Linder 
Road property shall be quieted in favor of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT
 
ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS 2
 00398G1 
LAW OFTICES O~ 
CLAR K AND FEENEY 































































5. Defendant Berkshire Investments shall be entitled to repayment of the $400,000 
purchase price paid for the Linder Road property, less the sum of$12,424.04 in costs pursuant to this 
Court's order dated April 6, 2007. 
6. With the exception ofthe Counterclaim XI Unjust Enrichment, all ofthe Defendants' 
remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses were dismissed in the Court's previousjudgments. 
The unjust enrichment counterclaim was decided by the Court's Memorandum necision date 
November 29,2006, reduced to a Judgment Denying Counterclaimant's Unjust Enrichment Claim 
on December 11, 2006. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
7·rDATED this day 0~007. 
, hI1f 
SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT 
ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS 3 00398~ 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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Dennis M. Charney '¢ U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law o Hand Delivered 
1191 East Iron Eagle Drive, o Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 o Telecopy (FAX) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
7 STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, 8 
9 and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 

















MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS ) 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, 
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25 CORRECTION TO FIRST AMENDED 
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The First Amended Judgment on Beneficiaries' claims dated July 21, 2006 is hereby 
corrected as follows: 
1. The title to the real property which is the subject ofthis lawsuit is quieted to the Theodore 
L. Johnson Trust. That property is more particularly described as follows: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, 
Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
ALSO DESCRIBED AS Lots 1,2,3,4,5,6, and 7 ofthe Fairfield Estates Subdivision, Ada 
County, Idaho. 
2. All other provisions of the First Amended Judgment not modified herein remain in 
full force and effect. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
 
DATED this R day of_~J)e-"l.l , 2006.
,--=-_t, 
RONALD J. \!\fiLF'ER 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper 
CORRECTION TO FIRST AMENDED 
JUDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS 2 
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Eagle, ID 83616 D Telecopy (FAX) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 





 Case No. CVOC0400473D 
FIRST AMENDED JUDGMENT ON 
BENEFICIARIES' CLAIM 
VS. 
THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN MAILE,
 













THOMAS MAILE, N and COLLEEN MAILE,
 
husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE REAL
 





This cause came before the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper for hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law contained within the Court's May 15, 2006 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim, 


































































































NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1.	 The trustees' failure to obtain judicial approval in this case pursuant to Idaho Code section 
68-108(b) rendered both the closing of the sale and the sales contract as a whole void, 
rather than voidable, as a matter oflaw. 
2.	 The property Gornmonly referred to as "the Linder Road property" is more palticularly 
described as follows: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 
5 North, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
3.	 The Linder Road property is currently being held in constructive trust by the current title 
holders for the benefit of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. 
4.	 In relation to the interests asserted by the Defendants therein, the title to the Linder Road 
property shall be quieted in favor of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. 
5.	 Defendant Berkshire Investments shall be entitled to repayment of the $400,000 purchase 
price paid for the Linder Road property, less any amount proven to be entitled to the 
Defendants pursuant to their counterclaim for unjust enrichment. 
6.	 With the exception of Counterclaim XI Unjust Enrichment, all of the Defendants' 
remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses are hereby dismissed. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
;5'Dated this -J..J:- day of~ ( """I 2006. 
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This cause came on before the Honorable Ronald 1. Wilper for hearing on a Motion for 
ummary Judgment on the Beneficiaries' Claim. Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions 
flaw contained within this Court's May 15,2006 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
udgment on Beneficiaries' Claim, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
ollows: 
1. The July 22, 2002 Earnest Money Agreement between The Theodore L. Johnson 
evocable Trust and defendants Thomas Maile IV and Colleen Maile for the purchase ofthe Linder 
oad property which is more fully described in paragraph 3 of this Judgment, and all subsequent 
ocuments relating to that transaction, are void as a matter of law. 
2.	 . The title to the property commonly referred to as "the Linder Road property" and 
ore particularly described in Paragraph 3 of this Judgment shall be quieted to the Theodore L. 
ohnson Revocable Trust, in fee simple. 
3.	 The Linder Road property is more particularly described as follows: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township 5 North, 
Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho 
4.	 The Defendants' remaining counterclaims and affirmative defenses, all ofwhich were 
ased on either equitable claims or the assertion that the Plaintiffs were wrongfully interfering with 
he Defendants' right to possess the Linder Road Property, are hereby dismissed. Specifically, those 
laims are as follows: 
A.	 Counterclaim I (tortious interference with contract between Defendants and 
their lending institution) 
B. Counterclaims VII and VIII (equitable estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel)
 
UDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS 2
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C.	 Counterclaim X (fraudulent transfer) 
D.	 Counterclaim XI (unjust enrichment) 
E.	 Affirmative defenses of Laches, Failure to Mitigate, and Unclean Hands. 
5.	 The Plaintiff Beneficiaries are the prevailing parties in this matter.
 
DATED this k- day of June, 2006.
 
~J"lO J. Wu..PER 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper 
UDGMENT ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS 3 
LAW OFFICES C F 
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orrect copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
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380 West State Street 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Connie W. Taylor 
Clark and Feeney 
PO Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 8350 I 
Jack S. Gjording 
Gjording & Fouster 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, ID 83702 
Dennis M. Charney 
Attorney at Law 
951 E. Plaza Drive, Suite 140 
Eagle, ID 83616 
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) JUDGMENT DENYING 
vs. ) COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
) UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAJIM 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN ) 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS ) 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, ) 
















THOMAS MAILE IV, and COLLEEN )
 
MAILE, husband and wife, and )
 










UNJUST ENRICHMENT CLAIM 1
 

















































This cause came on before the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper for trial on the Counterclaimant' s 
unjust emichment claim on October 11 and 12,2006. 
Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained within this Court's 
November 29, 2006 Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Counterclaimant's Claim for 
Damages Grounded on the Theory of Unjust Enrichment, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: 
1. The Counterclaimants' claim for damages grounded on the theory of unjust 
enrichment is denied. 
2. The Plaintiffs/counterdefendants are the prevailing parties on the Defendant-
Counterclaimants' claim of unjust enrichment and are entitled to an award of costs. 
DATED this ~ day ofDecember, 20062006. 
The Honorable Ronald 1. Wilper 
JUDGMENT DENYING COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
UNJUST ENRlCHMENT CLAIM 2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
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Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trust, by and through 
their attorney ofrecord, submit this memorandum in support of their motion asking that this Court 
enter an order dismissing this action in its entirety pursuant to LR.C.P. 12(b)(8), as well as through 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel and for an Order for Rule 11 Sanctions for filing 
of this frivolous lawsuit. 
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In 2002, Thomas Maile and his wife purchased 40 acres ofproperty on Linder Road in Eagle 
Idaho from Mr. Maile's long-time client, Ted Johnson. The property had been placed in a trust, and 
Mr. Maile had prepared all of the documents establishing that trust. 
On January 23, 2004 three of the residual beneficiaries of the Johnson Trust filed a suit 
attempting to recover the Linder Road property (Ada County Case No. CV OC 04004730). The 
Plaintiffs included John Taylor and Dallan Taylor, and the Defendants included the Mailes and their 
private LLC, Berkshire lnvestments. The Johnson Trust filed a lawsuit against the same Defendants, 
also seeking recovery of the property, on July 19,2004 (Ada County Case No. CV OC 04056560). 
On a motion by Thomas Maile, the two cases were consolidated. The Mailes filed a number of 
Answers and raised a plethora of Counterclaims, all but one of which were eventually dismissed. 
In Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005), (Taylor I), the Supreme Court ruled
 
that the Taylors, as residual beneficiaries of their mother's interest, had standing to challenge the
 
Mailes' purchase of property from the Johnson Trust. On remand, the District Court granted
 
summary judgment to the Taylors, finding that the successor trustees had a conflict of interest which
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mandated court approval ofthe sale, and that the lack ofcourt approval made the sale to Mailes void 
as a matter of law. The District Court also ruled that the Mailes were not bona fide purchasers 
because they "had actual knowledge that the Rogers were exceeding or improperly exercising their 
powers as a matter oflaw." That conclusion was based on "the finding that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact that Defendant Thomas G. Maile prepared the trust agreement creating the conflict 
of interest." See pg. 6, II. 13-20 of the Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 
on Beneficiaries' Claim dated May 15, 2006 attached as Exhibit C to the Amended Affidavit in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss previously filed in this case. The trial court entered a Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claim 06/07/06 which was amended on 07/21106, 12/27/06 and 05110/07. See 
Judgments attached as Exhibit E to the Second Affidavit in Support of the Motion to Dismiss. 
The Maile's sole surviving counterclaim, for unjust enrichment, was tried to the court and 
found to be without merit. See Memorandum Decision and Order denying the unjust enrichment 
claim was attached as Exhibit D to the Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
previously filed in this case. In that decision, Judge Wilper ruled that Mr. Maile had never advised 
his client Ted Johnson ofthe potential conflict of interest and the need for independent counsel. "Mr. 
Maile should have advised Mr. Johnson to seek independent advice about selling him that land for 
$400,000. Indeed Mr. Maile testified at trial that he did exactly that. The Court is not persuaded that 
Mr. Maile so advised Mr. Johnson." See pg. 4, II. 4-8, Memorandum Decision and Order attached 
as Exhibit D to the Amended Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss. Judgment Denying 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR 
RULE 11 SANCTIONS 3 
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Counterclaimants' Unjust Enrichment Claim was entered December 11, 2006. See Exhibit F 
attached to Second Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss for the Judgment. 
The Mailes are appealing those judgments, again asserting that Taylors lacked standing, as 
well as appealing various interlocutory orders and judgments. That appeal is scheduled to be heard 
by the Idaho Supreme Court on November 10,2008. 
The present action filed by the Mailes is simply another attempt to recover the property which 
the trial court returned to the Johnson Trust, largely based on arguments which have already been 
deemed to be without merit. 
ARGUMENT 
I.	 There Is Another Action Pending Between These Parties Relating to the Same 
Cause. 
This court has the discretion to dismiss this action against John Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and 
the Johnson trust under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8), "another action pending between the same parties for the 
same cause." 
In determining whether a lawsuit should proceed where a similar lawsuit is pending in 
another court, the court should consider (1) whether the other cause has gone to judgment, in which 
case the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion may bar additional litigation, and (2) whether the 
court, although not barred from deciding the case, should nevertheless refrain from doing so. Klaue 
v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437,988 P.2d 211 (1999). In exercising such discretion, a trial court should 
evaluate the identity of the real parties in interest and the degree to which the claims or issues are 
similar,judicial economy, minimizing costs and delay to the litigants, obtaining prompt and orderly 
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disposition of each claim or issue, and avoiding potentially inconsistent judgments. Wing v.
 
Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 684 P.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1984), overruled on other grounds
 
NBC Leasing Co., v. R&T Farms, Inc., 112 Idaho 500, 733 P.2d 721 (1987).
 
These same parties have already engaged in over four years of heated litigation relating to 
the impropriety oftheMailes.purchaseoftheJohnsonTrustproperty.This case has been to the 
Supreme Court once, and on remand the trial court awarded the property back to the Johnson Trust 
and dismissed all but one of the Mailes' counterclaims. The sole remaining counterclaim, unjust 
enrichment, was dismissed after a court trial. The case is now again on appeal before the Idaho 
Supreme Court. 
Given this tortuous and protracted history, it makes no sense at all to allow the Mailes to 
attempt to begin this entire litigation anew with the current lawsuit. The Defendants respectfully 
request that this court dismiss, with prejudice, the suit against John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and the 
Johnson Trust under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8). 
II. The Current Lawsuit Is Barred by the Doctrine of Res Judicata. 
In addition to their motion under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8), these Defendants also ask that the court 
dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice on the grounds that it is barred by the doctrine of res jUdicata, 
which includes both claim preclusion and issue preclusion (sometimes referred to as collateral 
estoppel). 
In a June 4, 2008 decision, Andrus v. Nicholson, 2008-ID-R0606.002, the Idaho Supreme 
Court dealt at length with the requirements for dismissing a case under the doctrine of res judicata. 
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The Andrus case involved two successive lawsuits, each of which attempted to gain access across 
the defendants' real property so the plaintiffs could reach their mining claims. The first suit was 
dismissed on summary judgment, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal 
of the second suit on resjudicata grounds. The Court also affirmed the award ofcosts and attorneys 
fees below and awarded attorney fees on appeal. In this section ofthis memorandum, we will follow 
the analysis of the Andrus court and apply that analysis to the facts of the Maile lawsuit. 
Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and issue preclusion
 
(collateral estoppel). Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803,805 (2002). For claim
 
preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: (1) same parties; (2) same claim;
 
and (3) final judgment. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007).
 
Each of those requirements will be discussed separately.
 
Same parties. "[T]he doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) bars the presentation of the
 
claim in a subsequent lawsuit between the same parties or their privies." Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v.
 
Cedar Mesa Reservoir and Canal Co.. 123 Idaho 634, 637, 851 P.2d 348,351 (1993). The Plaintiffs
 
in this action (the Mailes and Berkshire Investments) were Defendants in the prior lawsuits, and John
 
Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and the Johnson Trust were Plaintiffs in the prior lawsuits. Th~:refore, the 
"same parties" requirement has been met. 
Same claim. The next issue is whether both lawsuits involved the same claim. The Taylor 
suit, the Johnson Trust suit, and the present action all sought an order quieting title to the Johnson 
Trust real property, albeit on a variety ofdifferent theories. The Plaintiffs in this case have come up 
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with some new and quite novel arguments (including suing the opposing attorney for conspiracy to 
commit a variety ofcrimes, including theft and [inexplicably] public mutilation ofa flag.) However, 
claim preclusion under the doctrine of res judicata is not limited to theories that w(~re actually 
litigated in the prior lawsuit. 
The Andrus court pointed this out, citing Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co" 35 Idaho
 
549,553,208 P. 241,242-43 (1922): [T]he former adjudication concludes parties and privies not
 
only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but also as to every matter
 
which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." The prior adjudication "extinguishes
 
all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions out of which the cause of
 
action arose." Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150,804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990). The
 
determination of whether a group of facts constitutes a "transaction" is to be made "pragmatically,
 
giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space .. origin, or
 
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms
 
to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage." Restatement (Second) ofJudgments
 
§ 24 (1982). A cause of action can be barred by a prior adjudication even though the theory of
 
liability and supporting evidence differ trom the cause ofaction actually litigated in the prior lawsuit.
 
Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437-39, 849 P.2d 107, 110-112 (1993).
 
In this case, the Plaintiffs can make no plausible argument that their new lawsuit is not based 
entirely on claims arising out ofthe same transaction or series oftransactions out ofwhich the prior 
causes of action arose. Therefore, even the new theories under which the Plaintiffs claim the 
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Johnson Trust property should be returned to them are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
Final Judgments. As indicated by Exhibits E and F of the Second Affidavit in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss, final judgments were entered in the prior litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and the Theodore 
Johnson Trust respectfully request that this court enter an order dismissing this cause of action, with 
' 
prejudice and for an Order assessing Rule 11 Sanctions. 
Ai 
! , )1 
DATED this ~_ day of October, 2008. 
n 
By .~~ 
Conni W. Taylor, a member of the firm. ) 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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!(;r 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -1--- day of October, 2008 I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
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Thomas G. Maile, IV
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Attorney at Law 
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Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
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MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
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v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT A"lD 
MOTION FOR RULE 11 
SANCTIONS 
The plaintiffs above named, by and through their attorney of record, Thomas Maile IV, 
and provide this Statement of Facts in opposition to defendants Taylors and the Theodore L. 
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Johnson Revocable Trust's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement as follows: 
STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS 
1 In July, 2002, Mr. Theodore L. Johnson retained a local licensed appraiser, Knipe, 
Janoush and Associates to determine the fair market value of the property. The 
appraisal firm of Knipe, Janoush and Associates provided their appraisal report on 
July 17, 2002. The property was valued at $400,000.00. (Affidavit ofThomas 
Maile Part One deposition ofBeth Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing deposition 
exhibit 9). 
2	 Mr. Johnson approached Mr. Maile with an offer to sell the property for the 
appraised value. Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson he could have an independent 
attorney regarding the transaction. Mr. Johnson replied that he trusted Mr. Maile 
with the drafting of the agreement. Mr. and Mrs. Maile executed the agreement. 
On July 25,2002, Mr. Maile met Mr. Johnson at his home and again explained 
that he could retain independent counsel regarding the transaction. Again Mr. 
Johnson indicated he did not want to do so and executed the earnest money 
agreement making a modification on the addendum. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile 
Part Two- Exhibits "N" & "0" referencing the Supplemental Aftldavit of Elaine 
Lee, referencing dep testimony ofMr. Maile pp.l04-105, 120-121, and portions 
of trial transcript testimony, Tr. Vol. I p. pp.32-33, 137-138). 
3 In mid-August 2002, the successor trustees, prudently took the appraisal and the 
real estate forms for a review by an independent attorney in Boise, Idaho. 
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Independent counsel reviewed the contract, assignment, appraisal and provided 
some minor proposed changes to the proposed deed oftrust. Mr. Johnson, 
received the input from independent counsel and continued to support his decision 
to sell the real estate for the appraised value. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One 
deposition testimony of Beth Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing depo. pp. 44-52). 
4	 Defendant Connie Taylor drafted a letter to Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004 
which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up theft rights as beneficiaries 
of the trust unless Beth will affirm her prior factual statements in the fOlm of an 
affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. Ifwe aren't able 
to reach an agreement on that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and a 
copy of the trust and estate tax returns". (Affidavit ofThomas Maile Patt One 
deposition of Beth Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing deposition exhibit 39). 
5	 The Taylors individually filed their lawsuit in January 2004 against Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, Thomas G. Maile, IV., and Colleen Birch-Maile and on April 
23, 2004, the Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper entered his Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Order 
entered April 23, 2004 Exhibit "G"). 
6	 The Taylors and the Rogers (successor trustees) and the beneficiaries entered into 
a global "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement" which was dated 
July 15,2004. Under the terms of the Agreement the Taylors released the trustees 
Beth and Andy Rogers from all liability relating to the administration of the trust. 
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The Agreement further provided that the Taylors would be appointed as successor 
trustees. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One deposition of Beth Rogers Exhibit 
"B" referencing deposition exhibit 25). 
7 Armed with the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement", the Talyors 
alleged acting as trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust filed a 
second lawsuit on July 19th, 2004. Berkshire Investment and the Maih~s filed 
their filed their motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment on October 20, 
2004 alleging that the Taylors had not properly obtained judicial appointment as 
successor trustees. (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Exhibit "H") 
8	 In response to the motion before Judge Wilper, the Taylors filed their vt~rified 
petition in the probate court on November 12,2004, requesting the probate court 
to appoint them as trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The 
petition was executed by R. John Taylor as a verification of the facts contained in 
the petition. Page 2 of the verified petition states under oath, "the petitioner's 88­
year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary ofthis trust by 
virtue ofthe terms ofa Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement." 
(Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part Two Exhibit "I") (emphasis added). 
9	 The Taylors obtained an ex-parte order from the probate order on November 17, 
2004, appointing them as successor trustees, retroactively to June 10, 2004. On 
February 28,2005, Berkshire Investments and the Mailes filed appropriate 
pleadings before the probate court requesting that the ex-parte Order dated 
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November 17, 2004 be set aside. The ex-parte order was set aside by Judge Beiter 
and a hearing was ultimately held on the petition for appointment and an order 
was entered appointing the Taylors as successor trustees of the trust. 
10 At the hearing Mr. R. John Taylor was sworn under oath and provided testimony 
before the Honorable Judge Beiter on May 2,2005 and testified: page 14, In 4: 
Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why it is that you want to serve? 6 
A. "Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always thought it 
was a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the 
beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this claim." 
During that same hearing Mr. Clark provided in his closing argument before 
Judge Beiter on June 5, 2005 provided: page 17, In 12: MR. CLARK: "Yes. 
Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that, based upon, first, the agreement of the 
beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that the Taylors should serve as co-trustees. 
The Taylors, pursuant to that same agreement, have a guarantee in the disclaimer. 
So they have some interest in the proceeding. Their mother stands to gain and, 
thereby, they have an interest in the proceeding." (Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part 
One transcript ofprobate court hearing Exhibit "A"). 
11	 The Taylors appealed the decision authored by Judge Wilper and acting through 
their attorneys of record, provided statements to the Appellate Court, in their 
Appellants' Opening Brief in the Idaho Supreme Court case number 30817, dated 
October 15, 2004, stated, "The Taylors are beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson 
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Trust.. ..". (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two portions of appellants' Opening 
Brief Exhibit "J"). 
12 The district court entered its order granting in part and denying in part the 
Berkshire Investments and the Mailes' Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment. 
The district court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28, 2005 
allowing the "trust" to amend its complaint after the successor trustees received 
the required appointment by the probate court and denied their motion regarding 
that issue of law. The district court did grant Berkshire Investments and Mailes' 
motion in part ruling that the Taylors and the trust had waived rights to rescind the 
contract as "once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts 
giving rise to a right of recision, the right of recision is waived." The District 
Court further found that the "Plaintiffs (Theodore L. Johnson Revocablt~ Trust and 
the Taylors), now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to pursue 
rescission once the grounds for it arose. Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS 
Defendants' motion with respect to this claim" (Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part 
Two Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28, 2005 Exhibit "K"). 
13	 The Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Taylor v. Maile I on December 
23,2005. 
14	 On March 9, 2006, the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, and 
prepared by the co-defendant attorneys. Page 1 of the Verified Amended 
Complaint states under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce 
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County, Idaho; DaHan Taylor is a resident of Ada County Idaho. All ofthe 
plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Trust." (The 
verified amended complaint is annexed to Amended complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial as Exhibit "B") (emphasis added) . 
15 The Taylors acting with and through their attorneys on February 13, 2006, filed 
their Motion For Summary Judgment On Beneficiaries' Claim. The first sentence 
ofthe motion states, "Come Now Plaintiffs Reed, DaHan, and John Taylor 
(hereafter referred to as "the Beneficiary Plaintiffs") (Affidavit of Thomas Maile 
Part Two Exhibit "L"). 
16	 The Taylors again referring to themselves as Plaintiff Beneficiaries filed the 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claim on February 13, 2006. On page 5 of the Memorandum the 
Taylors state, "The Plaintiff Beneficiaries are entitled to summary judgment on 
their constructive trust claim against the Defendants pursuant to the Idaho 
Supreme Court decision dated December 23,2005." (Affidavit of Thomas Maile 
Part Two Exhibit "M"). 
17	 Ultimately the district court entered the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim" on 
June 7,2006 (The Judgment is annexed to Amended Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial as Exhibit "C") (emphasis added) . 
18 The Judgment was recorded with the Ada County Recorder's Office on June 9th 
2006. (Exhibit "E" to the Second Affidavit of Connie Taylor dated October 1, 
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Dated this -+- day ofOctober, 2008. 
TH AS G. ~ AILE, IV, Pro Se and 
Attorney for plaintiffs Berkshire Illvestm~:nts and 
Colleen Birch-Maile. 
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Eagle, Idaho 83616 
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Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
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v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT l'AYLOR, flk/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
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AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE 
PART ONE 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County ofAda ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, rv, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
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1.	 Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch­
Maile and in addition is a named plaintiffherein. That the information and facts set forth 
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can 
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
2.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the reporter"s transcript from 
the hearing dated May 25,2005 before the Honorable Christopher Bieter, Judge of the 
Probate Court. 
3.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by this reference: as if set forth in 
full herein are true and correct copies of pages 9 thru 93,96 thru 131, of the Deposition of 
Beth Rogers taken on August 11, 2004, together with deposition exhibit numbers 1 thru 
11, 13 thru 16, 18 thru 23,25 28, 38 and 39 said Exhibit was involved in the captioned 
matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand 
Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04­
056560, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV DC 04-00473D, in which 
your affiant was a party and co-counsel and proceedings in which all present patties were 
involved either as litigants or attorneys representing the litigants. 
4.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full 
herein are a true and correct copies of pages 1, 82, 83, 84, 85, 132, 133, ]134, of the 
deposition ofReed J. Taylor, taken on January 31,2005, together with Exhibit 53, said 
Exhibit was involved in the captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust vs Thomas Maile. IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada 












County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case 
Number CV OC 04-00473D, in which your affiant was a party and co-counsel and 
proceedings in which all present parties were involved either as litigants or attomeys 
representing the litigants. 
5.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "0" and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full 
herein are a true and correct copies of pages 1,25,26,27,28,29,30,31, and 32, of the 
deposition of Helen Taylor, taken on April 13,2005. 
6.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full 
herein are a true and correct copies of pages 1,36,37 ofthe deposition ofR. John Taylor, 
taken on December 14, 2004. 
7.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "F" and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full 
herein are a true and correct copies ofpages 1, 74, 75 of the deposition ofDallan Taylor, 
taken on September 9, 2004. 
DATED this _b day of October, 
THOMAS G. MAILE, N, 0 ;d 
Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
/ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
~ day of October, 2008. 
on~(]AM't 
Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30, 2014 
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1 THE COURT: --74M. 1bis is the hearing I 
2 should have conducted a few months ago to name successor 
3 trustees in the trust. 
4 Mr. Clark is here with the petitioners; and 
5 Mr. Gjording, representing Mr. Maile, is also here. 
6 Gentlemen, I have read all of the material 
7 filed since our hearing last month; and I think I have a 
8 sense ofyour positions. I will let you make whatever 
9 record and argument you care to. 
~O Mr. Clark, whenever you're ready. 
I MR. CLARK: Thank you, Judge. In the courtroom 
2 with me I have two of the -- I have the petitioner, John 
3 Taylor, and another proposed co-trustee, his brother ~2 
4 Dalen Taylor. Reed is not here today. ~3 
5 It seems to me that there are really three 4 
6 issues. One is the standing of Mr. Maile in this 5 
7 proceeding. 6 
~8 It seems to me that the court should make a 7 
~9 ruling with respect to that issue before proceeding 8 
')0 further. And then if we get beyond that -­ 9 
01 THE COURT: Sure. DO 
?2 MR. CLARK: -- beyond that, the second point is /1 
03 who we are going to appoint as trustee, or trustees. 
/2 
04 The third issue I see is the effective date of 
°3 




And so with the court's permission, it would 
seem to make judicial sense to address, the first issue, 
whether or not Mr. Maile has standing in this 
proceeding, because I think that could affect how we 
proceed with the next two issues. 
THE COURT: That's a fair suggestion, and I 
will hear both sides' arguments on that question. 
MR. CLARK: And I apologize; I'm not familiar 
with your courtroom here. Do you prder me to be here 
or -­
THE COURT: I prefer-- wherever you are 
comfortable, Mr. Clark, is fin(~. 
MR. CLARK: Thank you, Judgl~. 
First, as we talked about last day, the 
argument of Mr. Maile is a circular argument. He first 
says that the action, the pending action between the 
trust where the trust is the named plaintiff and him and 
his entities, is void. 
And if that -- in other words, because a 
trustee was not validly appointed, bringing that action, 
that action is void. Within this file, he has presented 
copies of briefing from the other case that stands for 
the proposition that that action is void. 
Now, if that action is void, his counterclaim 
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1 party to that. 
2 And if that's correct, he is not a creditor of 
3 the trust and, therefore, has no standing to even 
4 participate in this as a creditor. 
5 And I think, before he can participate in this 
6 proceeding, he has to advise the court that the 
7 companion case, the lawsuit, is valid because, if he 
8 claims it's invalid or void, then his position must be 
9 that he's not a creditor. 
a And in that case, he actually has two hats. 
1 One is the hat of the debtor. And as I pointed out 
2 before, as a debtor in that action, ifhe has 
3 participation in this case and input in this case to 
4 decide who the trustee or trustees are going to be, it's 
5 putting -- potentially putting the fox in the hen house 
6 because he would have every reason in the world to want 
7 the court to select somebody that is friendly to his 
~8 position. 
9 Correspondingly, if that case is valid and if 
DO his position is correct that he's a creditor -- and I 
In say "if' because, in that case, our position is that 
D2 they are simply unfounded allegations. 
D3 But ifhe has a claim because he is a debtor on 
D4 the one hand, a defendant -- and a plaintiff -- a 




1 conflict of interest. 
2 Because of that conflict, he should not be 
3 allowed to participate in this proceeding because 
4 whether it's -- whether it's on the -- as a defendant, 
5 he wants a trustee that will give him the best position. 
6 As a creditor, he wants a truste{~ that will give him the 
7 best position. 
8 This is not like something that you pointed out 
9 last day about a creditor wanting an interest in the 
~O case because they want to make: sure that the trustee
 
b does the right thing to preserve the assets of the
 
~2 estate and to protect his interests as a cn~ditor.
 
113 It's -- it isn't that. And we think, one, that
 
l4 the court -- I guess, fIrst, that the court simply
 
~5 should say that, if you are a creditor, you have
 
~6 conflict and we don't want to hear from you in this
 







11IE COURT: Mr. Gjording? 
b1 MR. GJORDING: Well, Judge, as I sit here 
b2 thinking about this case and listening to counsel, this 
03 phrase keeps going through my mind; "I was born at night 
04 but not last night." 
And I can't help but think that you could be
15 
7 I Page 8 
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1 thinking that. You've got a couple of lawyers down here 
2 kind of tap dancing in order that they can persuade you 
3 to come to a decision, come to a ruling, that will aid 
4 what these respective parties are trying to do. 
5 Basically, what we're wrestling over here, Your 
6 Honor, is whether or not the order of this court -­
7 whether you appoint a neutral trustee or the trustees 
8 that have applied, what is happening here is that the 
9 parties in this case are trying to speak to you in terms 
o of the effective date ofthe appointment of the trustee. 
1 Now, I could go on and argue all of the issues 
2 here about why Mr. Maile has standing. I don't think I 
3 need to do that. You mentioned that you have read the 
4 briefs. I think you probably know the law better than I 
5 do. We presented to you why we believe that we have 
6 standing. 
7 But the major point that we are trying to make 
~ 8 here, Judge, is that -- whether or not we have standing, 
~ 9 what we are hoping will happen in this case is that you 
1 not allow the parties to manipulate the orders that you 
2 enter in a way that will help them in a lawsuit that's 
3 upstairs. That's what it comes down to. 
4 We feel that we have a valid position here to 
5 talk about the appointment of the trust'ee. And I 
6 suppose one -- counsel says if you let ..- if you let Mr. 
7 Maile have input into the appointment of the trustee, 
8 it's like letting the fox in the hen hous{:. 
9 I would rephrase that to, "allowing another fox 
in the hen house," so that there are two foxes in the 
hen house. We all know what this is about. That's why 
I'm saying, "I was born at night but not last night." 
We think we have standing. I certainly leave 
that to you, Your Honor. 
I do wish to speak to the issue of the 
effective date of the order, regardless of how you rule 
on this. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
'9 Well, my sense of whether Mr. Maile has 
b0 interpret the law. 
? 0 standing comes from -- his status is SOli of contingent. 
b1 All ofthese issues -- whether Mr. Maile has 
? 1 I mean, his status really depends on that lawsuit. His 
? 2 standing, whether the petitioners should be trustees and 
? 2 interest in any actions of the trustee comes from its 
b 3 what the effective date of the appointment should be-­
[/3 effect on the lawsuit. 
b 4 we are simply asking you to interpret the law and make 
[/4 So he's a creditor. Maybe you could call him a 
b 5 your ruling consistent with the law in a way that does 
? 5 contingent creditor or an alleged creditor or a claimed 
Page 9 Page 10 
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1 creditor but I think -- I think the creditor-debtor 
2 possibilities of that lawsuit give him some interest to 
3 be part of this proceeding. 
4 Now, I think the fact that the statute 
5 characterized it as "an interested party" suggests, 
6 perhaps, that interest may be a self-interest. That 
7 doesn't necessarily disqualify someone from having a 
8 comment on how the appointment process goes and who 
9 might be appointed as a trustee. 
D But I think that interest can be pointed out, 
1 Mr. Clark, as you've done, that his interest may be to 
11 2 have someone not all that eager to pursue the case. I 
~ 3 think it's fair to -- it's fair to point out that 
h4 position. I think that's what gives him a basis to want 
5 to have some comment here. 
6 So I am going to find that, while the interest 
7 may be contingent, it may not be -- it may not be as 
8 clear as somebody that sold him his last pair of shoes 
9 or something. 
b 0 But I think he sold the trust some property or 
D1 may have some more direct status as a creditor. I think 
b2 it's enough to have a comment here, but it's fair for 
D3 all of the parties to discuss the nature of that 
b 4 interest and how that might color the decision that the 


























So I will fmd that there is -- that Mr. Maile 
has some status that would allow him to have a comment, 
an argument into the process. 
So with that, Mr. Clark, if you will, continue 
with the other points that you wanted to make. 
MR. CLARK: Yes, Your Honor. With respect to 
the appointment, I would like to call Jo1m Taylor and 
just have him testify briefly in support of his 
position. We have submitted affidavits, and I would 
like to present some additional evidence. 
THE COURT: All right. Sir, would you come up, 
please, and take the oath? Raise your right hand, 
please. 
* * * 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
having been first duly sworn, tf:stified as follows: 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. If you would, have 
a seat. 
Whenever you're ready, Mr. Clark. 
MR. CLARK: Thank you. 
Page 11 Page 12 
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1 DIRECT EXAMINATION 1 serve as a co-trustee with your two brothers in this
 
2 BY MR. CLARK: 2 matter?
 
3 Q. Please state your name for the record.
 3 A. Yes, sir.
 
4 A. R. John Taylor.
 4 Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why
 
5 Q. And where do you reside?
 5 it is that you want to serve?
 
6 A. Lewiston, Idaho.
 6 A. Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the
 
7 Q. Okay. And what is your trade or occupation?
 
7 trust. We have always thought it was a valid claim 
8 A. I am President of Crop USA Insurance and AlA 
8 because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is 
9 Insurance. 
9 the beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will 
I0 Q. And approximately how many employees are under I I
10 eventually win on this claim.
 
1 you in those positions?
 II
 Some of the other members of the trust were not 
2 A. 45. I 
12 interested in pursuing the claim, and they agreed to
 
3 Q. Okay. And how long have you been associated
 I 
13 withdraw as beneficiaries or contingent beneficiaries in 
4 with AlA Insurance?
 
I
14 exchange for us allowing -- going forth with the claim 5 A. Since 1977.
 
l5 and consented to our being trustees.
 
r: 
6 Q. And what type of company is AlA Insurance?
 
That, of course, creates some liability for me,
 7 A. AlA and Crop USA provide benefit plans and crop 
even if it is contingent, that if we end up losing the 8 insurance for members of various farm associations 
I 
I 
9 around the United States. 18 case, we may end up owing some costs or other 
I 
I 
bO Q. Okay. And according to your affidavit, you are 19 liabilities for the case. 
I 
Ib1 licensed as an attorney with the Idaho State Bar? 120 Q. SO you personally have some exposure? 
~2 A. Yes. I am a member of the Bar. A. Yes. 
~3 Q. How long have you been licensed? t:
 Q. And do you feel that you and your brothers are 
84 A. Since September 1976, I believe. ~:
 all qualified to act as co-trustees?
 bs Q. You have asked the court for permission to
 A. I do. 
125 MR. CLARK: That's all I have, Judge. 
Page 13 Page 14 
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1 THE COURT: Mr. Gjording, any questions? 
2 MR. GJORDING: Just a couple. 
3 
4 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR. GJORDING: 
6 Q. Mr. Taylor, the person that you seek to 
7 substitute for or replace is Beth Rogers? 
s A. Yes. 
9 Q. And had Beth Rogers been interested in pursuing 
a this claim that you talk about, I assume you wouldn't 
1 be -- there wouldn't be any need for you to be the 
2 trustee? 
1 a number of the beneficiaries and the contingent 
2 beneficiaries that didn't want to pursm: the claim 
3 against Mr. Maile? 
4 A. There were several beneficiaries. And, 
5 generally, towards the end, I would say that seven of us 
6 decided to continue the claim and the rest did not. 
7 Q. One of the reasons they didn't want to do that 
S is they didn't want to be exposed to th(~ expense of 
9 pursuing the lawsuit? 
a A. That may be true, yes. 
1 Q. And the only thing that is left in the trust, 
2 is it not, Mr. Taylor, is the lawsuit, if there is 
3 A. Not necessarily. She's on a Mormon mission in l3 
i 
one? 
4 Canada, so she no longer lives in the country. A. Yes. 
5 Q. But she did not favor this claim, did she? f: Q. All of the money has been distributed? 
6 A. She -- sometimes she favored the claim; 
tL6 A. Pretty much. 
7 sometimes she didn't. l7 MR. GJORDING: That's all I have. 
9 
S 
under oath here. It is true, is it not, Mr. Taylor, 
Q. Mr. Taylor, I don't have to remind you you're ls 
I 
19 MR. CLARK: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else, :Mr. Clark? 
D0 that Beth Rogers did not want to pursue this claim ~O 
D1 against Mr. Maile? Isn't that true? 
1/2 A. No, sir. 
Q. That's not true? 
1/ 4 A. That is not true. 
4 
Q. Okay. Is it true, Mr. Taylor, that there were 
Page 15 Page 16 
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1 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
2 BY MR. CLARK: 
3 Q. Mr. Taylor, who distributed the money? 
4 A. Beth Rogers, prior to her resignation. 
5 MR. CLARK: That's all I have, Judge. 
6 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir. 
7 MR. CLARK: I have no additional evidence to 
8 present, Judge. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Gjording, any evidence? 
o MR. GJORDING: No, sir. 
'­
1 trustee. There is no alternativtl proposal. 
2 And while there isn't anything in the statute 
3 that talks about priority as far as appointment, just if 
4 we were looking at a personal representative position, 
5 anyone that would have interest in a probate estate, for 
6 example, wouldn't have a greater interest than them. 
7 So it seems to me it's very appropriate to 
8 appoint them, and we would ask that the court enter such 
9 an order. 
~o THE COURT: If you want to address the 
1 THE COURT: Any other argument, Mr. Clark? ~ 1 effective retroactivity, it would probably be a good 
2 MR. CLARK: Yes. Just briefly, Judge.
 
[2 time to do that.
 
3 It seems to me that, based upon, first, the
 
13 MR. CLARK: Yes. Well, first, it's our
 
4 agreement of the beneficiaries -- they have all	 I
 
14 position with respect to the retroactive order that it's
 
I5 indicated that the Taylors should serve as co-trustees. ! 
15 a discretionary thing and that the court, basically, 
i6 The Taylors, pursuant to that same agreement, 
'16 acts under an abuse of discretion standard. 
7 have a guarantee in the disclaimer. So they have some 
17 It's interesting that one party here is 
8 interest in the proceeding. Their mother stands to gain 
18 opposing retroactive application when it seems to me 
9 and, thereby, they have an interest in the proceeding. 
19 that it's a benefit to both parties for the reason that, 
~ 0 There has been no evidence presented that they 
, 
20 if Mr. Maile's argument that the suit is void is valid, 
? 1 are in any way disqualified for any reason. In fact, 
2 1 he's not a beneficiary -- or he's not a creditor and 
b2 they are -- we have a lawyer, people that have been in I 
22 doesn't have a lawsuit against the trust. b3 business. They have experience. They are knowledgeable 
I 
23 And if a retroactive appointment or, simply, anb 4 with respect to the claims. 
rI 4 order approving what the Taylors have done in bringingb 5 No one else has been suggested to even serve as 
25 that action, in the alternative, is entered, it gives 
Page 17 I	 Page 18 
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1 both sides benefit. 1
 
2 It gives the trust the benefit of being able to 2
 
3 pursue that lawsuit. It gives Mr. Maile the benefit of 3
 
4 being able to pursue his counterclaim. 4
 
5



















0 beneficiaries, all of the beneficiaries, was to
 








4 beneficiaries; and it's a situation where everybody I
 15
 
5 thought that that was the case. I
16
 










8 they did -- they were all acting under the understanding 19
 
I
9 that they were in power. :20 
I
DO And in that regard, Idaho Code Section 21
 
j 










D3 can employ people to do anything, any act of 
I
 f5D4 administration, whether or not it's discretionary. 




entered appointing the trustee nunc pro tunc that this 
court can say, well, we approve the actions of the 
filing of this lawsuit on behalf of the trust. 
And because the -- pursuant to that statute, 
the then-trustees could give the Taylors authority to 
act on behalf of the trust. 
So we're simply asking the court, really, to 
ratify what's been done. 
Now, of course, Mr. Maile's position is, well, 
gee, you have to have somebody validly appointed. You 
can't do that. 
Well, what would be the situation :ifwe had a 
trustee who passes away without somebody appointed and 
the statute of limitations is about to run .md somebody 
steps in and files a lawsuit before that time? 
There's a lot of good reasons, and there's some 
arguments why the retroactive application or the 
approval of the actions by the court make a lot of 
sense. 
It seems to me that it will affect what the 
parties thought was happening. As you peruse that 
file -- it's a very thick file -- I think that it's 
apparent that the parties thought for some time that 
that was a valid -- that there wasn't any question about 
the validity of the lawsuit. 
Page 20
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1 They had been proceeding with the lawsuit. 1 you to appoint them as trustees. And I, of course,
 
2 There had been a lot of discovery done in it, and we 2 wasn't here because it wasn't a contested hearing; but
 
3 have proceeded in good faith to prepare that case for 3 there must have been some request of th'e litigants that
 
4 further proceedings and, eventually, trial. 4 you pre-date or make the effective date of the
 
5 All we are asking is that the court enter an	 5 appointment retroactive.
 
6 My guess is, Your Honor, that they didn't
 6 order approving the actions of the Taylors and/or 
7 bother to mention to you that there was a reason for 7 entering an order nunc pro tunc. 
8 that, other than they wanted it to be -- they wanted it 8 Thank you. 
9 to be continuous and they wanted to have continuity. 9 THE COURT: Mr. Gjording? 
110 They probably didn't mention to you that they ~O MR. GJORDING: And, of course, Your Honor, we 
1 needed to have your retroactive order in order for them 1 have opposed that. Again, I will try to be brief. 
2 to maintain their status in the court up above. 2 As the court is aware, a lawsuit was filed by 
3 That brings me to when we came into your court 3 the petitioners against Mr. Maile. That was dismissed 
. 4 a few weeks ago and you kind of annoilllCed to the parties 4 because -- this is upstairs, and I know you know about 
that it wasn't your interest to get involved in the case 5 this. l:
 up above, that you didn't want to interpreet the law and 
6 It was dismissed because they weren't the real 
issue orders that would have the effect of impacting or ~7 party in interest. In any event, Judge Wilper dismissed l:
 affecting the outcome of the case up above. ~8 it because he did not feel that the law justified the	 I 
I 
And I think you used the phrase, "Let the chips 9 continuing existence of that lawsuit.	 f9 
I 
120 fall where they may;" in other words, let the parties 
170 Then these petitioners filed another lawsuit. 
~1 fmd themselves in the status of the law as the law 
~/l In that lawsuit, the plaintiff was the trust -- the 
Q2 goes. 
b2 trustee but there was one problem with that. And that 
~3 And I agree with counsel. I think you probably 
t/3 is that, indeed, the trustees were not legally the 
~4 do have the discretion to do what you w.mt in this case. 
174 trustees. 
~5 But, of course, it's our request, Your Honor, that, 
r5 So they came down to your court and they asked 
Page 21	 Page 22 
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2 do let the chips fall where they may, that you not enter 
1 indeed, consistent with your earlier pronouncement, you 
2
 
3 an order in this case that does anything other than 3
 
4 adhere to the law.
 4
 
5 We have suggested to you what the law is. We
 5
 
6 think that the law would suggest that a retroactive
 6
 
7 application of this order is neither appropriate, nor 7
 
8 would it be the just thing to do in this case.
 8
 
9 Now, I appreciate counsel telling us that,
 9
 
o really, this is for our own good. I realize that an o 












4 retroactive order being really good for my client, Mr. 14
 

























? 1 minute ago, I see the retroactive application as a 21
 
? 2 win-win situation for both sides. b2
 
















of any fiduciary or trustee or personal representative 
or guardian, or whatever the case may be, is for it to 
be effective on its signing or filing. 
And I am going to stay with that typical 
pattern. I think that's what the law requires. I think 
it's appropriate that the petitioners be named successor 
trustees, or successor co-trustees, and would sign an 
order and appropriate letters of trusteeship. 
As to its effect on the lawsuit, Mr. Gjording, 
I think, accurately quoted me. I don't think it's 
appropriate for me to consider what its effect is. 
I think I should follow the typical standards 
for the appointment of fiduciaries, and that is to make 
it effective upon signing and filing, which I will do. 
Now, I think it's an inten~sting argument and 
one that occurred to me, Mr. Clark, that you made is the 
analogy that the relation -- the personal 
representative's action before he is officially named 
may receive -- may relate back. 
The statute that you quoted was 15-3701 and 
that may be -- I'm sure you are: prepared to make 
appropriate arguments with Judge Wilper that, now that 
they are officially the co-trustees, they can ratify or 
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1 But I am going to leave that for somebody	 1 trustees," effective nunc pro tunc, ifthafs your 
2 smarter than I to determine if that has an effect on	 2 intent. I have stricken that portion.
 
3 Have you filed the original acceptances?
 3 your lawsuit, ifit continues as it is or if you have to
 
4 MR. CLARK: Those are the originals, Judge.
 4 refile it.
 
5 TIlE COURT: They seem to -- all three have
 5 I'm sorry if the consequence is an economic one
 
6 "copy" stamps. Maybe -- is the original behind it?
 6 to everybody here that makes you effectively lose some
 
7 MR. CLARK: Maybe I gave Mr. Gjording the
 




8 the way the law really compels me to go and that's to 9 TIlE COURT: These have, stamped in red, "copy" 
9 make an order effective today. 
~O on them. I will just trade you. 
a I don't know if you have an order prepared 
~l MR. CLARK: Sorry. 
1 or -­
2 MR. GJORDING: Your Honor, may I inquire? 
2 MR. CLARK: I do, Your Honor, if! could 113 TIlE COURT: Yes, sir.
 
3 approach. I have acceptance of appointment of I
 4 MR. GJORDING: On the: second page of the order, 
4 co-trustees signed by the three proposed co-trustees. 5 subparagraph (a), (4)(a), I am a little perplexed as to
 
5 I do have an order of appointment of
 6 what that -- what that means. Maybe cOlIDsel can help us 
6 co-successor trustees that I would ask the court to ~7 with that? I guess all I need to know is what you think
 
7 change the date on the signature -- on the date portion.
 ~8 it means.
 
8 I put "nunc pro tunc" on that, and I think we can do 19 TIlE COURT: I'm not sure what it means, Mr.
 
I9 that by interlineation. 20 Gjording. Thank you. 
DO And then I also have proposed letters of II MR. CLARK: The reason I put that in -- that 
I
D1 co-successor trustees. I will give counsel a copy. came from our uniform form book that's promulgated with ~: the Uniform Probate Code. D2 MR. GJORDING: Thank you. 
24 TIlE COURT: Let's see if it comes -­D3 THE COURT: I have stricken, on the order, 
I 
I
25 MR. CLARK: I don't hav,e a problem with that 1/4 everything after the date. I dated it the 2nd of May. 
D5 I have stricken, "authority of the co-successor 
Page 25	 Page 26 
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1 CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPTION
 
2 MR. GJORDING: Well, I don't know ifit's a
 
1 being stricken, if that's a problem with counsel. 
2 
3 problem or not. I just don't know what it means. 3 The undersigned does hereby certify that she
 
4 Without knowing what it means, I would accept the offer
 4 correctly and accurately transcribed and typed, to the
 
5 to strike it.
 5 best of her skill and ability, the above excerpts of
 
6 THE COURT: If it doesn't advance -- I don't
 6 proceedings from the digital re(:ording of the
 
7 think -- you just need them named, and I think they have
 7 proceedings held in the above-entitled case.
 
8 whatever authority the statute allows them.
 8 DATED AND CERTIFIED this 9th day of July 2008. 
9 If it's going to ease some trouble, without any 9
 
o objection, I will strike that subparagraph (a).
 /s/
 
1 MR. CLARK: All right.
 
2 THE COURT: Frankly, Mr. Clark, I'm not sure
 LORI A. PULSIFER, Tnmscriber 
3 what -- where -- if that comes from the statutory 
4 language or not. But if you don't need it -- I don't 
~ 5 think it affects your clients' authority at all. 
6 If you don't mind taking this downstairs with 
~ 7 you, Mr. Clark, they can conform your copies. If you 
8 need certified ones, they can provide them to you. 
9 (Whereupon, the foregoing audiotaped 
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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPTION 
The undersigned does hereby certify that she 
correctly and accurately transcribed and typed, to the 
best of her skill and ability, the above transcription 
from the recording of the proceeding which was re.cordE~d 
in the above-entitled case. 
DATED AND CERTIFIED this 1st day of July 2008. 
LORI A. PULSIFER, Transcriber 
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DEh..-.>ITION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8"'--.04 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN Af\D FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and ) 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs, 
Ys. Case No. 
CV OC 04-00473D 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN ) 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS) 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and ) 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC., 
Defendants. 
DEPOSITION OF BETH ROGERS 
AUGUST 11,2004 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Robyn Dane, CSR 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the deposition of 
BETH ROGERS was taken by the attomey for the 
Defendants at the offices of Burnham, Habel & 
Associates located at 668 North Ninth Street in Boise, 
Idaho, before Robyn Dane, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the County of 
Ada, State ofIdaho, on Wednesday, the 11th day of 
August 2004, commencing at the hour of 9:35 a.m. in the 
above-entitled matter. 
APPEARANCES: 
For Thomas Maile as ANDERSON & JULIAN 
Realtorlbroker By: Phillip Collaer 
250 South Fifth Slreet, Suite 700 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
For Thomas Maile as GJORDlNG & FOUSER 
attorney: Jack S. Gjording 
509 West Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
For C. Maile and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Berkshire: Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Also Present: Andy Rogers 
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DEF--....oITION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8""'-"04 
2 Assignment of earnest money agreement 43 
3 9-16-02 promissory note 54 
1 Last will and testament ofT. Johnson 6 
2 Revocable trust 6 
4 Warranty deed 563 Purchase and sale agreement 6 
5 5-19-03 letter, T. Maile to B. Rogers 56 
4 5-24-02 letter, I. Hetherington to T. Maile 6 
6 Copy of 1-8-04 cashier's cheek for $293,848.03 58 
5 5-29-02 letter, T. Maile to T. Johnson 6 
7 Release and Reconveyance 61 
6 6-17-02 letter, T. Maile to T. Johnson 6 
8 3-24-03 letter, C. Taylor to T. Maile 63 
7 5-4-02 letter, T. Maile to E. Haff 6 
9 7-7-03 letter, C. Taylor to T. Maile 67 
8 Invoice from T. Maile to T. Johnson 28 vO 7-10-03 letter, T. Maile to C. Taylor 69 
9 Knipe appraisal report 28 VI 7-22-03 letter, AndrewIBeth Rogers to C. Taylor 73 
0 Earnest money agreement 36 °2 Undated letter, AndrewIBeth Rogers to C. Taylor 75 
°3 7-14-04 Affidavit ofBeth Rogers 771 9-5-02 letter, D. Wishney to A. Rogers 43 
v4 7-15-04 letter, C. Taylor to B. Harwood 85 
v5 Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement 86 
'v 6 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 89 
°7 Lis Pendens 95 
)8 Release and Reconveyance 97 
1/9 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 98 
'30 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 99 
)1 Fee agreement 100 
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DEP,,-,ITION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8-,,...A>4
 
p2 7-9-03 letter, C. Taylor to B. Rogers 109 1 Whereupon the deposition proceede:d as follows: 
B3 2-4-04 letter, Andy & Beth to Dear Family 101 2 
,4 Blank assignment [onn 102 3 BETH ROGERS, 







1-8-04 letter, R. Taylor to Beth 102 
2-2-04 E-mail, D. Whisner to Beth 103 
8-20-03 letter, C. Taylor to seven persons 104 
4-14-04 letter, C. Taylor to B. HaIWood 105 
3-20-03 letter by B. Rogers re estate status 117 















testified as follows: 
(Exhibit Nos. 1-7 marked.) 
MR. MAILE: Let the wcord reflect that it's 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, 
to the attorneys of record in this case. 
And it's being taken pursuant to rhe rules of 
the time and place set for the deposition of Beth 
Rogers in which proper notice of the notice of taking 
deposition duces tecum and the subpoena were provided 
civil procedure, and I would note for the record that 
-- at the current time if the attorneys could identify 
approximately 9: 33 on August 11th, 2004, and this is 
! 9 themselves on the record that are present? 
? 0 MR. COLLAER: Phil Collaer on behalf of Tom 
? 1 Maile and his capacity as a real estate agent and 
?2 broker. 
~ 3 MR. GJORDING: Jack Gjording on behalf of 
~ 4 Tom Maile in his capacity as an attorne:y. 
25 MR. COLLAER: Okay? 
Page 5 Page 6 
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DEP'-1lITION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8-,.;04 
1 MR. MAILE: Okay. 1 name? 
2 2 A. It's Beth Johnson Rogers. 
3 EXAMINATION 3 Q. And what's your Social Security number? 
4 BY MR. MAILE: 4 A. 
5 Q. Beth, this is a time where there will be -- a 5 Q. And where do you currently reside? 
6 series of questions will be asked, and the goal here in 6 A. 10816 Jay Road. That's J-a-y Road. 
7 a deposition is to try to understand facts related to 7 Q. And where is that? 
8 the case. 8 A. Boise, Idaho 83714. 
9 If at any point in time I may ask a question 9 Q. And could you give us a little bit ofhistory 
o that you don't understand or I stop in mid sentence, 10 about your educational background? 
~ 1 ask me to clarify the question and I will try again to 1 A. I completed one year of college. I was going 
~ 2 get our point across. I will be very formal in this 12 into education. I got married and we opened a 
h3 deposition by using the last names of everybody because 3 locksmith shop, and then I'd been a bookkeeper; and 
14 I think it will be easier for you to understand that. 4 then I left the locksmith shop and went to 
5 One of the items the court reporter always 5 office/computerlbookkeeping for a private firm, ESP 
6 needs is to make sure there aren't two people talking 6 Printing & Mailing. 
7 at the same, so even though I hesitate a lot, try to be 7 Q. And what's your date of birth? 
8 patient with me to make sure I finish my thought before 8 A.  
9 you try to respond; otherwise both of us are talking ~9 Q. And if you could just give us a little 
b 0 and the court reporter has a hard time recording ~ 0 history about what your family consists of? 
81 everything. 21 A. Okay. We have four children. We have a 
b2 Have you ever had your deposition taken 2 daughter in Seattle, Washington area; Bellingham 
tz 3 before? ? 3 actually. Excuse me. She has six children. The-­
A. No, sir. ~ 4 her husband is a doctor in psychology. I have a son 
Q. Okay. And would you please identify your 25 that took over a locksmith shop, A & BLock & Key here 
Page 7 Page 8 
4 (Pages 7 to 8) 






~  et r i t acr ss. I ill  er  f r al i  t is  into education. I got arried and e opened a 
~  e siti   si  t e last a es f e er  eca se 3 locks ith shop, and then I'd been a bookkeeper; and 












DEP-..,ITION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8--Al4 
1 in Boise, Idaho on State Street, and he has two 1 Q. As you know, there's a lawsuit pending by
 
2 children.
 2 certain beneficiaries of the ll1eodore L. Johnson Trust 
3 We have a son, Devon Rogers, who lives in 3 and those are Reed Taylor, DaHan Taylor and John 
4 Alamo, Nevada. He works -- he's an engineer for the 4 Taylor. What is your relationship to those three 
5 Bellagio Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada. He has 5 individuals? 
6 four children. 6 A. They're first cousins. 
7 And we have a daughter, Andrea Pierce, who 7 Q. Okay. And you of course were related to Ted 
8 lives on Victory Road, and her husband is a contractor, 
8 Johnson, and what was that relationship? 
9 Robert Pierce, and they just have a new baby. 
9 A. I'm his niece. 
~ 0 Q. Okay. Well, thank you. You of course have 
Q. Okay. And he passed away? 
~ 1 been requested to appear at this deposition and you 
A. Yes. September 14th, 2002. 
2 were provided a subpoena duces tecum and a notice of 
Q. What was his date ofbirth, if you remember? 
113 taking deposition duces tecum requesting that you bring 
A.  
~ 4 with you certain documents. 
Q. 1924. Okay. At some point in time did you 
5 How were you able to do on that task? 
serve in an official capacity in the Theodore L. 
6 A. I have them. 
Johnson Trust? 
7 Q. Okay. 
A. Yes. My husband and I were co-trustees. 
8 A. A briefcase full. 
Q. And do you remember when you became a 9 Q. Well, we'll take a look at those a little bit 
co-trustee of that trust? ?O later, so-­
A. November 1997. t;> 1 A. Okay. Fine. 
Q. And did you serve with Ted Johnson? Was he t;> 2 Q. -- at some point in time we'll take a break 
also a co-trustee of that trust? 17 3 and maybe we'll examine those documents that you did 
17 4 bring. A. I don't know if you call him "company." He 
I;;> 5 A. That's fine. I have them with me. managed the trust until he could no longer and then it 
was Andy's and I's (sic). I don't know how you would 
Page Page 10 
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1 call -- what you would call that, but -­
2 A. Yes. 
3 A. -- but actually he managed the trust until we 3 Q. On page nine, whose signature is that?
 
4 had the time to take over.
 4 A. That's Uncle Ted's.
 
5 Q. I'm going to hand you what's been marked
 5 Q. Now, this was executed, according to the 
6 document, on November 4th, 1997. Do you recall when 6 Exhibit 1, and I'll represent it was a will that was 
7 you would have received or seen for thf: first time 7 prepared by the law offices ofThomas Maile. Can you 
8 copies of these two documents" Exhibits 1 and 2? 8 identify that? Have you seen that? 
9 A. No. Shortly thereafter, but I couldn't tell 9 A. Many times. 
10 you when. But before they were drawn up I do know that 0 Q. Can you identify Exhibit I? I
 
11 he came out to Andy and I's house and asked us if we1 A. Yes. 
I 
12 would be willing to take this on, so it was discussed 2 Q. When do you recall first seeing it? 
I 
with us prior and then we saw them shortly after. ~3 A. Right after he became -- right after the I~:
 Then I never really saw them again because he 4 trust was finalized. 
I 
1 5 put them away and I never needed them until he became 5 Q. Okay. I'm going to hand you also Exhibit 2 
6 
6 and represent that that is a trust agreement prepared P-~.
 7 ill. Q Oka W thi .I . y. as s conSIstent with your 
7 by the law offices of Thomas Maile. Can you identify 
I
u.8 relationship with Ted Johnson, that he might share with 
8 that exhibit? I 
19 you information about his handling of his fmancial 
9 A. Yes. 
b 0 affairs and his worldly affairs? DO Q. And how can you identify that? 
A. Yes. 
A. I've had to use it many times in claiming, 
?2 Q. Who else -- who to your knowledge did Ted 
~ 2 you know, things for the trust and showing that Andy 
talk to, either family or other third partif:S, about 
2 3 and I were trustees and et cetera. 
his farming, his business life, his personal life? 
') 4 Q. Okay. Now, with Exhibits 1 and 2 there are 
A. As far as the trust that -.. and its financing 
t; 5 dates on there ofNovember 4th, 1997. Do you recognize 
Page 11 Page 12 
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DE~ITION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8-~04 
1 and things like that, both of my brothers, Brent 1 A. In the last years after hf: started having 
2 Johnson and Scott Johnson got in touch with him; my 2 heart trouble which was -- he had a surgery in 1999. 
3 aunt, Hazel Fisher, and they used to go to lunch 3 It became a lot closer because, of coursc~, Andy and I 
4 together and do lunch together, and I know Aunt Hazel 4 were talking care of animals and whatever on the farm. 
5 had read everything, you know, pretty much. He did 5 He went on a trip with us to Vegas and he 
6 just show her. 6 used to come over on Sundays for Sunday dinner with the 
7 As far as the farming goes, I mean, we kind 7 family and all the family for Qrristrnas and 
8 of knew what was going on but he had a renter named 8 Thanksgiving and et cetera. 
9 Rosti, R-o-s-t-i, and I know the farming things he and 9 Q. Now, when you say fanrily, family involvement, 
0 Sam pretty much handled, meaning if there was problems 0 do you recall having or Ted having any involvement with 
1 or -- we knew what was going on what was being planted 1 the Taylors? 
2 but not in particular. 2 A. Mter his heart attack in -- I mean after his 
3 Q. Now, how long did Ted live in Star? 3 heart surgery in 1999 he went over and stayed with Aunt 
4 A. 1977. November 1977 he moved in. 4 Helen for a while while he recuperated. Other than 
5 Q. And that was his principal residence? 5 that, no. And that was just Aunt Helen. I don't 
6 A. Yes. 6 remember contact with the kids. 
7 Q. And principal farm? 7 Q. Now, what kids would those be? Just-­
8 A. Yes. ~8 A. Aunt Helen's kids. 
9 Q. Did you and your husband visit him on a 119 Q. And who -- what are thf:ir names, just for the 
/0 regular basis? ~O record? 
n A. Sure. rn A. Oh, I'm sorry. Dallan, Reed, Gloria, Jenny, 
[;2 Q. And was that continuous from 1977 through his 82 Mark, Ray. 
l23 death? 23 Q. Okay. Now, in the case that's been filed in 
[;4 A. Yes. 24 this lawsuit, the three principal plaintiffs, do you 
:/5 Q. How often did you have contact with him? :/5 know who they are? 
Page 13 Page 14 
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DEP~ITION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8-'",-",4 
1 figured because the house was old and it had asbestos 1 drawer and I never had a copy and never saw them until 
2 or something and wouldn't let it work. 2 -- after that until 2002. 
3 And so I was always concerned that he would 3 Q. Okay. I'm going to hand you what's marked as 
4 get hurt and I couldn't get to him, and so we started 4 Exhibit 3 now and ask you if you can identify that. 
5 discussing going into a retirement home, and that's 5 And I'll represent to you that the document is called 
6 when he said, well, then maybe he needed to think about 6 the Real Property Purchase and Sales Agreement. It's 
7 selling the farm. 7 dated May 19th, 2002. 
8 Q. And that was the first time of any 8 Take your time. Look at the back signature 
9 substance -- 9 page, if you would, to see if you recognize any of the 
o A. Yes. He's a very quiet man. He did not o signatures on there.
 
1 discuss his financial -- you know, I didn't know about A. There's only one signature and it's Franz
 ,1
 
2 his annuities, how much -- I mean, I knew he had them ! 2 Witte, and I do not know Franz Witte.
 
3 but he didn't discuss his finances very much. He was a ~3 Q. Have you ever met Franz Witte?
 
4 very quiet person. ~4 A. No, I have not.
 
5 Q. Now, relative to Exhibits 1 and 2 concerning ~ 5 Q. Do you know if your uncle had ever met Franz
 
6 the estate planning, you had indicated that he had ~6 Witte?
 




9 prior to executing Exhibits 1 and 2 as to the
 
8 executed these exhibits, but did he ever talk to you 
A. Not to my knowledge. I'm sure he hasn't. 
DO percentage of what relative was to receive what, or-­ Q. When do you recall first being aware that 
1/1 A. He just told us that it would be very cut and ? 1 Franz Witte had presented a real estate-- real 
') 2 dried and simple, that everybody would get a fifth. 22 property purchase and sales agreement?' 
Q. Okay. And then once you received the ?3 A. Probably the day it was present{:d. Uncle Ted 
') 4 documents 1 and 2, did that confirm your earlier -- ? 4 was going to come to dinner, and he called and said 
')5 A. It did. And then they got put away in his 25 that he couldn't because some people were coming out to 
Page 17 Page 18 
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1 talk to him about the 40. We called it "The 40." 1 really don't think I need the money, and I like being a 
2 And so he didn't come. So Andy and I went 2 farmer." 
3 out to talk to him afterwards to see what was going on, 3 And I said, "Then that answers your 
4 and he said that Franz Witte and somebody else -- and I 4 question." If you -- I said, "If you like farming the 
5 do not know who -- had come out and approached him with 5 land, don't sell it." I mean, ifhe didn't need the 
6 a potential buyout of the 40. 
6 money and that made him happy, leavt: it alone. 
7 Q. Okay. Do you remember ifTed provided 
Q. Okay. Did he tell you that he ever -- that 
8 Exhibit 3 to you on that time that you came out to his 
he was going to make an appointment with the law 
9 Star property? 
9 offices of Thomas Maile? 
~ 0 A. We read it. 
A. Yes. ~ 1 Q. Okay. Did you have discussions with Uncle 
2 
113 
Ted concerning Exhibit 3? 
A. Yes, we did. ~: Q. Was it at that same meeting? A. I don't remember. 
4 Q. What did you -- what did any -- I assume it ~3 Q. Okay. Do you know -- do you recall what 
5 was you and Andy and Uncle Ted? il4 i 
Ted's impressions were of Exhibit 3 concerning the 
6 A. Right. ~S price and the terms, for example? 




Q. What was discussed? Do you remember? 
I 
r: tax. Q. Did he share that with you that day? 
') 0 A. We talked to him about it. We thought maybe ~9 A. Yes, he did. 
') 1 it was probably a pretty good deal under the Q. Okay. What was -- what was his concern about 
~ 2 circumstances ofmaybe -- because we were wanting -- I ~: that? 
? 3 was really wanting to put him in -- you know, to get 
A. He didn't know whether it would be better for 
? 4 
? 5 
him free so he could go to a retirement place, but he 
said he was thinking about it and then he said, "I ~: -- to wait until -- to hold the property until after he 
24 
I 
was dead and then Andy and I would have to deal with 
DS the tax as an estate tax or whether, because he'd had 
Page 19 Page 20 
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DE~ITION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8......,...04 
1 Exhibit 4? Let me strike that. When do you remember 
2 didn't know whether capital gains -- he just needed to 
1 it for so long and it increased so much in value, he 
2 first seeing Exhibit 4? 
3 know where his tax bracket would be either way. 3 A. Not long after he received it, but I couldn't
 
4 Q. Okay. Did he seem at that point in time
 4 tell you.
 
5 cogent and in control of his - -­ 5 Q. Okay. Now, "he" means Ted Johnson, your
 
6 A. Oh, absolutely.
 6 Uncle Ted?
 
7 Q. -- faculties?
 7 A. Yes. He showed it to me.
 
8 A. Oh, absolutely.
 8 Q. Okay. And did you have discussions with
 
9 Q. He knew what was going on?
 9 Uncle Ted about Exhibit 4? 
0 A. Right. He was -- he was -- could understand o A. Yes. We did.
 
1 all the tax issues and everything about everything.
 1 Q. Did you go through the columns of the dollar 
2 Q. And what was his age when this happened? 2 amounts set forth in Exhibit 4?
 
3 A. 78.
 3 A. Sure.
 
4 Q. Okay. And you had regular contact with him.
 4 Q. Did he seem to know the implications -­
5 How would you describe his mental capacity in May of
 5 A. He did.
 
6 2002?
 6 Q. -- outlined in Exhibit 4?
 
7 A. Very good. He was one of the brightest men
 7 A. I'm sorry. He does. In fact he -- it looked
 
8 I've ever been around.
 8 like the task was going to be a wash either way, you 
9 Q. Okay. I'm going to hand you what's marked as ~ 9 know. Capital gains is high but estate taxes are high, 
? 0 Exhibit 4, and I'd ask you if you've ever seen Exhibit I? 0 and we discussed that. 
n 4. Q. Do you remember ifhe had a tc~lephone 
A. Yes, I have. I? 2 conference with the accountant that drafted the letter? 
) 3 Q. Okay. And I'll represent to you it's a A. No, I don't. 
) 4 letter dated May 24th, 2002 addressed to Tom Maile Q. Did you or Andy provide any input to him 
) 5 regarding Theodore Johnson. When did you receive :;> 5 about the tax issues and your impressions of the sale 
Page 21 Page 22 
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DEP......,ITION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8-'~4 
1 
2 A. No. We felt if he wanted to keep it, we 2 
3 
1 of the -- of the 40? 
3 wanted him to keep it. 
4 Q. Had you had any contact with the accountant 4 
55 prior to May 24th, 2002? 
66 A. Personally?
 
7 Q. Yes. 7
 I 
IS 
S A. No. 
ii 99 Q. Do you know if Kenneth was in contact with I 
10 
0 the accountant prior to May of -- I 
1 A. hnajean Hetherington. She had done his taxes t: 
2 for years. They were back and forth on things all the	 I 
I 
13 
3 time. I think ten years at least she had been his ~44 accountant. 
15 
5 Q. Okay. Now, there's a provision in the letter i 
6 that starts, "If the properties are comparable it would t: 
7 be logical to assume that with inflation since 1996, ~8S the subject property should be worth a million dollars
 
9 to a developer today. That would be $25,000 per acre,
 ~:DO two and one-halftimes the offered price."
 
D1 Did you talk to Uncle Ted about that sentence
 ~: 
)2 or that paragraph? 
3 
D3 A. Yes, it was discussed. r4 
)4 Q. Do you remember what you folks said? 15 
)5 A. He said -- Andy and I did mostly listening. r 
I 
Page 23[ 
He said that there really -- he knew the cost of 
developing, what it was. He also knew that the water 
table was higher in one end thim another. He just 
thought that -- he said he'd like to get a million 
dollars, of course, but he didn't think it was feasible 
at the time because of the layout of the property and 
everything that was out there, you know, their own 
wells and whatever. 
Q. Yeah. Did you know anything about the 
groundwater level in May of 2002, for ,example? 
A. I knew he'd had problems out there but I 
didn't know what extent, I mean, with the water table. 
Q. Okay. All right. Now I'm going to hand you 
what's marked as Exhibit 5 and ask you if you remember 
looking at that in the past, that letter. And that's a 
letter from the law offices of Thomas Maile to Theodore 
Johnson dated May 29th, 2002. 
A. Yes, rve seen the letter. 
Q. And do you remember about when you saw that? 
A. No. Just the same time all this was going 
on. 
Q. Okay. Did you have any conversation with 
Uncle Ted concerning -- after receiving Exhibits 5, 4 
and 5, what Uncle Ted should do relative to the 
potential sale of the 40 acres? 
Page 24 
12 (Pages 23 to 24) 










t;> 0  












DE~ITION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8"~04 
Page 25 Page 26
 
13 (Pages 25 to 26) 





DEP~"TION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8-'~4 
1 Q. And that Exhibit 6 is a letter dated June 1 Uncle Ted receiving any billings relative to that? 
2 17th, 2002 with a copy of a June 7th, 2002 letter from 2 (Exhibit No.8 marked.) 
3 Franz Witte. Do you see that on page two? 3 A. No, I don't. 
4 A. Uh-huh. 4 Q. Okay. You've been handed Exhibit 8. Do you 
5 Q. And do you remember if you reviewed this 5 recall receiving or seeing this billing statement in
 
6 infonnation with your Uncle Ted on or about June 17th,





8 A. Yes, sir.
 Q. Do you know if Uncle Ted paid on that account 
9 Q. And what do you remember Uncle Ted discussing 9 ofExhibit 8? 
I~ 0 with you concerning Exhibit 6? 10 A. I'm sure he did. He paid everything.
 
1 A. I really don't remember because I think he'd I
 Q. Okay.
 
2 already made a -- made up his mind he wasn't selling to
 
A. He didn't owe anybody anything. ~:
 
3 Franz Witte. So I don't remember a lot of comments. 13 Q. And in fact the last page of Exhibit 8 shows 
4 Q. Okay. Now, in the letter from Franz Witte, l4
 a zero balance. Would that be consist(mt with the way 
5 Mr. Witte declines to share his financial statement, if 
5 Uncle Ted managed -­
6 you will. Do you know if that was any concern to Uncle 
I 6 A. Absolutely. 
7 Ted? 
7 Q. -- his finances? 
8 A. No, I don't think it was. 
8 A. He paid cash. And ifhe didn't pay cash he 
Q. Now, at this point in time were you aware 
9 paid it the minute the bill camt: due. That was his -­
? 0 that the law offices of Thomas Maile was providing 
PO Q. Just the way -­
? 1 legal services to your uncle relative to the prior 
A. -- way. 
? 2 exhibits on the real estate -- the real property 
Q. Okay. Just the way he did business. 
? 3 purchase and sales agreement? 
(Exhibit No.9 marked.)A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now I'm going to hand you what's marked as Q.	 Did you recall receiving any billings or
 
b 5 Exhibit 9.
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DEPb-ofTION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8-'~J4 
1 A. Uncle Ted a few months prior to this -- and
 
2 Q. You have, Beth, in front ofyou Exhibit 9 and
 
1 (A brief recess was taken.) 
2 I'm not sure how much sooner -- received just a private 
3 you've indicated you brought the original with you 3 solicitation in the mail saying that he was doing
 
4 today. Could you compare the Exhibit 9 with what you
 4 appraisals for land in that area and showing what lands 
5 brought? 5 he had done, he did, you know, what appraisals, and
 
6 A. I think it looks exact, Mr. Maile.
 6 Uncle Ted was just -- he hung onto it.
 
7 Q. Okay. Now, this appraiser report indicates
 7 He looked at it and he just stuck it in his
 
8 that there's an effective date of July 10th on the
 8 desk and kept it, so it was actually a private
 
9 first page. The report date is prepared July 15th,
 9 solicitation. 
o Q. Okay. Had you ever ordered or been involved
 
1 On the second page is actually a chart and a
 
o 2002. 
1 with an appraisal process before?
 
2 cover letter, it looks like, July 15th, 2002, itemizing
 2 A. No.
 
3 and charting out certain procedures undertaken by the
 3 Q. And do you know if your uncle had been?
 
4 appraisal. It indicates on the -- down at the bottom
 4 A. No. I do know he had never been. Excuse me. 
,5 Q. Do you know if your uncle ever indicated to
 
6 Johnson, 208-286-7380." Was that your uncle's phone you whether the law offices of Thomas Maile had
 
5 of that first chart, "Client's contact: Theodore 
I.· 6
 
7 number? 7 recommended that he obtain an appraisal?
 1

8 A. Yes, sir. 18 A. Not to my recollection. 
I
9 Q. Okay. Did your uncle tell you he was going 19 Q. Okay. What conversation do you recall having 
) 0 to get an appraisal started on the 40-acre parcel? ko with the appraiser that you called that you called on 
I 
) 1 A. I made the initial call. or about -- I guess that's the question. When was it 
) 2 Q. Okay. You made the call to Knipe & initiated? Do you remember? ~:
 
t;> 3 Associates? k3 A. First part of July, I'm thinking, but I'm not 
A. Yes. ?4 sure. 
Q. And how did you pick Knipe & Associates? :/5 Q. How many phone calls: did you have with the 
Page 29 Page 30 
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11 appraiser? 
2 A. I do not know. Not more than one or two. 2 
3 Q. Okay. Do you remember what appraiser? 3 
4 There's two listed here on the first page. Brooks 4 
5 Potter or Bradford Knipe? Do you remember which one 5 
6 you called? 6 
7 A. Ijust called this Knipe Janoush Knipe, LLC 7 
8 with a phone number that was on there. I just called 
9 and I talked to a girl in the office actually. 
~ 0 Q. Okay. Did you call and -- you called on 
~ 1 behalf of Uncle Ted? 
2 A. Yes, sir.
 
3 Q. And did you ask about the price that would be
 
4 charged for any appraisal?
 
5 A. I did.
 
6 Q. Okay. What was -- what was explained to you?
 
7 A. $1,800. $900 down; $900 at the balance.
 
8 Q. And was that the ultimate price that was
 
9 paid? 
I/o A. Yes, sir.
 





1/3 A. Uncle Ted paid it. I wrote the checks. 
1/3 






A. No. That's one of the first checks I had 
written. 
Q. And why did you -- why was that your first 
check? 
A. He never -- Andy and I had been on the 
checking account since 1997, but we didn't even have 
checks or anything. But I was at his house one night 
and we were doing this, and I was helping him do bills 
and I said, "Do you want me to write these out and send 
it in?" and he said, "Yes." 
I was just helping him. I'd been out there 
cleaning. 
Q. Okay. And was that one payment made or two? 
A. Two. 
Q. Two $900 checks? 
A. Yes, sir. I sent one in before they did and 
one when we received this packet right here. 
Q. Okay. I thought there was some date 
reference under here when the appraisal process was 
commenced, but I don't see it now. Did you have any 
contact with the appraiser after the Exhibit 9 was 
actually received? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you know if Uncle Ted had any contact with 
the appraiser after Exhibit 9 was received? 
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1 as he got it. He was quite proud of it. It had
 
2 Q. Do you remember if it came in the mail or
 
1 A. Not to my knowledge. 
2 colored pictures and everything. He really liked the 
3 whether it was picked up? 3 appraisal.
 
4 A. Brought in the mail.
 4 Q. Did he have any conversation with you or any
 
5 Q. Did you go over the appraisal once it was
 5 family members that you know of relaIive to the
 
6 received with Uncle Ted?
 6 appraised value being $400,000 when the accountant
 
7 A. Yes, we did, my brothers and myself and my
 7 thought the property would be worth a million dollars? 
8 Aunt Hazel. Several of us saw it. 8 A. The only thing I remember him saying is that
 
9 Q. Okay. And was there a -- any pending offer
 9 he would like to have a million dollars but he always
 
o or any pending contract to purchase the property from
 thought a million dollars was, you know, dreaming a
 
1 Franz Witte or Thomas Maile or Colleen Maile?
 little bit and he thought if it was worth $400,000, it
 
2 A. Not at this time. The Franz Witte contract
 was worth $400,000. 
3 had expired and we had not talked about, you know, Q. Now, I guess this might help us a little bit
 
4 another contract.
 here. Turning to the appraisal, there's a letter dated 
5 Q. Was there a meeting that was held with all June 13th, 2001. That must be inaccurate as far as the
 
6 the family members together that you've identified, or
 year -­




 Q. -- well, maybe -­
9 A. Different times. Andy and I saw it, and my
 A. Is that right? Maybe not. Was it 2001? It 
) 0 brothers as they came oversaw it. He actually took it was sold in 2000. 
t;> lover to Aunt Hazel's one day. Q. Well, the list-­
v2 Q. And do you know ifhe took it to Aunt Hazel's A. I think it's 2002, Tom. 
) 3 before any offer to purchase the property was signed or Q. The letter says, "This letter is to confirm 
) 4 any acceptance to purchase the property was signed? our agreement to perform profe:ssional services for you 
P5 A. Yes, he did. He took it over right as soon on the above referenced property as fonows." So there 
Page Page 34 
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1 was no agreement to your knowledge in 200 I with Knipe, 1 dates. 
2 Janoush & Associates? 2 A. Is the date stamped on there? No. 
3 A. NO,no. 3 Q. That's the -- that's the file number, 
4 Q. Do you -- does that help you -- this letter 4 02.3995. 
5 attached to actually a part ofExhibit 9, does that 5 A. Okay. 
6 refresh your recollection as to when you might have 6 Q. Well, in any event, after receiving the 
7 made the call to the appraising fIrm? 7 appraisal -- do you remember the date that you received 
8 A. I made the call to the appraising fIrm and 8 it? 
9 sent them the check for $900 and the appraisal was done 
I A. No, I don't. 9 
o shortly thereafter. ~ 0 Q. After receiving this appraisal _.. I hand you 
1 Q. Do you have a copy of that check with you? 
2 A. I have -- I don't have the checks with me but t: what 7::::~:~:~i; 10
 
3 [ have my 2002 accounting.
 
Q. Beth, we're handing you what's marked as
 
4 MR. MAILE: We'll go off the record.
 l:
 Exhibit 10 now, and I want to ask you to review Exhibit 
h- 5 (A brief discussion was held off the record.) i! 
15 10 and see if you see any signatures on it, dates on 
116 TIIE WITNESS: I'm really sorry. My 
16 it. 
7 accounting started when he died. I 
t: A. I do.
 8 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Okay.
 Q. Do you recognize Exhibit 2? 
i9 A. That I have with me. 
A. Yes, I do. 
20 Q. All right. Well, maybe it's not a big issue 
Q. What is it, based on your recollection? 
') 1 or a big point, but -­ ~:
 
1 A. It's an earnest money agreement to purchase
? 2 A. But I do have all of the check records so I F
k2 real property. I was with Uncle Ted when it was 
? 3 can fInd that out. ~3
 signed.
') 4 Q. Well, let me ask you to do that, and the I
24 Q. Okay. Do you remember picking up the earnestb 5 appraiser -- and the appraising fIrm may have the ~5 money agreement at the law ofiices of Thomas Maile? 
I 
i 
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1 A. I knew he was going to sign it, you know. 1 A. Yes, I do. 
2 I'm thinking maybe he read these first because of the2 Q. And at that point in time there were two 
3 signatures on the earnest money contract, Thomas Maile 3 onions. He discovered the onion thing at home, I 
4 and Colleen Maile, dated July 22nd; is that correct? 4 think, and so I think he read all of this before he 
5 A. That's correct. 5 signed it. 
6 Q. And there's a signature ofTheodore Johnson 6 So I think that was our sequence:, Mr. Maile. 
7 with a date line of July 25th. And is it your 7 I think so. We went in and got the paperwork and took 
8 recollection that you were present when your Uncle Ted 8 it home to read over it and took it home and signed it 
9 signed this agreement? 9 on the 25th, because I was in his office when he signed 
o A. Yes, sir. 
1 Q. Approximately how many days do you remember 
2 having Exhibit lOin your possession before Uncle Ted 
3 was given it by you and signed by him? I better 
4 rephrase that. That's too confusing. 
5 You testified that you picked up the earnest 
~ 6 -- the earnest money agreement to purchase real 
~ 7 property at the law offices of Thomas Maile. Do you 
~ 8 remember if you took it to Uncle Ted that day or the 
~ 9 following day? Do you remember the time sequence of 
~ 0 when you and Uncle Ted reviewed Exhibit 10? 
t21 A. Well, my recollection, he was with me. I do 
D2 not remember going to Mr. Maile's offices without Uncle 
D3 Ted. 
;> 4 Q. Okay. Okay. Did you have any discussions 
;> 5 with Uncle Ted about Exhibit 10 before he signed it? 
this. He told you we had to change the: onion, and he 
wrote that in. 
Q. Okay. And what was the change about the 
onions, just so the record is ckar about that? 
A. Mr. Rosti, who farmed the fann, was a seed 
farmer. He planted seed crops, and some seed crops 
take two years to mature and this crop was only a year 
old. 
And he felt like that for Tom -- and you have 
to buy your seed way in advanl;e and everything, and he 
felt that Mr. Rosti needed another year for the onion 
seed to mature so that he could get full value. 
MR. COLLAER: Ms. Rogers, could you identify 
what part of Exhibit 10 you're referring to on the -­
with respect to the onion seed? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. Addendum to real estate 
Page 37 Page 38 
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1 Q. Okay. Did he ever mention to you or other 
2 MR. COLLAER: Paragraph three on the 
1 agreement number three. 
2 family members to your knowledge that he had used the 
3 addendum? 3 word, oh, "option," "first option to buy" it? Do you 
4 THE WITNESS: Uh-huh. 4 remember him ever saying those words? 
5 MR. COLLAER: Thank you. 5 A. No. 
6 THE WITNESS: Thank you. I'm sorry. 6 Q. Okay. And the terms outlined in the earnest 
7 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Were you aware that your 7 money offer, Exhibit 10, were those telms that your 
8 Uncle Ted was going to approach Thomas Maile with the I 8 uncle had indicated he wanted for the purchase of this 
9 offer to purchase the property? property? 
~ 0 A. Yes, sir. A. Yes. It was a -- it was a common joke. It~: 
1 Q. Okay. And how were you made aware of that by 11 was $100,000 down and it was ajoke. He'd say, "Do you 
2 your uncle? l2 think I can live the next few years on $IOO,OOO?" and 
I 
3 A. Prior to this -- and I do not know the dates !J.3 we kept telling him ifhe couldn't, you know, we'd help 
I 




5 over some hay that hadn't been purchased and a few 15 Q. Yeah. There's a provision in the earnest
 
6 other things, and you had been acting for him as legal ~6 money agreement on page four. If you could turn to
 
7 counsel. page four, the page numbers are down on the bottom.
 
8 And at that time Uncle Ted told Andy and I There's a provision that says right abow the signature
 t: 
! 
9 that you had told him that if he ever wanted to sell 19 lines, "The parties acknowledgl~that Thomas Maile d/b/a 
I ~ 0 the property that you would be interested in buying it Thomas Maile Real Estate Company, is a licensed real 
t21 because you had horses and would like more land and et estate broker and is representing himself and Colleen ~:
 
1/ 2 cetera. 82 Birch Maile, husband and wife,. and/or their assigns in 
And so he had told us several times -- he'd 83 this transaction (hereinafter referred to collectively 
1/ 4 always say, "My attorney would like to buy the ~ 4 as buyer)." 
? 5 property." That's how he phrased it. ~5 Do you remember reviewing that section with 
Page 391 Page 40 
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DEP~I1TION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8-'"""J4 
1 property for himself?
 
2 MR. COLLAER: Are you talking about as a
 
1 Uncle Ted? 
2 A. No, because I think we knew that -- that you 
3 Realtor?3 had a real estate (sic), so I don't remember ever 
4 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) As a real estate broker. 4 discussing it. 
5 Well, strike the question. 
5 Q. Did -- did you or your Uncle Ted at this 
6 MR. GlORDING: Do you understand the 
6 point in time in July 22nd or 25th, 2002 consider 
7 question? 
7 Thomas Maile an agent on behalfof Uncle Ted or the 
8 THE WITNESS: I think, but I don't know how 
8 trust? 
9 to answer. 
9 A. Yes. 0 MR. COLLAER: Perhaps could I ask the 
0 Q. Okay. And how so? 1 question? 
1 A. Oh, I think we'd always just known you were 2 THE WITNESS: Yes, yes. 
2 Uncle Ted's attorney. 3 MR. GlORDING: It's okay with me. 
3 Q. Okay. But in the actual purchase of the 4 MR. COLLAER: Ms. Rogers, were you ever aware 
5 of any -- any conversations betw'een yourself and your 4 property -­
6 Uncle Ted where you'd indicatf:d that he: had hired Mr.5 A. Ofthis, you mean? 
~7 Maile in his capacity as a Realtor to assist him in 6 Q. Yes. In the purchase of the property did -­
~8 marketing this property? 
7 A. Yes, we did know. 
~9 THE WITNESS: No. 
S Q. You knew that -- that the paragraph applied 
~O MR. COLLAER: Were you awar,e of Mr. -- of 
9 saying that there was a licensed real estate broker. 
:/1 your uncle ever retaining the services or hiring any 
)0 You knew that? 
~2 Realtor to list or help him market his property? 
1 A. Yes. ~3 THE WITNESS: He never did. 
1:>2 Q. Did Ted know that? 94 MR. COLLAER: Are you aware of any written 
D3 A. Yes. 95 contracts that were referred to as either a buyer's 
tl4 Q. Okay. Did Uncle Ted believe that Thomas 
) 5 Maile was representing your uncle in purchasing 
Page 41 Page 42 
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1 Q. Okay. Exhibit 12. Have you seen that
 
2 agreement being presented to your Wlcle by Mr. Maile or
 
1 representation agreement or a seller's representation 
2 before?
 
3 any other Realtor dealing with his -- these properties.
 3 A. Yes, I have.
 
4 Q. And whose signatures appear on that?
 4 THE WITNESS: No. 
5 A. Thomas Maile, Colleen Maile, and myself. 5 MR. COLLAER: Okay. 
6 Q. Now, that was dated, looks like -­6 MR. MAILE: Let's move on to Exhibit II. 
7 A. 15th ofAugust 2002. 
7 (Exhibit No. II marked.) 
8 Q. And then the last page has your notary. Did 
8 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) You've been handed Exhibit II 
9 somebody notarize your signature on the 20th day of 
9 and I'd ask you to review that and ask you to identify 
10 August 2002? 
o Exhibit II. 
11 A. Yes. 
~ 1 A. Yes, I can. It's a letter from David Wishney 
12 Q. Was Exhibit 12 executed after your conference 
112 when -- a real estate attorney who Andy and I had asked 
1 3 with David Wishney or before? 
13 to read the copy of the earnest money agreement. 
14 A. After. It ... Mr. Maile, I'm not sure. 
4 Q. Okay. And when did that conference take 
15 Q. Okay. Now, what was -- going back to your 
~ 5 place? Do you remember? 
1 6 conference with David Wishney, do you remember what was 
1 6 A. Last -- sometime in August. 
1 7 discussed? And all the detail that you can remember 
7 Q. Okay. Who attended that conference? 1 8 would be helpful for us on the record. 
~8 A. Andy and myself and Mr. Wishney. 19 A. He asked where the property was and a little 
~9 Q. Okay. Was Wlcle Ted there? f0 bit about the property and basically, you know, why we 
70 A. No. 
'21 were handling it and we just wanted him to review the 
71 Q. And why was that? 22 paperwork because we didn't havl~ any agent, you know, 
[/2 A. He was in a nursing home. ~ 3 doing it and, you know, to have read it ahead of time 
73 Q. I'm going to have this identified as Exhibit 24 besides, you know, Mr. Maile who was buying the 
~4 12. 25 property, and we just wanted to make sure. 
125 (Exhibit No. 12 marked.) 
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1 He said that we needed to substitute a 
2 standard form of deed of trust on do-on-sale provision, 
3 and we -- I called Mr. Maile, sent him a copy of this 
4 letter, and it was taken care of and the final 
5 paperwork was correct the way that he felt it should 
6 be. 
7 Q. How many times did you talk with Mr. Wishney 
6 what it was -- if the bill might even give us a date of 
7 when the conference was? 
8 on behalf of the trust or Uncle Ted concerning the 
9 upcoming closing of the 40-acre parcel? 
~O A. Just the one time. 
1 Q. And that was the one office conference? 
2 A. Yes, sir. 
113 Q. Did you receive a bill from Mr. Wishney? 
4 A. Yes. We did. 
5 Q. And do you have a record of what was paid and 
9 wrote the check. 
8 A. It was $266 and it was 10-7 and -- when I 
I/o Q. Okay. 1O-7-04? 
A. Yes. '02. 
Q. Yeah. '02. Is there anything that you have 
? 3 in your possession that would demonstrate or show when 
D4 the conference took place, what date? We know it 
? 5 didn't take place in October. 
Page 45 
1 A. No, I don't think so. 
2 MR. COLLAER: Do you still have the return 
3 billing? 
4 TIIE WITNESS: Yes, I do. 
5 
6 
MR. COLLAER: That might show the billing. 
MR. GJORDING: The what? 
7 MR. COLLAER: The billing from Mr. Wishney. 
9 do have it. 
8 TIIE WITNESS: I don't have it vlith me but I 
2 A. It's in my files. 
7 Mr. Wishney concerning the fairness of the price? 
Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Was there any discussion with 6 
~ 0 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Okay. That might be helpful 
111 to have that, if you can make an effort to find that. 
3 MR. COLLAER: That will probably have the 
~ 4 date of the conference. 
~ 8 A. Yes. 
115 TIIE WITNESS: Okay. 
119 Q. What was discussed there? 
~ 0 A. He said without actually seeing the property 
bland knowing, you know, what was developable and what 
t 2 was out there according to water and sewer and 
t 3 everything, it would be hard for him to give us a 
b 4 really fair judgment. 
b5 Q. Okay. 
Page 46 
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1 real familiar with reading this kind of legal to know 
2 Q. Yeah. 
1 A. But he did look at the appraisal. 
2 (sic). I mean, we weren't worried about the issues of 
3 A. He did see a copy of the appraisal and he 3 the sale or who bought it or whatever; we were -- just 
4 felt like that it was a good appraisal, I mean, as far 4 wanted to make sure that the paperwork we were signing 
5 was proper, would be, because we're not familiar. 5 as, you know, the paperwork and everything, really 
6 Q. Okay. Was any discussions had with Mr.6 looked good to him and so I don't know that it was 
7 Wishney over the reputation, for example, of the7 questioned. 
8 appraisal firm, whether they were good appraisers, bad 8 Q. Okay. Was there any -- any discussion about 
9 appraisers?9 any allegations ofwhat's called a breach of fiduciary? 
a A. No.a Do you know what that tenn is? 
Ql Q. Was there any discussion with Ivtr. Wishney
1 A. Yes, I do. 
lL2 about the reputation of the law offices of Thomas 
2 Q. Okay. Was there any discussion with Mr. 
I 3 Maile? 
3 Wishney concerning that? 
4 A. No. 
4 A. No. 
Q. Any discussions with Ivfr. Wislmey over the ~55 Q. Okay. Any discussion with Mr. Wishneyabout 
t: reputation, for example, of the Thomas Maile Real 6 any areas ofunprofessionalism by the law offices of Estate Company as a broker? 
7 Thomas Maile? l8 A. No. 
8 A. No. 19 Q. Anything discussed in that nature? 
9 Q. Was there any concern on your part acting as 
bO A. No. 
b a trustee over those issues when you met with Mr. 
bl Q. Any discussion about -- with Mr. Wishney 
D1 Wishney? ~ 2 about whether there was undue influence or duress or 
2 A. No, there was not. That is not why we went 
b 3 coercion exercised on your uncle in the trust? 
b 3 to him. 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Q. Did you have any concerns acting on behalf of 
5 A. It was more paperwork. Andy and I are not
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1 Q. Okay. Did he know, for example, that you the trust over those issues? 
2 were making an appointment with David Wishney to -- for2 A. No.
 
3 the review of these documents?
 3 Q. At this point in time, in August of2002,
 
4 A. He did.
 4 were any of the Taylor family involved in uncle Ted's 
5 Q. And he chose not to go? 5 management of the trust and your management of the 
6 A. He couldn't. 
6 trust relative to this 40-acre sale? 
7 Q. Okay. 
7 A. No. 
B A. He was in a care center. 
8 Q. Did they know about the sale of the 40 acres 
9 Q. Okay. Did he want input back from you 
9 in August or September? 
~o concerning Mr. Wishney's evaluation of the paperwork? 
a A. No. I doubt it. 
tn A. Yes. 
1 Q. Okay. Do you know if Uncle Ted had any 
12 Q. Okay. Did you go back and report to Uncle -­
2 conversations with them to get advice and their 13 A. Oh, yes.
 
3 opinions about the sale?
 ~4 Q. Okay. Did you do it the same day or shortly
 
4 A. Re did not.
 ~5 after?
 
5 Q. In August he was in a nursing home. How was 16 A. I went in the nursing home every day, twice a
 
6 his state ofmind in August 2002?
 7 day, so I'm sure the same day but he also read this
 
7 A. Very good. B letter; I mean, I read to it him. He knew everything
 
8 Q. Still -- was he still in control?	 ~9 that was going on.
 
~O Q. All right. Do you know what his :lmpressions
 9 A. Re was still managing the trust. He -- Andy 
?1 were of the personal character of Thomas Maile? Did he )0 and I were the legs and the arms and the whatever, but 
t?2 ever talk to you about how he perceived bis attorney? )1 we went in. Everything that we did, we went in and 
?3 A. He said once, "I think he's a pretty good P2 read to him, went over it, talked to him and most of 
~4 attorney because everything he's ever done for me, I've )3 the times if available, you know, he signed it. 
tJ5 got my money." 
4 He was in complete control of the trust until 
;, 5 the first part of September. 
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1 August and September of2002, believed that there was 
2 shared with you concerning his relationship with his 
1 Q. Okay. Any other comments about -- that he 
2 any breach of any fiduciary that Mr. Maile owed the
 
3 attorney?
 3 trust or Ted Johnson?
 
4 A. The only thing I know is that he had
 4 A. No.
 
5 mentioned several times that if he ever sold the farm
 5 Q. Did -- going back to the earnest money 
6 agreement -- I think it's 10, if you could find that, 6 he thought he would sell to his attorney because he had 
7 Beth -- was Ted aware and were you and Andy aware that 7 -- he and his attorney had talked about it. But other 
8 there was the potential that the property would be 8 than that, he didn't say a lot but I -- we -- this was 
9 developed?9 not a shock to the family that knew him the best, 
~o A. Yes.h 0 so ... 
1 Q. Okay. And specifically in Exhibit 10 there's1 Q. Did you advise Mr. Wishney about another 
2 an addendum to the real estate contract. 2 offer that was presented on the 40 acres by Franz 
A. Right.~3 Witte? 
Q. And there's paragraph four on -- let me see 4 A. I do not remember. 
if I can help you out. On page -- well, paragraph four 
5 Q. Had you, after conferring with Mr. Wishney on 
says, "The parties acknowledge that this agreement, ~ 6 behalf -- acting on behalf of the trust and/or Ted 
together with buyers' obligation, are conditioned upon 
7 Johnson, did you -- did you consider rescinding this 
buyer undertaking 'due diligencd review within the 
8 paperwork and canceling the real estate contract? 
h9 next 30 days." And it goes on to explain testing, ~9 A. No. 
b 0 engineering, water resources. bo Q. Did you believe that there were any mutual -­
'/1 A. Right. ~ 1 any mistakes, mutual mistakes made by either your uncle 
Q. What -- what did you and Ted understand that 
rz 2 or the trust and Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile and 
Q3 provision to mean? 
73 Berkshire Investments, LLC? 
74 A. For one thing, we knew the water table was 
A. No. 
b 5 being checked to see if it would be developable, you 
Q. Had you, acting on behalfof the trust in 
Page 52Page 51 
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A. Yes, sir. 
~ 8 
? 0 
Q. Okay. Did you know that there was a -- a 
development process being undertaken by -- with Ada 
County Development Services, and the process was being 
9 
undertaken to develop the 40-acre parcel for a 
subdivision? 
A. Yes, we did. We received a notice from the 




stuff together. I don't know where it went. 
want to do is take a break here just for a couple of 
Q. Well, that's okay, Beth. I think what we 
minutes. 
(A brief recess was taken.) 
(Exhibit No. 13 marked.) 
Q. Beth, we're handing you what's been marked as 
Exhibit 13, ask you to identify that if you can read 
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1 Q. And your uncle had passed away at this point 
2 A. Yes. 2 in time? 
3 Q. -- and ask you if can you just identify 13. 3 A. Yes. Two days prior. 
4 A. It's a promissory note secured by a deed of 4 Q. And you believe that the -- that executing 
5 trust telling us how we would receive our money every 5 Exhibit 14 was what he wanted to take place on behalf 





7 Q. Okay. And was that acceptable to the trust
 
8 (Exhibit Nos. 14 and 15 marked.)
8 under the terms and the conditions of the real estate
 
9 Q. If you can look at Exhibit 15 and see if you
9 contract? 
o recognize the two pages that consist of IS?o	 A. Yes.
 
1 A. I do. It is a check, our first cheek, which
1 Q. And that was provided or executed on or about 
2 was $323,757 for the payment of September 17th, 2003. 2 the closing date of the escrow by Alliance Title; is 
Q. Was that paid early? 3 that correct?	 1~3
 
il4 A. Yes, it was.
 4 A. That's correct.
 
5 Q. Did you have any conversation with anyone
5 Q. And if we could look at Exhibit 14 and ask
 
~ 6 concerning this payment received for the trust?
 
6 you to identify that? That's a warranty deed dated
 
~7 A. Yes. I called Mr. Maile.
 
7 September 16th, 2002. Do you recognize the signature
 




9 perhaps refusing to take the money?






~1 Q. And why was that? 
Q. And you executed that on the date of the 
A. Any issue -- would you repeat that, please? 
D2 closing consistent with the real estate contract, 
b 3 I'm confused. 
b 3 Exhibit 10, which is the earnest money agreement and 
Q. Okay. Let me just rephrase that. This was 
? 4 the assignment; is that correct? 
~ 5 executed on or about May 2003. 
A. That's correct. 
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'­
1 prior to May 19, 2000 by a beneficiary or an attorney 
2 Q. Had any members or beneficiaries of the trust 
1 A. Right. 
2 representing the beneficiaries?
 
3 in 2003 started any process complaining about the
 3 A. Actually I think they called me and asked
 
4 transaction between the trust and Berkshire
 4 when the check was going to be (sic), Mr. Maile, and I 
5 Investments? 5 told them I already received and it they told me not to 
6 A. Yes. I was told not to accept the check. 6 cash it, I think is how it worked.
 
7 Q. And who indicated that to you?
 7 Q. Okay. Did you choose to cash the check
 
8 A. Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor. Got the
 8 anyway on behalf of the trust?
 
9 notice from Connie Taylor.
 9 A. I did. 
o Q. And why was that? 
1	 they were requesting the trust not accept payment? 0-1 A. Because I was -- Andy and I were not in favor 
2 ofany lawsuit or anything. We infomled them of that 
o Q. Okay. And was there a letter indicating that 
2 A. I don't think it was a letter; I think it was
 
3 with a letter and told them that we were going to
 3 a meeting. 
,4 proceed as was outlined in the original agreement with 4 Q. Okay. And when did that meeting take place,
 
5 the property, and we cashed the check.
 5 if you can recall?
 
6 Q. Okay. I'm going to hand you Exhibit 16.
6 A. No, I can't recall but the meeting was -- all
 
7 (Exhibit No. 16 marked.)
7 of them weren't there either. The"meeting I met with
 
, 8 Q. Okay. Exhibit 16. Can you idt:ntify that
 8 all of them was in July. I don't recall when it was.
 
9 Q. But do you remember if any payment had been exhibit?
~9 
(Z 0 A. Yes, I can. DO received after closing before this meeting took place? 
Q. And what is it? D1 I'll rephrase that. You've testified that you were 
A. This is the final check from Berkshire D2 instructed not to take any money over this transaction 
? 3 Investments that paid off the property, and it was D3 on behalf of the trust; is that correct? 
b 4 given to me by Stephen Sherer in Meridian. It wasA. Correct. 
? 5 hand delivered to me. 5 Q. And are you sure that you were instructed
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1 Q. And upon accepting that check did you 1 paid off if you gave us, you know, an extra payment or 
2 negotiate it or deposit it on behalf of the trust? 2 et cetera. 
3 A. I did. 3 And I contacted some of the members of the 
4 Q. And you put it, I assume, in the trust 4 family and actually contacted our attomey and he said 
5 account? 5 because Andy and I -- even though we had no problems 
6 A. I did. 6 with it but we were acting as trustees for the benefit 
7 Q. Were there continued requests by some of the 7 of the family, that we would be best to stay by the 
8 beneficiaries of the trust not to finalize this S contract and so I asked you please not to develop the 
9 transaction? 9 property until it was paid off. 
0 A. Yes, there was. 0 And so you told me that that was fine and 
~l Q. And how -- just give me a thumbnail sketch, ~l that you would probably payoff early. 
h 2 if you could, how much contact there was by ~2 Q. Okay. And do you remember when these 
3 beneficiaries that didn't want to finalize and have the 3 conversations took place? 
4 trust paid off? 4 A. No, I don't. 
~5 A. There was quite a bit because they told us .~5 Q. Were the Taylor -- I'll call them the Taylor 
I6 they were still going to proceed with the lawsuit and 6 beneficiaries -- advised that -- advised of that? 
7 they really didn't want the property to be paid off !7r A. Yes, sir. 
~s because they were afraid if the property started to be ls
 Q. And when do you remember advising the Taylor 
9 developed that they would not have it as leverage in ~:
 beneficiaries of that component?
 ?O the lawsuit. A. We had a meeting July 4th, I think it was, 
bl And so they wanted -- it was easier to get 2002. And when they were talking to us about the 
92 hold of if it was undeveloped, and they figured once it lawsuit and getting the payoff of the property and ~:
 
23 was sold, you know, you -- Mr. Maile, you had contacted 3 et cetera, and I told them that you and I had had this 
b4 me prior to this and asked if you could start rb4 discussion and that we did not want to -- that you were 
?5 developing the property prior to having the property b5 not going to develop it. 
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1 Q. Okay. Did you -- at some point in time were 
2 you aware, acting on behalf of the trust, that Idaho 
1 And then right after that Andy and I sent 
2 them a letter informing them that we, as -- acting as 
3 Independent Bank would be providing a new commercial 3 beneficiaries in the trust, wanted no part of any 
4 loan on the subject 40 acres? 4 lawsuit, that we were going to follow through with 
5 A. No. 
5 Uncle Ted's wishes as it was initially outlined. 
6 Q. Okay. In December of 2003 were you advised 
6 Q. Okay. That was -- I think we'll get to a 
7 that there would be a payoff coming shortly on the deed 
7 letter that you wrote concerning that. 
8 of trust? 
8 A. But they did know that you and I had had the 
9 A. Yes. Mr. Sherer called me and he actually 
9 conversation about the development. 
'1 0 sent me papers of what he figured the payoff might be 
o Q. Did -- was there any response by any of the 1 and asked me to take them to my accountant to make sure 
1 Taylors and/or Connie Taylor relative to allowing the 2 that the -- you know, we were in tune with the payoff
 
2 trust to do what's called lot releases for the ~ 3 as far as the interest goes, which Andy and I did.
 
3 development? ~ 4 We went to the accountant, and she and Mr.
 
15 Sherer went with us. We were within, I think, seven 4 A. They told me not to -­
6 dollars of each other and so we had contacted Mr.5 Q. Okay. 
7 Sherer and told him to proceed.6 A. -- but we'd already made that decision. ~:
 Q. Did Mr. Sherer send you any portions of
 7 Q. Okay. Now if we could this have this marked Exhibit 17 prior to actually having the payoff ready? 
8 as 17 and have you take a look at that. 
20 A. Not that I remember. 
9 (Exhibit No. 17 marked.) 
Q. I noticed in your material that you brought 
/0 Q. Okay. Now, Beth, if you could take a look at 
? 2 with us there was a letter from Stephen Sherer. I'd 
/ 1 17 and see if you recognize that. There may be 
34 just ask if you could look for that for a second. 
D2 portions of Exhibit 17 that you haven't seen before. A. Sure. 
D3 A. Right. And I don't remember the last page. 5~ Q. Okay. Do you have a copy of what's called a 
4 Q. The letter? 
D5 A. Yes, sir. 
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1 deed of -- a release and reconveyance in there? 
2 A. Here's how Imajean came up with that. I'm 
3 not seeing anything. 
4 Q. Okay. I may make copies of these two. We'll 
5 make these exhibits. No. Let me just put these aside 
6 right now and we'll look at those later so I keep my 
7 order going. 
8 A. Okay. 
9 Q. In Exhibit 17, have you seen this before, the 
o release and reconveyance? 
1 A. I don't really remember it. 
2 Q. Okay. Let's move on and have this marked as 
3 18, then, a letter dated March 24th, 2003. 
4 (Exhibit No. 18 marked.) 
5 Q. Beth, I'm going to hand you what's marked as 
6 Exhibit 18 and ask you to identify it. I'll represent 
9 Joyce Seely and John Taylor. Do you remember ever 
7 that it's a letter dated March 24th, 2003 and it's 
8 signed by Connie Taylor, carbon copy, Helen Taylor, 
D0 seeing this letter before? 
01 A. Yes, I do. 
2 Q. Okay. Did you receive a copy of it? 
3 A. Yes, I did. 
D4 Q. On or about March 24, 2003? 



























Q. Is that -- did you have conversations with 
Connie Taylor prior to March 24th, 2003 about what 
she's writing about in the March 24th :letter? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And when -- when did the discussion start 
with you as trustee or co-trustee and Connie Taylor 
about altering the trust and disclaiming interest in 
the trust? 
A. About January 2003, the end of January. 
Q. And why was that? Do you -- do you have any 
reasons why they were trying Ito -­
A. My cousin, Dallan Taylor, called me at work 
and said that his mother was building a new house and 
she needed $80,000, and I told him I couldn't give her 
$80,000. 
a health and maintenance and whatever, but the money 
was to go to the heirs after they were dead. But even 
there that, you know, they could only get a portion for 
was in the process of doing taxes, and the accountant 
For one thing, there was a -- the clause in 
if it had been different, I tried to explain to him I 
had warned me that -- to write no checks until -- we 
had to do the state tax, the truslt taxes and et cetera, 
and that until the government released me, you know, 
saying that there would not be any audit or anything 
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because ofan estate the size it was, that to be 1 the beneficiaries? 
careful not to write any checks or give out any 2 A. She's the niece to -- or she is the 
disbursements because there -- if there was an audit I 3 daughter-in-law of Helen Taylor. 
could be in trouble, and that it might take me months 
to get that paperwork back. 
4 
5 
Q. She is married to John Taylor? 
A. That's correct. 
And I told them that I could not give them 6 Q. And to your knowledge what does John Taylor 
any money. And from there on that's when the problems 7 do? 
began. 8 A. He's an attorney, but I'm not sure how acting 
Q. Okay. What were the problems? 
A. Well, they were upset because the trust was 
9 attorney he is (sic), but he is also I think a CEO in 
o the AIA Insurance Company. My cousin, Reed, owns the 
written the way it was. They were upset because they 
1 insurance company. I think John is one of the CEO's. 
said I could give her a partial distribution at that 
2 Q. Okay. And what does AlA Insurance do? 
time; I did not need to hold all the money, that kind 
of thing. 
So then they decided that they would break 
the trust by doing a disclaimer and disbursement 
papers, you know, for everybody and get those filed, 
and so -- which they did. But I still told them I was 
IJ. 3 A. What they do? They sell insurance of all 
l54 kinds but I think their main target is for -- isl insurance for retired people and people, you know, that 
6 are of Social Security age. 
b- 7 Q. Okay. Now, were any beneficiaries other than 
~ 8 Dallan making requests for early disbursements or 
19 disclaimers or was it -­
advised not to give out the trust money yet because I 
bO A. No. 
had not been cleared by the government. 
And so they finally said, well, she had to 
Q. Did you have any conversations with Reed or 
(22 John during this period of time in the spring of2003, 
have the money, which -- I don't think she really 
needed it, but so I did do a partial distribution of 
t2 3 March 26,0003? 
A. No. Only-­
$50,000. 
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"-'" 
1 Q. This July 2003. Do you remember 
2 approximately when Bart Harwood was retained by the 
1 A. Excuse me. Only DaHan and Connie. 
2 Q. Okay. At some point in time did they raise 
3 trust?3 an issue concerning the propriety of the -- the 
4 A. No, I don't recollect. 4 appropriateness ofthe sale of the 40 acres? 
5 Q. Okay. What conversations did you have with 5 A. Yes. 
6 Connie Taylor or any beneficiaries prior to July 7th, 
6 Q. Okay. Ifyou -- if we could look at Exhibit 
7 2003 relating to the allegations set forth in this 
7 19 now. 
8 Exhibit 19? 
8 (Exhibit No. 19 marked.) 
9 A. We actually had a meeting July 4th, 2003. My 
9 Q. Okay. Ifwe can take a look at Exhibit 19, 
o brother, Garth Fisher, who is the assistant co-trustee, 
a Beth, have you seen that before? And I'll represent 
1 myself, were there plus several of the Taylors and 
1 it's a July 7th, 2003 letter addressed to Thomas G. ~ 2 that's when they said that, you know, this was all 
2 Maile, IV, and it's signed by Connie Taylor. ~ 3 wrong, that it was bought wrong and everything and they 
3 A. Yes. 4 wanted to go ahead with the lawsuit and they wanted to 
4 Q. Did you receive a copy ofthat as indicated t7: ::t~; ::~too to be the attorney fm the 
5 on the carbon copy or "cc" section?
 
6 A. Yes, I did. And so Andy was not there; he was out of
I
 
7 Q. And is that an accurate depiction that Connie 118 town. And so Garth and Scott and I said, well, we'd
 
8 Taylor at that point in time in July was representing
 9 think about it, we would talk about it, which we did 
? 0 afterwards privately and decided that we wanted no part9 your interest as successor trustee? 
~ 1 of any of this. And it was also at that meeting that A. It was not my opinion, no. 
~ 2 they kept telling me that I needed to giVI~ Aunt Helen Q. Okay. Did the trust have Bart Harwood 
1:)3 her money.
2 involved in -- as their attorney? 
?4 And so then Andy and I drafted the letter ~3 A. Yes, shortly thereafter. 
? 5 telling them that we did not want any part of any of 
4 Q. After what? 
D5 A. After this letter. 
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1 letter dated July 10th, 2003 on the lettt:rhead of Law 
2 the trust as things were. 
1 this and we were going to proceed as was outlined in 
2 Offices of Thomas G. Maile, IV, PA, with a fax number 
3 Q. After that July 4th meeting with Connie 3 to Connie Taylor.
 
4 Taylor -- was she present?
 4 Did you ever receive a copy of this letter?
 
5 A. She was.
 5 A. I don't think so.
 
6 Q. Do you ever remember ever set:ing this letter?
 6 Q. Did you have any other meeting with Connie 
7 A. No, I don't.7 Taylor over the direction of what the trust should be 
8 Q. Did Connie Taylor indicate to you on or about 8 . doing? 
9 July 10th or in any of these conversations that she had 9 A. No. Just telephone calls. 
o received a response concerning her July 7th o Q. And how many of those phone calls did you 
1 transmittal?1 have between July 4th and the date of your letter which 
~2 A. Yes. She told me that she'd gotten a letter 2 is July 22nd? 
~3 from you. 3 A. Probably three. 
4 Q. Did she tell you what was addre:ssed in that 4 Q. And what was discussed in those? 
5 letter?5 A. I called and told her that the letter was 
6 A. Some. She just told me that you felt like 
6 forthcoming, that we were not going to, and she called 
17 that what you had done was correct, that you had not 
7 back. It was just that kind of stuff. 
18 breached any legal actions or anything like that, and 
8 Q. So on that first call to her after the July 
9 she told me that she still was going to pursue it. 
94th meeting did you make it clear to her that the trust 
~O Q. Now, there's a sentence on the third line 
;> 0 -- in your opinion as co-trustee the trust didn't want 
Q1 down. It starts, "However, on a broader note, I would 
) 1 any involvement in this lawsuit? 
t::> 2 like to advise you that the purchase price and the 
A. Yes, sir. 
::> 3 terms were fully explored by both Ted Johnson and Beth 
Q. I'm going to hand you Exhibit 20. 
74 Rogers." 
(Exhibit No. 20 marked.) 
D5 Would you contend that that's an accurate, 
Q. I'm going to hand you Exhibit 20 which is a 
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DE~ITION OF BETH ROBERS TAKEN 8',-04 
~ 1 have taken advantage ofhim.?2 The facts as made known to you today, does 
Q. Okay.b3 that appear to be a truthful statement? 
A. And I would go -- you know, if Uncle Ted had A. Yes. 
b 4 told me to go jump in the lake I probably would have Q. And then finally -- strike that. In the last 
b 5 gone and jumped. I mean, he -- I did -- [had never 
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A. That's true. ~7 
8 Q. And then the letter also says, "Mr. Jobnson 
9 honored his verbal commitment to me made years ago that 
~ 0 ifhe ever decided to sell this land he would afford me 
? 1 first option to purchase the property." 
~ 
~ 7 Did you feel that way? 
~8 A. No. 
Q. And why was that? 9 
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1 they wanted to do anyway. any reason to ever question him on anything. 
2 Q. And when did she tell you that she was going 
3 to go ahead and do -­
2 Q. Okay. And if we could have the next document 
3 marked as Exhibit 21. 
4 A. Shortly after the letter. 4 (Exhibit No. 21 marked.) 
5 Q. Would it have been late July or early August 5 Q. Okay. If we could look at 21, it's a letter 
6 2003? 6 dated July 22nd, 2003. And are there signatures on 
7 A. Yes. Yes, sir. Probably early August. 
7 Exhibit 21? 
8 Q. Okay. And I know that you signed an 
8 A. Yes, there are. 
9 affidavit and we'll get to that later, but it seems as 
9 Q. Okay. And is this authored by you and your 
~ 0 though there was never any scheduled family meeting as 
o husband? 
~ 1 a result of this July 22nd letter. Was there? 
1 A. Yes, it was. 
12 A. Correct. I asked them if they would. My 
2 Q. And do you know if these individuals listed 
3 aunt from Salt Lake, Joyce Seely, the fanlily was all 
3 received copies of this letter? 
4 going to, you know, volunteer they'd have another 
4 A. They did. ~ 5 meeting and they would all come and support Andy and I. 
5 Q. Were there any-­ ~ 6 And the Taylors never would have another 
6 A. The only -­ 7 meeting. 
7 Q. Excuse me? 8 Q. Did you ever form an opinion as to what was 
h 8 A. Okay. The only ones that didn't call me back ~ 9 motivating the Taylors in insistirlg that there should 
9 on it was the Taylors, but the rest of them were very ~ 0 be litigation surrounding this 40 acres? 
;> 0 supportive. ? 1 A. It's still a mystery to the whole family, 
;> 1 Q. Okay. When you say Taylors, did you get a /2 Tom. 
?3 Q. Okay.I;> 2 response from Connie Taylor? 
~ 4 A. We do not know what is behind it. To our;> 3 A. Yes. I did get a response from her. She did 
D5 knowledge they didn't have any prior notice of you, to 
;> 4 get it and didn't abide by it. She didn't think it 
I;> 5 meant -- that they were going to go ahead and do what 
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1 Do you remember what they were -- what you meant, that 
2 Franz Witte ahead of time. We have no clue why this 
1 be mad at you. We do not know. There was links with 
2 they were"after us"?
 
3 has happened.
 3 A. Yes. We felt at the time -- and that is the 
4 reason we retained Bart Harwood as our attorney -- is4 Q. Okay. Let's look -- let's mark this as 22. 
5 that if we didn't cooperate that the lawsuit -- another5 (Exhibit No. 22 marked.) 
6 lawsuit was going to be enforced against Andy and I.6 Q. Beth, if you could take a look at that I'll 
7 Q. Had anybody ever verbally said that or 7 represent to you that the date is covered up there, but 
8 alluded to that?8 it's-­
9 A. It was implied several times.9 A. No. I'm sorry. I didn't mean to do that. 
o Q. Andwho?o Q. But there was a sticky note. Do you remember 
1 A. Nobody said it directly. 
1 attaching a sticky note to your letter of July 22nd? 
12 Q. What were the -- what was stated that caused 
2 A. That sticky note should have been in your 
~ 3 you to draw the conclusion it was implied and who said ~ 3 coffee. Yes, I did. 
4 it? 
4 Q. And is that handwritten? There's a 
5 A. Again it came from the Taylors, and most of 
5 handwritten portion up at the top. Can you read that? 
1 6 our conversation was with Connie. Reed and his son did 
6 A. Yes, I can. 
~ 7 fly down and talk to us several times but they felt -­
7 Q. Read it. What does it say, just so the court 
8 you know, we got the feeling that they did not think 
8 reporter can hear it. 
9 that Andy and I were doing right by the bUSt, and they 
9 A. It says, "The letter mailed to Connie Taylor" 
b 0 did want to be trustees and therefore if An.dy and I 
DO -- I can't remember what the first is. "Andy and I 
b1 didn't -- weren't going to resign, you know, I guess 
D1 wish no action to be taken and refuse to sign the 
b 2 they could force us. 
1/ 2 paperwork. Thought you should know." Now they're -­ ~3 Q. Now, how do you know they wanred to become 
D3 "Now they are after us. Nice people." b 4 the trustees? 
r;> 4 And I sent this to you. ~5 A. They mentioned it severa:! times because as 
b5 Q. Okay. Right. This was a note to my office. 
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1 trustees they would have more leverage with the farm, 1 story and then to edit it and rewrite it, rewrite it, 
2 especially the 40, especially before it was completely 2 and then he put it in affidavit form. 
3 paid off because if you had defaulted or whatever, the 3 Q. Okay. Was this affidavit required by the 
4 property probably would have gone back to Andy and I 4 Taylors prior to executing what's been called the 
5 because we signed the original, you know, finalization. 5 disclaimer, release and indemnity? 
6 So I think it was felt that the property 6 A. No. 
7 could come back to us, and -- because we were the 7 Q. Was this affidavit, Exhibit 23, shared with 
8 signatures (sic). 8 the Taylor beneficiaries and/or Connie Taylor? 
9 Q. Okay. Let's take a look at 23, if we could 9 A. She received the story before it was an 
o have this marked. r 0 affidavit. 
1 (Exhibit No. 23 marked.) 1 Q. Okay. I'm just wondering -- we're going to 
2 Q. Okay. Beth, I'm going to hand you what's 2 get to an exhibit called the disclaimer release and 
3 marked as Exhibit 23 and I'll represent that Bart 3 indemnity agreement that was prepared on July 15th, it 
4 Harwood, the attorney for the trust, provided this by R4 looks like, 2004 or signed on that date by certain 
5 E-mail to various E-mail addresses and that's how -­ 5 parties. 
6 A. That's correct. 6 Was there a request made by any of the 
7· Q. -- copies were obtained. Does your signature 7 beneficiaries to have this done, have the affidavit 
8 -- was it notarized on July 14th, 2004? 8 signed by you before they entered into the disclaimer 
9 A. Yes, it was. 9 agreement? 
Q. And you had -- who drafted this? I assume-­ 70 A. No. 
A. I did. 71 Q. Didn't go hand-in-hand in any way? 
Q. Okay. Was it on your word processor or -­ 17 2 A. No. They didn't see the affidavit until 
A. Yes, it was. 17 3 after the disclaimer. They all have it now, but it did 
Q. Okay. D4 not go out until after the disclaimer. 
A. What happened is Bart asked me to write my 75 Q. Now, you said that they had -- they had it 
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1 written or just commented to verbally by someone?
 
2 or-­
1 before it was signed. Was a rough draft sent to them 
2 A. Commented to verbally, but eVf:ll in front of
 
3 A. Basically it wasn't a rough draft; it was
 3 our attorney. 
4 Q. Bart Harwood? 4 basically this, only it just wasn't in affidavit fonn 
5 A. Uh-huh.5 with the squigglies and the whatever. It was just my 
6 Q. So am I correct in assuming paragraph 15 was6 story. And I just started out as, "My name is Beth 
7 to put -- it was put in for you to basically be under 7 Rogers" and it went from there. And then they had that 
8 oath saying that "We didn't do anything like that"? 8 for probably three months befure Bart put it in an 
9 A. That's correct. 9 affidavit. 
o Q. When were those type of allegations being o He did not put it in affidavit fonn until the 
~ 1 made against you and Andy? 
1 time of the disclaimer. 
A. Actually that's since the time I refused to 
2 Q. Okay. Now if you can go to paragraph 15, 
3 give them their $80,000. They claim that Aunt Helen 
3 Beth, I just want to ask you a couple questions there. 
4 made the comment that Uncle Ted had told her that he 
4 A. Okay. 
5 had left her an annuity. 
5 Q. There's a paragraph that you felt was 
~ 6 Well, all of his money was in annuities and 
6 important enough to put in the affidavit about "After 
u. 7 so he did, but they were thinking that she got an 
7 Uncle Ted's death I found that claiming on all the 
8 annuity and she didn't get anything by itself. 
8 annuities and policies I found was a challenge." 
9 There was a life insurance policy made out to 
119 What was the purpose of putting that into 
~ 0 my dad and my Aunt Betty that they wer,e both deceased, 
b 0 this affidavit, that kind of statement about the 
~ 1 and so I got hold of the insurance company. I found 
b 1 annuities? 
2: these things before Uncle Ted died just before, and I 
1/ 2 A. The family, Le., the Taylors, felt like that 
called them and they said it would be easier for us 
D3 there was annuities made out to Aunt Helen that Andy ~ kids -- there's eight kids involved -- to claim on 
? 4 and I had changed, that she did not get her fair share. b 5 these if we could get it changed to the eight names 
D5 Q. Now, was that accusation or allegation 
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1 rather than have to prove death certificates and 1 think Jud was entitled to any of the money.
 
2 whatever, because those two were deceased and that was 2 Q. And who is the owner of the title of that
 
3 an old life insurance policy he'd had for years. 3 property now?
 
4 And so I did change that, and so actually the 4 A. Taylor Land Company.
 
5 Johnsons and the Farnworths ended up with a little bit
 5 Q. And is Reed Taylor th(~ principal owner?
 
6 more money than everybody else. Betty Farnworth was
 6 A. Yes. I think it's in Reed's and Dallan's
 
7 one of the beneficiaries, and so her heirs and my
 7 name, but I think that Dallan wanted on it because he 
8 father's heirs, which is Richard Johnson's, got money. 8 could handle the footwork here because Dallan lives 
9 that the rest of them didn't get and it's caused a 9 there. 
1i0 great problem. 0 Q. Was there ever an appraisal done on the Star 
1 But it was a life insurance policy taken out 1 property? 
~2 like in 1990, and so that was just in there to kind of 2 A. No, there was not. 
3 dear up, I think. ~3 Q. Did you -- did you feel comfortable in 
4 Q. Now, paragraph 14, the one preceding what fL4 selling the property on behalf of the trust without his 
~5 we've just talked about, deals with the purchase and 5 appraisal? 
6 the sale of the Star farm, doesn't it? 
6 A. Yes, I did, because they were going to give 
7 A. That's correct. 
7 us $500,000. We had two other offers to buy the 
8 Q. And who ended up actually purchasing that 
8 property for $280,000 and those people had actually 
9 property from the trust? 
9 looked into value. Water, sewer was not there yet so 
20 A. Reed Taylor. 
DO we felt that it was fair. 
h Q. And did he purchase it, as your affidavit 
D1 They were also going to give an endowment 
b2 says, maybe purchase it for his son? Was the son 
b2 fund to the FFA, and my aunts really, really liked 
D3 I involved in that purchase? 
f:
 that. They were with Andy and I at this meeting and
 D4 A. I think we bought it for his son, Jay, was in they were all for that, giving the money to the b5 the -- or Jud was there in all the things, but I don't 
25 endowment fund. Number one, it would be a tax break 
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1 for probably Reed and for us, and it would also, you 1 A. 25 at the time of the sale of the property at
 
2 know, perpetuate FFA.
 2 closing and 25 at the time of development.
 
3 Q. And I guess in your affidavit somewhere I
 3 Q. And how much has been funded?
 
4 remember that that may not have been funded the way you
 4 A. $10,000.
 
5 thought it was?
 5 Q. Who are the current trllstees of the Johnson 
6 A. It was not. 
6 Trust, to your knowledge? 
7 Q. And have you ever followed up to see if it's 
7 A. I've not seen anything in writing and I'm not 
8 currently funded the way you thought? 
8 sure that they've done it legally, but supposedly it's 
9 A. I have. It still has not been. 
9 John Taylor. 
o Q. How much did -- was there a verbal agreement 
o Q. Now, in paragraph 22, if you look at that, it 
1 to fund it for $50,000? 
1 looks like the way I have read paragraph 22 that there 
2 A. Verbal agreement. 
2 was a family meeting sometime prior to January 8th or 
3 Q. Was that an element that you felt was 
h3 at least more involved. There wasn't? b- 4 important on behalf of the trust to get that assurance 
I 4 A. Letters were sent out. h 5 to-­
5 Q. And do you have copies of those with you 6 A. It was.
 
6 today?
7 Q. Do you have any explanation to -- as to why 
A. I do.b- 8 that wasn't honored or done? 
fl- 9 A. We, Andy and I, have talked to Reed about it 8 Q. Well, we don't have to take a look at them 
DO and he said, "Well, they'll get the rest of it when 9 now, but let me just-­
81 it's developed." )0 A. I do have letters. 
Q. Is that your understanding of how -­ Q. Okay. And basically what were those letters 
~3 A. No. b 2 outlining? 
Q. When -- what was your understanding of when )3 A. The letters ask if they want to sign two 
b 5 it would be funded? ) 4 ways. You could either sign that you were in with the 
l;> 5 lawsuit, and if you were in with the lawsuit you needed 
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1 A. Yes.1 $3,000 down, you know, to re- -- you know, to help 
2 Q. Okay.
 
3 A. I actually gave the signatures to Bart
 
2 start funding the lawsuit. 
3 And then it could be, you know, 10,000 or
 
4 Harwood.
4 whatever more ifneeded, but then you would share in
 
5 Q. This shows that Dallan Taylor signed the
5 the returns from the lawsuit; or the other letter that 
6 agreement on 6-14. Gloria Rydalch, R-y-d-a-l-c-h, 6 went out or paper that went out with it said that you 
7 signed on 6-14. Mark Taylor signed on June 14th. John 
7 did not wish to go in with the lawsuit. 
8 Taylor is R. John; signed it but no date. And Reed 
8 So you either was with -- you know, for or 
9 Taylor signed it but no date; is that correct? 
9 against in the two letters. 
~ 0 A. That's correct. 
o Q. Okay. And then paragraph 23 says again 
hI Q. Then I guess if we can look at 25, which I 
1 people refused to sign the papers. Would this be the 
2 think these signatures go to ... 
2 papers you're talking about? 
3 (Exhibit No. 25 marked.) 
3 A. I am. It is. And people refused to sign ~ 4 A. Mr. Maile, I'm sorry. I did not -- I was 
4 either way. They didn't want to sign that. Yeah. ~ 5 thinking this was the other signatures. These 
5 They were for and they didn't want to sign this; they 
h 6 signatures came directly from Connie Taylor to Mr. 
6 were against, even though they were against because 7 Harwood. I apologize.
 
7 they just did not want the lawsuit to happen. They got
 8 Q. I think so. Exhibit-­
8 no signatures. 119 A. Yeah. They came directly. 
9 Q. Well, we'll have to take a look at those and ~ 0 Q. Yeah. Exhibit 24 by fax maybe? 
b 0 ask you some questions about those. Exhibit 24, if we b 1 A. They did. 
b 1 could have that marked. b2 Q. Okay. Exhibit 25 is what's called a 
/) 2 (Exhibit No. 24 marked.) b3 disclaimer and release, indemnity agreement and this 
D3 Q. If you could take a look at Exhibit 24 and 04 relates to also Exhibit 24 showing signature pages. 
b 5 What was your understanding of what was being 4 see if you can identify that. Did you receive a copy 
b 5 of that from Bart Harwood, for example? 
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1 beneficiaries about the counterclaim that's been filed 1 this -- I think written about the same, which I believe 
2 in this lawsuit against the Taylors? Were you aware 2 I have copies of -- showed Andy and I as trustees 
3 that there was a countersuit? 3 versus you. Versus -- I'm sony -- versus Berkshire 
4 A. Yes, sir. 4 Development or Investments. 
5 Q. Okay. Was there any discussion by the 5 Q. Okay. 
6 Taylors after the filing of the countersuit -- which 6 A. And Andy and I then, you know, refused to be 
7 I'll represent was probably in February or March of 7 part of the lawsuit and so it got changed into Reed, 
8 2004 -- about the merits of the counterclaim, the 8 DaHan and John Taylor. 
9 appropriateness of it? 9 Q. Now, when did -- how -- can we see a copy of 
o A. No. They are pretty close-mouthed about the 
I 0 that with you today? 
1 counterclaim. All we hear basically is the other, is 
1 A. Let me see. 
2 their suit, not the suit against them, except they did 
2 (A briefdiscussion was held offthe record.) 
3 admit to me that there was a suit against them pending. 
3 Q. Was it presented to you and Andy in-­
4 Reed told me. He said that Mr. Maile was suing for 
4 A. They mailed it to me because we had to sign 
5 damages. 
5 it. I apparently don't have it. I have it at home. 
6 Q. Okay. I think we're probably up to 26. 
6 Q. Okay. 
7 (Exhibit No. 26 marked.) 
7 A. But it had -- instead of the Reed Taylor, 
8 Q. Exhibit 26, Beth, has been handed to you. 
8 DaHan Taylor and John Taylor at the top, it had Andy 
~ 9 It's a complaint and demand for jury trial, and it has 
9 and I as co-trustees "versus," and we refused to sign 
) 0 a signature of January 22 by Jon Hally for Connie 
? 0 it. 
) 1 Taylor of the law firm for the plaintiffs. Have you 
Q. Did you send back a letter to Connie Taylor 
) 2 seen this lawsuit before? 
D2 saying you refused to sign it? ~3 A. Yes, I have. 
A. That's that letter that is an exhibit here Q. When do you remember seeing it? 
) 4 earlier saying we want no participation, I believe. A. The first lawsuit that I saw very similar to 
) 5 No. It's not. 
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1 Q. Because that one was way back. 2003? 1 sign.
 
2 A. No. I don't think I sent them a letter.
 2 Q. Okay. Let's just look at -- I guess you can
 
3 Q. Do you think you received that complaint by
 3 put your stuff back so we don't get it all
 
4 Connie Taylor back in July of 2003 that had your names
 4 intermingled. You start shuffling paper, it gets
 
5 on it?
 5 pretty confusing. If you'd just turn through the
 
6 A. No, no.
 6 complaint with me and take a look at allegation 3.2, it 
7 Q. It was in 2004 you think? 7 says, "Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson not to accept an 
8 A. You know, I think it was 2003. It was 2003. 8 offer to purchase the property. Then within
 
9 Q. Okay.
 9 approximately two months Thomas and Colleen Maile 
o A. It was. o entered into an earnest money agreement to purchase the 
~ 1 Q. Could you put that on your list there, Beth? I 1 40 acres for the price of $400,000." 
2 A. I will, to get it for you. It was 2003 ~ 2 Do you know if there was ever any advice to 
~ 3 because there was a few months went on before the ~ 3 Mr. -- or Johnson, Ted Johnson, that he not accept the 
4 final. 4 offer to purchase the property by Franz Witte? 
5 Q. Okay. We'd like to see that. ~ 5 A. Not to my knowledge. That was his own 
11	 6 A. In fact, the first one was wrong because it ~ 6 decision. 
7 had my name as trustee. Andy and I -- the way the h 7 Q. Okay. On paragraph 4.2 on the next page it 
8 trust is drafted I cannot sign anything as trustee by says, "The defend"'" breached his fiduciary duty to 'be l8 
11 9 myself.	 Theodore Johnson Trust by self dealing, which included 19 
[20 Q. Okay. [;> 0 but is not necessarily limited to: a) paying less than
 
b 1 A. The trust -- everything is co-trustees. It's :;> 1 fair market value for the purchase of the property."
 
? 2 written up as co-trustees, and so I pointed that out. ? 2 Do you believe that statement to be true?
 
? 3 That was totally wrong. There was no way I could go to ~ 3 A. No. With the appraisal we thought it was
 
b 4 court by myself. It had to be "co." They drafted t2 4 fair market.
 
? 5 another one with us as co-trustees which we refused to b 5 Q. And then in c) it says, "Offering to purchase
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1 the properties on tenns which were unfavorable and 1 cetera, the crops and et cetera. And what was 
2 inappropriate given Mr. Johnson's advanced age and the 2 discussed then, Mr. Maile, I have no idea. 
3 fact that he had cancer which was known to be 3 I do know that I don't think he would have 
4 tenninal." 4 paid the money, knowing Uncle Ted, for legal counsel on 
5 Do you believe that -- do you and/or Ted 5 whether it was right or wrong because did he not feel 
6 Johnson -- do you believe that the tenns were 6 it was a bad situation. 
7 unfavorable and inappropriate given Mr. Johnson's 7 Q. Now, the 4.3 paragraph on page 3 says, 
8 advanced age? . 8 ""Plaintiffs are infonned and believe, and on the basis 
9 A. No, I don't. And the fact that he had 9 of that infonnation and belief allege that these 
o cancer, we did not know at that time that the cancer o damages will not be less than $600,000." 
1 was tenninal. In fact the cancer was not what killed .~ 1 At the time of the filing of this lawsuit in 
2 him. ~ 2 February 2004 you were the co-trustee of the trust; is 
3 Q. Okay. And then the allegation, "Failing to l:I. 3 that correct? 
4 deal fairly with Mr. Johnson," do you believe that 4 A. Correct. 
5 that's a true statement? 15 Q. Did you, acting on behalfof the trust, 
6 A. No. 16 believe that there would be damages associated with any 
7 Q. And then, "Failing to advise Mr. Johnson to 17 of these allegations? 
8 consult independent counsel before entering into the 8 A. No. We don't know where the $600,000 figure 
9 transaction." Do you know if that's true or false? ~ 9 came from. 
D0 A. I do not really know that. I have been asked ~ 0 Q. Did you believe at the time as trustees or 
D1 that before, but I -- Andy and I were not with you and b1 co-trustee that there were any damages sustained by the 
D2 Uncle Ted -- Mr. Maile and Uncle Ted -- during all the /'2 trust? 
? 3 transactions. /'3 A. No. 
? 4 I know you were out at the fann a couple of t? 4 Q. In allegation 6.22 on page 4, do you believe 
:;> 5 times talking to him about the water table and et ? 5 it's a truthful statement that there was a "Failure to 
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1 advise Mr. Johnson to obtain an appraisal of the real 1 
2 property for development, its highest and best use, 2 
3 rather than as agricultural property"? Is that a true 3 
4 statement? 4 
5 A. I don't know that you advised him on that. I 5 
6 don't know how to answer that for sure. 6 
7 Q. Were you aware that the appraisal itselfin 7 
8 Exhibit 9 indicates that the price that the appraisal 8 
9 takes into account that the -- that a person or entity 9 
o most likely to pay that kind of money would develop the o 
~ 1 property? 1 
2 A. Yes, I am. 2 
3 Q. Paragraph 6.2.6, "Failing to advise Mr. 3 
4 Johnson to retain the property in trust until after his 
4 
5 death to avoid taxation of capital gains." Do you ~ 5 
6 think Mr. Johnson was incorrectly advised by either the 
6 
7 law offices or the accounting firm? ~ 7 
8 A. No. He looked into that pretty seriously and ~ 8 
9 it was a wash. That's something he did look into. 
fl.9 
80 1bat's why he went to the accountant. 
DO 
MR. MAILE: Just one more document and we'll 
b2 take a break for lunch and maybe we'll see where we go. 
D2 
t2 3 If we could have that marked. 
b 4 (Exhibit No. 27 marked.) t: 
b5 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) You've been handed Exhibit k5 
Page 95 





Q. Did you know that there was a notice of a lis 
pendens filed on the real property that"s owned by -­
A. I did. 
Q. And who -- how did you become aware of that? 
A. Our attorney, Mr. Hanvood, informed us. 
Q. Was there ever any discussion by any of the 
Taylors or beneficiaries about filing a notice of lis 
pendens when a lawsuit was filed and what the 
ramifications of that would be? 
A. Well, I knew they were: going to file so it 
would stop you from developing that so it wouldn't tie 
up the property, because they felt like developments 
would tie up the property further than just yourself. 
It would make it a lot harder for them to get property 
back, if that's what they're after. 
Q. Is that -- did they tell you that they were 
after -- to get the property back? 
A. They didn't say. They just told me they were 
going to tie up the property. 
Q. Did the trust while you were managing the 
trust ever desire to get the property back? 
A. No. 
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1 Q. Why is that? 
2 A. Don't want it back. We don't want to farm 
3 it. We don't want to resell it. Uncle Ted sold it. 
4 Q. Was there ever any discussion by any of the 
5 Taylors to the effect that all we need to do is find -­
6 get a couple of older ladies to verify, that at their 
7 age they could be taken advantage of? Do you ever 
8 remember a statement like that? 
9 A. Never. 
o Q. Was there ever any discussion by any of the 
1 Taylors to the effect that -- how they would proceed in 
2 getting evidence to make their "case," quote/unquote? 
3 A. No. 
~ 4 Q. And this last document, ifwe could have 
2 0 seen that form before? This is to Berkshire 
9 deed of reconveyance on the subject property. Have you 
8 signed by the trustee, Stephen Sherer, concerning the 
(Exhibit No. 28 marked.) 





D2 A. I don't recognize it. No. 
3 Q. Okay. Did you understand that by accepting 
/ 4 the payoff at one check for $293,000 in January 2004 




1 discharge each party from any further obligations or 
2 responsibilities? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. That was accepted -- acceptable to you as 
5 trustee when you took that last payment? 
6 A. Right. Mr. Sherer explained that. 
7 MR. MAILE: I'm going to need to take a break 
8 so ifwe could just take a recess for a second. 
9 (A brief recess was taken.) 
o (Exhibit No. 29.) 
Q. Now, Beth, I'm going to handing you what's 
A. Yes, I can. 
Q. And what is that? 
112 marked as Exhibit 29. Can you identify Exhibit 29? 
l3 
l4 
Q. And was there an accompanying letter with 
A. Yes, there was. 
that proposed complaint? 
A. That was a -- going to be a lawsuil: that they 
8 property and et cetera. 
~ 6 wanted to bring as a trust against Thomas Maile for the 
~ 7 way the property was handled and for more money on the 
Q. Okay. 
A. It was a letter saying that they represented 
-- they were now representing the: trust. 
Q. And did you give authority to Carmie Taylor 
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>5 about the same time.
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1 Q. All right. And I think we're going to get a 
2 copy here shortly of the letter that might have heen -­
3 that had the enclosed fee agreement. 
4 MR. MAILE: Let's have this marked as 32. I 
9 Q. And what was the response from the family? 
DO Did you receive any as co-trustee of the -­
1 signing the nonparticipation one that they were giving 
2 them their permission to do the lawsuit, and so they 
3 all refused to sign. 
4 MR. MAILE: Okay. Let's have these marked as 
MR. MAILE: Let's have this as 36. That's a 
In letter dated January 8. 
1)1 A. No. The family did not want to sign the 
b2 (Exhibit No. 36 marked.) 
b2 paperwork yea or nay. They didn't want to -- they 
b3 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Okay. Beth, if you could 
D3 wanted to -- they felt if they signed the participation b4 take a look at Exhibit 36 and identify that if you can? 
b 4 agreement they would he involved with the suit which b5 A. Yes. That is a letter to Andy and I from 
5 they did not want to, hut they felt like that by 
I 
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1 Reed Taylor saying that they were going to pursue the 1 Q. Let's go up to 38. 
2 lawsuit and that they wanted people to send in the 2 (Exhibit No. 38 marked.) 
3 money if they wanted to be involved, to sign if they 3 Q. If you could take a look at Exhibit 38, Beth, 
4 didn't want to. 4 and identify that and explain the contents as best as 
5 He gave his cell phone and et cetera. 5 you can. 
6 Q. Okay. 6 A. This is a disclaimer agreement. It's a 
7 A. Actually this accompanies 34 and 35 too. I 7 letter from Connie stating to the farrlily that Andy and 
8 mean, that's preceded it. 8 I did not want to pursue the action against Mr. Maile 
9 Q. Okay. Let's take a look at 37 and have that 9 and the 40 acres, but asking them if tht:y would sign 
o marked as 37. u. 0 the disclaimer of beneficiary so that they could get 
I 
1 (Exhibit No. 37 marked.) ill their money early. 
2 Q. Okay. Now, Beth, if you could take a look at 2 And in this disclaimer they were told -- they 
3 Exhibit 37, can you identify that? 3 signed that they would disclaim all of the money in the 
4 A. Yes, I can. This is an E-mail I got from I 4 trust except for the 40-acre parcel of land that we had 
5 Reed Taylor's secretary telling me that this is the 5 sold to Mr. Maile. At that time it was not paid for
 
6 letter she wanted me to use, that it was for the
 6 but they disclaimed everything in the trust but the
 
7 disclaimer and et cetera, that Reed had corrected it or
 7 land.
 
8 put in what he wanted.
 8 Q. What was the reaction from the farrlily at this
 
9 Q. Okay. And the last page, what does that
 9 point in time in August of 2003? 
DO have? /0 A. To be honest, the farrlily all felt like the 
A. The last page is they sent me one, and this D1 reason they were disclairrling the funds in that at that 
/2 was the page that -- the last page is the one that had time was because it wasn't paid for and they thought f2 
D3 the disclaimer, all the forms on it, and the other one 3 that was a way of saying, "Well, we don't have the f
 
D4 was the one where they had changed the letter, and they f4 funds; therefore we're not going to get that money" but 
/ 5 were all from Diane Whisner. D5 later we realized that we were disclairrliug that because 
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1 they wanted us to hold the money for lawsuit. But at 1 share of the funds because they felt lik,e there needed 
2 the time that's not what we felt. 2 to be money in the trust if there was a lawsuit. 
3 Q. Was that ever explained to you, that they 3 So they wanted me to give everybody else 
4 wanted to withhold the money for the lawsuit costs? 4 their money but I wouldn't giVI~ Aunt Helen hers, but 
5 A. Not until later. 5 then they decided the judge might say, well, they're 
6 Q. When was it explained later? 6 holding her money, they're using her money, their 
7 A. When I disbursed the money after I received 7 mother's money who is not dead yet, so they decided 
8 it. 8 that we should distribute her money. Okay. That's 
9 Q. Who explained that to you? 9 number one. 
0 A. Well, Taylors called and they thought I n 0 Second, they are concemed that that -- let's 
should still have $400,000 in the account. 1 see. That they -- let's see. They demand that all of 
2 Q. Which Taylors told you that? 2 the Taylors release the trustees from any potential 
3 A. Connie. She was the one we had 3 claims or waives a right to an accounting of the trust, 
III 
4 correspondence with. Well, and Reed. Reed was out at
 
5 the house also.
 
6 Q. Very interesting. Let's take a look at this
 
7 August letter. .
 
8 (Exhibit No. 39 marked.)
 
9 Q. If you could take a look at Exhibit 39 and
 
PO let us know what it is. And did you receive a copy of 
:> 1 it or not? 
A. Now, this is a letter to Mr. Harwood. He had 
D3 E-mailedhimseveralletters, things going back and 
:> 4 forth in the trust. At first they -- at one time they 
115 had said they did not want me to disburse Aunt Helen's 
Page 105 
4 so they wanted a complete accounting of everything on 
~ 5 the trust which they already had pretty much had. 
6 I had kept them pretty much informed of 
. 7' everything, and Mr. Maile had already mailed them all 
8 of his stuff also. 
9 And, third, they needed assurances that Andy 
? 0 and I would be supportive of the lawsuit because they 
:> 1 said there is no getting around the fact that Beth will 
:> 2 be an essential witness. 
They wanted Andy -- they needed Andy and I's 
? 4 support. And they say in there that the suit was based 
:> 5 on my total unequivocal representation that Mr. Maile 
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1 never infonned Uncle Ted that there was a conflict, and 1 that got -- went to Tom came through Mr. Harwood, or 
2 that had been addressed to them in a meeting in front 2 anything that came from Tom to me came through Mr. 
3 of our attorney, Mr. Harwood, that that was false. I 3 Harwood. Tom and I really did not. 
4 do not know why this was coming again. 4 And it said we attended a meeting with Mr. 
5 On July 22nd they said they received a letter 5 Maile, and the attorneys appeared to be on good tenns 
6 that said that they had -- the suit had no merit in the 6 with all of them. You two attorneys met me in the 
7 1rust, but they never received a basis for that 7 hallway and introduced yourselves but we did not 
8 conclusion. They had many times. I'm sorry. They 8 discuss the case. 
9 even met in front of our attorney. 9 You introduced myselves (sic) and told me in 
o On February 23,2004 they received Mr. ~ 0 fact you were talking to me about going to school with 
~ 1 Maile's answer and counterclaim and it said that they h 1 Bart, and the conversation was very generic. There 
2 did not provide him a copy of 1hat letter, that it must 2 wasn't any collaboration. And then she said after the 
3 have been from me. The letter I think that they're 3 hearing I told her that was not possible 10 obtain all 
~ 4 talking about, about the things that we went through ~ 4 of the signatures that they needed by the deadline, 
5 with David Wishney, I mailed to Tom at that time, not ~ 5 which was true because some of them, we had just found 
~ 6 even dreaming there would be a lawsuit, because I 6 out they need mailing and they went as far as New 
7 wanted Tom to make sure that that clause was in our 7 Jersey and we can't mail within New Jersey. 
8 closing. ~8 And I get things back within the same week, 
~ 9 And so, yes, Tom did have correspondence but h 9 and so I explained that to her. And so basically it 
~ 0 it didn't have anything to do with -- I meant at the ? 0 was -- I don't know. Said the clients would waive 
~ 1 time I didn't even know. ? 1 their right to these records only if Beth executes an 
~ 2 After we actually found out there was a ~ 2 affidavit and expedites the signing of the documents. 
P3 lawsuit involved, our attorney advised me not to have ? 3 They were afraid Judge Wilpur was going to close on 
/4 any contact with Mr. Maile just to protect Mr. Maile ? 4 them and I could not give them everything that he 
p 5 and myself, and so Tom and I had no contact. Anything / 5 needed at that time. 
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1 last paragraph there -- says, "Wherefore plaintiffs
 
2 you look -- I think this is Exhibit 32, the long lost
 
1 Q. Okay. Well, I appreciate that. Let's have 
2 pray for relief."
 
3 letter, July 9th, 2003 letter, and it's 32 because I
 3 A. Right.
 
4 Q. And then paragraph three says, "for
 4 assmned it accompanied what is spelled out in Exhibit
 
5 rescission of the real property transaction and the
 5 31. 
6 return of said property to the bl~neficiaries ofthe6 (Exhibit No. 32 marked.) 
7 Johnson Trust." Do you read that section? 7 A. Yes. It's the fee agreement. Oh, yes. And 
8 A I do.8 it also is the original complaint I got at that same 
9 Q. Under your understanding of the disclaimer 9 time. That's right. The original complaint just had 
o and indemnity agreement that was entered into between o my name on it as suing. 
~ 1 the beneficiaries, if this property were in fact 
1 Q. Okay. 
2 ordered to -- the contract rescinded and the property 
2 A. That was right. 
3 restored, who in -- consistent with your understanding, 
3 Q. Had you entered into an attorney -- had the 
4 would receives the benefit of that property? 
4 trust entered into an attorney-client privilege -­
A. If the Taylors have indeed become trustees it 
5 excuse me. Had the trust entered into an 
6 would be them. 
6 attorney-client relationship with Connie Taylor as of 
7 . Q. And would your line of family have any 
7 July 4th, 2003? 
I 
118 interest in that at all? 
8 A. No. 
9 A. Yes, they -- the rest of the family or -­
9 Q. Did Connie Taylor represent the trust as of 
~O Q. Yeah, all of the other beneficiaries that 
:;> 0 July 9th, 2003? 
/1 aren't Taylors. 
A. No. We never signed any agreement at all 
A. Yes, they would. 
1:>2 with her. 
Q. All right. So your family line would have 
3 Q. Okay. Let's go off the record a second. 
i/ 4 vested interest in -­
(A brief discussion was held off the record.) 
A. If they -­
) 5 Q. Beth, if you go to page five -- this is the 
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1 A. No.
 
2 A. From the Taylors.
 
1 Q. -- getting back the property and dividing it? 
2 Q. Now, could you -- did you intend to take the 
3 Q. You would get it from the Taylors? 3 money and also intend to get the propelty back for the 
4 A. You know, if the Taylors get this back that's 4 trust?
 
5 when the family would have a vested interest.
 5 A. No.
 
6 Q. Okay.
 6 Q. Okay. Do you believe ..- did you believe at 
7 A. As it is, no, the family does not have an 7 any point in time that the trust, while you and your 
8 interest. 8 husband were managing the trust, had a legitimate claim 
9 (A brief discussion was held off the record.) 9 knowing the facts that you did, to share in any of the 
a Q. One of the questions -- well, one of the a profits that were realized from the subdivision? 
1 issues in that paragraph asks for a rescission of the ~1 A. No. No. Our share was the $400,000 original 
~ 2 contract. When you were managing the trust as '12 money. 
3 co-trustee with Andy, did you assert any right to 3 Q. Has anyone shared with you as trustee or
 
4 rescind this transaction against -- to get the 40 acres
 4 individually what profits could be obtained in
 
5 back to the trust? ~ 5 subdividing the property in the manner in which it
 
6 A. No. ,16 currently is being subdivided?
 
~7 Q. When you ~- when the trust accepted the 7 A. No.
 
8 checks, both the 2003 check and the 2004 check, did you
 8 Q. Had any of the Taylors represented to you how 
119 realize that to get rescission after receiving all of 119 much profit they believe - -­
b a those benefits would be inequitable? ~O A. No. 
~ 1 A. Never occurred do me. I thought it was a /1 Q. -- is going to be generated? 
b 2 done deal. ?2 A. No. 
? 3 Q. Okay. So in taking checks on behalf of the D3 Q. Did you in your capacity as co-trustee ever 
b 4 trust did you consider the trust waiving any right to b 4 instruct Berkshire Investments to hold the property or 
b5 get the property back? b5 the proceeds in a constructive trust? 
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1 A. No. 1 Q. Was that informationshared wirh Connie
 
2 Q. Did you specifically -- strike that. Did 2 Taylor or just Dallan Taylor?
 
3 Connie Taylor ever ask you if your Uncle Ted had a 3 A. Oh, I'm sure the -- it was shared with
 
4 written agreement for Thomas Maile Real Estate Company 4 Connie.
 
5 to act as the broker? And I think maybe we covered 5 Q. But did you share it with Conni(: or just
 
6 this. I don't -- Phil asked you a couple questions.
 6 share it with Mr. Taylor? 
7 Didn't she ask you at some point in time if 7 A. I have -- don't know. 
8 there was a written documentation? 8 Q. Okay. 
9 A. Yes. They -- they called me and wanted to 9 A. May I comment? 
0 ._- wanted the original listings for the 40. 0.0 Q. Sure. 
1 Q. Yes. 1 A. One reason that Uncle Ted -- another reason 
w-2 A. And asked me if I -- the 40 was never listed ~2 -- thought the 400 was fair is because we did not ever 
3 with anybody. 0.3 have to list it; we didn't have to pay the six percent 
4 Q. Okay. When did you tell Connie Taylor that? 0.4 or whatever to Realtors, you know. We thought all the 
5 A. I don't really remember, but I -­ 5 money was ours. 
6 Q. Was it-­
6 Q. Sure. And did you at any point in time know 
7 A. But 1-­ ~7 or did Ted know that even though the appraisal was 
h 8 Q. Was it prior to the filing ofany-­
0.8 based on 40 acres, when the survey was conducted it was 
9 A. Actually it was Dallan that called me. Yeah. 
9 only 39 acres? 
80 It was prior to all of this, prior to the July 4th, 
?O A. I think that came out afterwards, yes, 
21 2003 meeting. But they did ask for all the listings 
b1 because of the -- something to do with the easement. 
~2 and they had thought that it had been listed for sale. 
b2 And I don't remember how it came out, but there was 
~3 We'd never, never talked to a Realtor. 
tl3 something to do with the easement took off almost an 
b4 Q. Okay. And did you tell that to Connie? 
b4 acre. 
17 5 A. Oh, yes. I didn't have any to give her. 
~s Q. Okay. 
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1 A. But I don't think we realized that until -­ 1 through the trustee forgiving each other, in essence, 
2 Q. Sure. Let's go back to Exhibit 28. Can you 2 because the payment, the fmal payment, was made? 
3 find that somewhere? It's the release and 3 A. (Nodding.) 
4 reconveyance. Here it is. Let me just read a portion 4 Q. Did you understand that was what was 
5 to you of this release documentation. 5 happening? 
6 It says, "To Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 6 A. Yes, I did. 
7 Trust, beneficiary of said deed of trust, and for other 7 Q. And was that acceptable to the trust? 
8 good and valuable consideration, the trustee on behalf 8 A. It was. And Mr. Sherer gave me a letter 
9 of the grantor and the beneficiary does hereby remiss, 9 showing that I gave him the deed oftrust and he gave 
o release and forever discharge grantor and beneficiary 
o me the check, you know. I have -- I mean, it wasn't-­
1 together with their successors, representatives, 
1 I -- I understood it was clear. 
2 assigns, agents, servants, personal representatives, 
2 Q. And did you consider upon the fmal payment 
3 and employees from all and every claim, liability, 
3 of that deed oftrust that Theodore Johnson Trust and 
4 demand and judgment right or cause of action of 
4 Berkshire Investments would go their separate ways, 
b.. 5 whatever kind or nature, on account of or growing out 
5 each-­
6 of any claim predicated upon the obligation referenced 
6 A. Yes. 
7 in the above deed of ~st, including the property 
7 Q. -- forgiving each other for any wrongdoing 
b. 8 described therein or any other claim arising out of 
8 allegedly? 
9 said transaction, including but not limited to any 
9 A. Yes. Correct. 
? 0 claim, liability, demand and judgment of any kind or 
b 0 Q. Okay. I want to just take a break for two or 
b 1 nature, or any claims that could or may have been 
b 1 three minutes and collect my thoughts, Beth, so let me 
b 2 asserted." 
') 2 just take a break and I think Wl;:'re done. ~ 3 Did you understand that when the final 
b 3 (A brief recess was taken.) b 4 payments were exchanged between the grantor, which is 
b 4 MR. MAILE: These accounting -- let's justb 5 Berkshire Investments, and the trust that each one was 
b 5 have this marked so I can und{~rstandhow this works. 
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"'-­
1 (Exhibit Nos. 40 and 41 marked.) 1 A. Yes, it is.
 
2 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Beth, I'm going to hand you 2 MR. MAILE: Okay. We'll just staple that
 
3 Exhibit 40 which consists of four pages. And does that 3 together. And that's all the questions I have. Thank
 
4 relate to the accounting of the trust that forms were 4 you.
 
55 generated by you for accounting purposes?
 
6 EXAMINATION
6 A. Yes. 
7 BY MR. COLLAER:7 Q. And is there anything on that Exhibit 40 that 
8 Q. Mrs. Rogers, my name is Phil Collaer and 8 shows the actual funds leftin the trust? 
9 we've met before, and I represent Mr. Maile in his9 A. As of right now? 
o capacity as a real estate agent and broker. 0 Q. Yes. 
~ 1 I'm going to hand you what I'm going to have1 A. Yes. 
lJ. 2 marked as Exhibit No. 41 and I'm going to ask you, have 2 Q. Where does it show that? 
3 you ever seen -- up at the top it reads, "Exclusive 3 A. 2004. The balance as of7-23-04 was $2,672. 
4 seller representation agreement." It's for a Realtor. 4 Q. And the disbursements to all the 
5 In any -- in your handling of the trust's 5 beneficiaries are listed somewhere? 
lJ. 6 affairs or your dealings with Ted Johnson have you ever 6 A. Right there. 
~ 7 seen a document of that nature? 
7 Q. On the last page of it? 
8 A. No. 
11 8 A. Right. See, this was the disbursements that 
9 Q. Are you aware of a seller's representation 
11- 9 was just made this year, just last month. 
Q0 agreement being executed by Mr. Johnson prior to his 
DO Q. Okay. Almost $60,000 to the various -­
b1 death with anybody? D1 A. Right. 
D2 A. No. 
D2 Q. -- family branches. 
b 3 Q. Specifically are you aware of a seller's 
1;>3 A. Right. 
~ 4 representation agreement being executed by Mr. Johnson 
1;>4 Q. And is this a true and correct copy of your 
b 5 between himself and Mr. Maile or Mr. Maile's real 
DS accounting records? 
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1 estate brokerage company? 1 A. No. He knew Tom only as his attorney. He 
2 A. No. 2 didn't know any deal at all with the real estate. 
3 Q. As the trustee, as the co-trustee, did you or 3 Q. Okay. Tell me -- earlier today we saw a 
4 your husband, Andy, ever enter into a seller's 4 letter that Connie Taylor wrote to Mr. Maile and it's 
5 representation agreement with Mr. Maile dealing with 5 dated back in July of 2001. It's Exhibit No. 19. Do 
6 property that's the subject of this lawsuit? 6 you see that? 
7 A. No. 7 A. Uh-huh. 
8 Q. Are you aware of the trust entering into any 8 Q. The first sentence of it says, "I am 
9 form ofa seller's representation with any brokerage 9 representing Beth Rogers, the successor trustee of the 
0 dealing with any of the trust's real estate? 0 Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust." Did I read that 
1 A. No. 1 correct? 
2 Q. There's a -- I'm going to draw your attention 2 A. You did. 
3 back to Exhibit 39. Strike that. It's the complaint, 3 Q. As of July 7th, 2003 had you retained Ms. 
4 Exhibit 26. There's a reference here on count two, h4 Taylor to represent you in any respect as your 
5 paragraph 5.1, that reads, "By virtue ofhis position ,5 attorney? 
6 as a real estate broker and the relationship between 6 A. No, I had not. 
7 the parties." Do you see that? 7 Q.. Had you received any legal or solicited any 
8 A. Uh-huh. 8 legal advice from this -- from Ms. Taylor in any 
9 Q. Are you aware of any relationship between Mr. 9 matter? 
t:> 0 Maile and Mr. Johnson ofa client and a real estate bO A. No, I had not. 
) 1 agentfbroker relationship of any kind? Q. Had you authorized her in any n:spect to 
A. No. b2 speak on your behalf or on behalf of the trust? 
Q. Did that ever -- to your knowledge did that A. No. 
? 4 ever exist at any time during your -- during your Q. So is this sentence that says, "I am 
b 5 uncle's lifetime? ') 5 representing Beth Rogers," is that a true statement 
, 
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1 $4000,000.1 from your perspective as the person it's purportedly 
2 Q. Okay. Were those monies the monies that were 2 being represented? 
3 to be paid to Helen Taylor or was it monies that you 3 A. No, it is not. No, it is not. 
4 were owed, would have been owed to all the 4 Q. You were asked some questions about -- I 
5 beneficiaries?5 believe one of the Taylors called you when the money 
6 A. All the beneficiaries. 6 was disbursed out of the trust, and there's a question 
7 Q. So they wanted monies from -- owed to all the 7 about money being retained to fund this lawsuit. 
8 Remember those questions? . 8 
9 A. Ido. 9 
0 Q. Which Taylor contacted you? o 
1 A. Reed. 1 
2 Q. Okay. Did you ever talk to Connie Taylor on ~ 2 
3 that issue? 3 
4 A. Yes. Not directly. Through our attorney, 4 
5 :Mr. Harwood. 5 
6 Q. Okay. What did Reed ask you about those 6 
7 disbursements or the money that was retained? 7 
8 A. When he came down and talked to us about the 8 
9 letter that we sent out with the disclaimer or, you 9 
b 0 know, we either wanted to be in the trust -- I mean in D0 
2 1 the lawsuit or not in the lawsuit, he was under the D1 
) 2 impression that there was still $400,000 in the trust /2 
) 3 to fund the lawsuit. ) 3 
Q. Okay. 
A. Because we were supposed to retain Tom's D5 
Page 121 
beneficiaries to fund this lawsuit? 
A. That's true. 
Q. Turning back to the complaint, Exhibit No. 
26, there's a reference -- there's an allegation here 
in paragraph 3.2, and I believe this relates to the 
earlier offer from the -- was it Franz Witte? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you aware ofany advice given by Mr. 
Maile with respect to whether that offer was -- should 
be accepted or not? 
A. No, I am not. 
Q. Did he, Mr. Maile, makt: any statements in 
your presence about whether that offer should be 
accepted or not? 
A. No. Mr. Maile only was a resource for us to 
look into what we should do. 
Q. Now, in connection with the Witte offer, in 
fact you did -- or strike that. In fact after the 
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1 Witte offer came in, the property was appraised, wasn't 
2 Q. And why did you encourage him to do that?
 
3 A. Not till the offer had -- I think had
 3 A. Because, you know, after the -- the Franz 
4 Witte had fallen through, I think it was a curiosity. 4 actually -- Witte gave us a time frame that the offer 
5 We did not really know what the property was worth. 5 was good, and I think that had already passed before we 
6 Q. Okay.6 ever-­
7 A. And Uncle Ted had mentioned it several times, 7 Q. It had expired? 
8 and so we kind ofjust wanted to know what it was worth 8 A. Right. 
9 to see where we were at. 9 Q. Okay. So Exhibit 9, the appraisal from 
~o Q. Okay. Now, in connection with the Franz o Knipe, was obtained after the Witte offer expired? 
~ 1 Witte offer, your uncle did communicate with his own 
1 A. Right. I think it expired the end of June. 
2 accountant, did he not, about th::: tax ramifications? 
2 Q. Okay. 
3 A. Oh, yes. 
3 A. And so we didn't -- there wasn't any offer on 
4 Q. Andyou-­~ 4 the property at all when we got this. 
r:
 A. I had nothing to do with that.
 5 Q. Okay. And is it your -- what was your Q. Did you meet with him at the accountant or 
6 understanding of who advised or why your -- why your 
7 visit with the -­
7 uncle hired Mr. Knipe do the appraisal? 
8 A. No. 
8 A. Myself, my husband and my brothers, we had 
~9 Q. Speak with the accountant at all? 
9 all seen the private solicitation from Mr. Knipe. And 
?O A. No. He did that. 
) 0 actually I think it was a -- sent out to all the people 
?1 Q. Okay. 
) lout in that area because they were doing that area. 
~2 A. I saw the final letter issued, but I did not 
D2 And we didn't know who to go to but we had this letter 
?3 rneet with them. 
v3 and so that's -- we just called them. 
24 Q. Okay. Tell me, returning again to the 
Q. As -- had you encouraged or advised your 
? 5 complaint, Exhibit No. 26, the paragraph 6.2.1 
v5 uncle to have the property appraised? 
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1 A. NQtthat I remember, no..
 
2 of interest, at that time that Mr. Maile made his offer
 
1 regarding failure to infonn Mr. Johnson of the conflict 
2 Q. Okay. In connection with Mr. Maile's offer,
 
3 to purchase this property were you aware that Mr. Maile
 3 in fact you and your husband sought out the advice of 
4 Mr. Wishney, did you not? 4 was also both an attorney representing your uncle and 
5 A. Yes, we did. 5 also that he was a Realtor? 
6 Q. And did anybody encomage you to do that or 6 A. No. To be honest I thought he was the 
7 did you decide to do that on your own? 7 attorney; Colleen was the Realtor. 
8 A. No. It was Andy's idea. 8 Q. Okay. Did you look at the addendum to the 
9 Q. And you were referred to Mr. Wishney by Mr.9 purchase and sale agreement? 
~o Maile? o A. Yes, we did. 
~1 A. No. ~ 1 Q. Does that -- did you see the paragraph on 
12 Q. Were you referred to Mr. Wishney by anyone?
2 that that discloses the fact that Mr. Maile is a - -­
3 A. No. 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. Why did you select him as an attorney to 
Q. -- Realtor? 
~ 5 consult about this? 
5 A. That's when I realized, but at the time of 
16 A. My husband, Andy, and son, Brandon, own A & B 
6 the actual sale I thought that Tom and Colleen were 
7 Lock & Key, and they did a lot of work for Northwest 
1 7 separate entities. 
8 Property Management, which was managl~d by Susan 
8 Q. Okay. 
19 Wishney. 
9 A. I don't know what I thought then, but that 
~ 0 And even though Andy did not know David 
~ 0 was my impression. 
D1 Wishney, he knew that Susan's husband was a real estate 
?1 Q. Did you and your uncle ever speak about that? 
22 attorney and, you know, we didn't know who else to go 
A. Huh-uh, no. 
? 3 to. It was just ... 
~3 Q. Did you ever talk about the disclosure that Q. Okay. Tell me, has the -- because the 
? 4 was on the addendum to the purchase and sale that f2 5 property was sold and was not in a trust until it was 
~ 5 discloses the fact Mr. Maile was a Realtor? 
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1 sold prior to your uncle's death, did the trust realize 
2 any adverse tax consequences to your knowledge? 
3 A. That's why he went to the accountant, Imajean 
4 Hetherington, to see what the tax liabilities would be 
S for himself or the trust. Also, Mr. Collaer, the land 
6 was in the trust the land itself was in the trust. 
7 Q. Okay. So your uncle checked out the tax 
8 consequences of a sale before his death? 
9 A. Or after. 
0 Q. Versus after? 
1 A. That's right. That's correct. 
2 Q. And he was comfortable about the tax 
3 ramifications? 
4 A. He was. 
S Q. In fact I think we've seen a letter from the 
6 accountant describing that to him? 
7 A. That's correct. And he didn't know the 
8 dollar amounts, you know. He could -- when he was 
9 discussing it with his kids he actually knew the dollar 
DO amounts and they were pretty close, you know, one way 
I;> 1 or the other because the estate taxes are so high. 
Q. Has anybody -- do you know of any appraisals 
D3 by anyone, whether it be a certified appraiser or a 
r 4 Realtor or anyone else, who has placed a value on this 
/ S property in excess of $400,0007 
1 A. No. 
2 Q. Ms. Rogers, have you had actual one-on-one 
3 personal conversations with Connie Taylor regarding the 
4 sale, your uncle's sale ofhis property to Mr. Maile? 
S A. No. 
6 Q. Have you talked to any of the Taylors 
7 individually about your uncle's sale of this property? 
8 A. No. Only what the temlS were. 
9 Q. Okay. 
n. 0 A. That kind of -- you know, the tenns and the 
1 financing is all. 
2 Q. All right. So did anybody -- so Ms. Taylor 
3 never contacted you to obtain -- to determine whether 
~ 4 or not there was a representation agreement between Mr. 
n. S Maile and your -- and your uncl e or the trust? 
6 A. No. They asked for the original paperwork, 
7 the earnest ~oney and like that, but that was all that 
n. 8 I was able to -- all I gave them. 
[9 Q. Okay. Did they ever ask you for any 
b 0 documentation to create -- that would have created or 
b 1 evidenced an attorney-client relationship between your 
b 2 uncle and Mr. Maile? 
A. You mean as in other things that they dealt 
b 4 with? 
bS Q. Yes. 
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1 A. No. 
2 Q. They never asked you for anything regarding 
3 the fonnation of any kind of a -- of a Realtor-client 
4 relationship between -­
5 A. No. They only asked for an original listing
 
6 which we never had.
 
7 Q. Did you tell them it was never listed with 
8 Maile? 
9 A. I did. I told them it was never listed with 
o anybody. We had never listed the property at all with 
1 any Realtor. 
2 Q. When you say you told them, who did you say 
3 that to? 
4 A. 'The Taylors at the meeting on the July 4th 
5 meeting. 
6 MR. COLLAER: Okay. I have nothing further. 
7 MR. GJORDING: I have nothing. 
8 MR. MAILE: We're off the record. 














5 I, BETH ROGERS, being first duly sworn on my 
6 oath, depose and say: 
7 That I am the witness named in the foregoing 
8 deposition taken the 11 th day of August 2004, 
9 consisting of pages numbered 1 to 129; that I have read 
11 0 the said deposition and know the contents thereof; that 
1 
r the answers to said questions were given by me, and 
[1143 that the answers as contained therein (or as corrected 
I by me therein) are true and correct. 
[II 2 the questions contained therein were propounded to me; 
[ 
BETH ROGERS ~7 Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
day of --', 2004, at _. , Idaho. 
l8 
9	 Notary Public for Idaho
 
Residing at . -' Idaho.
 
My commission expires: _
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
 




3 COUNTY OF ADA )
 
4 
5 I, ROBYN DANE, Notary Public and Certified 
6 Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Idaho, do 
7 hereby certify: 
8 That prior to being examined the witness 
9 named in the foregoing deposition was by me duly sworn 
~ 0 to testify to the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
h 1 but the truth; 
2 That said deposition was taken down by me in 
3 shorthand at the time and place therein named and 
~ 4 thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction, 
5 and that the foregoing transcript contains a full, 
6 hue, and verbatim record of said deposition. 
7 I further certify that I have no interest in 
~ 8 the event of the action. 
9 Witness my hand and seal this 18th day of 




b 4 ROBYN DANE, CSR, Notary Public 
~ 5 My commission expires: 7-18-06 
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
I, THEODORE L. JOHNSON, presently residing in Ada County, State of Idaho, being of 
sound and disposing mind and memory, and not acting under duress or undue influence of any 
person, and being mindfiJI of the uncertainties of life and the certainty of death, and being desirous 
of settling my worldly affairs and directing how my estate shall be disposed of after my death, and 
having full knowledge and cognizance of the extent of my property and all who should share in my 
bounty, do hereby make, publish and declare this to be my Last Will and Testament. 
I hereby expressly revoke and set aside all Wills, Codicils to Wills and other expressions 
or testamentary disposition ofmy estate heretofore made by me. 
Section 1. Identification of Family 
1.01 That I have never been married in the past and I have no direct issue. 
1.02 There are individuals andJor relatives of settlor who are included as beneficiaries 
herein and are to share in the following percentages, to-wit: HELEN TAYLOR (20%); HAZEL 
FISHER (20%); BETIYFARNWORTH (20%); JOYCE SELLEY (20%), and the surviving issue 
of my deceased brother, RICHARD B. JOHNSON (20%), share and share alike. All references 
in this agreement to the settlor's issue shall mean only these named beneficiaries or their issue. Any 
reference in this agreement to the settlor's issue shall mean the settlor's above referenced siblings, 
nieces and nephews and their issue. The settlor has no deceased children as of the date of this 
agreement. 
Section 2. Nomination of Personal Representative 
2.01 I hereby nominate my sister, HELEN TAYLOR to serve as my personal 
representative. Should she be unable or unwilling at. any time to serve as my personal 
representative, I nominate ANDREW and BETH ROGERS, ofBoise, Idaho to serve as my co­
personal representative. 
2.02 I direct that my personal representative, and any successor thereto, be permitted to 
Last Will and Testament of Theodore L. Johnson prepared by the Law O~_... .. 
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serve without bond in any jurisdiction.
 
Section 3. Disposition of Tangible Personal Property
 
3.01 I direct that my tangible personal property be distributed in accordance with a 
written statement signed by me or in my handwriting which I intend to leave at my death. 
3.02 I give, devise and bequeath my tangible personal property not disposed of by the 
written statement described in paragraph 3.01 above shall be distributed to HELEN TAYLOR 
(20%); HAZEL FISHER (20%); BETTY FARNWORTH (20%); JOYCE SELLEY (20%), and 
the surviving issue of my deceased brother, RICHARD B. JOHNSON (20%), share and share alike, 
to be divided among them in approximately equal shares as they may agree, taking into account the 
personal preferences of the distributees of the devisees. If the devisees are unable to agree on the 
distribution of this property, my personal representative may permit the devisees to draw lots to 
determine the order ofselection by the devisees. My personal representative may, in his or her sole 
discretion, sell any of the property which in his or her opinion is not suitable for distribution, and 
the proceeds thereof shall become a part of my residuary estate. If none of the: devisees named in 
this section survive me, I direct that the said property be disposed of or distributed with the residue 
of my estate. 
Section 4. Residuary Devise 
4.01 The balance of my residuary estate shall consist of all property or money owned by 
me at the time of my death and not otherwise effectively disposed of in this will, including all 
insurance proceeds or other death benefits that are payable to my estate but excluding any property 
over which I may have a power ofappointment, less all valid claims asserted against my estate and 
all expenses incurred in administering my estate, including expenses of administering non-probate 
assets. 
4.02 I direct that the balance of my residuary estate be distributed to the then acting 
Trustee of the revocable trust that was created by myself under a Declaration of Trust dated the 
4th day ofNovember, 1997, to be held, administered, dealt with and distributed as provided in that 
trust agreement and any lawful amendments thereto. 
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4.03 If the balance of my residuary estate cannot be distributed as provided in paragraph 
4.02 above either because the trust has been revoked or for any other reason, I give, devise and 
bequeath the balance of my residuary estate as follows: HELEN TAYLOR (20%); HAZEL 
FISHER (20%); BETTY FARNWORTII (20%); JOYCE SELLEY (20%), and the surviving issue 
of my deceased brother, RICHARD B. JOHNSON (20%), share and share alike and in the event 
any of said beneficiaries fail to survive my death and said heir leaves issue, then said heir's issue 
share in said portion by representation. 
Section 5. Powers of Personal Representative 
5.01 My personal representative, and any successor thereto, shall have all of the powers 
granted to personal representatives and fiduciaries under the probate code and other applicable laws 
of the state ofIdaho, including the power to execute any joint or individual tax: return on my behalf 
or on behalf of my estate. 
5.02 My personal representative shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for services 
actually perfonned and to reimbursement of expenses properly incurred. 
5.03 My personal representative shall have, in addition to any other powers, the power 
to invest, reinvest, sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise transfer or dispose of any part or all of my 
estate, without the necessity of obtaining prior or subsequent court approval. 
5.04 My personal representative may make distributions either in cash or in kind. 
Distributions in kind may be made at the discretion of my personal representative. My personal 
representative may make any distributions under this will either (l) directly to the beneficiary, (2) 
in any form allowed by applicable state law for gifts or transfers to minors or persons under 
disability, (3) to the beneficiary's guardian, conservator, or care giver for the benefit of the 
beneficiary, or (4) by direct payment of the beneficiary's expenses. 
Section 6. Construction and Definitions 
The following rules and definitions shall apply in the construction of this instrument and in 
the administration of my estate: 
6.01 Any reference to "child," "children," or "issue," shall be construed as including all 
Last Will and Testament of Theodore L. Johnson prepared by the Law Offices of 
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persons who are descended from the person referred to under the intestacy laws of the state of 
Idaho, as those Jaws exist on the date of my death. An adopted child or issue shall be considered 
as descended from the person referred to only if such child or issue was adopted prior to age 18. 
A child in gestation who is later born alive shall be considered as a living child throughout the 
period ofgestation. The term "issue" includes "child." 
6.02 When an interest is given to the issue of a deceased person, distributions shall be 
made by representation whereunder the issue of the deceased person take and share equally the 
share of the estate that would have been taken by deceased person ifhe or she were alive. 
6.03 Any reference to my "personal representative" in whatever form refers to the person, 
persons, or institution then acting as the personal representative of my estate. 
6.04 Ifany devisee or other beneficiary under this will dies within 30 days after my death 
or under such circumstances where there is insufficient evidence in the judgment of my personal 
representative to detennine whether such person has died within 30 days after my death, the 
devisee or beneficiary shall be deemed to have failed to survive me. 
6.05 All questions as to the validity and construction of this will shall be governed by the 
laws of the state ofIdaho. 
6.06 The term "estate and death taxes" shall mean all estate, inheritance, transfer, 
succession, or other taxes or duties payable by reason of my death, including interest and penalties 
thereon. 
Section 7. Payment of Taxes and Expenses 
7.01 I direct my personal representative to pay the expenses of administering my estate, 
the expenses created by reason of my death, and all estate and death taxes payabl,e with respect to 
property includable in my gross estate or taxable by reason of my death, whether or not such 
property is part of my probate estate and whether or not su~h taxes are payable by my estate or by 
the recipient of any such property. Such taxes and expenses should be paid out ofmy residuary 
estate without apportionment. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal at Eagle, Ada County, 
Last Will and Testament of Theodore L. Johnson prepared by the Law Offices of 







































Idaho, tllis -±- day of---L7--,-1,-"CLj~t:..:-" -', 1997. 




County of Ada )
 
WE, TIIEODORE L. JOHNSON, 7ANA ~/G- and----J 
7hb;r/?!> b. mm/e- , the Testator and the 'i:nesses, respectIvely, whose names
 
are herel~~er signed to th~ ~ttached-.9r foregoing instrum.ent, being fi!'st dul)' sw~m, do hereby
 
declare this mstrument conSlstmg of hre- (5) typewntten pages, mcJudmg this page, as his
 
Last Will and Testament, and that he had signed willingly or directed another to sign for him, and
 
that he executed as his free and voluntary act for the purposes therein expressed; and that each of
 
the witnesses, in the presence and heanng of the Testator, signed the Will as witness and that to
 
the best of their knowledge, the Testator was at that time an adult, of sound mind and under no
 
constraint or undue influence.
 
estat~ / 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to and acknowledged before me by the Testator and 
subscribed II sworn to before me by 711..<£A I..",/J{-;; . , and 
,ttl II ./~ witnesses, this ~ day of jW~~ ~ 1997. 
~"'V'~ .... '.Ii./) '~.•• "fr<'p ~ .:~ ··.o~ ~~: ~oTA.Rr •• -;t..~
:::<. ~-- ::: : ..... . *:
:. * \ C:: ot Pu IC ~r 0 
.. - P \... .. /. . . • ~ •• VB\.. ._ 0 ~ Resldmg at: -1C Y7'IL_LL.... Idaho 
..-;.. V';......~ ~.-.b.-~ l Commission Expires: ..:v??h? 
....., ""1 - .....- I P "
'" I'.e OF '\.~ ,...... 
Last W[rr'Mtd.iesttlment of Theodore L. Johnson prepared by the Law Offices of 
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REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEl\IENT 
THIS TRUST AGREEMENT is made and entered into this ~ day of November, 1997, 
between THEODORE L. JOHNSON, a single person, ofAda County, Idaho, hereinaf1:er referred 
to as "Grantor", and THEODORE L. JOHNSON, hereinafter referred to as "Trustee". 
WIT N E SSE T H: 
WHEREAS, the Grantor desires to create this Trust Agreement effective this date and 
the Trustee agrees to act as Trustee thereof; 
NOW, THEREFORE, the Grantor and Trustee agree as follows: 
ARTICLE I 




2. TRUST PROPERTY: The Grantor hereby transfer, convey and deliver to the trust 
the property set forth on Schedule "A" which is attached hereto and by reference made part 
hereof. All the property transferred and delivered to the trust shall, upon written acceptance 
thereof by the Trustee, constitute the trust estate and shall be held, managed and distributed as 
hereinafter provided. That no consideration was or will be given by the Trustee for the 
conveyance or transfer to it of any of the Trust Estate; that the Trustee accepts such title to the 
Trust Estate as is conveyed or transferred to it hereunder, without liability or :responsibility for 
the conditions or validity of such title; and that the Trust estate has been or will be conveyed or 
transferred to the Trustee, IN TRUST with power of sale, for the uses and purposes herein 
provided. 
3. ADDITIONAL PROPERTY: The Grantor, or any other I?erson, with the consent 
of the Trustee, may name the trust as beneficiary of life insurance poliCIes, or deposit property 
with the trust, or devise property to the trust. . 
ARTICLE II 
1. WITHDRAWALS BY Grantor: While Grantor is living, the Trust shall distribute 
to or/or the benefit of the Grantor such sums from income and prinCIpal as thl~ Grantor may at 
any tIme request. 
2. DISTRIBUTIONS BY TRUSTEE: The Trustee may distribute to or for the 
benefit of the Grantor, such sums from income and principal as the Trustee deems reasonable 
for the maintenance, support and health ofGrantor. 
3. CHARACTER OF PROPERTY: All property transferred to this trust bv the 
Grantor shall retain its character as separate property during the lifetime ofthe: Grantor and any 
withdrawal from the trust by the Grantor of such property shall be his separate property. 4. 
LIFE INSURANCE: The following rights and obligations apply to any life insurance policies 
which designate the trust as beneficiary. 
a. Prern.ium Payment: The owner or owners of any life insurance policies shall 
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pay aJl premiums and other charges to keep in force life insurance policies which such owner or 
owners desire to maintain on the life of Grantor. The trust shall be under no obligation to pay 
premiums or other charges but may make such payments if sufficient cash is available to the 
trust. 
b. Collection of Benefits : Upon the death of the insured, the trust shall collect 
any benefits. The trust is authorized to take any action to collect the benefits which it deems 
reasonable and proper. The trust may compromise or settle any claim and may execute any 
property release or acquittance. 
c. Policy Rights: The owner of each policy shall retain and have the right to 
change the beneficiary and to exercise any option, right or ~rivilege relating to each policy, 
including the right to borrow in accordance with the provisIOns of the policy and to pledge the 
policy as collateral. Nothing herein shall bestow upon Grantor, who does not own any policy, 
any nght, privilege or incident or ownership. 
ARTICLE III 




A. ADDITION TO THE TRUST ESTATE: The Grantor may, from time to 
time, by conveyance, assignment, transfer, or Will, add property of any kind or any part thereof, 
to the Trust Estate, whicn shall thereupon be subject to all the terms and provisions of this 
trust. 
B. ALTERING OR REVOKING TRUST: While Grantor is living and
 
competent, the Grantor may, at any time or times, by written notice filed with the Trustee:
 
1. AJter or amend any provision thereof; 
2. Revoke this Trust in whole or in part, and in such event, the Tnlst Estate 
or portion as Grantor's separate property. 
C. DIRECTION BY THE GRANTOR TO THE TRUSTEE: While Grantor is
 
living and competent, the Grantor may, at any time or times, direct the Trustee in writing:
 
1. To retain as part of the Trust Estate, any securities, properties, or
 
investments at any tie held hereunder, for such length of time as such di~ectiolls may provide;
 
2. Or to sell, encumber, lease, manage, control, or dIspose of any property
 
of the Trust Estate;
 
3. Or to invest available income or principal in specific securities, properties' 
or investments. 
The Trustee shaH not be liable for any loss sustained or incurred by reason of its 
compliance with any such written instruction of the Grantor. 
II. ADMINISTRATIO N BY THE TRUSTEE: 
A. THE TRUST BANK ACCOUNT: Deposits and withdrawals by the Grantor or 
Trustee to or from Bank or Savings and Loan accounts held by the trust shall automatically be 
deemed to constitute contributions to or withdrawals from the trust estate. 
B. PAYMENT OF TRUST EXPENSE: The Trustee shall payor reserve 
sufficient funds to pay all expenses ofmanagement and administration of the Trust Estate, 
including: 
1. The compensation of the Trustee; 
TRUST AGREEMENT PREPARED BY THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G. :MARE 

























2. Out of pocket expenses of management and administration of the Trust 
Estate; 
2 3. Payments of interest and principal on any outstanding notes, ",.. hether or 
not secured by a Deed of Trust, on any real estate w111ch may be part of the Trust Estate; 
3 
C. DISTRIBUTION TO THE GRl\.NTOR: All of the net income shall be 
4 distributed to or for the use and benefit of the Grantor while he shall live, in convenient 
installments, not less frequently than quarterly, as his separate property. In addition to the net 
5 income, the Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of the Grantor, out of the principal of 
the Trust Estate, such sums as trustee deems necessary for Ius reason- able care, support, health 
and comfort, if in trustee's discretion, the income to v';hich he is entitled is considered 
insufficient for such purposes. 
7 
6 
a. Distribution: The Trustee shall pay to or for the benefit of the Grantor such 
8 sums from the income and principal as the surviving Grantor may at any time request. 
9 b. Grantor Disabilitf Should the Trustee at any time consider the Grantor to be 
unable for any reason to direct the rustee with respect to disposition of such sums fi'om the 
10 trust estate, the Trustee is authorized in its sole and absolute discretion to expend for the 
Grantor such sums from principal or income as the Trustee shall deem necessary or advisable 
11 for the Grantor's support, maintenance and health. 
12 D.	 UNDISTRIBUTED FUNDS: All undistributed funds in the Trust Checking 
Account at the time of the termination of the Trust, shall become a part of the Corpus of the 
13 Trust. 
14 III.	 ADMINISTRATrON OF THE TRUST UPON THE DEATH OF THE 
GRANTOR: 
15 . 
A. FUNERAL EXPENSES: Upon the death of the Grantor, the Trustee may pay 
16 the expenses of her last illness and funeral, from either income or principal, at the discretion of 
the Trustee, unless other adequate provision shall have been made therefore. 
17 
B. TAXES AND OTHER CHARGES: 
18 
1. Upon the death of the Grantor, any estate, inheritance, success:ion or 
19 other death taxes, duties, charges or assessments, together with interest, penalties, costs, 
Trustee's compensation, and attorneys' fees incurred by reason of the Trust Estate or any 
20 interest therein being included for such tax purposes, may be paid by the Trustee from the Trust 
Estate, unless other adequate provisions shall have been made therefore. Any such payments . 
21 shall be charged to princIpal of the Trust Estate or the separate trust so included for such tax 
purposes. 
22 
2. The Trustee shall have full power and authority to pay from the Trust 
23 Estate any other taxes, charges or assessments for which the Trustee, the Trust Estate, or any 
interest therein becomes liable, and any such payments shall be made from and charged to either 
24 income or principal of the Trust Estate or any share or separate trust thereof, as the Trustee in 
its discretion deems proper. 
25 
3. The Trustee may make any payments directly or to a personal 
26 repre~entative or other fiduciary and shall be under no duty to see to the application of an funds 
so paId. 
27 
IV. DISPOSITION OF TRUST ASSETS UPON DEATH OF GRANTOR: 
28 
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. The Trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the Trust Estate and shall collect 
and receive the interest, income of profits therefrom for the benefit of Grantor for the life of 
Grantor and thereafter and upon the death of the Grantor the corpus of the trust and all income 
and interest acquired hereafter, shall be held, applied and distributed in the following manner: 
a. After the death of Grantor, the Trustee shall hold, manage and cOlltrol the 
property comprising the trust estate for the benefit of the HELEN TAYLOR (20%); HAZEL 
FISHER (20%); BETTY FARNWORTH (20%); JOYCE SELLEY (20%), and the surviving 
issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B. JOHNSON (20%), as follows: 
Twenty percent (20%) of the trust estate shall be distributed immediately upon 
Grantor's death to the survivmg issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RlCHARD B. 
JOHNSON, share and share alike. In the event any of Grantor's nieces or nephews born the 
issue ofRlCHARD B. JOHNSON, should fail to survive the death of Grantor, and leaves issue 
then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share alike in the share of the 
predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime ofl-IELEN 
TAYLOR and upon her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to her issue share 
and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death of}-IELEN 
TAYLOR, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share 
alike in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime of HAZEL 
FISHER and upon her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to her issue share 
and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death of HAZEL 
FISHER, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share alike 
in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Twenty percent (20%)of the trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime of BETTY 
FARNWORTH and upon her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to her issue 
share and share alike, In the event any ofher issue should fail to survive the death of BETTY 
FARNWORTH, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and 
share alike in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime of JOYCE 
SELLEY and upon her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to her issue share 
and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death ofJOYCE 
SELLEY, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share alike 
in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Discretionary Payments to Helen Tavlor, Hazel Fisher, Betty Farnworth, and Joyce 
Selley: The Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of Helen Taylor, Hazel Fisher, Betty 
Famworth, and Joyce Selley such sums from the income of their 20% share of the corpus of the 
trust, as the Trustee deems reasonable for the maintenance, education, support and health of the 
said beneficiary during their lifetime. The balance of the income of their respective trust not so 
distributed shall be accumulated and added to the principal thereof at the end of each fiscal year 
of the trust. 
A. Income for Grantor's life: The Trustee shall distribute alI of the income oftrus 
Trust in convenient installments, but not less frequently than quarter-annually, to or for the 
benefit of Grantor, so long as he shall live. 
B. Use of Principal for Grantor's life: So long as Grantor is living the Trustee, in 
the sole exercise of the Trustee's discretion, shall distribute to or for the benefit of Grantor, so 
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much of the principal of this Trust as Trustee shall deem necessary or desirable for his proper 
heath, education, maintenance and support. 
C. Creation of Beneficiaries' Issues Trusts if Issue are under the age of 35 years of 
age: After the death of HELEN TAYLOR; HAZEL FISHER; BETTY FARNWORTH; 
JOYCE SELLEY, and the surviving issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B. 
JOHNSON, and/or in the event any such beneficiary fails to survive Grantor's death and leaves 
issue who have not attained the age of thirty-five (35) years, the Trustee shall immediately 
divide all of the remaining principal and undistributed income of this trust into as many equal 
shares as represent the surviving issue of said beneficiaries, one share to each, per stirpes, and 
the Trustee shall establish a separate trust (except as to the share of any issue then thirty-five 
(35) years of age or older) for each issue then living and one for the issue of each deceased
 
issue, to be held and distnbuted as follows:
 
1. Distribution When Separate Trusts for Issue Created. If any issue ofHELEN 
TAYLOR; HAZEL FISHER; BETTY FARNWORTH; JOYCE SELLEY, and the surviving 
issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B. JOHNSON shall not have attained the 
age of twenty-five (25) years at the time of distribution of their respective share of the principal 
of this trust IS to conveyed to said issue, the Trustee shall immediately thereafter distribute 
absolutely to such issue one third (113) of his or her particular share; If any issue shall have 
attained the age of thirty (30) years at such time, the Trustee shall distribute absolutely to such 
issue one third (113) of his or her share; and if any issue shall have attained the age of thirty-five 




2. Distribution ofIncome and Principal for issue. The Trustee shall distribute to or 
for the benefit of each issue all of the income derived from his or her particular share. In 
addition, the Trustee, at any time and from time to time, shall distribute to or for the benefit of 
each issue so much or all or none of the principal of his or her share as the Trustee, in the 
Trustee's absolute discretion, shall deem necessary or desirable for the proper health, education, 
maintenance and support of such issue. Further, the Trustee shall distnbute absolute]y to or for 
the benefit for any issue one-third (1/3) of the principal of his or her share when such Issue 
attains the age of twenty-five (25), one third (1/3) of the remaining principal when such issue 
attains the age of thirty (30) years, and the remaining principal and undistributed income of his 
or her share when such issue attains the age of thirty-five (35) years. 
3. Distribution to Issue of Beneficiaries. Exce~t as herein provided, if a share of this 
trust is at any time set apart for surviving issue of Grantor s deceased beneficiaries above 
named, such share shall be immediately distributed absolutely to such issue, free and clear of 
any trust unless said issue is under the age of thirty-five (35) years of age. 
4. Distribution Upon Death of Issue. Should any issue of any oftbe above 
referenced beneficiaries die before his or her share has been distributed absolutely to him or her, 
the then remaining principal and undistributed income of such share shall be distributed, upon 
the death of the issue, absolutely to his or her then living issue,per stirpes. In the event there 
are no such issue then living, the then remaining principal and undistributed income of the share 
of the deceased issue shall be divided among the other beneficiaries above referenced or their 
living issue, per stirpes; any portion thereof so divided and set apart for any issue who is the 
beneficiary of a share of this trust which has not yet been fully dIstributed shall be added to the 
principal of such share and held in further trusts and managed and distributed as a part thereof 
under the terms of this Article; and any portion thereof set apart for any issue who is the 
beneficiary ofa share of this trust which has been fully distributed shall be distributed absolutely 
to such issue. In the event an of the beneficiary's last surviving issue shall die before the entire 
share set apart for such issue has been distributed absolutely to him or her and none of other 
beneficiaries issue are then living, the then remaining principal and undistributed income of such 
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share shall be distributed as follows: 
100% thereof to: The lawful heirs of Grantor consistent with the laws of intestate Succession 
under the Laws of the State of Idaho. 
5. Retention for Minors. In the event any beneficiary of the trusts created 
hereunder has not attained majority at the time a share thereof is required under the tenns 
hereof to be distributed absolutely to such beneficiary, the Trustee, In the Trustee's absolute 
discretion, may retain the share of such minor beneficiary in further trust until he or she attains 
majority. In such event and during such time, the Trustee shall distribute to or for the benefit of 
such beneficiary so much of the income and principal of such beneficiary's particular share as 
the Trustee, in the Trustee's absolute discretIon, shall deem necessary or desirable to provide 
for the proper health, education, maintenance and support of such beneficiary;, any income from 
such share not so distributed shall be added to the pnncipal thereof at the end of each fiscal year 
of the trust. At the time such beneficiary attains majority, or upon is or her death, whichever 
occurs first, the trust shall terminate as to such beneficiary's particular share, and the then 
remaining principal and undistributed income thereof shaH be distributed absolutely, free and 
clear of any trust, to such beneficiary, or, if such beneficiary is then deceased, to hIS or her 
estate. 
D. PERPETUITIES AND ALIENAnON: 
a. The absolute power of alienation of real property in the State ofIdaho shall
 
not be suspended by an provision of this trust agreement for a period longer than the
 
continuance of the lives of the persons in being at the creation of any such limitation or
 
condition and twenty-five (25) years thereafter. This trust agreement shaH be construed to
 
eliminate or modify any provisions violating the fore~oing sentence, but in such a manner so
 
that the provisions of this trust agreement are carriea out to the greatest extent possible.
 
b. As to real property which is not in the State ofIdaho, each trust's interest in 
such real property shall temunate twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last sUf\~vor of 
such of the beneficiaries thereunder as shall be livmg at the time of the death of the last Grantor 
to die, and thereupon such real property which is not in the State ofIdaho shall be distributed, 
discharged of trust, to the persons then entitled to the income of such real property in the 
proportIOns to which they are entitled to the income. 
E. CHARACTER OF DISTRIBUTIONS: Unless otherwise specifically stated, all
 
distributions, whether of trust income or principal, shall be the separate property of each
 
individual distributee. All income, rents, Issues, profits, gains and appreciatIOn of property
 
distributed to each individual distributee as separate property, shall also be the separate
 
property of each such distributee. .
 
F. SPENDTHRIFT PROTECTION: Neither the principal nor the income of any 
trust herein created shall be liable for the debts of any beneficiary or issue of a beneficiary, nor 
shall the same be subject to seizure by any creditor under the writ of proceedin~rs at law or in 
equity, nor bankruptcy proceedings, nor other legal process. No beneficiary otissue of a 
beneficiary, shall have the power to sell, assign, transfer, encumber or in any other manner to 
anticip.at~ disposition of his or her interest iI} the trust estate or th.e il!c~me pro~!uced thereby'. 
As used In this paragraph, the word benefiCIary shall refet to any mdlvldual havmg a benefiCial 
interest in the trust and not merely to an indiVIdual that the trust may specifIcally Identify as a 
"beneficiary." . 
G. TRANSACTlONS WI~~GRANTOR'S~STATE: Upon th~ death of Grantor 
or any benefiCIary the Trustee may, If It deems such actlon necessary or advlsabJe for the 
protection of the estate of the deceased Grantor or beneficiary, or in the best interests of any 
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.such estate or this trust and its beneficiaries: (a) purchase securities and other property from
 
the legal representative of such estate and retain such property as part of the trust estate, or (b)
 
made secured or unsecured loans to the legal representative of any such estate. The Trustee
 
shall bear no liability for any loss resulting to the trust estate by reason of any such purchase or
 
loan. 
H. INVESTMENT DIRECTION BY GR.:\NTOR: The Grantor, during his lifetime,
 
reserve the right to direct the investment of the trust estate. The Trustee shall not be liable for
 
any investments made at the direction of the Grantor or of the surviving Grantor in accordance
 
with the foregoing provisions.
 
VI. SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE: Should THEODORE 1. JOHNSON, be unable or unwilling
 
for any reason to continue to act as Trustee, ANDREW and BETH ROGERS, husband and
 
wife shall become co-successor Trustee of this trust and shall have all authority herein granted
 
to the "Trustee." Should ANDREW and BETH ROGERS be unable or unwilling for any
 
reason to act or continue to act as Co-Trustees, GARTH FISHER shall become Successor
 
Trustee ofthis Trust and shall have all authority herein granted to the "Trustee".
 
VII. POWERS OF TRUSTEE: To carry out the purposes of the trust created under this
 
Trust Agreement, and subject to any limitatIOns stated elsewhere in this Trust, the Trustee is
 
vested with the following powers with respect to the trust estate and any part of it, in addition
 
to those powers now or hereafter conferred by law.
 




2. To lease trust property for terms within or beyond the term of the trust; 
3. To borrow money, and to encumber or hypothecate trust property by mortgage,
 
deed of trust, pledge, or otherwIse, provided sufficient security to manage the trust property.
 
4. To cany, at the expense of the trust, sufficient insurance In such kinds and in
 
such amounts as the Trustee shall deem advisable to protect the trust estate and the Trustee
 
against any hazard; .
 
5. To commence or defend such litigation with respect to the trust: of any property
 
of the trust estate as the Trustee may deem advisable, at the expense of the trust; .
 




7. To invest and reinvest the trust estate in every kind of property, real, personal or
 
mixed, and every kind of investments, specifically including, but not by way of limitation,
 
corporate obligations of every kind, stocks, common or preferred, shares of investment trusts,
 
investment companies, and mutual funds, and mortgage participation, which men of pfLldence,
 
discretion, and to manage the trust property. However, that so long as an income beneficiary is
 
also acting as Trustee herein, he shall not invest in any wasting assets; provided further that
 
during the lifetime of Grantor no real property or other investments shall be sold, traded or
 
disposed ofwithout the written consent of GrantOf.
 
8. With respect to securities held in the trust, to have all the rights, powers, and 
privileges of an owner, mcluding, but not by way of limitation, the power of votIng, give 
proxies, any pay assessments; to participate in voting trusts, pooling agreements, foreclosures, 
reorganizations, consolidations, mergers, liquidations, sales, and leases, and incident to such 
participation to deposit securities with and transfer title to any protective or other committee on 
such terms as the Trustee may deem advisable; and to exercise or sell stock subscription or 
conversion rights. 
9. In any case in which the Trustee is requirea, pursuant to the provisions of the 
trust, t divide any trust property into parts or shares for the pUI])ose of distnbution, or 
otherwise, the Trustee is authorized, ill the Trustee's absolute discretion, to make the division 
and distribution in kind, including undivided interests in any property, or partly kjnd and partly 
in money, and for this purpose to make such sales of the trust property as the Trustee may
deem necessary on such terms and conditions as the Trustee shall see fit. 
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VIII. BENEFICIARY STATUS: 
A. Upon the death of any beneficiary for whom a trust is then held, any accrued or
 
undistributed net income thereon shall be held and accounted for, or distributed, in the same
 
manner as if it had been accrued or received after the death of such beneficiary.

B. Any instrument executed by the Trustee shall be binding on all parties hereto and
 
on all beneficiaries hereunder. No person paying money to the Trustee need see to the
 
application of the money so paid.
 
C. The interest of any beneficiary in principal or income of this Trust shaH not be
 
subject to claims of his or her creditors or others, or liable to attaclunent, execution or other
 
process oflaw, and no beneficiary shall have any right to encumber, hypothecate or alienate his
 
or her interest in this Trust in any manner, except as provided for elsewhere herein. The
 
Trustee may, however, deposit in any bank desIgnated in vlIiting by a beneficiary to his or her
 
credit, income or principal payable to such beneficiary.
 
IX. TRUSTEE TO PAY CERTAIN EXPENSES: 
The Trustee shall pay from income or principal of the Trust Estate or partly from
 
each, in his discretion, all expenses, incurred in the administration of the Trust and the .
 
protection of this Trust against legal attack, including counsel fees and a reasonable
 
compensation for his own services as such Trustee, which compensation and expenses
 
constitute a first lien on the Trust Estate.
 
X. AMENDMENT AND REVOCATION: The Grantor may at any time during his life
 
amend any of the provisions of this trust agreement by an instrument signed by Grantor and
 
delivered to the Trustee. During the life of the Grantor, the trust created by this agreement may
 
be revoked in whole or in part, by an instrument signed by Grantor and delivered to the
 
Trustee. Upon revocation. the Trustee shall distriDute all or the designated portion of the
 
property to the Grantor.
 
XI. TRUST TITLE: This Trust shall be known and referred to as the THEODORE L.
 
JO.H:N'SON TRUST and shall be admiillstered under the laws of the State ofIdaho.
 
XII. CONSTRUCTION OF AGREEMENT: The headings and subheadings used throughout
 
this Agreement are for convenience only and have no significance in the interpretation of the
 
body, ,?fthis Ag~eement. and the Grantor directs that they be disregarded in construing the
 
proVISIons of this Agreement.
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, THEODORE L. JOHNSON, as Grantor of the foregoing
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The undersigned hereby accepts the trusts imposed by the foregoing Trust Agreement and 
agrees to serve as Trustee upon the tenns and conditions therein set forth. 
Signed, sealed and delivered 
in the presence of: 
~Lf~rnIi?s\ee 
of THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST 
Witness: 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. iCounty ofAda) . 
On this -+ day of IJ': J~I . 1997, before me, the undersigned, a Notary 
Public in and forsaIcrState, persona y app'eared THEODORE L. JOHN'SON, a single person, 
known or identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed in the instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set y hand anzaffixe,my official seal the 
day and year in this certificate first above written. 
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SCHEDULE "A" PROPERTY 
I, Theodore L. Johnson, a single person, Grantor, do hereby quitclaim, convey and 
transfer to the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust dated the day of Nove!TIber, 1997, all 
of his right title and interest in and to the following described rearproperty, to-wit: 
Parcel I: 
Government Lot 5 and the Southeast 1/4 of the Northwest 1/4 of Section 6, 
Township 4 North, Range 1 West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
Parcel II: 
The Northwest Y2 of the Southwest 114, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1
 
West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho.
 
In addition the I provide the following conveyance to the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust dated the 4th day ofNovember, 1997 the following personal property, to wit: 
STATE OF IDAHO l 
S5. 
County of Ada / / 
On t~s..-;td day of jjaJ~ , 1997, before me, the undersigned, a 
Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared THEODORE 1. JOID-.JSON, known or 
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and affixed my offieial seal in said 
County the date and year first above written. .~. / 
d /~_£~..J 
t!1!)' u Ie A Jl. - ­
esidlryg !It:~'~ ---J Idaho 
ComnusslOn Expltes: -V'~/y? 







































REALPROPERTY PURCHASE AND SALE"tGREEMENT 
This agreement is effective as of the J't day of May, 2002 (the "Effective 
Date") between Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, whosl2 office address 
is 12601 West New Hope Road, Star, Idaho 83669 (herein "Seller") and F:ranz 
Witte, Jr., a married man, whose office address is 9770 West State Street, 
Boise, Idaho 83703 (or rlis assign) (herein the "Buyer"). 
For and in consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements herein 
contained, to be kept and performed by the parties hereto. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1)	 Agreement of Purchase and Sale. Seller hereby agrees to sell to 
Buyer, and Buyer covenants and agrees to purchase from Seller, the 
real property situated in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, and more 
fully described on Exhibit "A", together with all and singular tile 
improvements, fixtures, tenements, hereditaments, and appurt
'
2nances 
thereto belonging, or in anywise appertaining C'the "Real Property'')., 
including, but not limited to, all water rights, all ditch rights or other 
easements or rights of way for ditches, all shares in any irrigation or 
ditch company representing a water right or the right to receive water, 
and any proportionate interest of any storage water entitlement 
represented by or associated with such shares or water rights 
associated with the Real Property (the "Water Rights''); and t0gether 
with all irrigation equipment owned by the Seller an used on the Real 
Property (the "Personal Property'') (Unless the context otherwise 
requires, the property and other interests described in paragraph 1 is 
collectively herein referred to as the "Property".) 
2)	 Purchase Price. 
a)	 Purchase Price. It is agreed by and between the parties that 
the Purchase Price for the Property is the sum of Four Hundred 
Thousand and no/100ths ($400,000.00). 
b)	 Payment. 
i)	 Earnest Money. Within five - (5) days after the Effective Date, 
the Buyer shall deposit Earnest Money in the sum of 
$5,000.00 with the Closing Agent. Such deposit shall be 
returned to the Buyer by the Closing Agent if the transaction 
contemplated hereby does not close because of (i) the 


















during the Feasibility Review PeriOCf or (iii) any reason other 
than a default of the Buyer. If this Agreement dOE~s not 
close because of a default of the Buyer, the deposit shall be 
paid by the Closing Agent to the Seller as the agreed 
liquidated damage which shall be the sole and exclusive 
remedy of the Seller therefore. 
ii)	 Payment Due at Closing. The Buyer shall pay the 
sum of One Hundred Thousand and no/l00's 
($100,000.00) less the Earnest Money paid and 
plus or minus prorations at the time and place of 
closing. 
iii) Deferred Balance of the Purchase Price. The 
balance of the Purchase Price shall be paid by 
Buyer executing and delivering to Seller a 
Promissory Note in the approximately amount of 
Three Hundred Thousand and 00/100 Dollars 
($300,000.00) (the "Note"). The Note shall bear 
simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from 
the Closing Date and until paid. TIle Note shall 
call for even payments of principal and interest 
sufficient to fully amortize the amount thel-eof 
over fifteen (15) years from the Closing Date. 
However, the Note shall also contain a clause 
requiring the payment of all sums due thereon in 
full on or before the fifth anniversary of the 
Closing Date. (The Note shall expressly allow 
prepayment in full or in part, in eacll case without 
penalty or premium.) The Note shall be secured 
by a Deed of Trust on the Real Property 
("carryback Deed of Trust"). 
3)	 Conveyance and Title Insurance 
a)	 Conveyance. 
i)	 Deed. At Closing, Seller sh_all convey the Real Property to 
Buyer by a general Warranty Deed in a form reasonably 
satisfactory to the Buyer (herein the "Deed"). 'ntle to the 
Real Property shall be marketable and insurable and sllall be 
free and clear of all liens, encumbrances and restrictions 
other than (i) real property taxes and assessments for the 















Closing Date. (ii) the Sellers obligalTO"ns accruing on any 
presently existing lease of the Real Property after the 
Closing Date and (iii) the Permitted Exceptions (as 
hereinafter defined). 
ii)	 Assignment and Bill of Sale. At Closing, Seller shall convey 
the Water Rights, any leases encumbering the Real Property 
and Personal Property to the Buyer by an Assignment or Bill 
of Sale, both in a form reasonably satisfactory to the Buyer. 
lltle to the Water Rights, any leases encumbering the Real 
Property, and Personal Property shall be merchantable and 
shall be free and clear of all liens, encumbrances and 
restrictions other than (i) taxes and assessments for the 
current year which are not due and payable on or before the 
Closing Date, and (ii) the Sellers obligations accruing! on any 
leases after the Closing Date. 
b)	 lltle Commitments/Review Period. 
i)	 lltle Commitment. Within five (5) days following thE! full 
execution hereof, the Seller shall deliver to the buyer a 
current commitment for an owner's ALTA standard c'.::Jverage 
policy of title insurance (the commitment report, together 
with a legible copy of all exceptions referred to in the said 
report is herein referred to as the "lltle Commitment''), 
issued by lltJe One, 1101 River Street, Boise, Idaho (the 
"lltle Company''), describing the Real Property, Iistin!~ Buyer 
as the prospective named insured, showing the Purchase 
Price as the policy amount. Buyer may purchase such 
additional endorsements ""extended coverage'') as Buyer 
. may elect, with the cost thereof to be paid by the Buyer. 
ii)	 Review of litle Commitment. 
(1)	 Buyer shall have 10 (ten) days after receipt of the lltle 
Commitment (the "Review Period'') in which to notify 
Seller of any objections Buyer has to any matter shown 
or referred to in the lltle Commitment. Any exceptions 
or other items that are set forth in the lltle Commitment 
and to which Buyer does not object within the Review 
Period shall be deemed to be permitted exceptions (the 
"Permitted Exceptions''). 















within the Review Period, Seller shall, within the (10) 
days after receipt of notice from Buyer of Buyer's 
objections, notify Buyer of Seller's agreement Dr refusal 
to cure such objections. If Seller is unable or unwilling 
to cure such objections by Closing Date, including any 
objections resulting from extended coverage 
endorsements, Buyer may, at Buyer's option, either (i) 
waive the objections not cured or (ii) within the five (5) 
day period after the foregoing notice by Seller, 
terminate this Agreement by notice to Seller. (In the 
event that the Buyer elects to terminate as herein 
provided, the Earnest Money shall be refunded to the 
Buyer and neither party shall have any further liability 
to the other.) 
4)	 Prorations. All taxes and assessments imposed upon the Property 
and all income (including, without limitation) all rents from any leases 
of the Property paid for the period incorporating the Closing Date) 
received from the Property shall be prorated between the parties as of 
the Closing Date. 
5)	 Possession. Subject only to the license granted to the Buyer during 
the Feasibility Review Period, the Seller shall be entitled to retain 
possession of the Property described in this Contract until the 
consummation of the closing on the Closing Date. Thert=after, the 
Buyer shall have the right to the possession of the Property as more 
fully provided for herein. 
6)Warranties. Seller represents and warrants to, and covenants With, 
Buyer as follows: 
i)	 Authority of the Seller. Seller has full power, authority and the 
legal right to execute, deliver and perform its obligations under this 
Agreement. 
ii)	 Consents. No approval or consent of any person, firm or other 
entity is required to be obtained by the Seller to permit the Seller 
to consummate the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
iii) Material Misstatement or Omission. No representation or warranty 
made by the Seller in this Agreement or in any document or 
agreement furnished in connection with this Agreement contains 










'WI'II omit to state any material fact nece~ry to make the 
statements made by the Seller not misleading. 
iV)	 Compliance with Law. To the best of Sellers knowledge, the 
Seller has complied in all material respects with all laws, 
regulations and orders affecting the Property and is not in default 
under or in violation of any provision of any federal, state or local 
order, rule, regulation or law. 
v)	 No UD's. To the best of Sellers knowledge, there are no local 
improvement districts affecting the Property, nor is Seller aware of 
any local improvement districts pending or threatened against or 
affecting the Property, except as disclosed to the Buyer by the 
Seller in writing. 
Vi) No Litigation. There is no equitable, legal or administrative SUit, 
action, arbitration or other proceeding pending or threatened 
against or affecting the Property. 
vii) Brokerage Fee. The Seller is not obligated to pay any fee Dr 
commission to any broker, finder or intermediary for or on account 
of the transaction contemplated by this Agreement. 
Viii)	 Environmental. The Seller has no actual knowledge of the 
existence of any Hazardous Substances (as hereinafter defined) on 
the Real Property. 
(As used herein, "Hazardous Substances" means and includes, 
without limitation, any toxic or hazardous substances or materials, 
petroleum or other pollutants and SUbstances, whether or not 
naturally occurring, including, without limitation, asbestos, radon, 
and methane gas, generated, treated, stored or disposed of, or 
otherwise deposited in or located on or under the Real Property, 
including without limitation, the surface and subsurface waters of 
the Real Property.) 
7)	 Risk of Loss and Insurance. Until Closing, Seller shall assume all 
risk of loss or damage with respect to. the Property, in the event: of 
any loss or damage to all or any part of the Property. Buyer shall 
have the right to (i) terminate this Agreement, in which event each 
party shall be fully released and discharged from any further 
obligations under this Agreement and the Earnest Money shall be 
refunded to the Buyer, or (ii) close the purchase of the Property and 
elect to receive any insurance proceeds that many be paid or payable 
5 
000443











l i l 
l l 
subst l 
 I l l l l 
l l l
l
 l l .
l
l 
by ~son of the loss or damage. After CloS'm"g, the risk of loss or 
damage to the Property shall transfer to the Buyer. 
8)	 Closing. 
a) General. The closing of this transaction and the dE~livery of all the 
executed documents and instruments contemplated by the parties 
shall take place at the office of Title One, 1101 RivE:r Street, Boise, 
Idaho (the "Closing Agent'). 
b) Closing Date. The Closing Date shall be on or before the later of 
(a) July 20, 2002, or such other date as the parties may aqree to. 
c)	 Seller Deposits. On or before the Closing Date, Seller shall deposit 
with the Closing Agent, the following executed documents: 
i)	 Deed. The Deed, properly executed and acknowledged, 
conveying the Real Property to Buyer. 
ii)	 Bills of Sale. All bills of sale, assignments and other instruments 
of transfer as appropriate to transfer any leases and the Water 
Rights and Personal Property to the Buyer. 
iii)	 Notice. A Notice to Assessor executed by the Seller directed to 
the Assessor of Ada County authorizing the said Assessor to send 
to Buyer all future assessment notices and tax notices with 
respect to the Property. 
iv)	 Certificates. Certificates representing any water or ditch shares 
to be transferred to the Buyer, together with a stock power 
that authorizes the transfer of water and ditch rights allocable 
to the Property. 
v)	 Other instruments. Any other documents or instruments 
required to completely close the transaction in accordance with 
the terms and conditions hereof. 
d)	 Buyer Deposits. On or before th~ Closing Date, Buyer shall deposit 
with the Closing Agent the following sums and executed 
documents: 
i)	 Payment Due at Closing. The Payment due at closing as 














nr Note and Carryback Deed of Trust. ~ Note and the Carryback 
Deed of Trust, property executed and, in the case of the Carry­
back Deed of Trust, in recordable form. 
iii) Other instruments. Any other documents or instruments 
required to completely close the transaction in accordance with 
the terms and conditions hereof. 
e)	 Joint Deposits. On or before the Closing Date, Buyer and Seller
 




i) Contract. The original or an executed copy of this Contract. 
ii) Escrow Instructions. Such escrow instructions as shall be 
required by the Closing Agent named in this contract to effect 
the provisions of this contract. 
iii) Closing statements. Such closing instructions and closing 
statement as shall be required by the Closing A~lent to affect 
the closing of this transaction. 
f)	 Consummation. Upon receipt of the documents and instruments 
listed above, the Closing Agent shall determine if it can close this 
transaction as provided by the parties' agreements and, if so, the 
closing Agent shall deliver the balance due Seller and shall record 
the Deed and, thereafter, the Closing Agent's duties shall 
terminate. 
g) Inability to Close. If the Closing Agent is unable to close all the 
Closing Date, the Closing Agent shall notify Seller and buyer in 
. writing of the reasons it is unable to close. The Parties shall have 
seven (7) days from the Closing Date in which to close and the 
Closing Date shall be extended accordingly. If the purchase is not 
completed within such period, the Closing Agent shall return all 
documents and instruments held by it to the Seller depositing the 
same,	 and its duties shall terminate. In which event, the remedies 
prOVided for in paragraph 10 her~of shall apply to any actual or 
alleged breach hereof. 
Except as may be expressly stated to the contrary in this 
Agreement, the return of such documents by the Closing A~Jent 












~tract, and the party not in default sh~'have all rights and 
remedies for default as set forth in this Contract. 
9)	 Conditions Precedent. The obligations of the parties under this 
Agreement, including the parties obligation to close are subject to the 
satisfaction of the following conditions: 
a)	 Conditions Precedent of the Buyer. The obligations of Buyer 
under this Agreement, including Buyer's obligation to close, are, 
at Buyer's sole discretion and option, subject to the 
satisfaction of the following conditions: 
i) Representations and Warranties True. The representations 
and warranties of Seller are true, complete, and accurate as 
of the date this Agreement and as of the datE~ of Closing as 
if made as of such date. 
ii) Covenants Performed. Seller has performed all obli9ations 
covenants and agreements to be performed prior to closing 
as set forth in this Agreement. 
iii)	 Execution and Delivery of Documents. Seller (and others 
where required) shall have executed and delivered to the 
Closing Agent the Deed, the Assignments, the Bills of Sale, 
the certificates representing water and ditch rights to be 
transferred as herein provided and all other instruments of 
transfer. 
iv)	 Title Insurance. The 1itle Company is prepared to issue the 
title insurance referred to in paragraph 3, showing no 
exceptions other than Permitted Exceptions. 
v)	 Title to Other Assets. Buyer shall have completed a Uniform 
Commercial Code lien search evidencing that the Water 
Rights and Personal Property are unencumbered. 
Vi) Completion of Feasibility Review. Buyer shall not havE~ 
cancelled during the Feasibility Review Period. 
Buyer may waive, as a condition precedent to Closing,. compliance 
with any of the conditions set forth in Section 9)a) above. 
b)	 Conditions Precedent of Seller: The obligations of Seller LInder 
this Agreement, including Seller's obligation to close, are, at 
8 











Sellers sole discretion and option, subj'eCi: to the satisfaction of 
the following conditions: 
il	 Representations and Warranties True. The representations 
and warranties of the Buyer are true, complete, and 
accurate as of the date of this Agreement and as of the date 
of Closing as if made as of such date. 
ii)	 Covenants Performed. Buyer has performed all obligations, 
covenants and agreements to be performed prior to closing 
as set forth in this Agreement including, without limitation, 
payment of the Purchase Price and other sums due to the 
Seller as herein provided. 
Seller may waive, as a condition precedent to Closing, 
compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 9)b) 
above. 
10) REM EDIES 
a)	 Notice and Claim Procedure. In the event of an actual or 
alleged breach of a representation, warranty, covenant or 
obligation of a party, then the other party shall provide written 
notice to the defaulting party which notice shall specify the 
breach claimed. The other party shall have five (S) days to cure 
or to disprove the default claimed. If the actual or alleged 
breach continues after this cure period, then the non-defaulting 
party shall have the remedies provided by this Agreement or at 
law or in equity. 
b) Mediation. If a dispute arises from or related to this Agreement 
or a breach of this Agreement, and if the dispute cannot be 
settled by the parties by direct discussions, then the parties 
agree to first endeavor to settle the dispute in an t3micable 
manner by mediation administered by the American Arbitration 
Association under its Commercial Mediation Rules, or as then 
otherwise agreed by the Parties. Thereafter, any unresolved 
controversy or claim arising from or relating to this Agreement 
or a breach of this Agreement shall be resolved as provided by 
law. 
c)	 Remedies. In the event of a default and after notice and 









--in the event of forfeiture of Earnest M~ey, each party shall 
have all remedies available at law or in equity. 
11) OTHER PROVISIONS 
a)	 Notices. All notices, claims, requests and other communications 
CNotices") under this Agreement (i) shall be in writing and (ii) 
shall be addressed or delivered to the parties at the adclresses 
set forth below (or at such other address as shan be given in 
writing by a party to the other). 
If to the Seller: Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust 
12601 West New Hope Road 
Star, Idaho 83669 
With copy to: 
If to the Buyer: Franz Witte, Jr. 
9770 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
With copy to: Eric Haff 
Suite 500, 1109 Main Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Notices complying with the provisions of this Section shall be 
deemed to have been delivered (i) upon the date of delivery if 
delivered in person, or (ii) three days after the date of the 
postmark on the return receipt if deposited in the United States 
Mail, with postage prepaid for certified or registered mail, return 
receipt requested. 
b)	 Feasibility Review Period. 
i)	 Seller hereby grants Buyer a license to enter upon the 
property for all purposes reasonably related to a full and 
adequate determination of the sUitability of the Property for 
such uses and Buyer shall, in the exercise of Buyer's alJsolute 
discretion, determine, including Buyer's ability to secure such 











necessary or helpful to such use. "'r"r'Tfs license includes, 
without limitation, the right to conduct surveys, soils tests, 
engineering studies, and environmental tests and audits. 
ii)	 Buyer agrees to indemnify, defend, and hold 11armless Seller 
and the Property from any and all liability, claims, damages, 
expenses, judgments, proceedings and causes of action of 
any kind whatsoever, arising out of Buyer's exercise of the 
license granted herein. Upon completion of any such tests, 
studies, surveys and or audits, Buyer, at Buyer's expense, 
shall restore the Property substantially to its condition 
existing immediately prior to such tests. 
iii)	 Buyer shall complete all of its studies, feasibility analyses, 
review of eXisting surveys and other reviews of the property 
within thirty (30) days following Seller's delivery of the Seller 
Documents to Buyer (the "Feasibility Review Period"). 
During the Feasibility Review Period, Buyer may cancel this 
agreement for any reason and receive a full refund of the 
Earnest Money. If the Buyer shall not have delivered to 
Seller a written notice of Buyers intent to cancel as herein 
provided during the Feasibility Review Period, Buyer shall 
thereafter be firmly bound to purchase the Property on the 
terms hereof, SUbject only to the Buyers Conditions 
Precedent. 
c)	 Assumption of Lease. At the Closing, the Seller a9rees to 
Assign to the Buyer, and the Buyer agrees to then assume and 
hold the Seller harmless of and from the Lessor's obligations on 
any leases accruing on or after the Closing Date.) The Seller will 
p~rform the landlord's obligations on any lease accrued to the 
Closing Date.) 
d)	 Attorneys Representation, Fees and Costs 
i) Representation. The Buyer's attorneys proVided represen­
tation to the Buyer only and did not represent or advise the 
Seller with respect to any 'T1atter relevant hereto. In 
executing this agreement, the Seller acknowledges the 
foregoing and, further acknowledges that Seller either has 
had this agreement reviewed by an attorney of it's choosing 
or has elected to proceed without such review. 
















'-' being filed or instituted between the parties to this 
Agreement to enforce the terms and conditions of tl1is 
Agreement or arising from the breach of any provision 
hereof, the prevailing party will be entitled to receivle from 
the other party all costs and expenses, inclucling reasonable 
attornels fees, incurred by the prevailing party, whether or 
not such controversy or claim is litigated or prosecuted to 
judgment. The prevailing party will be that party who was 
awarded judgment as a result of trial or arbitration or who 
receives a payment of money from the other party in 
settlement of claims asserted by that party. 
e)	 Governing Law, Jurisdition and Venue, Idaho law shall !~overn 
this agreement. The courts of Ada County, Idaho shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction. 
f)	 Time of the Essence. Time is of the essence with respect to the 
Obligations to be performed under this Agreement. 
g)	 Assignment. Seller understands that Buyer intends to assign his 
Rights under this agreement to a limited liability company or 
corporation. Seller agrees that, upon such assignment as 
assumption of this Agreement by the assignee, such assignee 
shall be entitled to enforce the terms hereof and shall be bound 
herby and Franz Witte, Jr. is then released form all other and 
further liability on this Agreement. 
h)	 Successors and Assigns. Subject to any express provisions in 
This Agreement regarding restrictions on transfers or 
assignments, this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to 
the benefit of the parties and their respective successors, 
assigns, heirs, and personal representatives. 
i)	 Entire Agreement. All exhibits to this Agreement constitute a 
Part of this Agreement. This Agreement, together with the 
accompanying exhibits, constitutes the entire, completely 
integrated agreement among the parties and supersedes all 
prior agreements, memoranda, correspondence, conversations 
and negotiations. 
j)	 Severability. The invalidity of any potion of this Agreement 
Should not affect the validity of any other portion of this 
Agreement. 
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~ Counterparts. This Agreement may ~executed in one or more 
Counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, 
but all of which together shall constitute one and the same 
instruments. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their 
hands and seals as of the date and year first above written. 











8 : _________________ _ 
State of Idaho ) 
):55 
County of Ada ) 
On this day of May, 2002, before me, the undersigned, a Notary 
Public for the State of Idaho, personally appeared -I known or 
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within 
instrument as Trustee, and acknowledges to me that (s)he executed the same as 
such Trustee. 
IT WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
 
official seal the day and year in this certificate first above written.
 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
Residing at _ 
Commission expires: 
State of Idaho ) 
):ss 
County of Ada ) 
On this day of May, 2002, before me, the undersigned, a Notary 
Public for the State of Idaho, personally appeared Franz Witte, Jr. known or 
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within 
instrument, and acknowledges to me that he executed the same. 
IT WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my 
official seal the day and year in this certi'ficate first above written. 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
Residing at _ 











The Real Property 
The Real Property is more fully described as follows: 
The Northwest Y4 of the Southwest Y4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, 






,,,1ARAS & HETHERINGTON,,- t'
- CERTIFIED ~BI.IC ACCOUNTANTS 
101 S. CAPITOL BLVD., SUIrE 502 
BOISE, IDAHO 8370:2 
JOHN W. MARAS, CPA (208) 342-.3578 
IMAJEAN HETHERINGTON, CPA FAX (209) 342-4416 
May 24,2002 
Tom Maile, Attorney 
380 W. State 
Eagle,ID 83616 
Re: Theodore Johnson 
Dear Tom: 
As discussed, I have reviewed the tax implications of Mr. Johnson selling his forty acres of land 
in Eagle versus holding it indefinitely for disposition in his estate. 
Before I get into those specifics, I believe the sales offer for $400,000 is too low. This is hus\.:J 
on 3. similar sale made by a client of ours in 1996 of forty acres of bare land on \-fcM illan Road 
with a Meridian, Jdaho address for $850,000. It was sold to a developer, which is most likely the 
highest and best use for the land. This equated to $21,250 per acre versus the $10,000 per acre 
offer to Mr. Johnson. 
If the properties are comparable, it would be logical to assume that with inflation since 1996 the 
subject property should be worth $1,000,000 to a developer today. TI1at wQuld be $25,000 per 
acre, two and one-halftimes the offered price. 
We have notes in our files indicating that the cost basis of the property 10 ~r. .lohnson is 
$76,000. 

























As you can see, the amounts shown above are rounded and do not retlcct selling expenses, etc., 
but should be close enough for decision-making purposes. 
If the property is retained and sold after his death by his beneficiaries, there would be no income 
ta.,""{ due to the basis step up to fair market value in his estate. This would resu II. in no gain if sold 




















Tom Maile, Attorney 
May 24, 2002 
Page 2 
Assuming that both the 40 acres and the investments from the sales proceeds would be of 
equivalent value in Mr. Johnson's estate, the estate ta'( implications would be the same whether 
the property were sold or not sold. Any estate tax 'will be variable depending on the tax laws in 
effect at date of death. Such laws are subject to change and aTe expected to change. In fact, there: 
is a possibility that they could be totally repealed, in which case there would be no estate lax. 
Based on all of the above, my recommendations would be to determine the current value of the 
property based on highest and best use and on recent sales. Once that is known, a counter olTcT 
could be made. If a buyer can be found for current value and ifMr. Johnson i i' willinl:l. to take the 
tax bite, sale of the property probably makes sense. Ifhe earries a note on the sale, we would 
recommend getting a financial statement from the buyer for review of the buyer's financial 
strength. The tive-year ba.lloon and the seven percent interest rate are good provisions in Lhc 
note. 
J agree that a sale of the property would simplify his life since there is no assurance that a lessee 
for the property will continue to be available unless a long-term lease is entered into, which may 
or may not be desirable. 
I trust this will be helpful. 
Very truly yours, 
~~ 
IMAJEAN HETHERINGTON, CPA 
IraJ 













 LAw OmCE Or 
THOIvlAS G. MAILE, IV, P.A. 
380 WEST STATE STREE'J', EAGLE, IDAHO 83616 
(208) 939-1000 I Fax (208) 939-1001 
May 29,2002 
Theodore Johnson 
12601 W. New Hope Rd. 
Star, Idaho 83669 
Re: Real Estate Transaction 
Dear Ted; 
As we've discussed by phone, I've completed the review of the real estate contract. I also 
discussed your finances with your accountant Imajean Hetherington last week. On May 24, she faxed 
us a letter indicating her impressions of your current real estate offer. I'm enclosing a copy of her 
letter for your review and consideration. I deem it prudent that you contact our office to discuss the 
possibility ofproviding a counter offer to the potential purchaser to determine the fair market value 
for the real estate. Also as indicated in the letter, we need to do some due dil'igence relative to the 
buyers potential and fiscal responsibility. Consequently please touch base with my office to schedule 































L-\w OFFICE OF 
THOMlA.S G. MAJrLE, IV, P.A. 
380 WEST ST.HE STREET, EAGLE, lo.-\.HO 83616 
(208) 939-1000 I Fax (208) 939-1001 
June 17, 2002 
Nlr. Theodore Johnson 
12601 West New Hope Road 
Star, Idaho 83669 
Re: Real Estate Transaction with 
Franz Witte, Jr. 
OUf File No. M02-4004.0 
Dear Ted: 
Please find enclosed a copy of the letter from Franz Witte concerning his decline to submit 
his financial statement to us for review of his solvency. 
Please touch base with our office. 





















June 7. 2002 
Thomas G Maile, IV 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Re:	 Theodore L. Jolmson Revocable Trust and 
Franz Witte, JI. 
Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement 
File No M02-4004.0 
Dear Mr. Maile: 
Thank you for your reply to my offer on the Theodore L. Johnson Property. In responsl~ to your comments 
on values, my research shows like property selling for 10% less than this offer. I also have concerns over 
high water tables and City of Eagle issues that make development costs higher. As for my financ:ial 
strength, I believe that is shown by the $100,000 down payment and the terms of the loan. 
I will extend the tenns of this offer 











LAw OFFlCE OF 
THOMAS G. MAILlE, !V, P.A. 
380 \\'lEsT STATE STREET, EAGLE, IDAHO 83616 
(208) 939-1000/ Fax (208) 939-1001 
June~ 2002 
~ 
BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
TO (208) J4J 4809 d+,.j'-S-~t?O ~ 
Mr. Eric L. Haff 
Attorney at Law 
Post Office Box 139 
Boise, Idaho 83709 




Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement
 
Our File No. M02-4004.0
 
Dear Mr. Haff: 
Our office represents the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and Theodore Johnson, 
individually, relative to the offer of Franz Witte, Jr., presented on or about May 19, 2002. Mr. 
Johnson would be willing to sell his real property; however, based upon comparable values in the 
area, we feel your offer is extremely low. In addition, Mr. Witte is seriously requesting my client 
to carry a short-tenn mortgage. We will need to review his current financial statement, year-to-date 
profit and loss statements, and his federal and state income tax returns for the last three (3) years. 
Please touch base with my office to discuss the same at your leisure. 
( Sincerely,
'" / .... --'--j7~--··_··_-_·--­






















IV, P.A. ( 
_.,380 W. StQL~ Street 
Eagle, 10 83616 
Invoice submitted to: 
Ted Johnson
 











05/22/2002	 legal Services 
Review Real Estate Purschase and Sales Agreement; telephone 
conference with client and accountant (Immajean Hetherington 342-3578). 
05/29/2002	 legal Services 
Review transmittal from accountant; draft letter to client. 
05/31/2002	 legal Services 















Total amount of new charges $400.84
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IV, P.A. f 
380 W. Stak .:>treet 
-.­
Eagle, 10 83616	 "'­
Invoice submitted to: 
Ted Johnson 
12601 W. New Hope Road 
Star ID 83669 
July 24,2002 
In reference to: potential real estate transaction 
Invoice # 4093 
Previous balance 
Payments/credits 
07101/2002	 Payment by ck# 6492 - thank you 
Total payments 

















Complete Appraisal. Summary Report 
Fee Simple Estate 
An unimproved 40.00 Acre Parcel 
East Side Linder Road. North of Beacon Light Road 
Ada County, Idaho 






















Bradford T. Knipe. MAl. CCIM, CRE
 
Idaho Certified General Appraiser eGA-117
 
KNIPE JANOUSH KNIPE, LLC 
Commercial & AgricUltural Real Estate Advisory Services 
EXHIBIT NO. G1 
e,. 'eC~~ 
DATE.K (liiOlf 




























Mr. Theodore Johnson 
12601 W. New Hope Road 
Star, Idaho 83669 
Dear Mr. Johnson: 
In accordance with your request, we have conducted market investigations, 
gathered pertinent data, and performed analyses necessary for an appraisal of the 
following property, under the following valuation scenarios and assumptions: 
Name of Property or Johnson Property 
Occupant: 
Location: Linder Road 
Ada County, Idaho 
Property Type: Rural acreage 
Status: Existing I 
REFERENCE NOS: 
Client's Log #: NA 
K]K File 10: 02.3395 
CONTACfS: 














1661 Shoreline Drive 
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Identification of Property, File References, and Contacts . , 
, • ,/ i 
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Valuation Types, Effective Dates and Premises Effective Dates 
IVALUE rYrE(S), 
As isSCENARIO(S)jDATE(S): JulylO,2002 
JNTEREST(S) APPRAISED: Fee simple estate 
APPRAISAL TYPE: Complete appraisal 
REPORT TYPE: Summary report 
Physical Summary I 
SITE SIZE (SF j AC): 
GROSS 
40.00±AC 
SITE ZONING: Ada County RUT (Rural-Urban 
Transition) 
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Summary of'1!."Ppraisallssues 
The following paragraphs highlight critical valuation issues and assumptions, The reader is 
advised to become familiar with these issues prior to finalizing any decisions, 
Report Format 
Per the requirements and guidelines set forth in the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal 
Practice (USPAP), there are three levels of detail in the reporting of an appraisal. As set forth in 
Advisory Opinion AO-H, which provides explanation of Standards Rule 2-2, the following report 
comparison chart is offered for the client's edification: 
9 Format Options Comparison Chart 
Identify and describe the real estale 
being appraised 
State the real property interest being 
appraised 
Sta te the purpose and intended use of 
the appraisal 
Define the value to be estimated 
-=- ­Slate the effective dale of the appraisal 
and the dale of the report 
Sta te the extent of the process of
 




Conunent: tlle full extent of tlle process
 
should be apparent to the reilder in the
 
content of the report
 
Siale a/l assumptions and limiting
 




Describe the information considered, tlle 
appraisal procedures followed, and the 
reasoning tllat supports the analyses, 
opinions and conclusions 
Describe the appraiser's opinion of the 
highest and best use of tlle real estate, 
when such an opinion is necessary and 
appropriaIe 
Explain and support the exclusion of 
any of the usual valuation approaches 
Describe any additional information 
that may be appropriate to show 
compliance with, or clearly identify and 
explain permitted departures from, the 
specific guidelines 01 USPAP Standard 1 
(which deals witll tlle requirements of 
the appraisal process) 
lnclude a signed certification in 
accordance witll Slandards Rule 2-3 
(which deals with the requirements of 
appraisal reEorting) 
ry Appraisal Report 
i 
Identify and provide a surrunary
 








Slale the purpose and intended use of
 
I 
I the appraisal 
Define the value to be estima led 
State the effective date of the appraisal 
I and the date of the report 
Summarize the exlent of the process of 
collecting. confirming and reporting 
datil 
Comment: tlle full extent of the process 
may not be apparent to the reader in tlle 
content of tlle report 
State all assumptions and limiting 
conditions thaI affecl tlle analysis, 
opinions and conclusions 
Summarize the informa tion considered, 
the appraisal procedures followed, and 
the reasoning tllal supports the 
analyses" opinions and conclusions 
Summarize tlle appraiser's opinion of 
the highest and best use of tlle real 
estate, when such an opinion is 
necessary and avvroDria Ie 
Explain and supporlthe exclusion of 
any of the usual valuation approaches 
Summarize any additional information 
tllat may be appropriate to show 
compliance with, or clearly identify and 
explain permitted departures from, tlle 
specific guidelines of USPAP Standard 1 
Include a signed certification in 




Identify the real estale being appraised 
I 
State the real proper~y interesl being 
~raised 
I State the purpose and intended use of 
I 
I Ihe apprmsal 
I Slale and reference a definition of the value to be estimated 
I Slate the eff.'Ctive date of the apprai5<ll 
I and tlle dale of the report 
Describe the extent of the process of 
collecting, confirming and reporting 
,Iala 
Comment: the full extent of the process 
will not be apparent to the reader in the 
con"cnt of the report I 
State all assumptions and Iimi ting 
I





State the appraisal procedures followed,
 
sta Ie the valUf' concl usion and reference
 
tlle existence of specific file information
 
in su pport of the conclusion,
 
Slate lhe appraiser's opinion of the
 
highest and best use of the real estate,
 
when such an opinion is necessary and
 
i:lpproprinh:: 
Slale tlle exclusion of any of the usual 
valuation approaches 
Contain a prominenl use restriction tllat 
limits reliance on the repmtto the client 
and warns that the report cannot be 
understood properly withou t additional 
information in tl1e wor~, file of tlle 
appraiser, and clearly identify and 
explain perrnili:ed deparhlres from, the 
specific gUidelines of USF AP Standard 
lnclude a signed certification in 
accordance witll Standards Rule 2-3 
000466
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This appraisal has been prepared in conformity with the current requirements of t.he Appraisal 
Foundation as set forth in the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), the 
Code of Professional Ethics of the Appraisal Institute, and with the requirements of the federal bank 
regulating agencies. If we may be of further assistance to you on this or other matters, please contact 
us at your convenience. Thank you for providing us this opportunity to be of service. 
Respectfully su bmitted, 
KNIPE JANOUSH KNIPE, LLC 
~pCUltu"l R"I E'lal' Advi'ory s.",,,,, 
Bradford T~, MAl, CCIM, CRE 
Manager & Member 
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Value Con~ions 
The following values are subject to the standard (generic), specific and extraordinary assumptions 
and limiting conditions as set forth in this report. To fully understand our value co~c1usions, please 
pay particular attention to the following sections of the report: 
Special Assumptions
 
Property Strengths & Weaknesses
 








~IMPLE ESTATE EFFECTIVE DATE CONCLUSION 
Markel Value As Is 
40.00 AC, As Is July 10, 2002 $-tOO,OOO 
:ESTIMATED MARKETING TIME EFFECTIVE DATE CONCLUSION 
If Priced at Market Value and Professionally & July 10, 2002 Sale Within 12 Months 
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Underlymg Assumptions, Contingencies~ Scop,e Limitations 
Overview 
In the course of the normal appraisal process, situations arise wherein we must make standard 
(generic) and specific and/or extraordinary assumptions with regard to information not readily 
available to us. All Standard, Specific and/or Extraordinary Assumptions & Limiting Conditions 
which may appear in the report are believed to be compatible with generally accepted appraisal· 
principles, Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), and Appraisal Institute 
requirements. All are to be considered a part of the report, and the reader is advised that acceptance 
of the report constitutes acceptance of all Assumptions and Limiting Conditions. 
standard Underlying Assumptions & limiting Conditions 
Standard Assumptions and Limiting Conditions include such issues as construction components 
of existing construction; adaptability of soils to development; existence of typical easements, etc. 
Additionally, since Idaho is a non-disclosure state, details of comparable property sales or leases are 
presumed to be accurately portrayed by the parties to the respective agreements; in lieu of cooperation 
by the parties (or in some cases, where parties have no recollection of such details), assumptions 
and/or reasonable approximations are sometimes necessitated. Such generic assumptions are 
provided for in the Standard (Generic) Underlying Assumptions and Limiting Conditions contained 
in the Addenda. The reader is encouraged to read this section of the report. 
Special/Extraordinary Underlying Assumptions & limiting Conditions 
More Specific Assumptions & Limiting Conditions are sometimes required depending upon the 
individual nature of the appraisal problem, and are clearly disclosed in the following the Generic 
Limiting Conditions, and/or in the discussions within the report to which l:hey pertain. These 
assumptions are of matters which we have no knowledge, expertise, or timely ability to clarify. 
Standard Rule 2-1c of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice require, as 
applicable to the appraisal problem, clear and accurate disclosure of, and an indication of any impact 
on value of, a third classification of assumption: "extraordinary assumptions and limiting conditions" 
that directly affect the outcome of appraisal. In the event any specific and/or e:<traordinary 
assumptions and limiting conditions are deemed relevant to the subject and its valuation, they will be 
set forth immediately following, and/or in the discussions within the report to which they pertain. 
Enumeration of Special Assumptions 
• Parcel size report of the Ada County Assessor's Office is assumed to be correct. 
John~;on Property 
Linder Road. Ado county, Idaho 
















Limitations of Scope 
None. 
Johmon Property 
Linder Road .. Ada County, Idaho 










Certificate of Appraiser 
We certify U1at, to the best of our knowledge and belief: 
1.	 All representations of factual information contained in this appraisal report: are true and correct. 
2.	 The reported analyses, opinions, and conclusions are limited only by the reported assumptions 
and limiting conditions and our personal, unbiased professional analyses, opinions, and 
conclusions. 
3.	 We have no present or prospective interest in the property that is the subject of this report, and we 
have no personal interest or bias with respect to the parties involved. 
4.	 Our compensation is not contingent upon the reporting of a predetermined value or direction in 
value that favors the cause of the client, the amount of the value estimate, the attainment of a 
stipulated result, or the occurrence of a subsequent event. The appraisal assignment was not 
based on a requested minimum valuation, a specific valuation, or the approval of a loan. 
5.	 Our analyses, opinions, and conclusions were developed, and this report has been prepared, in 
conformity with the requirements of the Code of Professional Ethics of the Appraisal Institute, 
and the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. 
6.	 The use of this report is subject to the requirements of the Appraisal Institute relating to review by 
its duly authorized representatives. 
7.	 We have made a personal inspection of the property that is the subject of this report. 
8.	 No one provided significant professional assistance or contribution to the signatories to this 
report. 
9.	 We have the necessary level of knowledge and experience to credibly estimate the value of the 
subject property, or have taken reasonable steps to achieve such competency and to provide a 
professional appraisal of the subject property, in accordance with the Uniform Standards of 
Professional Appraisal Practice. 
10. Brad Knipe an MAl Designated Member of the Appraisal Institute (No. 10992), and have met the 
continuing education requirements of that organization. He is a CCIM Designated Member of the 
Commercial Investment Real Estate Institute (No. 7213), and a CRE Designated Member of The 
Counselors of Real Estate. 
Brad Knipe is a State Certified General Appraiser in Idaho (No. CGA-OOOn?), and t-,-fontana (No. 
CGA-494). He has have met the continuing education requirements for real estate appraisers 
practicing in these states. 
KNIPE JANOUSH KNIPE, LLC
 
Com ricuIturaI Real Estate Advisory Services
 ~:...-----
I 
o s Po er, Associat;j p aiser i 
c. _ 
Johnson Property 
Linder Road. Ada county. Idaho 
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Part I: Introduction & Executive Summary 
r.. ••·.. 
Johnson Property 
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-' Introduction & Executive Summary 
Identification: Johnson Property 
Property Type: Rural, Irrigated Cropland 
Location: East Side Linder Road, % mile north of Beacon Light Road 
Ada County, Idaho 
Owner of Record: Theodore Johnson 
Legal Description: NW %, SW 1/4 Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 East, 
Boise Meridian, Ada County 
Property Rights Appraised Fee simple estate 
Appraisal/Report Classification: Complete / Summary 
Limitations of Scope: None 
Values Estimated: Market value "as is" 
Date of the Report: July 15,2002 
Effective Date of Valuation: July 10, 2002 
Neighborhood: 
Identification: Rural Unincorporated / Ada County 
Neighborhood Type: Rural residential and agricultural 
Assessment & Taxation Data: See Taxes & Assessments Section 
Zoning: Ada County Rural Urban Transition (RUT) 
Parcel Size: 40.00 Acres 
Building Improvements: None Considered 
Highest & Best Use 
As Is: Rural residential I ag 
Johnson Property 
Linder Road. Ada County, Idaho 
©2002, Knipe Janoush Knipe, llC • File ID 02.3.395 • Page 2 
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Total Value, As Is $400,000 
Marketing Period: Sale within 12 months, if professionally marketed at 
concluded as is market value. 
Sale History: No sales known. 
Johnson Property 
Linder Road. Ada County. Idaho 





Project strengths & Weakn~ses 






•	 The subject is served by telephone and electrical service. 
•	 The subject has paved accessed maintained by the pu blic sector. 
•	 The subject is located within the Eagle area of impact. 
Property Influences 
•	 The subject parcel is generally level. 
Market Influences 
•	 There is demonstrated demand for similarly zoned parcels, both for rural residential/ag uses, and 
for development into 5-acre lots. 
Project Weaknesses / Potential Detriments 
Location Influences 
•	 The subject is outside the Eagle Sewer Co.'s 20-year service plan. Sewer is highly unlikely. 
Property Influences 
•	 No detriments apparent, other than lack of 'utilities required to realize more intensive 
development potenlial. 
Market Influences 
The residential market has slowed somewhat in recent months. 
Conclusions 
The subject parcel is located on the east side of Linder Road, 1f4 mile north of its intersection with 
Beacon Light Road. The subject is within the Eagle impact area, in an area dominated by agricultural 
uses, rural residences, and limited acreage lot subdivision development (primarily on ind:ividual well 
and septic systems). 
Johnson Property 
Linder Road" Ada County, Idaho 
©2002, Knipe Janoush Knipe, llC • File ID 02.3395 • Page 4 
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View of subject 
as seen looking 
south on Linder 
Road. 




View of subject 
as seen looking 
north of Linder 
Road. 
Taken by RBP 
Johns,:>n Property 
Linder Road. Ada County, Idaho 
©2002, Knipe Janoush Knipe, llC • File 10 02.33~15 • Page 5 
000476
 




View of subject 
as seen looking 
east acrosS 
Linder Road. 





Linder Road. Ada County. Idaho 







No sales or specific offers to sell are known to us in recent years. 
Scope of the Assignment 
The Appraisal Process 
Real property appraisal is the systematic acquisition, classification, analysis and presentation of 
data toward the goal of arriving at a reliable estimate of the value of the subject property. 
The first step in the process, corresponding to Part I: Executive Suml!:@.!Y is rather seU­
explanatory. It provides the "big picture" and summarizes the relevant issues, including a summary 
of important facts & conclusions, identification of the scope and limitations of the appraisal and the 
appraisal report, property strengths & weaknesses, an estimate of exposure and marketing periods, 
and an overview of the project. 
Part II: Definition of the Appraisal Problem is the identification and discussion of all issues 
relevant to an understanding of the subject property and its market segment. This involves 
presentation of relevant definitions, adequate identification and description of the subject property, 
the effective date of the value estimate, the property rights being appraised, and the type of value 
sought. 
Once this has been accomplished, we report our research and analysis of the factors that influence 
the valuation of the subject property. Among other considerations, these include area, neighborhood 
and!or community analyses, consideration of property taxes, and zoning, culminating in a discussion 
of the subject site and existing improvements. In a sense, the process of defining the appraisal 
problem works from the general to the specific. 
Having been afforded economic, social, legal and physical perspectives developed for the subject 
property in Part II of the report, in Part III: Property Valuation, we will analyzE' the subject's highest 
and best use, which will assist in the identification and analysis of compara ble market data. With this 
data, the property is valued by the cost, sales comparison and income capitalization approaches to. 
value, as applicable to the subject of this appraisal. 
Type of Appraisal and Type of Appraisal Report 
Type of Appraisal: Complete Appraisal 
Type of Report: Summary Appraisal Report 
Limitation of Scope: None 
Steps of the Appraisal Process 
The scope of the appraisal required investigating sufficient data relative to the subjeci property to 
derive an opinion of value. The depth of the analysis was intended to be appropriate in relation to the 
significance of the appraisal problem. 
Johnson Property 
Linder Road. Ada County, Idaho 





====f ,cope of the Assignment 
An inspec ,A the property and its neighborhood was~nducted 1:0 determine the physical 
features and ~dition of the subject, and the environment in which it is located. A search of 
municipal records has been completed to ascertain the current and historical assessment and 
ownership data regarding the property. 
The subject property's current physical and legal condition, its background, and history were 
researched with the due diligence expected of a professional real estate appraiser in the course of 
performing appraisal services. We have attempted to analyze the subject property as seen through the 
eyes of the hypothetical, "most probable" buyer. 
This appraisal report is intended to be an "appraisal assignment." That is, the intention is that the 
appraisal sE'rvice is performed in such a manner that the results of the analysis, opinion, or conclusion 
be that of a disinterested third party. 
We expressly assume all data obtained from the client, the owner, and other sources, was 
accurately reported and reliable. 
The sales comparison approach to value was developed to determine the fee simple value of the 
underlying land. 
The reader is reminded that Idaho is a non-disclosure state. Buyers of real estate are not required 
to disclose their purchases, and those who eject to disclose their purchases to local assessors are often 
suspected of understating the prices to favorably impact their assessed values. Confirmation of sales 
often relies on reports of buyers, sellers, brokers / agents for one of the parties to the sale, the local 
assessor, an appraiser familiar with the sale, or an appraiser who was able to confirm the sale with one 
of these parties. We make reasonable efforts to verify the accuracy of the sale (and lease) information, 
and expressly assume the information to have been factually provided to us. To the extent lliat this 
might be an erroneous assumption in some circumstances, we reserve the right to revise our value 
estimates accordingly when such discrepancies become known to us. 
Ollier than in the Letter of Transmittal and Special Assumptions sections when authored by a 
single appraiser, we prefer to utilize plural pronouns (e.g., we, us, our and ours) rather than singular 
pronouns (e.g., I, me, my and mine) in the narrative. In the interest of disclosure as mandated by the 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, R. Brooks Potter was responsible for the data 
collection, analysis of the data, and the reporting of the findings of the analysis. An examination of 
the data acquired, and the reasoning and conclusions based thereupon, are presented in the body of 
the report to follow. 
Johnson Property 
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Part II: Definition of the Appraisal Problem 
Johnson Property 
Linder Road. Ada County, Idaho 





. precedin lition is taken from the Uniform Standard: ..ofessit........ l Appraisal Practice, 
1992 Edition!; an~ virtually identical to that appearing in the"'rl'deral Register, vol. 55, no. 163, 
August 22, 1990, pp. 34228-29, and The Appraisal of Real Estate, 10th EditiOJ1 Chicago: Appraisal 
Institute, 1992, p. 21. 
Definition of Property Rights Appraised 
The property rights of concern to the client are those of the fee simple estate. Fee simple is defined 
as follows: 
Possession of a title in fee establishes the interest in property known as lhe fee simple estate-i.e., 
absolute ownership unencumbered by any other interest or estate, subject only to the limitations 
imposed by the governmental powers of taxation, eminent domain, police power, and escheat2 
Effective Dates 
The relevant dates are summarized as follows: 
The date of Brooks Potter's initial inspection was: July 10, 2002
 
The effective date of the as is market value estimate is: July 10, 2002
 
The date of the report is: July 15,2002
 
The effective dates of the value estimates put the values in their applicable context. The value 
conclusions estimated are valid only in this context, and are subject to change with changing market 
conditions. Prospective values are not trended for future value changes. 
As Is Premise 
Market value"as is" as of a specific appraisal date means: 
An estimate of market value of the property in the condition observed upon inspection and as it 
physically and legally exists without hypothetical conditions, assumptions, or qualifications as of the 
date the appraisal is prepared." 
Highest and Best Use Definition 
The reasonably probable and legal use of vacant land or an improved property, which is physically 
possible, appropriately supported, financially feasible, and that results in the highest value.3 
The four criteria the highest and best use must meet are physical possibility, legal permissibility, 
financial feasibility, and maximum productivity. 
IAppmisnl S/nlJlinrds Bonnl 01 TIle Apprnisnl FOlllldnlioll, Page 7.
 
'TIle Apprnisnl or Renl Eslnle. lOt/I Erlilioll, C1licngo: Appraisnlllls/illlle, 1992. p 122.
 
J Tile Awmisnl orRenl Es/llle, Tellill Edilioll, 1992, p. 275 ­
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Location Boise is the capital of Idaho, and the county seat Ada County. 
The subject is located in between southwest Boise and Kuna. 
Access State Hwy. 44 to Linder Road, then north. to Beacon Light 
Road. The subject is located % mile north of this intersection 
on the east side of Linder. 
Airline Passengers Boise Air Terminal reports 4,000 seats per day, 2,840,000 
passengers in 1999 (up 9 percent from the 1988 figure) 
Population, Boise City 185,787 (2000) Up 46.7 percent since 1990 Census 
Population, Meridian 34,919 (2000) Up 263.9 percent since 1990 Census 
Population, County 300,902 (2000) l!p 46.2 percent since 1990 Census 
Population, MSA 432,345 (2000) Ada & Canyon Counties, combined 
Johnson Property 
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e Home, Canyon County $95,938 $87,82.) 
New Homes, Ada Coun $162,673 $137,900 
Commercial Building Permits 
TOTAL ADA COUNTY NON-RESIDENTIAL PERMITTRENDS 
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1994 1995 1996 1997
 
Year 
199B 1999 2000 
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Effective Buyi¥ncome (1999) 
Median Household EBI 
Average Household EBI 
Per Capita EBI 
Local Inflation 
Housing 




1991-1992 - 4.9% 
1992-1993 - 4.8% 
1993-1994 - 3.7% 
1994-1995 - 4.4% 
1995-1996 - 2,3% 
1996-1997 - 1.6% 
1997-1998 - 3.3% 
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The general area is characterized by farmland and low­
density rural residential development, with marked increases 
in density in proximity to city service in Eagle and Boise. At 
the sUbject's location, these municipal services are not 
available. According to Lynn Moser of Eagle Sewer, sewer 
delivery to the subjects location is not in the 20-year plan. He 
said further that it is unlikely that the subject will ever be 
sewer served. 
Maintenance of roads, recreational areas and facilities is 
provided by the public sector. 
The subject is located in a district where there has been acreage subdivision development activity. 
But, according to officials at Eagle City Sewer, there are no plans to extend municipal sewer to the 
subject within the next 20 years. 
:.. ­
~ -. '. 
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Zoning & Administrative Requirements 
District Classification 
The subject property currently falls within the Ada County RUT (Rural-Urban Transition) zoning 
district, having been established to: 
RUT (RURAL-URBANTRANSITlON) 
1. Provide standards and regulations for the development of property within areas of city 
impact, except for the Foothills Planning Areas designated in the Boise City 
Comprehensive Plan within the Boise Area of City Impact, that may not presently be 
served by urban services, consistent with the goals and policies of the applicable city 
comprehensive plan. The maximum density shall not exceed one dwelling unit per 5 acres; 
2. Allow agriculture and rural residential uses to continue within areas of city impact until 
urban services are extended; 
3. Provide design standards that shall permit redevelopment of property to higher densities 
when urban services are extended; and 
4. Limit new agricultural uses within the areas of city impact to those that shall not 
significantly impact nearby urbanizing areas with noise, odor, dust, or other nuisances 
normally related to more intensive farm uses, such as livestock confinement facilities with 
301 or more animal units. This Article, however, shall in no way preclude the continued 
use of properties within these areas for agriculture. 
Allowable Uses 
The zoning district is primarily geared to rural residential and agricultural uses. 
Subject's Existing Uses 
The su bject constitutes ag.j cropland. It is considered 
zoning. 
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Dimensional Standards _ 
40 minimum
 
Minimum street fronta e (in feet)
 250 




2. Other roadwa 25 




Maximum covera e in %)
 5 
I Moximum hei ht in I'" 35 
Maximum lot width and depth (in NA 
fee~'t)"============d============!l 
Table 8-2B-2: Dimensional Standards for Rural Base District Property 
likelihood of a Zoning Change 
The subject's RUT zoning is consistent with the zoning of surrounding properties and with the 
existing and foreseeable alternate uses of the subject property. 
i· ... 
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t<ea, Jle V"es and Assessments 
=~=========="--===r 
Real Estate Taxes and Assessments 
Tax Parcel Map 
Property Tax Overview 
Ada County is divided into about 400 taxing code areas, with 2001 mill rates ranging from about 
0.94 percent to 1.87 percent of assessed value. Rates at the upper end of the range generally tend to 
reflect incorporated areas fully serviced by the public sector, and/ or presently paying off new public 
infrastructure projects. Mill rates are set in the fall of each year, and taxes are paid in arrears. In 
Idaho, assessed value is intended to be 100 percent of market value, and there is no equalization rate; 
however, assessed values typically range from 70 to 90 percent of market value for commercial 
properties. This gap is narrowing in some property segments. 
Properties are generally appraised for assessment purposes on a five-year cycle, or upon change of 
ownership/design. Based on a review of rates and assessments for the past several years, an average 
increase in property taxes of 3± percent per year is indicated market-wide due to increases in assessed 
values-despite a general leveling of the mill rates for most of the past few years. The prudent 
assumption is for a trend of generally increasing tax liability for modern, competitive properties. 
t .. 
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Real .Jte Tr"'''s and Assessmentsi ============. (
'­
Assessment Summary 
The subject is indicated to consist of a single assessor parcel, identified in the following table: 
Assesser===S=03=3=6=32=0=OO=0======40=.=00======$=1,=2=SO=;=A=C:=======$=51~
 
The subject land is assessed well below market value, which is not surprising given its current 
agricultural use. 
Estimated 2002 Taxes 
According to the Ada County Assessor, the estimated taxes for 2002 are as fol:lows: 




The subject's property taxes appear to be current, and the assessed value appears to be well below 
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40.00± Acres Gross 
Irregular (See Assessor Parcel Map in Taxes section). 
Frontage 1/4 mile of frontage on Linder Road. 
Topography: The site is generally level and sits below grade with Linder 
Road. 
Developmental Restrictions No physical or legal development restrictions are apparent, 
other than those imposed by the parcel's irregular shape, and 
those imposed by canals, ditches and laterals, and those 
imposed by the absence of municipal sewer and water. 
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Utilities and Easements 
Utilities noted 
We were not provided an environmental site assessment 
report (ESA). 
We expressly assume that 
contamination exist which 











We have no expertise in soils suitability or hydrogeology. 
We are aware of no problems with the subject'S soils that 
would limit development or redevelopment potential, and 
observed no signs of settling for building improvements. 
Electricity and telephone are availa ble to the site. 
Utility Summary : 
Utility Provider Comment I 
Electricity Idaho Power Company Available 
Telephone Qwest Communications Available 
Liens & Easements of Record 
Off-Site Influences 
Drainage 
Seismic Classifiea tion 
Flood Zone Classification 
The subject would have to be developed with individual well 
and septic systems. 
We were not proVided a title report on the subject property. 
We specifically assume there to be no adverse title issues. 
Drainage appears to be typical. No adverse conditions are 
apparent. 
Believed to be UBC Zone 2b. No significant risks apparent. 
Immediately following is presented a Transamerica Flood 
Hazard Certification, as obtained from the following website: 
http://www.fJoodinsights.com/. 
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Conclusions 
The subject has a desirable location for its historical agricultural (irrigated farmstead) use, as well 
as for redevelopment to a low-density rural residential subdivision. The absence of municipal sewer 
and water, and the probability that such services will not be available for many years, relegates the 
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===============~D,,;;,:eS( ~O' the ImprovefTIe/ll~ 
-
Description of the Improvements 
The subject is vacant, no improvements considered. 
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Highest 8. Best Use 
!:-. 
Highest & Best Use As Is 
The subject is presently irrigated farmland in crop production. If sold to another operator, the 
farming operation would likely be maintained. If sold to a subdivision developer, it would likely be 
purchased as a strategic acquisition for future development. Again, the implicit value of the land for 
subdivision development suggests ag to be an interim use. 
Most Probable Buyer 
The available market seems to suggest that there has been significant amount of lanel acquisitions, 
both for immediate development as weJl as strategic positioning for future development. As such, the 
most probable buyer would be a developer. 
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Sales Comparison Approach 
It is assumed in this approach that there exists a market for the type of property being appraised, 
and that data on recent sales of similar, competitive properties in the market are "arms length" 
transactions, indicating a most probable sale price that the subject property would bring as of the 
valuation date. Although individual sales often deviate from a situation where both buyer and seller 
are knowledgeable market participants, it is assumed that a sufficient number of sales should tend to 
reflect investor and/ or owner-user patterns of prices (and thus values) in a particular market. 
The following process is typically undertaken in order to develop an informed opinion of a 
property's value using the sales comparison approach: 
1.	 Search out sales, listing, or offerings of similar properties. 
2.	 Confirm the prices as to terms, reason for purchase, and if a bona fide sale. 
3.	 Compare the sale property's attributes with those of the property being appraised. 
4.	 Analyze all the differences as to their probable effect on the sale price. 
5.	 Form an opinion of the relative value of the property under appraisal as comp,ued with the 
sale price of each similar property. 
Our valuation first concentrates on the value of the underlying land (40.00 acres, zoned Rural­
Urban Transition), and then we employ another array of sales to value the contribution of the subject's 
residential im provement. 
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Trendline for Parcel Size 
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Typically, larger parcels sell for less per acre than smaller parcels, due to diminishing marginal 
utility. As such, we look at the sales as graphed for parcel size, to see if there is indeed a predictable 
pattern: 
Actually, what we see here is the inverse to what we typically see. Our assessment of this is that 
we have one sale that skews what would otherwise be a relatively flat line of central tendency. This 
considered, within the range of parcel sizes presented, there is not a demonstrative trend in pricing 
differential for parcel size. 
Bracketing Analysis 
Superior Sales 
Comparable 1	 This parcel abuts a previous phase of Moon Valley Ranch 
subdivision. This subdivision's location, being "closer in'" is superior 
to the subject. Clearly, this'comp's proximity to a mature subdivision 
makes it superior. Thus, at $15,000+ per acre, this sets the upper-most 
end for acreage residential development ground in the neighborhood. 
Inferior Sales 
Comparable 4	 Although this sale is situa ted essentially across the street from the 
subject, it is not in the Eagle area of im pact. The realtors who are most 
familiar with this sub-market indicated that parcels outside the area 
of impact are considered inferior. The reader wi II recall that the sale 
of this parcel may have been somewhat distressed in nature. While 
we consider this factor, we have no way to ascertain to what extent 
this may have affected the sales price. We therefore focus on its 
l .. locational disadvantages being ou t of the Eagle area of impact. At 
$7,333 per acre, this sale is considered inferior to the subject's 
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potential and sets the low end for acreage development ground in the 
subject's neighborhood. 
This sale is located south of the subject by about 5 miles. It is situated 
in an area that typically has more generic, higher density 
subdivisions. The Floating Feather/Beacon Light "corridor" is 
considered superior for acreage homesites. At about $9,000 per acre, 
this sale is considered slightly inferior to the subject's potential. 
The remaining two sales represent a very tight range of $10,141 to 
$10,258 per acre; time adjusted. Comparable 2 represents a 66-acre 
site purchased in August of 2000. This site is less than a mile 
southeast of the subject and is located in the Eagle impact area. The 
time adjusted indication for this sale is $10,285 per acre. Comparable 
3 represents a 40-acre parcel purchased in Apr:il of 2000. This site is 
also located less than a mile from the subject. The time adjusted 
indication for this sale is $10,141 per acre. In terms of topographical 
or configuration differences, they are minimal. These sites represent 
level, irrigated cropland - as does the subject. In terms of zoning 
differences, these sales are RT and RR respectively. There is no 
differential in the per acre pricing. In fact, Comparable 1 sets the high 
end of the comparables - with a lower density requirement than 
Comp 3 and the same as Comp 4. The nuances of zoning do not 
appear to have entered the formula at this juncture. 
Comps 3 and 4 represent the best indication of the subject's value 
potential in our opinion. Our conclusion is made at $10,000 per acre, 
which develops the following value estimate for the subject's land: 
FEE SIMPLE VALUE OF LAND IF VACANT, BY SALES COMPARISON ' 
Component 
Value if Vacant 
Conclusion 
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.ure & Marketing Time 
Historical Exposure Time 
Exposure time is defined as: 
The estimated length of time the property interest being appraised would have been offered on the 
market prior to the hypothetical consummation of a sale at market value on the effective date of the 
appraisal; a retrospective estimate based upon an analysis of past events assuming a competitive and 
open market.1 
The land sale comparables do not indicate a clear time on market trend. Thus" as a vacant tract, a 
conclusion of 12 months or Jess is typical exposure time in the market of recent years. 
Reasonable Exposure Time & Estimated Marketing Pe~riod 
Subject's Estimated Marketing Period 
Reasonable marketing time is defined as: 
The estimated amount of time it might take to sell a property interest in real estate at the estimated 
market value level during the period immedia'tely after the effective date of appraisal.s 
The estimate of marketing time uses some of the same data analyzed in the process of estimating 
reasonable exposure time. The difference, however, is that exposure time reflects the history of the 
general property class, whereas marketing period considers the anticipated marketability from the 
effective date of valuation, specific to the subject property. 
The factors influencing the subject's anticipated marketing period if offered for sale as of the date 
of our value estimate were set forth in the Property Strengths & Weaknesses section of this report. 
Market conditions have not materiatly changed, and so our conclusion is indicated at 12 months 
or less. . 
'Apprnisnl Sin/II/nrns Bonrn of IlIr Apprnisnl FOl/l/naliol/, Slnll'lIIml 01/ Apprnisnl Sinl/darn No.6 Srpll'lII/Jer 16, 199.~. 
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The following values are subject to the standard (generic), specific and extraordinary assumptions 
and limiting conditions as set forth in this report. Also, please pay particular attention to the 
following secbons of the report: 
Special Assumptions & Limiting Conditions 
Property Strengths & Weaknesses 




Market Value As Is
 
40.00 AC, As Vacant 
I 
, ESTHvlATED MARKETING TIME 






If Priced at Market Value and Professionally & Aggressively July 10, 2002 

















Sale Within 12 Months
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-
Underlying Assumptions 8. Limiting Conditions 
Following are Underlying Assumptions and limitIng Conditions pertaining to the appraisals (and 
as applicable, appraisal reviews) produced by Knipe Janoush Knipe, LLC Real Estate Advisory 
Services. The accompanying report is subject to these Underlying Assumptions and Limiting 
Conditions, vl'hich qualify the interpretation and use of the information contained in the report. 
Some of the clauses contained herein may not be relevant to a given appraisal probIE-m. However, 
their inclusion in this document does not diminish the relevance of other assumptions and conditions 




Hereafter, all references to the report reflect the specific appraisal report of which this statement of 
Underlying Assumptions and Limiting Conditions is a part. 
Unless otherwise noted, all references to Knipe Janoush Knipe, LLC, K]K, its npprnisers, or 
employees are used interchangeably, and should be so construed. Except in the Certificate of the 
Appraiser, as this report is a product of the firm of Knipe Janoush Knipe, LLC as well as the appraiser 
or appraisers signatory to the report, we have elected to author the report in the second person (i.e., 
n we" rather than "I"). 
Following are standard Underlying Assumptions and Limiting Conditions pertaining to the 
appraisals (and as applicable, appraisal reviews) produced by Knipe Janoush Knipe, LLC Commercial 
Real Estate Advisory Services. The attached report is subject to these Underlying Assumptions and 
Limiting Conditions, which qualify the interpretation and use of the information contained in the 
report. Some of the clauses contained herein may not be relevant to a given appraisal problem. 
However, their inclusion in this document does not diminish the relevance of other assumptions and 
conditions set forth herein. 
Again, the reader is advised that additional, more Specific Assumptions and Limiting Conditions 
may be contained in the Certificate of Appraisal, the body of the report, and the Letter of Transmittal. 
All such assumptions are believed to be compatible with generally accepted appraisal principles, 
USPAP and Appraisal Institute requirements. All slIch nsslllllptiollS, iI/elI/ding these Underlyil/g 
Assllmptions nnd Limiting Conditions, nre to be considered n pnrt of tize report, nl/d tlll~ render is ndvised tlwt 
ncceptllnce of the report constitutes ncceptlluce of nIl Uudcrlyillg IlIld SpecifiC Assll/llptiol/s fl1ld Limitillg 
COlldiliolls. 
By this notice, nIl persons nnd jinus reviewil/g, utilizing or relying on tizis report in nllY mil/iller billd 
thelllseives to ncctpt these nssllmptiolls nlld limitillg conditiolls. Do IIOt lise this report ~r yOIl do not so nccept 
these cOllditiolls nre n pnrt of the nppraisnl report. They nre n prefnce to nllY certificnholl, defillitioll, fnct or 
Ullillysis, nlld lire intellded to estnblish ns a mntter of record thllt the nppmiser's jllllctioll is to provide n presellt 
mnrket vaille or other vallie estimnte, as defined in the report, for the s/lbject properh) based lIPOII the apprniser's 
observatiolls of the s/lbject properh) relntive to the prevllilillg renl estnte mnrket. 
The certification of the report is subject to the foJIowing Underlying Assumptions and Limiting 
Conditions: 
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Generic I Standard Assumptions & Limiting Conditions 
Fair lending statement 
The estimates of market value in the report are not based in whole or in part upan the race, color 
or na tural origin of the present owners or occupants of the properties in the vicinity of the property 
appraised. 
Completion of the Assignment &Terms of Payment 
We will make every reasonable effort to complete all promised work on or before the requested 
delivery date in the client's Letter of Engagement or contract, as applicable. However, circumstances 
beyond our control can delay projects beyond the anticipated / requested delivery dates, and in such 
circumstances we insist on delivering a thorough analysis rather than an expedient one. We expect 
our clients will appreciate this commitment to quality, and will not impose late fees unless the delay is 
significant, and there has been no communication from the appraiser that there will be a delay. 
The contract for appraisal, consultation or analytical service is fulfilled and I:he total fee is payable 
upon completion of the report. Invoices not paid by the client within 30 days of delivery are subject to 
interest charges at an annual nominal rate of 18 percent, daily compounding. 
The fee for this appraisal or study is for the service rendered and not for Ithe time spent on the 
physical report. 
Cancellation of assignments will result in a pro-rata billing for work completed to date, with a 
minimum charge of $500 for work turned away subsequent to allocating time for appraisal of the 
subject property. 
limits of Appraisers' Expertise 
The appraisal is based on the premise that there is full compliance with all applicable federal, 
state, and local environmental regulations and laws unless. otherwise stated in the reporl; further, that 
all applicable zoning, building and use regulations and restrictions of all types have been complied 
with unless otherwise stated in the report; further, it is assumed that all required licenses, consents, 
permits or other legislative or administrative authority, local, state, federal andlor private entity or 
organization has been or can be obtained or renewed for any use considered in the value estimate. 
All representations of fact put forth in the report which are used as the bas;is of the appraiser's 
analyses, opinions and conclusions will be true and correct to the best of Knipe JanOLlsh Knipe's 
knowledge and belief. 
This appraisal report is an economic study to estimate value as defined in it. It: is not an 
engineering, construction, legal or architectural study nor ?urvey and expertise in these areas, among 
others, is not implied. 
No responsibility is assumed for matters legal in character or nature, whether existing or pending, 
nor matters of survey, nor of any architectural, structural, mechanical or engineering nature. No 
opinion is rendered as to the title, which is presumed to be good and merchantable. The property is 
appraised as if free and clear, unless otherwise sta ted in particular parts of the report. 
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==========S=t=a=n=d=a=rd=U=n=d=e=rl~yil"'" :ump~ & Limiting Conditions 
~' '~ 
All valuations in the report are applicable only under the stated program of highest and best use 
and are not necessarily applicable under other programs of use. 
The valuation of a component part of the property is applicable only as a parI: of the whole 
property. No separation may be made of any of the various valuation components without 
invalidating the results which would be derived by such a separation. 
Possession of the report or any copy thereof does not carry with it the right of publication through 
advertising media or any other public means of communication (especially any conclusions as to 
value, the identity of the appraiser, or the finn with which the appraiser is connected, or any reference 
to the Appraisal Institute or the MAl designation) without the prior consent and written approval of 
the appraiser, nor may it be used for other than its intended use 
The physical reports remain the property of the appraiser for the use of the client; the fee being for 
the analytical services only. The report may not be used for any purpose other than the purpose 
stated in the report by any person or corporation other than the client or the party to whom it is 
addressed or copied without the written consent of the appraiser, and then only in its entirety. 
Disclosure of the contents of the report is governed by the by-laws and Regulations of the Appraisal 
Institute. 
No third parties may rely upon the report for any purpose whatsoever, including the provision of 
financing for the acquisition of improvement of the subject property. This appraisal was prepared 
specifically for our client. Third parties who desire us to prepare an appraisal of the subject property 
for their use should contact the signatories of the report. 
It is acknowledged that this firm has consented to the Resolution Trust Corporation policy, 
effective July 30, 1991, for disclosure of reports by Resolution Trust Corporation receiverships, 
conservatorships, subsidiaries and appointed asset management contracting firms. 
This appraisal report remains the property of Knipe Janoush Knipe, and consists of "trade secrets 
and commercial or financial information" which is privileged and confidential and exempted from 
disclosure under 5 USC 552 (5) (4). Please notify the signatories of the accompanying report of any 
request for reproduction of the report or any part thereof. 
The appraiser may not divulge the material (evaluation) contents of the report, analylical findings 
or conclusions, or give a copy of the report to anyone other than the client or his designee as specified 
in writing (except as may be required by the Appraisal Institute as they may request in confidence for 
ethics enforcement), or by a court of law or body with the power to subpoena. 
! ." This appraisal is to be used only in its entirety and no part is to be used without the whole report. 
All conclusions and opinions concerning the analysis which are set forth in the report were 
prepared by the appraiser whose signature appears on the report, unless indicated as "Review 
Appraiser". No change of any item in the report shall be made by anyone other than the appraiser, 
and the appraiser and firm shall have no responsibility if any such unauthorized change is made. 
Conditions which are Not Apparent 
The appraiser assumes that there are no hidden conditions or conditions which are not readily 
apparent pertaining to the property, subsoil or structures which would render it more or less valuable 
than otherwise comparable properties. The appraiser assumes no responsibility for the ex'stence such 
conditions, or for engineering which might be required to discover such conditions. 
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standard Underlyin~ 'umpt( ~ limiting Conditions
- ...,The appraiser assumes no responsibility for adverse drainage conditions. 
The land or the soil for the area being appraised appears firm, however, subsidence in the area is 
unknown. The appraiser does not warrant against this condition or occurrence of problems arising 
from soil conditions. 
No judgment is made as to adequacy of type of insulation or energy efficiency of the 
improvemenl~ or equipment. 
Only visual surface inspection of the property appraised has been made by the appraiser, unless 
otherwise indicated in the report. The appraiser assumes no liability for damages or losses sustained 
by the client for latent or non-apparent defects existing on, below, or above the property which may 
not readily be ascertainable by a visual surface inspection. 
Nothing in this report should be deemed a certification or guarantee as to the structural and! or 
mechanical (electrical, heating, air conditioning, and plumbing) soundness of structures and the 
mechanical systems that relate to the functions and operations of the subject property. Rather, this 
appraisal assumes functions and operations are satisfactory, consistent with the age and condition of 
the subject improvements and associated mechanical systems, unless specifically stated in the report. 
This report does not preclude or limit any party of interest from obtaining, at its own expense, 
architectural, engineering or contractor inspections report, certifica tions, assurances and! or 
guarantees, which might serve the purposes of technically ascertaining the structural and! or 
mechanical soundness of the subject property. All such reports received shall be made available to the 
appraisers. 
Court Testimony 
The appraisers or those assisting in preparation of the report will not be asked or required to give 
testimony in court or hearing because of having made the appraisal, in full or in part, nor will they be 
requ ired to engage in extensive post appraisalconsullation with client or third parties except under 
separate and special arrangement and at an additional fee, with a minimum fee of $500 per day. 
Testimony or attendance in court by reason of the appraisal shall not be requ:ired of the appraisers 
herein named unless arrangements have been made prior to the completion and delivery of the report. 
Any such appearance and! or preparation for testimony will necessitate compensation in addition 
L. to that which will be paid for this appraisal report. Uitless expressly provided for, the findings 
contained in the report are limited to uses outlined in the "Purpose of the Appraisal" section of the 
report. 
Economic Conditions 
The market value estimated and the costs used are as of the date of the estimated value. All dollar 
amounts and values ascribed in the report are based on the purchasing power and price of the United 
States dollar and financing rates prevailing at the effective date of the value estimate. 
The value estimation herein is subject to an alI cash purchase consistent with the definition of 
market value utilized in the report and does not reflect special or favorable financing in today's 
market unless !;pecifically stated. The estimated market value is subject to change with market 
.changes over time; value is highly related to exposure, time, promotional effort:, terms, motivation, 
Johnson Property 
Under Road. Ada County, Idaho 










Standard Underlying f, . " ,Iptiq limiting Conditions 
.....' ....,
r and conditions surrounding the offering. The value estimate considers the productivity and relative 
attractiveness of the property physically and economically in the marketplace. 
In cases of appraisals involving the capitalization of income benefits, the estimate of market value 
or investment value or value in use is a reflection of such benefits and the' appraiser's interpretation of 
income and yields and other factors derived from general and specific client and market information. 
Such estimates are as of the date of the estimate of value; they are thus subject to change, as the market 
and value are naturally dynamic. 
The appraisal report and value estimate are subject to change if the physical or legal entity or 
financing are different than that envisioned in the report. 
Income Property Appraisals 
Responsible ownership and competent management are assumed. Data submitted to the 
appraiser regarding income and expenses is assumed to be accurate unless otherwise stated. 
This appraisal reflects a value based upon market considerations. It is not represented that the 
opinion as to value would allow for the replacement of the property in kind if it were destroyed. 
Identification of the Property 
Any legal description(s) shown herein are presumed to be correct, but have not been confirmed by 
a survey. The appraiser assumes no responsibility for such a survey, or for encroachments or 
overlapping that might be revealed thereby. 
The appraiser renders no opinion of a legal nature, such as to the ownership of the property or 
condition of title. 
The appraiser assumes the title to the property to be marketable, that the property is an 
unencumbered fee, and that the property does not exist. in violation of any applicable codes, 
ordinances, statutes or any other governmental regulations. 
The valuation estimate applies only to the property specifically identified and described in the 
ensuing report. The value reported is only applicable to the property rights appraised and the report 
should not be used for any other purposes. 
Appraisal Data and Analyses Submitted 
The analysis and statements contained in the appraisal are statements of opinion only, and not 
necessarily the only indication of value or analysis that might be obtained on the subject property. 
Appraisal opinions by qualified appraisers differ. No warranty or guarantee, express or implied, is 
made by the appraiser indicating that his opinion represents the only opinion of dollar value which 
might be obtained by the client on the date of valuation. ­
The appraiser, by rendering his appraisal report, is not offering legal advice or conclusions of law. 
The client is advised that legal matters concerning the property may have a direct bearing on the value 
of the property. If such legal matters are different than those assumed by the appraiser and set forth 
herein, the appraiser's value conclusion may be invalid. Client is advised to retain legal counsel to 
advise client regarding the effect, if any, of the assumptions, legal or otherwise, made by tile appraiser 
and set forth in these contingent and limiting conditions. 
Johnson Property 
Linder Road. Ada County, Idaho 
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standard Underlyino' 'umpt( & limiting Conditions 
= 
Americans with Disabilities Act 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) became effective January 26, 1992, We have not made 
a specific compliance survey and analysis of this property to determine whether or not it is in 
conformity with the various detailed requirements of ADA" It is possible that a compliance survey of 
the property, together with a detailed analysis of the requirements of ADA, could reveal that the 
property is not in compliance with one or more of the requirements of the Act.. If so, this fact could 
have a negative effect upon the value of the property. Since we have no direct evidence relating to 
this issue, we did not consider possible noncompliance with the requirements of ADA in estimating 
the value of the property. 
Binding Agreement 
Acceptance of, and/ or use of the report constitutes acceptance of all the preceding Underlying 
Assumptions & Limiting Conditions, as well as Specific Assumptions & Limiting Conditions which 
may appear in the Letter of Transmittal, Certificate of Appraisal, or the body of Lhe report. 
If any of the individual assumptions or limiting conditions are found to be unenforceable, the 
validity of the remaining assumptions is not lessened. 
Johnson Property 
Linder Road" Ada County, Idaho 










June 13, 2001 ,c.• Ii•
ML Theodore Johnson 
12601 W. New Hope Road KNIPE 
Star, Idaho 83669 JANOUSH 
RE:	 Appraisal Services KNIPE40 Acres vacant land 
NW V4 SW % Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1 West, BM LLC 
% Mile north of Beacon Light Rd. on Linder Road 
Eagle, Ada County, Idaho Commercial! Agricultural 
Real Estate Advisory 
ServicesThis letter is to confirm our agreement to perform professional services for YDU 
on the above-referenced property, as following. 
1661 Shoreline Drive 
Boise, [daba 83702 
The following conditions will be the basis of a contract agreement between you 
("Client") and Knipe Janoush Knipe, LLC, Commercial Real Estate Advisory 
Services ("KJK"). 




Type: Complete Appraisal, Summary Appraisal Report
 
2.	 Value Definitior!: Market value of the property in accordance with the
 
current definition utilized by the Uniform Standards of Professional
 
Appraisal Practice, unless another value (investor value, use value) is
 
specified' and dLsclosed in all documentation.
 
3.	 Independent Iudgment/Conduct: KJK agrees to exercise independent
 
judgment and to complete the appraisal or consulting assignment in
 
accordance with sound appraisal practice and the Code of Professional
 
Ethics and Standards of Professional Practice of the Appraisal Institu teo
 
4.	 Payment/Retainer: Client agrees to pay KJK as compensation for
 
professional appraisal services, as specified below:
 
Not to exceed $1,800 
Retainer $900 Due Upon Commencement of Services
 




Ii for any reason it appears that the fees will exceed this quotation, KJK
 
agrees to contact the client for further instructions J-approval.
 
5.	 Late Fees/Collection: Fees are due and payable upon KJK's delivery of
 


































Agre,"'--o::nt 19' "VIces· Page 2 of 3 
If any balance due KJK under this agreement is not paid within 30 days of our completion of 
the assignment, then such account shall be considered delinquent and shall accrue interest at 
per diem equivalent of a 1.5% per month late penalty, commencing on the date such payment 
became originally due. 
If any payment due K]X Inc. is not paid when due, Client shall pay all expenses of collection, 
including but not limited to, reasonable court costs and attorney's fees. 
6.	 Unbiased Opinion: KJK d~es not assure or guarantee any preconceived value to the Client. 
7.	 Copies of the Report: K]K agrees to provide the Client ~ copies of each clppraisal report. Extra 
copies can be made available at a $75 minimum charge per copy. 
8.	 The anticipated time to complete the project is 
30 Days from Client's Acceptance. 
This delivery date assumes we receive from the Client all readily available data p'~rtinent to the 
assignment, including but not necessarily limited to: 
• Permission to inspect/property contact 
• Any surveys 
• Copies of any prior appraisals 
The estimated completion period assumes that access to the property is ;,eadily available. We 
agree to make a good faith effort to complete the report within the anticipated time frame; but 
reserve the right to delay such completion where strict adherence to an anticipated delivery 
date would compromise the reliability or validity of the resulting analysis. 
9.	 Court Testimon\~: If Client requests or anyone requires KJK or its agent(s) to testify or be in
 
attendance at any court or administrative hearing relating to this appraisal or consulting
 
assignment, attend conferences or depositions relating thereto, and for any prepara.tion relating
 
thereto, such will be agreed upon prior to acceptance of the assignment.. and the Client shall
 
pay KJK at the rate of
 
$200 per hour. 
10.	 Cancellation: If you agree to the conditions set forth herein and subsequently decide that our 
services are no longer needed, you are responsible for payment for the time KJK has invested in 
the project up to that point. In such case, you will be billed for the time K]K has invested at the 
rate of £'500 per d~ not to exceed the fee quote for the complete assignment. 
There will be a minimum rescheduling charge of $500. 
11.	 Projects Put "On Hold." H during the course of this assignment K]K's work has to be put on 
hold due to the unavailability of information required from the Client, KJK will move on to the 
next project on its schedule, and will make every effort to come back to the Client's project as 
soon as the project next in line is completed, assuming the requested information from the 
Client has since become available. 
When an appraiser puts a project on hold for a number of days, it takes the better part of the 
first day back on the Client' 5 job to read through the file notes and appraisal draft to get back 
000508
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KNIPE JANOUSH KNIPE, LLC (fonnerly JANOUSH & ASSOCIATES) 
ASSOCIATE APPRAISER 
Currently an Associate Appraiser with Knipe ]anoush Knipe, LLC, a full service real estate consulting 
firm. Emphasis is on performing complete, self-contained appraisals and feasibility studies of 
residential subdivisions, light industrial properties, and retail/commercial properties. Primary clients 
are lenders and developers in Idaho. 
KEY BANK OF IDAHO 
VICE PRESiDENT & RELATIONSHIP MANAGER 
Served as Vice President of Key Bank's construction loan division, was assigned the division's ten 
largest borrowers in order to congeal and expand these relationships. Primary duties involved the 
analysis of proposed construction projects, with greatest emphasis on retail, light industrial and 
residential subdivisions. 
RAMSER DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC. 
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT & PARTNER. 
Ramser Development Company is a mid-sized, regional developer of industrial properties in Southern 
California. He joined this firm after a ten-year career in commercial real estate banking and was 
charged with the mission of restructuring and redirecting the company's core business. 
5igll ificallt A ccomplisl'llleJlts: 
Developed and implemented short and long term strategies in the form of a formal business 
plan to - downsize and restructure the company, focusing on the comp]!etion, leasing, and 
intensive management of projects with the most profit potential and negotiating the sale of 
unprofitable assets. 
Implemented new accounting and reporting procedures; expanded and updated the company's 
computer systems to accommodate more sophisticated software. 
Secured an institutional equity investor, providing $30 million enabling the refinance of 
troubled projects. 
Renegotiated an/or restructured $45 million in construction and term debt. 
Development and partner in the construction of five industrial buildings totaling 750,000 square 
feet. All buildings were either pre-leased or pre-SOld p'rior to completion. 
'. . '. '. . ;..... ; .. ;. '."~., 
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SECURITY PACIFIC REALTY VENTURES 
VICE PRESIDENT & REGIONAL MANAGER 
This division of Security Pacific Corporation handled the bank's real estate joint ventures and 
participating mortgages. SPRV ventured with local, regional, and national developers on virtually all 
types of real estate; office buildings, neighborhood shopping centers, regional malls, industrial parks, 
subdivisions, and construction revolvers. The venture portfolio exceeded $1.2 billion. 
Sig7lificmlt Accol7lplisJl11le1lts: 
Direct P ,~ L responsibility for the portfolio with heavy emphasis on documentation and legal 
matters. 
Implemented the design of a comprehensive software package for the group that incorporated 
investment specific measures for the monitoring of various project investments. 
Lead officer in the origination, due diligence, documentation and closing of SPRV's largest 
single transaction at that time. The project involved the development of a master-planned 
community incorporating approximately 1,000 acres, requiring capital of $142 million. 
Implemented a program, in concert with Security Pacific's Capital Markets Group, utilizing 
interest rate swaps and other instruments in order to hedge interest rate risk on invested capital. 
SECURITY PACIFIC REALTY FINANCE, INC. 
VICE PRESIDENT & REGIONAL MANAGER 
SPRFI's mission was to enhance Security Pacific's ROA through fee generating services to existing 
commercial real estate customers. These services included arranging term financing for and equity 
investments in institutional quality real estate, ranging in size from $5 million to $75 million; utilizing 
Security Pacific's correspondent relationship with major life insurance and Japanese financial service 
companies. In addition, SPRFI provided all underwriting and due diligence services for Security 
Pacific Merchant Bank in the securitization of approximately $1 billion in real estate debt. 
Sigl/ljicallt A.ccomplisJllllellts: 
•	 Developed and implemented a full business plan with short and long range strategies, directed 
the opera tions of the proposed regional office and minimized the time pE'riod between start­
up and profitability. 
• Loca ted and staffed a new office Newport Beach, CA with loan officers and support staff. 
•	 Spearheaded SPRFI's "Project Japan" relationships, comprised of nine Japanese conespondent 
banks; personally oversaw all presentations and transaction closings. 
•	 Establi~hed the first loan servicing agreements between a Security Pacific company and a . 
Ja panese financia I institu tion. 
• Top Loan Producer Award. 
SECURITY PACIFIC MORTGAGE AND REAL ESTATE SERVICES 
VICE PRESIDENT 
SPRMS was a full service real estate finance company with 12 offices nationwide, focusing primarily
 
on direct conventional construction, participating in term loans for institutional quality real estate
 
ranging in size from $7 million to $75 million. These included offices, retail, industrial, residential
 
subdivision, builder lines, and land developments.
 
Significallt AccolllpIislIlIlents: 
• Top Loan Producer A ward 
• Develop particular expertise in industrial and retail developments. 
";:," ..	 ::1 ""'.. 
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RAINER MORTGAGE SERVICES 
VICE PRESIDENT & J\;IANAGER 
Worked with Rainer Mortgage Services, a subsidiary of Rainer National Bank, an $11 billion regional 
bank (headquartered in Seattle, WA). Worked in the southern regional office located in Orange 
County, CA. Expanded Rainer's real estate presence in Southern California. RMS provided 
construction and term financing for institutional quality properties ranging in size from $2 million to 
$55 million. 
S ignijical/t Accomplis/mIen ts: 




Fourth highest producer out of twenty company wide and the youngest by nine years.
 
Nine months prior to the merger, promoted to regional vice president with responsibilities
 
including the management of a $120 million construction loan portfolio and overseeing the
 
operations of the Orange County and San Diego offices.
 
'EDUCATJONL_' --_---.~.-._.-_-- .. _-_--.-_.-- "_·-_·_·-_·--_"1.._-._.-_----_ ._.--_"--_---_--._'_.--._.,._"_.-_._"__
B.A. Economics and Business Administration (double major) 1980 - Lake Forest 
College, Lake Forest, Illinois 
Postgraduate: Corporate Finance 
1980-1981 - Grad uate School of Management, University of California 
... --. --­ ----. -. ,,"__ .n. _. ._._._1 
. AFFILIATIONS 
Board of Directors, Idaho Fish and Wildlife Association 
Nature Conservancy 
Ducks Unlimited- U.s. and Mexico 
.....'.... ' : ,. ~.'" .. ,.;.. : :.: ".' .. ". 
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:OVERVIEW OF QUALIFICATIONS ~ 
This overview serves as a cover letter to the professional resume of Bradford Taylor Knipe. 
General Background 
Bro'ught up in a family of real estate professionals, Bradford Knipe is the son of a Boise-based, regional 
farm and ranch broker, William Knipe, Jr., Ph.D., ALe and is the oldest son of Diane Shaw Knipe, CRS 
who is a commercial broker, property manager and leasing agent. One of his brothers is a real estate 
anorney; another took over his father's farm and ranch brokerage; a third is a specialist in training time 
share sales staff in Orlando; and his oldest brother, William B. Knipe, III (Trey), MAl, is his partner. 
Brad and Trey established their commercial real estate appraisal and consulting practice in 1993. 
Bradford Knipe resided in the Puget Sound area for three rears, and spent three years in Northern 
Idaho while attending the University of Idaho. He is a Boise native, but the six years he spent outside 
the Boise area and his extensive travels through 1\·lontana, Idaho, Oregon and Washington afford him a 
valuable perspective on the cycles of various other real estate markets in the region. 
Business Accomplishments 
Bradford Knipe has been actively involved in appraisal. appraisal review and consulting on a variety of 
commercial. residential, industrial and special-purpose properties since 1989. Prior to that, Knipe was 
employed in the personal computer software industry in Seattle, Washington, where he resided 
following his graduation from the University of Idaho in 1986. While there, he was involved in the 
expansion of two small business concerns. 
Knipe serves real estate clients from around the country, with a concentration on the appraisal and 
evaluation of complex income-producing properties for lending institutions (mortgage financing and 
disposition of special credit properties). Other clients include local, state and federal government 
entities, law firms, accountants, and local, regional and institutional investors. Consulting services 
include identification of the most favorable investment options among properties named in 1031 
exchange proceedings, feasibility and market studies, etc. 
Knipe has on several occasions written articles for local trade publications including the Building 
Officers and Managers Association of Treasure Valley. He has edited/published a newsletter on Ada 
and Canyon County residential trends (1994-1998) and commercial trends (1998-2001), and is often 
quoted in the local press as an authority on office, industrial and land market dynamics. 
Bradford Knipe attained the Appraisallnstitute's highest professional designation (MAl) within 4 years 
of becoming a candidate with that organization, and the Commercial Investment Real Estate Institute's 
CCIM designation within the year following. Most recently, Knipe was invited to join the National 
Associa lion of Realtor's consulting division, The Counselors of Real Estate. 
MUJlidisclplinary Education 
A graduate of the University of Idaho (two Bachelor of Science degrees, 1985 am'l 1986), Bradford 
Knipe has received high marks in an interdisciplinary curriculum, emphasizing the study of human 
behavior on both individual (Psychology) and collective (Political Science) levels. These 
complementary perspectives afford him a conceptual advantage over those whose foclls is limited to 
finance paradigms. 
His real estate education includes brokerage classes as well as all the Appraisal Institute's required 
courses for the MAl designation, all the Commercial Investment Real Estate Institute's required :ourses 
for the CCIM designation, and various seminars. His courses reflect current theory and methodology, 
having been taken during the period 1990 to 1997. Knipe has been placed in accelerated, honors and 
independent studies programs since junior high school, and was able to successfully challenge many of 
his appraisal and finance courses, including several offered by the Appraisal Institute (AI), Af'lerican 
Society of Farm Ivlanagers and Rural ApprRisers (ASFI\IRA), and the Commercial Investment Real 
Estate Institute (ClREI). 


















OVERVI EW OF QUALI FI CATIONS (co'--=n-'-Ct"-.-in_u-=-e-=-d}'-- _ 
Areas 01 Specialization 
Bradford Knipe has extensive experience in the appraisal of retail, office, industrial, multifamily, 
subdivision, agricultural and special-purpose properties. Preferred property Iypes and areas of 
specia lizalion are as follows: 
Consulting for Feasibility / Inveshnenl Value / Risk Analysis 
Professional/Medical/Dental Office 
Industrial (Warehouse, Shop, Manufacturing, Flex-Space, etc.) & Self-Storage (Mini-Storage) 
Recreation Lots / Govemment Leased Lots 
Special-Purpose (e.g., Full & Self-Service Car Wash, Convenience Store, Fueling Operation) 
Land Valuation 
Subdivision Cash Flow Analysis (Single-Family Residential, Condominiu m & Townhouse Projects) 
Eminent Domain Appraisal (Right-of-Way / Condemnation / Easement Valuation) 
Apprnisal Review for Lending, Eminent Domain and Litigation Purposes 
Publication of J'vlarket Trends & Statistics 
Business Philosophy 
Knipe's appraisal emphasis blends his strong analytical skills, appreciation of the English language, 
and his eye for design to produce a ppraisal reports reflecting: 
Good judgment and soundness of ana lysis 
A logical approach to innuences not readily qunntifiable from market data 
Personal integrity 
Clarity of communication 
An attractive, highly visual, and logical presentation 
In so doing, Knipe brings to the table his competence in the latest availnble technologies. He learned 
page layout from the firm that led the personal computer desktop publishing revolution--Seattle's 
Aldus Corporation. Bradford Knipe's computer literacy ranges from cash flow and sprendsheet 
analysis, to graphic design and desktop publishing. 
Products & Services Offered 
Appraisal products offered include complete and limited scope appraisals in self-contained, summary 
j.: or restricted formalS, analyses of inveshnent value, feaSibility studies, market analysis', property 
inventory shJdies, etc. As his appraisals tend to be thorough, and well-supported. 
Bradford Knipe emphasizes a quality analysis, and fees tend to reflect his commihnent to 
professionalism, trending toward the mid- to upper--Ievels of the range for local appraisal services. 
Consulting services are provided on an hourly, daily or we~kly rate, or on a project basis.
_._----=!REFERENCES 
Scott R. Rodie VP & Chief Appraiser, Century Pacific Bank 714-372-8187 
Ronald W. Bunn, MAl, eRE VP & Regional Manager, Bank of America 360-696-5642 
R. Doyle Pugmire Chief Appraiser, Idaho Transportation Department 208-334-8517 
Tom Boyle. MAl Senior Review Appraiser, U.s. Bank 503-275-6650 
.__..__._--------]ffmUME .~----------------------------------------" 
On the pages following is presented a summary of Bradford Knipe's business and educatio"al background. 
. . .: :.•..... :. 
"' .. :::" ..- ... 
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Boise State University. Boise. Idaho 
Pre-Professiona IStudies (Pre-MeJ) 1991-1992 CPA in major: 3.9 Overall: 3.5 
University of Idaho. Moscow, Idaho 
Bachelor of Science, Politicill ,S·(jence 
B~chelor of Science, Psycholof;)' 
1986 
1985 
CPA in major: 4.0 
GPA in major: 3.9 
Business ll. Statistics Courses; 
Fin~ncial Accounting. M"nagerial Accounting. Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Business Lmv, Business Math. 
Statistical Methods, Experimental Design, Research Methods for the Sod"1Sciences, BASIC Programming. 
I... 
Knipe Janoush Knipe, llC 
Commercial 8. Agricullural Real Estate Advisory Services, Boise, Idaho 
Real Estate Advisor' Member, Manager of Technology & Publications 
Real Estate Soles Agent 
Appraisal and counseling for complex commercial, industri~1. 
anJ special-purpose properties; right-of-WilY; litigation; 
c feasibility analyses; market studies; publications; appraisal 
, review; negotiahons. 
Knipe ll. Knipe, Inc. 
Commercial Real Estate Services, Boise, Idaho 
Real Estate Appraiser & Consulfant • President 
Appraisal of commercial, industrial. ami special-purpose 
properties; righl-of-way villuat;on; consulting; feasibility 
analysis; markl'l studies; real eslale newsleller publication. 
Real Estate Consulling Group, Inc./Appraisal Group, Inc. Boise, Idaho 
Senior Commercial Appraiser & Consultant. 
Appraisill of commercial. induslrial, agricuJlural and speciill­
purpose properties. Computer specialist. 
Property Counselors Northwest. Boise. Idaho 
Commercial Real Estate Appraiser. 
(PCNW subsequenlly merged with RECC, Inc.) 
3/00 to Present 
I 0/S'3 to 2/00 
2/90 to 9/93 
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SPECIALIZED REAL ESTATE EDUCATION
 
Course or Examination Title
 
Fundamentals of Real Estate 
Washington State Real Estate Licensing Exam 
RL'al Estate Appraisal Principles (lAl/I-1I0)
 
StandanJs of Professional Practice A (SPPA/I-IIO)
 
Capitalization Theory & Techni'lues A (1BA/I-310)
 
Capitalization Theory & Techni~ues B (lBB/ 11-510)
 
Advanced Rural Appraisal (A-30)
 
Stale of Idaho General Apprais'" Exam
 
Real Estate Appraisal Procedure'S (1 A2/1-120)
 
Standards of Professional Practice B (SPI'B/II-120)
 
Advanced Applications/Cdse SludiL'S (2-1/11-550)
 
Report Writing and ValuMion Analysis (II-~O) 
Appraisallnslitute's Comprehensive Exam (MAl)
 
Business Valualion, Paris 1 & 2 (Seminnr)
 
Financial Analysis for Conunerciallnvt?stmenl R.E. (et-101)
 
Dilta Confirmation ;InJ Verificlltion ~minar 
Market Analysis for Commerdallnveslment R.E. (et-201)
 
Decision Analysis for Commercial Investment KE. (C1·301)
 
Core Courses Review (CH08)
 
Commerciallnvestmenl Real Estate Institute's Camp. (CClM)
 
Standards of Professional Practice C (SPPC/ 11-130)
 
Real Estate Litigation in Idaho
 
I" 
The Digilal Appraisal Office 
The Valuation of Local Retail Properties 
Special-Purpose Properties: The Challenge of Appraising in Ltd. Mkls. 9-99 
~ 
Sponsor 8. location 
Quorum R. E. School. Seanle, WA 
Sla,e of Washington. Bellevue, WA 
Appraisal Institute, Boise, JD 
AppraisallnstitlJte. Reno, NV 
AppraisJllnstil1Jte, Boise, 10 
Apprc,isallnstitute. Seattle, WA 
Aml'r. Soc. Farm Mgrs .. Boise. ID 
State of Id,h" [r'SI), Boise, 10 
Appraisallnstitut.·, Seattle. WA 
Apprais"llnstitute, Bellevue, WA 
/\rpraiSilllnstitule. lJoise, ID 
AppraisallnstitutL'. 5.1crllmento, CA 
AppraisJlln,titute, SeaTac. WA 
Apprai,,)lln'titute. 1'051 Falls, ID 
Conun. Inv, R~il} Estille Inst.. Boise, ID 
Appraisallnstitl.te, Boise, ID 
Comm. Inv. I-(eal Estate In;I., Doise, ID 
Comm. Inv, H.I~al Estille Ir~;l., Boise. ID 
Comm. Inv. Real Estate Inst., JrlJndo, FL 
Comm. Inv. Real Estate Insl .. Orlando, FL 
Apprais.1 Institute. Portland. OR 
Nlliional OU5int?~;s Institult!, Boise, Idaho 
ApprnisilllnstitUle, Boise, Idaho 
ApprnisallnslitulO. Ketchum, Idaho 
Appraisal Institute, Ketchum, Idaho 
Building Owners & Managers Assn., Boise, 10 
AI/ ASFMRA, Portland, Oregon 
Idilho Real Estate Commjssion, Boist.". ID 
Apprai'i1llnstitul". Boise, ID 


























BOMA Boise Real Estate SympoSium 
F~Jeral L3nd Acquisitions & Exchanges 
Idaho Real Estate Sales License Exam 
Eminent Domain in Idaho 
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HONORS, AFFILIATIONS, COMPUTER EXPERIENCE & MISCEllANEA 
Professional ( Business Affiliations & Memberships 
State of Idaho Certified General Appraiser (CGA-DOO1l?, December 1992). 
Member of Building Officers and Managers Association (BOMA) of Idaho's Treasure Valley (1993). 
Member, Boise Area Chamber of Commerce (1993). 
Member, National Association of Realtors® Appraisal Section (AOOOm 0756, June 1994). 
Accredited Member, Appraisal Institute (MAl Member No. 10992, May 1996). 
Member, Ada County Association of Realtors®/Soulhwest Idaho Multiple Listing Service (May '1997). 
Accredited Member, Commercial Investment Real Estate Institute (CCl1\'1 Member No. ?213, June 1997). 
Associate Member, Urban Land Institute (1997). 
Member, International Right-of-Way Association (1997). 
State of Montana Certified General Real Estate Appraiser (Certificate No. 494, Octoper 1997). 
State of Washington Certified General Real Estate Appraiser (Certificate No. 1100946, tv:!ay 2000). 
Accred ited Member, The Counselors of Real Estate (CRE, June 2000). 
State of Idaho Licensed Rea I Estate Sa les Agen t (SP00024825, October 2000). 
Boards and CommiHees
 
Appraisal Institute Regional Ethics & Counseling Panel ([erm August 1996-December 1998).
 
Chairman, Public Relations Committee, B01\'IA Boise Commercial Real Estate Symposium (1997-98)
 
Board of Directors, Southern Idaho Chapter, Appraisal Institute (1998).
 
Board of Directors, Director of Communications, BOMA of Idaho's Treasure Valley (1998).
 
State of Idaho Lease/ Purchase Task Force (1999).
 
2000 Vice-president, Southern Idaho Chapter, Appraisallnstih.lte.
 
2001 President, Southern Idaho Cha pter, Appraisal Institute.
 
2002 Founder/Chairman of the Board, Idaho Appraiser Political Action Committee (IAPAC).
 
Academic Achievemenfs 
Program for Accelerated Learners, Grades 8-12 (Meridian School District).
 
Pi Gamma Mu International Honor Society, Social Sciences.
 
Dean's List, Four Semesters (University of Idaho).
 
"Outstanding Senior Award" nominee (University of Idaho, 1986).
 
Academic Scholarship, School of Health Sciences (Boise State University, 1992).
 
Graduate Record Examination (GRE): Scored in 89th percentile nationally on verbal abilities,
 
74th percentile on analytical abilities (relative to all US college graduates sitting for the eRE in 1986).
 
Computer Bae kground 
Extensive personal computer experience: IBM PC (since 1984) Apple Macintosh/PowerPC (since 1988).
 
Member, Macintosh Users Group of Southern Idaho.
 
Internet e-mail address: btk@knipejanoush.com; web page: http://www.knipejanoush.com/.
 
Strong working knowledge of Argus cash flow software, Microsoft Word, Excel, Adobe PageMaker, etc.
 
General Skills 
Effective technical writing and business communications skills.
 
Extensive computer publishing abilities.
 
Strong background in general business, all phases of small business operation.
 
Good grounding in chemical, physical, life and environmental sciences.
 




n Boise Office Market Conditions," BOMA Leasing Guide, 1991.
 
"Boise's Office Marketplace: Occupancy Rates Show Steady Increase," BOMA Leasing Guide, 1992,.
 
"Boise Office Market Conditions: Vacancy Stabilizes and Rents Increase," BOMA Leasin1; Guide, 1995.
 
"Boise Office Market Conditions: Highs for Oce. & Rents Spur Dev'L Plans," BOMA LeaSing Guide, 1996.
 
Quoted in Idaho Sta tesman, ldaho Business Review, Commercial Investment Real Estate Journal aan. 1998).
 
"Boise Office Market Conditions: Dev't Activity & Vacancy Rates on the Rise," B01\IA Lensing Gude, 1998.
 
Editor / publisher of the Southern Idaho Reol Estate News Re~idelltill/ Report and COIllIIIL'rt'l1l1 Report.
 
Editor, First & Second Annual BOMA Boise Commercial Real Estate Symposium Guide 1998 & 1999.
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PARTIAL LIST OF EXPERIENCE / PROPERTY TYPES J 






Car Wash, Full-Service Tunnel 










Eminent Domain/ Right-of-Way 
Farm Implement Dealership 
Fitness Club 
Flex-Space 
Government Ad min. Building 
Government Lab 
Heavy Equipment Dealership 
Hotel 
Leased Fee Estates 
Leasehold Estates 
Light Industrial Shop 
Conserva tion Easement 
Manufacturing, Food Service 
r"lanufacruring, Electronics 
Market Shldies, Commercial 
Market Studies, Multifamily 

















Single Family R{'sidence 
Subdivision, Corr,mercial 
Subdivision, Manutactured Housing 





iAPPRAISAL & COUNSELING SERVICES-PERFORMED FOR THE FOLLOWING 
Ada County Highway District 
American Bank of Commerce 
Bank of America, NT&SA 
Bank One 
Boise City Housing Authority 
Broadway Bank, Texas 
Central District Health Dept. 
City of Boise Air Terminal 
City of Boise, City Attorneys' Office 
City of Boise Public Works 
Coors Brewing Company 
F&C Corporation 
Farmers & Merchants State Bank 
Farmers Home Administration 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. 
First Interstate Bank 
First Security Bank 
Harty & Harty 
Ida-Ore Planning & Development 
Idaho Banking Co, 
Idaho Dept. of Parks & Recreation 
Idaho Dept. of Lands 
Idaho Independent Bank 
Idaho Transporlation Department 
Intermountain Development Group 
Key Bank 
NCSB Texas 
Pacific One Bank 
Paragon InVE,stments 
Pioneer Federal Savings & Loan 
Resolution Trust Corp. 
Security Pacific Bank 
Sundance Investments, LP 
Sunwest Bank, California 
Syringa Bank 
West One Bank/US. Bancorp 
US. Dept. of Interior, Bureclu of Reclamation 
US. Dept. of Interior, Forest Service 
US. Dept. of Interior, National Park Service 
U.s. Govt., General Services Administration 
United Water 
Washington Federal Savings & Loan 
Washington Mutual Bank/Western Bank 
WeJ]s Fargo Bank 
Various Attorneys, Loan Brokers, Developers, 
Investors & Private Sector Entities 
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EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE REAL PROPERTY
 
THIS AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE REAL PROPERTY ("Agreement") is made as of 
this _ day of July, 2002, by and between by and between Thomas G. Maile IV & Colleen Maile, 
husband and wife, and/or their assigns hereinafter referred to as ("Buyer") and Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust, whose office address is 1260 J West Hope Road, Star, Idaho,
 
hereinafter referred to as ("Seller");
 
1. Consideration: In consideration of the acceptance of this Agreement, 
Buyer shall deposit the sum of $2,500.00 with designated escrow agent in said agent"s trust 
account, all in accordance with the tenns and condition~ hereinafter set forth. 
2. Terms & Conditions: The property located in Ada County, Idaho 
generally described as a 40 acre parcel located immediately east of Under Road, Eagle, Idaho and 
approximately 1/4 mile north of Beacon Light Road, Eagle, Idaho, and as further described in 
Exhibit "A" annexed hereto and incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in full herein. 
(A) Seller shall assign and transfer any and all mineral, and water rights relative to the 
above described property and covenants to execute any and all documents necessaty to effectuate 
said transfer. 
2. Purchase Price. The sum 0 f$400,000.00subject to the terms and conditions set 
forth in the attached Exhibit "A", which is annexed hereto and made a part hereof as if set forth in 
full herein. 
3. Conveying Documents, Title and Title Insurance. 
(a) The Property shall be conveyed by a General Warranty Deed in a form reasonably 
acceptabJeto Buyer subject only to those certain exceptions, easements, and restrictions approved 





















by Buyer prior to closing. 
(b) The Seller shall pay for title insurance policy in the amount of the selling price 
showing marketable title in Seller's name. That immediately upon the execution of the current 
Agreement, Seller shall direct title insurer to issue a preliminary title report, naming the Buyers as 
the prospective insured, showing the purchase price as the policy amount. 
4. Closing Date & Possession Date. see Exhibit "A"for terms and condil:ions. 
Possession will be granted to Buyer upon closing of real property. 
5. Occupancy and Leases. See Exhibit "A"for terms and conditions. 
6. :rime of Essence. Time is of the essence of this Agreement. Any reference herein 
to time periods of less than six (6) days shall in the computation thereof exclude Saturdays, 
Sundays and legal holidays, and any time period provided for herein which shall end on a 
Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday shall extend to 5:00 p.m. on the next full business day. 
7. Documents for Closing. Seller shall provide marketable title at closing. 
8. Attorney Fees and Costs. All matters pertaining to this Agreement (including its 
interpretation, application, validity, performance and breach), shall be governed by, construed and 
enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. The parties herein waive trial by jury 
and agree to submit to the personal jurisdiction and venueof a court of subject matter jurisdiction 
located in Canyon County, State ofIdaho. In the event that litigation results from or arises out of 
this Agreement or the performance thereof, the non prevailing party shall reimburse the prevailing 
party's reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and all other expenses, whether or not taxable by the 
court as costs, in addition to any other relief to which the prevailing party may be entitled, 
including attorney's fees and costs associated with any appeal. In such event, no action shall be 







entertained by said court or any court of competent jurisdiction iffiled more than one year 
subsequent to the date the cause(s) ofaction actual!y accrued regardless ofwhether damages were 
otherwise as of said time calculable. The parties agree to submit to binding arbitration in lieu of 
court proceedings concerning the terms and conditions herein, consistent with the American 
Arbitration Association. 
9. Default. If Buyer fails to perform this Agreement within the time specified, the 
deposits paid by the Buyer aforesaid may be retained by or for the account of Seller as liquidated 
damages (subject to Buyer's due diligence provisions), consideration for the execution of this 
Agreement and in full settlement of any claims; whereupon all parties shall be relieved of all 
obligations under this Agreement, subject to the conditions set f0I1h in Exhibit "A". 
If, for any reason other than failure of Seller to render his title marketable after diligent 
effort, Seller fails, neglects or refuses to perform this Agreement, the Buyer may seek specific 
performance or elect to receive the return of their deposits without thereby waiving any action for 
damages resulting from Seller's breach. 
10 Conveyance. Seller shall convey title to the propel1y by statutory warran.ty deed 
subject only to matters contained in Paragraph 3 hereof and those otherwise accepted by Buyer. 
Personal property shall, at the request of the Buyer, be conveyed by an absolute bill of :,ale with 
warranty of title, subject to such liens as may be otherwise provided for herein. 
II. Other Agreements. No prior agreements or representations shall be binding upon 
any of the parties hereto unless incorporated in this Agreement. No modifications or changes in 
this Agreement shall be valid or binding upon the parties hereto unless in writing, executed by the 
parties to be bound thereby. 







12, Binding Agreement. The parties hereto agree that this agreement shall be binding 
upon the parties, their heirs, devisees, assignees, transferees, etc. 
The parties acknowledge that Thomas Maile d/b/a! Thomas Maile Real Estate Company, is 
a licensed Real Estate Broker and is representing himself and Colleen Birch Maile, husband and 
wife, and/or their assigns in this transaction, (hereinafter referred to collectively as Buyer). 
Dated this jlZjj11fi')r20f July, 2002 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, by: 
/J.2-.-­
Dated this __?'-__ day of July, 2002 
Lj) / J( ~,///({,. .-- //7i " ~ ,C', \..
._._----~. ..~ \...." t./L-- "-.' . 
BUYER 
Dated this ~_._ day of July, 2002. 
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ADDENDUM TO REAL ESTATE AGREEMENT
 
BETWEEN THOMAS & COLLEEN MAILE AND JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST
 
Undersigned parties agree to the additional terms to the above refel-enced and attached 
Ernest Money Agreement as follows: 
(1) Tile parties acknowledge that the real property located in Ada County, Idaho 
generally described as a 40 acre parcel located immediately east of Linder Road, Eagle, 
Idaho and approximately 1/4 mile north of Beacon Light Road, EagIE~, Idaho with a legal 
description of "Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
(2). The parties shall equally pay all the expenses of closing costs and escrow. 
however, Seller shall pay for the cost of title insurance. 
(3) The parties acknowledge that the property is subject to a current year crop 
lease and the Seller warrants that no ot~~r.lease or agreements affect the real property, 
past the current crop year( ~'I;;~iJ :,.,~4iJrl-~lf-rv.f~,?ct rj/\/!l t (~ 
(4) The purchase price of $400,000.00 will be paid as fOl!oJ,s:l . 
(a) Buyer to provide immediate earnest money payment of $2,500.00; at 
closing Buyer to provide the sum of $97,500.00, as additional down-payment. 
(b) As to the balance of the purchase price, to wit: $300,000.00, Buyer shall 
be obligated to Seller for said principal outstanding balance, together with 7% percent 
interest per annum thereon from the date of closing until paid in full, amortized over fjfteen 
(15) years. Buyer shall be obligated to Seller for a minimum payment of $,32,357.00 (which 
would include principal and interest). payable each year from the anniversary date of 
closing, and each year thereafter, until the 5th anniversary of the closing date, at which the 
full remaining principal and interest shall be paid in full, subject to the following terms and 
conditions. With each payment, the parties acknowledge interest to be paid first and the 
balance to be applied to principal. Buyer is entitled to pay the entire balanCI;} or such 
additional sums at any time without pre-payment penalty. 
(c) Buyer and Seller acknowledge that payment from the Buyer to Seller for 
the balance of the purchase price of the property shall be secured by Buyer executing a 
standard Deed of Trust, incorporating the terms herein, to be placed in escrow at Alliance 
Title, of Boise, Idaho, with both parties sharing evenly in the cost of the escrow charges. 
Seller agrees to the assignment of interests in the real property by Buyer (Ie£lal entity 
established by Buyer) before or after closing and further to the assignment of the 
obligation under the Buyer above referenced, conditioned upon Seller's written approval, 
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which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. A true and correct copy of the Deed 
of Trust form is annexed hereto as Exhibit "A-2" and incorporated by refemnce herein as 
if set forth in full herein. 
(d) The Buyer agrees that the failure to abide by above performance requirements 
shall constitute a default, entitling the Seller to foreclosure. 
(4) The Parties acknowledge that this agreement, together with BUYE!r's obligations 
are conditioned upon Buyer undertaking "due diligence" review within the next thirty (30) 
days after the Buyer receives Seller's preliminary title report, prepared by Alliance Title, 
for purposes of determining the financial feasibility of the project, inclUding but not limited 
to research involving development costs, engineering, water feasibility, water rights with 
the Department of Water Resources. electrical costs, road costs, de\l'elopmE~nt costs, site 
review, all governmental entities approval and issuance of all necessary permits to allow 
the Buyer's development, by any governmental agencies, including but limited to the City 
of Eagle, Ada County Highway District, and County of Ada approving Buyer's proposed 
development, and the potential of granting to Buyer all necessary permits for the 
commencement of said project. The contract is also contingent upon the Buyer's 
verification that the proP3rty is not subject to any other encumbrances or restriction which 
would prohibit the Buyers plans, etc. 
The contract is also contingent upon the Buyer's verification that the property is not 
in any designated wetlands, flood plain and/or flood way, etc. In addition after the 
execution of this real estate purchase agreement the Buyer shall be afforded the right to 
have certain tests performed with the aid of construction equipment to determine the 
existence of bedrock and/or determination of sewer depths, ground water. and/or irrigation 
requirements, which may impair the construction of certain improvements. 
Said testing and "due diligence" shall be performed within thirty (30) days after the 
receipt of the preliminary title report and if determined that any impairment exists will 
impair Buyer's development, buyer in buyer's sale discretion, shall havE~ the right to cancel 
this agreement and the parties agree to the return of the earnest mOnE~y deposited to the 
Buyer, with each party bearing their own costs and fees. 
Buyers' testing for the existence of groundwater or bedrock that may impair 
construction, described herein, shall be accomplished in such mannE~r as tD cause the 
least practicable amount of disruption of the surface of the land, and all holes shall be 
refilled and leveled at Buyers' expense promptly upon completion of the testin!;). All entry 
upon the lands of Sellers by Buyers or Buyers' agents and contractors for sucb purposes, 
and all testing activities, shall be done solely at the risk of Buyers and Sellers shall have 
no duty to warn of possible dangers or to make the premises safe for carrying on such 
testing activities. Buyers shall be solely liable for payment of all claims for worker's 
compensation made by parties who enter upon the lands of the Sellers in connection with 











such testing and/or surveying activities. 
Said testing and "due diligence" shall be performed within thirty (30) days after the 
receipt of the preliminary title report and if determined that any impairment exists will 
impair Buyer's development, buyer in buyer's sale discretion, shall have the right to cancel 
this agreement and the parties agree to the return of the earnest money deposited to the 
Buyer, with each party bearing their own costs and fees. 
(5) Buyer covenants to utilize Buyer's best efforts to seek all governmental 
approval on the subject property by all governmental agencies. Buyer to be solely 
responsible for all costs associated with governmental approval of said development and 
will not incur any expense in which seller shall be responsible. 
(6) Closing and possession shall occur on or before September 15, 2002. The 
Buyer shall be obligated for insurance and real estate taxes pro-rated after closing and all 
such insurance payments, taxes, water assessments, etc., thereafter. 
(8) The current offer to purchase shall expire if not accepted by 5:00 o'clock p.m. 
on July 25, 2002. 
(9) The Buyer has the right to waive any of the above conditions and close the real 
property under the terms above referenced, regardless of any grant or denial of the 
proposed zoning changes by the governmental authorities. 
(10) The parties hereto agree that this agreement shall be bindinn upon the parties, 
their heirs, devisees, assignees, transferees, etc. 
(11) The parties acknowledge that Thomas Maile d/b/a/ Thomas Maile F~eal Estate 
is a licensed Real Estate Broker and is representing himself and his wife. 
The parties agree that a!l terms contained in the purchase agreement above 
referenced are incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in full herein. 
Dated this ~')- day of july, 2002, 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, by: 
:e-Iv.-vt-(~ 
ON, Trustee, SELLER 
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Dated this _2.---:2-- day of July, 2002 
Dated this day of July, 2002. 
/7? ."....,~,~?~ Ilj/JZ-u
BUYER 






DEED OF TRUST 
THIS DEED OF TRUST, made and entered into this __ day of September, 2002, by and 
between THOMAS G. MAILE, IV and COLLEEN MAILE, husband and wife, and/or their assigns, 
whose address is 885 Rush Lane, Eagle, Idaho, hereinafter called "Grantor", and Alliance Title of 
Idaho, hereinafter called "Trustee", and Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, whose office address 
is 12601 West Hope Road, Star, Idaho, hereinafter called "Beneficiary". 
WITNESSETH 
Grantor does hereby irrevocably GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL AND CONVEY TO 
TRUSTEE, IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, that certain prope11y located in Ada County, 
State ofIdaho, more particularly described on Exhibit "A", attached hereto and incorporated herein 
by this relerence as if set forth in full herein, which property is located either within an incorporated 
city or village at the date hereof 
If all or part of the subject real property or any interest therein is sold, transferred, or 
contracted to be sold or translerred in the future by agreement without the Beneficiary's prior written 
consent, excluding a transler by devise, descent or operation oflaw upon the death of the Grantor, 
then the Beneficiary may, at Beneticiary's option, declare all sums secured by this Deed of Trust to 
be immediately due and payable. If the Beneficiary shall waive the option to accelerate as provided 
by accepting in writing 1m assumption agreement of the successor-in-interest, Beneticiary shall then 
release Grantor under this Deed of Trust and the Promissory Note, TOGETHER WITH the rents, 
issues and prolits thereofSUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given 
to and conlerred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues and prolits, lor the purpose 
of securing payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a Promissory Note of even date herewith 
executed by Grantor in the sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND HUNDRED DOLLARS 
($300,000.00), with tinal payment due thereon on September 17,2007, and to secure payment ofall 
such further sums as may hereafter be loaned or advanced by the Beneticiary herein to Grantor herein 
while record owner ofpresent interest, for any purpose, and of any notes, drafts or other instruments 
representing such further loans, advances or expenditures together with interest on all such sums at 
the rate therein provided. Provided, however, that the making of such lurther loans, advances or 
expenditure shall be optional with the Beneticiary, and provided, further that it is the express intention 
of the parties to 1his Deed of Trust that it shall stand as continuing security until paid for all such 
advances together with interest thereon. Said assignment of rents to Beneticiary by Grantor is an 
ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AND PROFITS. 
Request is hereby made that a copy ofany Notice ofDefault and a copy ofany Notice of Sale 
hereunder be mailed to the Grantor as his address hereinbefore set forth. 



















r     
.  
'­
DATED Tllis __ day of September, 2002. 
GRANTOR: 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
 
COLLEEN MAILE 




County of Ada )
 
On this day of September, 2002, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, 
personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN MAILE, husband and wife, known 
to me to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are attached to the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged to me they executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and aftixed my o:t1icial seal the day 
and year in this certificate tirst above written. 
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LAW OFFICES 
DAVID E. WISHNEY 
601 WEST HAYS STREET, SUITE 11'_ 
PO. Box 837 
BOISE, IDAHO 83701 
TELEPHONE: (208) 336-5955 FAX: (208) 334-2442 
September 5, 2002 
Andy Rogers 
A & B Lock and Key 
4106 W. State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Re: Maile/Ted Johnson 
Dear Andy: 
Per your request, I have reviewed the enclosed Earnest Money Agreement To 
Purchase Real Property and Assignment Of Earnest Money Agreement To Purchase Real 
Property. As we discussed, because the agreements have already been execmecl by the 
respective parties, it is really too late for me to provide any substantive input. It: however, 
the Purchaser is willing, I urge you to substitute a standard form deed of trust, including a 
due on sale provision, for the deed of trust attached as Exhibit A-2 to the earnest money 
agreement. The short fonTI deed of trust attached does not include standard language which 
protects the interests of the beneficiary (seller), such as a requirement for payment of taxes 
before the same become delinquent. 
Should you have any questions or concerns, please give me a call. 
Very Truly Yours, 
~z:4J~ / 






BURNHAM. HABEL & 
ASSOCIATES, lNC. 
. ( 
Septembe; j 6. 2002 
2i:J;~1'~S:lG~r:. n··i'y'ES-r:viF'·;:rs, LLC., Pa::or, an Idaho limited liabiliTy company ;xi!h its 
princip2! );c~c:: 0/ busbess C.l 3gCI :..~,:. State Street: Sagle, Ada CQunty, Idaho, for value rece\·td. the 
. . 
undersigT,ed pre::rnises to PAY TO THE ORDER OF THEODORE 1. JOHNSON REVOC.WLE 
. 10816 Jay Road Boise,Id.83703 
TRL:ST, ?:=..,·':t. \\'hose oifi.ce address is r-'-5S-:--\.l;-·ffi-1-k....0"-Fh;OO,..£.tt±f,k.:ahe-, Three Hundred 
Th01.lSa!ij ::n.d ~';Ci '1 00 Dollar~ (5300:000.00) in !awful money ofrhe United Stites of .t..meric~. at with 
inten::st thereon from September 17,2002 at the rate of 7% per annum, payable as follov·is: aruma] 
paymems iIi Q. minimum amount ofS32,357.00 (which would include principal and interest, fullonized 
over 15 :"~3Is), commenemg OIl the 17th day of September, 1003 and the 17th day of September, 
each year t!.1crCarter, until the 17th day of September 2007, at which the full remai~ing principal ~d 
imerest shall be p<!id in ntH, subject to the foJlo~ing terms and conditions. With each p~:yment, the 
parties a::.b1o\','ldge interest 10 be paid first and the balance to be applied to principaL Payor is 
entitled ILl p2), [he- entire balaJiCe. or such additiopal sums at any rime without pre-:paymem penalty; 
and shou!d payo~· fail to make al1)' such payments as set forth nolder hereof has the right to declare' 
the full bE,bnce. 1iiduding int::r:=st "red Jilincipal iilimediateJy due and payable; and should ihis note 
be placed \,'itt: ,m attorney Em ,::ollecTloI::. dlle to payor default 0: if suit be instituted for its cdlection, 
J, \,,'e, or ;;~th<:r:.J J3, ;;ti2:rte iLl P<i\' in ::;;i:her case :,cuscJDable :;'~lOrncy's fees. Tbe maker:;. sureties, . 
. ' - . _. . 
gu.arantor: cmd ec.':br3er hereof severaily v..ah'~ presentment for payment, protest, notic~ :,f pratest 
and of nO~l-pa~'l:-lent af this no~ce. The undersigned has the right to prepay the remaining: principal 
[J.;(-l :r·;""~·,- ~T "':~:""';7 ";:.;-.",l~·\' T~·ll·" "."!'~ i<: ~"!'I;- ....-11J'" liFF" c-:F TIl" nS .....l (IF FVE.N D 2, T;:a ... •• , _ ... _ ...... __ ......_ ••__ ...... -,.l" ... _ ........ .1 __ ~ __.l". ... _ .. _ _ .' _, - ~ .. ,,:,", -" _. _ • .1. __ •
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FOR VALUE RECEIVED 




the grantor(s), doles) hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, All Idaho Limited Liability Company
 
whose current address is 380 W. STATE ST. EAGLE, IDAHO 83616
 
the granlee(s), Ihe following described premises, in Ada Counly, Idaho, TO WIT: 
The Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 36, Township S Norlh, Range 1 
West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
TO HAVB AND TO HOLD Ihe said premises. with their appurtenance., U1110 Ull: said Granite. heirs ;mrl 
assigns forever. And the said Grantor does llereby covenant 10 and willi Ule said Granlee(s), that (s)he is/are lhe 
owner(s) in fee simple of said premises; thai they are free frolll all encllmbrances Except Current Year Taxes, 
conditions, covemmls. restrictions, reservations, easements, rights and rights of wa~(, apparent or of record. 
And that (s)he will warrant and defend !he same from all lawful claims whatsoever. 
-:, . 
Daled: September 16,2002 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust 
CffilAd'( ~y 7Xu-~ 
Andrew Rogers. TnlSlt: 
b-v"-' !b~, ~ 
_BellI Rogers, Tiuslee_ . 




Counly of Ada )
 
On this l6\11 day of September, in tile year 2002, before me, a Notary Public in and lor said slale, personally 
nppeared Andrew Rogers and Beth Rogers known or identified 10 me to be the person whose name is subscribed 10 
tile foregoing instrument as trustee of tile The Theodore L. JOIUlSOIl Revocable Tmst, alld ackno\'rledged to me tllat 
Uley e"ecuted the-sillne as Trustee. 
BURNHAM, HABEL & 
ASSOCIATES, INC. 000531
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/,Dt, COUNTY RECOR8 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto sci my hand and affixed my O[fiCia~~ i: an~ year in t.!us 
oerlificate tust;b:;:;;O'S6f/L- L Iut U~ 
11J~ L 
- "-- -- ..- ..... Notary Public for ti,e State ofIdaho \ --~Ir .1,", ['In' i'"' Residing at: Caldwell, ldallo \ !' ,', \ h \ T l \ ,'. i " ..... ~ COIfllllis5ion Expires: 6/28/2003 ; -I" I -I [. i' I' I f I ': I, _ . I [" {, (,d,d. ~l! ~;'L)llil: (.' :-,·;.1 
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 "'-' l'HO~lLAS G.l\1AliLE, IV, 
3S0 WEST STATE STREET, EAGLE, IDAHO 83616 
(2l18) 939-1000/ Fax (208) 939-1001 
May 19,2003 
Ms. Beth Rogers 
10816JayRoad 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Re: 40-Acre Parcel on Linder Road, Eagle, Idaho
 
/ Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust::
 
Our File No. M02-0048.0
 
Dear Beth: 
Please tind enclosed our check in the amount of$32,357.00 to be applied to our first annual 
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-.	 LAW OfFICES OF 
CLARK AN D FEE N EYRON T. BLEWETT TELEPHONE 
PAUL THOMAS CLARK THE TRAIN STATION. SUITE 106 (20e)743-9516THOMAS W. FEENEY 
SCOTT D. GALLINA·" (BOO) B65'9516Icc9 MAIN STREET 
JONATHAN D. HALLY P. O. DRAWER cBS FAXRUBE G . .JUNES Jo 
DOUGLAS L. MUSHLITZ LEWISTON, IDAHO 63S01	 (206)746-9160 
CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN 
cflaw@lewiston.comCONNIE	 TAyLOR .... '" 
TINA L.KERNAN"" 
"LICENSED IN WASHI .... GTON ONLY 
hLlCi:NS,EO IN IDAHO & WASHINGTON 









Re:	 Estate oCTed Johnson! Ted Johnson Revocable Tmst 
Dear Mr. Maile: 
Thank you for your letter of March 24, 2003. 
Helen Taylor, Joyce Seeley, and Hazel Fisher's children are all considering disclaiming any remainder 
interest in their uncle Ted's trust so that the trust proceeds can be distributed to their mother's without delay. 
They have asked me to prepare the necessary paperwork for them to do that, but because I am also a member 
of the family I want to be scrupulous in disclosing to them exactly what it is that they will be disclaiming. 
Beth was the person who told me to contact you and I explained to her that I would be asking for this 
information. I just want to be certain that there won't be a situation down the line where someone claims 
that they would not have disclaimed their interest if they had a better idea of the amount of money that was 
involved. 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK. AND FEEN EY RON T. BLEWETT TE:lEPHONE 
PAUL THOMAS CLARK THE TRAIN STATION, SUITE 106 (20B) 743- 9516THOMAS W. F"EEN E:Y 
SCOTT D. GALLlNA.·'" 1229 '1"IN STREET (SOO) 665· 9515 
.JONATHAN D. HALLY P. O. DRAWER 285 
RUBE G . .JUNES]II, F"x 
DOUGLAS L. MUSHLlTZ LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 (206)7~-9160 
CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN 
CONNIE TAYLOR 'Je. cllaw@lewiston.com 
TINA L., KERNAN.]II, 
_L.CE:NSEO IN W ..... SI-UNGTON A OAEGON ONLY 
h,lICE:NSED IN IDAHO & WAS~INGTOH 
July 7, 2003 








Re: Theodore L Johnson Revocable Trust 
Dear Mr. Maile: 
1am representing Beth Rogers, the successor trustee oflhe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, 
and the beneficiaries ofthat trust in relationship to your purchase of forty acres ofproperty on Linder 
Road. All communications relating to this matter should be through me from this point forward. 
After examining the pertinent documents, it is apparent that you purchased this prope11y for far less 
than the fair market value. The transaction was a violation ofRule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and ofthe Realtor's Code ofEthics. I believe it also constituted professional negligence, 
and ask that you forward this letter to your errors and omissions insurer for both your law practice 
and your realty practice so they will be aware ofour claim. 
I note that paragraph 8 of the Eamest Money Agreement you drafted contains a provision which 
purports to limit the statute of limitations to causes of action relating to that purchase to one year. 
While I do not believe this limitation will apply to this matter, which relates to negligence and breach 
offiduciary duties rather than to the purchase contract, I do plan to file our complaint before July 22, 
2003 just to avoid having to litigate that issue. I will consider delaying the filing only if! receive 




. Carmie W. Taylor 0 
cc: Beth Rogers 
Garth Fisher 
DaHan Taylor EXHIBIT NO.--l:L ~'Q.o6t:lz..,.S 
DATE. 'if If { 0If 
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L.\W· OFFICE OF 
THOMAS G. l\1AliLJE, X", P.A. 
380 \\"£:::T .3T.\TE STI~E[T, E.-\LTLE, 1D.-\J-ILl 83616 
(2081939·1000 I F.", 12(8) \)31)·1DO] 
July J 0, 2003 
BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION 
TO (208) 746-~1l60 
Connie W. Taylor 
The TrainStation, Suite 106 
PO. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 8350] 
Re:	 Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust
 
Our File No. M02-4004.0
 
Dear Ms. Taylor: 
EXHIBlTlJO. ~O ~.Qo~ 
DATE~ 
BURNHAM JiAB 
ASSOCIATES, ~~.&: . 
I received your July 7, 2003 correspondence and wish to advise you in writing that we would 
have no objection to waiving any defense relative to a one (1) year application of any possible Statue 
of Limitations. However, on a broader note, I would like to advise you that the purchase price and 
terms were fully explored by both Ted Johnson and Beth Rogers. An appraisal was conducted, which 
r trust you have a copy of The land payment represented the appraised value of the property. The 
appraisal was conducted soley by Ted Johnson and my office had no involvement on that matter 
whatsoever. Mr. Johnson honored his verbal commitment to me made years ago that if he ever 
decided to sale his land he would afford me first option to purchase the same. Finally, your client 
sought independent legal counsel prior to the closing, and your client chose to close the transaction 
even after consulting an attorney. 
It is my family's position no trust was violated, nor was there any malpractice committed. I 
am providing the following provisions ofIdaho Code and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for your 
careful consideration as well as that of your client's: 
12-l23. SANCTIONS FOR FRIVOLOUS CONDUCT IN A CIVIL CASE. (1) As m,ed in this 
section: 
(a) "Conduct" means filing a civil action, asserting a claim, defense, or other position in connection 
with a civil action, or taking any other action in connection with a civil action. 
(b) "Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of record that 
satisfies either of the folJowing: 
(i) It obviollsly serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party La the civil action; 
,.',' . 
000537
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(ii) If is not supported in t~lct or warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good 
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 
Rule 11(a)( I). Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at 
least one (1) licensed attorney of record of the state ofldaho, in the attorney's individual name, whose 
. address shall be stated before the same may be tiled. A party who is not represented by an attorney 
shall sign the pleading, motion or other paper and state the party's address. Except when otherwise 
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a ceJtificate that the attorney or party has read the 
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief 
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost 
oflitigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed 
promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. ilfa pleading, motion 
or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, lipan motion or upon its own initiative, 
shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
With the above authority in mind, I would request that you provide any and all facts which 
you or your client believes support your threat of litigation. I can assure you that my family will 
contest your threatening innuendos to the fullest extent under the law. In any event, if you have any 
questions please feel free to correspond directly with me. 
Sincerely, 
7 
" ;\ ) 
, .' 
, . ,,1~J 
....... - ) / ,1....,.
 I ,'; / I i 
..; .,/'- . '\... .. 
, "/ ~ i \".I v I 
Thomas G Maile, IV 
TGM 






















July 22, 2003 
Connie Taylor 
Clark and Feeney 
1229 Main St 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Re: Theodore L. Johnson Trust 
Dear Connie, 
Andy and I, acting as the trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust, wish to withdraw from all 
proceedings of the Jaw firm of Clark and Feeney against Thomas G. Maile, Colleen Maile, and 
Berkshire Investments, LLC. It is our judgement that this suit has not the merit to benefit the 
trust. We desire to let the purchase of the Linder property proceed as in the current contract with 
Maile/ Berkshire Development until said property is paid ofT in full. 
We know we have a fiduciary duty to the beneliciaries of the trust to act in their best behalC 
but we also feel we have a moral obligation to follow Uncle Ted's wishes in the way in which he 
entrusted us to do. 
If you can come to Boise in the near future, give us a call, and we will schedule a family 
meeting having at least one representative from each of the five beneficiaries in attendance, 
Sincerely, 
(l /10v1.(' ',.~.  -,-',( d, / I/«y~; l. A A .. ,,' /' 
,I 7 / 
'~L. 9~i tl -iL'.7---"/ 
Andrew T. Rogers ( 
Beth J. Rogers 
Co-Trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust 
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....'I I'- ~1'< LA.PI ~~~ --t. L ••-<--> 1;Connie Taylor .~-!·"~~I iW~Clark and Feeney ..cJ 
1229 Main St 't1."'\~~ ~ IflI~ C</~ ­
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 t~~·~f.~~:~d~A""£~ 
Re: Theodore L. Johnson Tru::. . ..~..../.~~.".J' ' . ~\,&"~. ~.:~ ..,t··~~~~~V'" rJ//..:/ 0"-\, 
Dear Connie, ~Vj>~~~ ~~~~~'~i 
Andy and I, acting as the trustees of the Theodore 1. Johnson Trust, wish to withdraw from all 
proceedings of the law finn of Clark and Feeney against Thomas G. Maile, Colleen Maile, and 
Berkshire Investments, LLC. It is our judgement that this suit has not the merit to benefit the 
trust. We desire to let the purchase of the Linder property proceed as in the current contract with 
Maile/ Berkshire Development until said property is paid off in full. 
We know we have a fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries of the trust to act in their best behalf, 
but we also feel we have a moral obligation to follow Uncle Ted's wishes in the way in which he 
entrusted us to do. 
If you can come to Boise in the near future, give us a call, and we will schedule a family 
meeting having at least one representative from each of the five beneficiaries in attendance. 
Sincerely, 
Andrew T. Rogers 
Beth J. Rogers 
Co-Trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust 
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AFFIDAVIT OF BETH ROGERS
 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Ada ) 
Beth Rogers, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am currently one ofthe trustees oflhe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, 
along with my husband, Andrew T. Rogers ("Andy"). The grantor ofthe trust, Theodore L. Johnson, 
was my uncle ("Uncle Ted"). My father, Richard Johnson, who died in July, 1981, was Uncle Ted's 
brother. Uncle Ted never married and had no children. 
2. Uncle Ted and my father owned fanns that were one-halfmile from each other. They 
shared fann equipment, etc., and my brothers and I were close to Uncle Ted all of our lives. 
3. My husband and 1were made first successor trustees when Uncle: Ted formed the 
Trust on November 4, 1997. The Trust provided that my cousin, Garth Fisher. would become a co­
trustee if either my husband or I could not serve. On the same day, Uncle Ted made a ne''''; will in 
which he basically left to the Trust any property not already transferred to the Trost. Uncle Ted 
owned two fanus: one 40-acre parcel on Linder Road near Eagle, and the other an 80-acre parcel 
where he lived near Slar. In council with two ofhis sisters, Hazel Fisher and Joyce Seely, Uncle Ted 
decided that Andy and 1should assume the duties of the trustees jfUncle Ted could not handle his 
own affairs. At the same time. Andy and I were also given a Durable General Power ofAtto.mey and 
a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care. We never had to use our General Power ofAttorney 
for anything significant because Uncle Ted's mind remained sharp, and he was able to manage his 
own affairs right up to the time of his death. I did, however, have to use the Power of Attorney for 
Health Care several times. 
4. Between December. 1999. and his death on September 14,2002, Unde Ted had three 
heart attacks. All three times I was the first one to find him and either take him to thl~ hospitEl1 or call 
the ambulance. Even before the first attack, Uncle Ted had open heart surgery, and while IH~ was in 
the hospital and recupera1ing, Andy and I went to Star daily to do his chores. as he had cattle, dogs 
and cats to tend. After his first heart attack, which was in the winter of 1999, we took the bull, cows 
and calves to the cattle auction for him. Itwas worrisome that Uncle Ted might fall while doing the 
chores, and as he was a bachelor and lived alone, it could have had serious consequences. He hated 
giving up this part ofhis life. Even though he had leased his-farm to another farmer, Uncle Ted kept 
a five-acre parcel to grow hay on for his livestock He loved doing the irrigation and bailing of the 
hay. After his heart attack in2001. the doctors installed a pacemaker that enabled him to lead a much 
fuller life. But after they installed the pacemaker, the doctors insisted that Uncle Ted go to anursing 
home for a while for rehabilitation. He did not want to go but said that if! really felt that he should. 
he would go. I promi sed him that ifhe would go for one week, I would take him home. Andy went 
with him for therapy and designed a pulley system for strengthening his arm and shoulder and 
AFFIDAVIT OF BETH ROGERS - Page I EXHIBIT NO. ;:)3
b. YZb&f::'Il~ 
DATE.1J ,r (01 
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( i I. 
installed it in his home so that he could continue his therapy. Uncle Ted was faithful at doing his 
exercises when he returned home. He also had eye surgery for cataracts in 2001. 
5. In the Spring of 2002, Uncle Ted received an unsolicited offer to purchase his 40-acre 
parcel on Linder Road.. He took the offer to his attorney, Tom Maile, to have it reviewed, and also 
to his accountant to research the tax liabilities as to capital gains or estate taxes. The taxes seemed 
about the same either way, but Uncle Ted said that he really did not need the money at that time and 
really liked being a farmer, so his decision was not to sell. He told several ofus in the family that his 
attorney had offered to buy the property if he ever wanted to sell it, but (hat he just was not ready. 
6. In June of 2002, Uncle Ted was diagnosed with lung cancer and had a series of 
radiation treatments. Some of the family members (oak him to the hospital every other day. 
7. Meanwhile, Uncle Ted received a letter in the mail fromKnipe.Janoush.Knipe. LLC, 
saying that they performed land appraisals. After what I recall to be a few weeks, Uncle Ted decided 
to have the property appraised, and the appraisal report WaS completed on July 10, 2002. The 
property was appraised for $400,000. When it was finally decided that he would go to an assisted 
living home, Uncle Ted said he may as well sell the property rather than leave it for Andy' and I to 
have to deal with, and he talked to Mr, Maile about purchasing the land. Uncle Ted was having 
trouble with his legs, he kept falling and could not easily get back up. We began looking at assisted 
living centers as an alternative. Because he was a bachelor, Uncle Ted had taken out a good nursing 
home insurance policy that would help with his financial needs. He was very careful in all of his 
financial affairs and kept very good records. On July 22, 2002, Uncle Ted entered into an agreement 
to sell the property to Mr. Maile or Mr. Maile's company for $400,000. He seemed quite: pleased 
with the sale and showed the contract to my brothers and his sister Hazel Fisher. He even joked to us 
about whether or not he could live in the nursing horne on the $100,000 down payment. 
8. I do not recall that Uncle Ted ever specifically mentioned getting another legal 
opinion, but Andy and I decided to take the paperwork from Mr. Maile to a real estate attorney, 
David Wishney, to review. Mr. Wishney suggested that Mr. Maile substitute a standard form deed of 
trust, including adue onsale provision, to the earnest money agreement. I sent acopy ofthe letter to 
Mr. Maile, and the proper changes were made. Uncle Ted was satisfied with th~: sale and never 
seemed interested in other opinions, as he considered it a good sale. I do not know if Mr. Maile told 
Unele Ted to get another opinion on the sale, but Iwas not alwayswith him at all oftheir ffii~etings. 
Mr. Maile did know that Uncle Ted had heart problems and had fallen, because Wt: saw Mr. Maile 
right after one of the falls and Uncle Ted had broken his nose and had black eyes, but 1 do not 
remember ifUncle Ted told him about the cancer. He was a quiet, private person and seldom talked 
about himself. 
9. The earnest money agreement stated that no lease agreement could affect the property 
past the current crop year, however, the land was leased to Sam Rosti who had crops on it. Uncle 
Ted to ld Mr. Maile that five acres ofonions on the property was a two-year seed crop, and that Mr. 
Maile would have to let Sam Rosti have that portion ofthe land until mid-Summer, 2003. The:refore, 
Uncle Ted penciled in "spring 2003" for the five acres ofonions and initialed it befbre signing the 
agreement. Sam Rosti later called and said that he needed $8,000 for loss of income as he had no 
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prior notice of the sale. We thought Mr. Rosti had been treated fairly with regard to the onion crop 
and was to get the other crops off for the year. His lease had terminated at the end of the previous 
year (2001) and a new lease had not been signed for 2002. 
10. On August 17,2002, my aunts, my brothers and some ofOUT families got together and 
had a cleaning day at the SO-acre fann near Star where Uncle Ted lived. We cleaned the house and 
shop, graded the barnyard, and put all ofthe equipment together that Andy and I would have to sell. 
It had been a long time since things had really been done around the yard, so it was a challenge. We 
had two dumpsters delivered. We loaded 9,872 pOill1ds of scrap iron, filled a 50-yard dumpster, and 
had to order another one; but the equipment was now organized and the place really looked much 
better. 
11. Andy and I went to the title company and signed the deed and other papers to close 
the sale to Berkshire Investments, LLC, on September 16,2002, as Uncle Ted hac! died ofhis heart 
trouble two days prior. In August, 2002, he had a massive heart attack at home. I found him barely 
conscious on the floor. He was in the hospital for four days and then had to go to a care center, 
where he died on September 14,2002. 
12. Andy and I went to the title company to sign off on the papers on the sale of the 40­
acre Linderparcel on September 16,2002, which was the day before Uncle Ted's fimeral. I had told 
Mr. Maile that I would get the water rights for the land changed over into Berkshire Investment's 
name. Due to all ofthe preceding week's events leading up to Uncle Ted's death, l! had forgotten to 
do so. I spoke to Mr. Maile and apologized and told him I would get the papers to him as soon as 
possible. Thereafter, I could not get a hold ofthe secretary ofthe ditch company as soon as Iwanted, 
so the paperwork did not get to Mr. Maile immediately. The title company called and said that Mr. 
Maile had refused to sign the papers until he had the water rights. I guess tl:ds is a standard 
procedure, but I was upset because I had told him I would get them to him as soon as possible and 
felt my circumstances were unusual with all that I had been dealing with. Mr. Maile was upset 
because he did not have them, so both sides were unhappy. As I look back now, Jthink Jwas not as 
rational as I could have been, but I was grieving over my uncle's death. Mr. Maile's company, 
Berkshire Investments, signed the papers on September 26, 2002, with possession of the water 
rights. . 
13. Prior to receiving the payment in full from Berkshire Investments, LLC, I reeeived a 
call from Mr. Maile inquiring if, acting as trustee ofthe Trust, I would be interested in amending the 
deed of trust to allow lot releases for the potential sale of five-acre parcels, in Jieu of Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, obtaining construction financing with a new lender. We considered the offer, 
discussed the same with the Trust's accountant, and detennined it would be better for the Trust to 
receive the cash consistent with the initial deed of trust. The deed of trust was paid in fuJI to the 
Trust on January 13, 2004. . 
14. During the time Uncle Ted was in the care center, Sam Rosti came to us with .moffer 
to buy the 80-acre fann near Star. This was approximately August 12,2002. He offered $3,500 an 
acre. Andy and I talked to Uncle Ted about the offer, and Uncle Ted felt that the offer was low. He 
said he felt we should get at least as much for that land as we did the land on Linder Rd.,. so we 










                








declined the offer. Then, on August 22, 2002 we received another offer from American Realty for 
about the same amount - $280,000.00. We also declined that offer. The sewer system was being 
installed along the highway in Star and would eventually reach the farm making the land more easily 
developed. On the day ofUnele Ted's funeral, my cousin from Lewiston, Reed Taylor, asked ifhe 
could see the farm, maybe to purchase it for his son. He did not know where Uncle Ted lived, so I 
gave him directions and met him there the next day. He made us an offer of $400,000. ',}.'hen Sam 
Rosti found this out, he matched the offer at $400,000. Then Reed flew his accountant, Ernie 
Dantini, in from the Seattle, Washington, area to talk to Andy and myself, my brother Scott, and my 
alUlts. He raised the offer to $425,000 cash with a closing date of December 31 (which] had 
requested because of taxes), plus he would establish a $50,000 endowment fund to a non-profit 
organization of our choice. They would give the organization $25,000 down at the time ofclosing 
and the rest when the property was developed. My aunts really liked that idea. It was discussed that 
maybe could we give the money to the Idaho FFA. Uncle Ted and my father were both members of 
the FFA while in high school in Preston. Idaho, and farming was Uncle Ted's love and life. At the 
time, I felt I was being pressured into a quick sale, but agreed to it and said I would contact the FFA. 
We closed on the Star property on December 27,2002. 
15. After Uncle Ted's death, I found that claiming on all the annuities fmd policies that I 
found was a challenge. Uncle Ted kept all ofhis paperwork on everything for pre'~ious years, and r 
found old insurance policies with the names of his siblings on them but could find no current 
statements. When I tried to call the insurance companies, I found that the policies were no J.onger in 
force. or the company had merged or changed its name. I finally figured out that these policies had 
been converted into the annuities that were in the Trust. When the Trust was established, Uncle Ted 
added my name and Andy's name to the checking account, savings account and safe deposit box. 
The saving aCCotUlt statements read "POD" after our names. After his death we decided to put all of 
the bank money together and went to the bank to put the savings into the checking account, only to 
find out that they could not do the transfer. POD meant payable on death, and Andy and I were 
beneficiaries ofthe savings account (approximately $55,000). Therefore, the only waywe could put 
the money into the Trust account was to cash it in and then deposit it into the checking etccount, 
which we did because we felt that the money belonged to the Trust. 
16. In 2003. I was working at the WesteriJ. Idaho Fair as a clerk for the animal judging 
when the leaders ofthe Meridian FFA chapter came and thanked me for the generous gift they had 
received. They said they were able to do a lot with the $10,000. I thought they were mistaken on the 
lUDount, so I later called the bookkeeper for the FFA and found out that $10,000 was the amOlwt 
donated. The family feels that this matter needs to be rectified, as this endowment fund wacS a key 
factor in the sale of the property. I had always felt that Uncle Ted wanted the land to be sold to Sam 
Rosti, but his initial bid was too low, and later when he offered us $500,000, we had already 
committed to sell the property to Reed. 
17. In February of2003, DaHan TaylQrcalled me at work and said that his mother, Helen 
Taylor, needed $80,000 to put down on the new home she was building. ] told him :r could not give 
it to him out of the Trust because the taxes were not done and because our accountant told us we 
should not give out any monies until the government sent us a release letter stating that it accepted 
the tax return. ] did not receive the government's letter until September, 2003. Also, I told Dallan 






















that the Trust stated that 20% of the trust estate was to be held in trust for the Iifetime ofA \illt Helen, 
and upon her death, then her issue was to share and share alike. He asked about the clause for 
discretionary payments. The Trust states that the trustees could payout the income for tJle 
maintenance, education, support and health of each beneficiary during her lifetime, but apparently 
we did not have the authority to payout the principal. The Taylors had Tom Maile, the attorney who 
drafted the Trust, send them all of the papers concerning the Trust and had me send them an 
accounting of all of the monies received and all of the expenses, balances, etc. 
18. In May. 2003, Connie Taylor sent out a proposed paper called "Disclaimer of 
Beneficiary" to all of the cousins involved in the Trust for their signatures so that there could be a 
distribution of the money. The paper stated that the person signing the disclaimer "hereby forever 
renounce and disclaim alI my remainder interest under the trust and all right, title, and interest 
whatsoever given to me by the provisions ofthat trust instrument, with the exception ofany interest 
in funds received by the Trust relating to the sale ofa 40 acre parcel ofproperty east ofUnder Road, 
Eagle, Ada County, Idaho, and all potential claims or causes of action relating to the sale of said 
property. I specifically do not disclaim my interest in funds or causes of action relating to said 
property, and request that the Trustee retain the $100,000 down payment received on that property." 
19. On July 6,2003, the Taylors called a family meeting that was attended by four ofthe 
Taylor cousins, Cormie Taylor - who is John Taylor's wife and an attorney in Lewiston, myself, my 
brother - Scott Johnson, and Garth Fisher. They said that Aunt Helen was closing on her house and 
needed $50,000.00 that week. They said they felt that TomMaile had taken advantage ofUncle Ted 
in several ways in the sale of the property and wanted to sue him for retwn of the prope:rty plus 
monetary compensation. They wanted the suit to be named with Andy and myself as plaintiffs, as 
we are the trustees. The suit would be initiated by Connie Taylor, as the attorney, and she discussed 
the fee schedule. etc., with us. Garth, Scott and I all said that we would look into the matter but 
made no commitment at the time. After consulting with the Trust's accountant, I did make 1\ partial 
distribution of $50,000 to each Aunt Helen, Aunt Joyce and Aunt Hazel. I felt it was only fair that 
each ofthe aunts, not just Aunt Helen, receive the money. 
20. After a few days, we received a copy ofthe complaint and the attorney fee schedule 
for us to sign. After a careful reading ofthe papers and a discussion with several family members. we 
decided that the suit really had no merit for the Trust. We had been told repeatedly that Andy and I 
had a fiduciary duty to the Trust. We agreed, and in this case we felt that obligation was to follow 
Uncle Ted's wishes. He had sold the property the way he had wanted and felt good about it. So we 
mailed a letter stating this to Connie Taylor, to all ofthe beneficiaries, and to Tom Maile. I also told 
Connie in the letter ifshe could come to Boise in the near future, Iwould schedule a family meeting 
having at least one representative from each of the five family beneficiaries in attendance. This 
meeting never happened. 
21. In September, 2003, Connie Taylor sent out papers to all of the beneficiaries wanting 
them to sign an assignment fonn giving the Taylors all rights and interest in a dispute relating to a 
contract for sale of real property in Ada County between the Johnson Trust and Thomas Maile. 
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22. Then, on January 8, 2004, I received a letter from Reed Taylor stating that there was 
little interest in having the Trust pursue an action against Mr. Maile, as Connie did not hear back in 
writing from anyone. Then Reed and his son Jud came to visit Andy and myself and brought new 
assignment letters and a participation agreement which stated that if you signed the participation 
agreement, they wanted $3,000 down to help with the lawsuit. Reed called several family members 
to tell themwhat was going on, and he asked me to write acover letter to mail out to the family with 
the assignment fonns telling the family that they would not be liable for any expenses incurred with 
the lawsuit and that Uncle Ted would not be dishonored in any way. 
23. Again, people refused to sign the papers. We told Reed we would consider iit, but that 
we were in the process of having paper work drawn up by our own attorney to get us released as 
trustees of the Trust, and we had to meet with our accountant after the 15th of April. 
24. As the chart attached hereto shows, besides Helen Taylor, Uncle Tl~d had three other 
sisters. one deceased, and a brother (my father now deceased) for a total of25 beneficiaries. 
AFFIDAVIT OF BETH ROGERS - Page 6 
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DISCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
 
1.1 Disclaimer of Claims by Certain Beneficiaries. Except for those 
individuals identified in the last sentence of this Section J.I, each of the beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust, UTD November 4, 1997 (hereafter referred to as the "Trust"), 
hereby disclaims, in favor of the Trust, any ownership interest he/she may now or in the future 
have in any claims or causes of action by the Trust or the trustees of the Trust against attorney 
Thomas G: Maile, or his successors or affiliates, including, without limitation, Thomas 
Maile, IV, Colleen Maile, Thomas Maile Real Estate Company and Berkshire Investments, LLC, 
in connection with the purchase of real property from the Trust ("Claims"); and by this 
Disclaimer, the same individuals confirm in the Trust complete ownership and control of any 
such Claims. No warranty or representation is made as to the existence or efficacy of sllch 
Claims. The following beneficiaries do not join in this disclaimer: Helen Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor, 
Dallan J. Taylor, Mark J. Taylor, Gloria RydaJch, Virginia Porter and R. John Taylor. 
1.2 Disclaimer of A 1\ Other Interests. 
1.2.1 Fisher. Gordon E. Fisher, Garth 1. Fisher and Judith F. Crawford,
 
comprising all of the ch ildren of Hazel Fisher, hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the
 
Trust, not previously disclaimed in Section I. I above, in favor of their mother, Hazel Fisher, and
 
hereby approve immediate distribution to Hazel Fisher.
 
1.2.2 Seely. J. David Seely, Karl J. Seely, Dorothy S. Dayton, Janet S.
 
Denison and Nathan L. Seely, comprising all of the children of Joyce Seely, hereby disclaim all
 
interests whatsoever in the Trust, not previously disclaimed in Section 1.] above, in favor of
 
their mother, Joyce Seely, and hereby approve immediate distribution to Joyce Seely.
 
1.2.3 Taylor. Reed 1. Taylor, Dallan 1. Taylor, Mark J. Taylor, Gloria 
Rydalch, Virginia Porter and R. John Taylor, comprising all of the children of Helen Taylor. 
hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the Trust, in favor of their mother, Helen Taylor, and 
hereby approve immediate distribution to Helen Taylor. All of the individuals identified in this 
Section] .2.3 are sometimes hereafter referred to as "Taylors". 
2. ~eceipt in Full - Income Tax. The undersigned acknowledge receipt in lull of all 
property, money and benefits which he/she is entitled to receive from Andrew T. Rogers and 
Beth J. Rogers, in their capacity as trustees of the Trust. This includes a full share of the final 
payment received in 2004 from the sale to Thomas G.. MailelBerkshire Investments, LLC, in 
2002, of the real estate located in Ada County. (Except for the Taylors, to th,~ extent they are 
retaining a ben(~ficial interest in the Claims), the undersigned have no further expectation of 
receiving anything from the Trust. The undersigned further understand that the trustees have not 
paid income tax on the nnal payment received in 2004 and that he/she will receive an IRS form 
K-l indicating his/her share of such tax, which is to be included on the beneficiary's own federal, 
and state income tax returns for 2004. 
EXHIBIT NO._~s:­~~~ 
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J. Release of Trustees - Estimated Expenses. The undersigned hereby release and 
discharge Andrew T. Rogers and Beth J. Rogers from all claims or causes of action, whether 
known or unknown, he/she may have against them (i) in their capacity as trustees of the Trust, or 
(ii) arising in any way out of their service as trustees of the Trust. The undersigned further 
acknowledge that the trustees have distributed, and he/she has received, all of the property, 
money and benefits to which he/she is entitled under the terms of the Trust, except an amount 
which shall not exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), which has been retained for the sole 
purpose of paying accounting, legal and other expenses associated with the Trust. Any surpl us in 
such retainage will be distributed to the beneficiaries proportionfltely. The undersigned 
acknowledge the financial information he/she has received will constitute a final accounting; and 
he/she waives any right to a court-approved formal final accounting. 
4. Resignation of Trustees. The undersigned understand Andrew T. Rogers and Beth 
J. Rogers intend to resign as trustees of the Trust, leaving in the Trust the Claims described in 
Section 1.1 above; and the undersigned approve of such resignation. The undersigned further 
understand and agree that the successor trustee, Garth Fisher, wiJl decline to serve as tl'llstee, and 
that Reed 1. Taylor, Dallan J. Taylor and R. John Taylor will be nominatedl and appointed to 
serve as successor co-trustees of the Trust. 
5. Indemnification. Taylors, jointly and severally, agree to defend, indemnify and 
hold harmless (i) Andrew T. Rogers and Beth J. Rogers, and (ii) all of the other beneficiaries of 
the Trust against all suits, claims, expenses, costs, attorney's fees, losses or monies that they may 
incur or be required to pay as a result of any lawsuit by Taylors, or any of them, or their 
successors, based upon the Claims, including, without limitation, any third-party claim or 
counterclaim advanced by the defendants. 
6. Enumeration of Beneficiaries. This wiJl certifY the twenty-five (25) individuals 
identified below as signators constitute all ofthe beneficiaries of the Trust. Exhibit A attached is 
a graphical depiction of the relationship of the signators and grantor Theodore L. Johnson. Blair 
Johnson predeceased the Grantor, Theodore Johnson, leaving no issue; and the beneficial interest 
of Blair Johnson therefcxe lapsed. 
7. Binding Effect. This instrument shall be effective as of the latest signature by all, 
and not less than all, orthe signators indicated below; and this instrument shalll be binding upon 
the heirs and successors of the parties. 
8. Attorney's Fees. If any party commences legal proceedings for any relief against 
the other party(ies) arising out of this agreement, the prevailing party(ies) shall be entitled to an 
award of hislher/their legal costs and expenses, including, but not limited to, reasonable 
attorney's fees as determined by the court. The prevailing party(ies) shall be that party receiving 
substantially the reI ief sought in the proceeding, whether brought to final judgment or not. 
9. Counterparts and Facsimile. This instrument may be executed in several 
counterparts and all so executed shall constitute one instrument, binding on all the parties hereto, 
even though all the parties are not signatories to the original or the same counterpart. A signed 
document transmitted by fax shall be the equivalent of execution and delivery of an original 
signed document. 














10. Entire Agreement. This agreement, together with all exhibits attached hereto and 
other agreements and written materials and documents expressly referred to herein, constitutes 
the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the matters set forth herein. All prior or 
contemporaneous agreements, understandings, representations, warranties and statements, oral or 
written, are superseded. 
11. Further Assurances. The parties agree to perform such further acts and to execute 
and deliver such additional documents and instruments as may be reasonably required in order to 
carry out the provisions of this instrument and the intention of the parties. Each of the signators 
warrants and represents that in executing this instrument he/she is dealing with his/her sole and 
separate property. 
12. Governing Law. This agreement shall be governed, construed and enforced in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. 
13. Modification/Waiver. No modification, waiver, amendment or discharge of this 
instrument shall be valid unless the same is in writing and signed by all parties. 
HAZEL FISHER Dated 
GORDON E FISHER Dated 
GARTH 1. FISHER Dated 
JUDITH F CRAWFORD Dated 
JOYCE SEELY Dated 
DOROTHY S DAYTON Dated 
J DAVID SEELY Dated 








KARL J SEELY Dated 
NATHAN L SEELY Dated 
JANET S DENISON Dated 
BRENT B JOHNSON Dated 
BETH J ROGERS Dated 
scon B JOHNSON Dated 
D GRANT FARNWORTH Dated 
LU DAWN FARNWORTH Dated 
LAURIE DuNKLEY Dated 
KARLA FARNWORTH Dated 
RUTH F STEPHENS Dated 
REED J. TAYLOR Dated 




HELEN TAYLOR Dated 
DALLAN J. TAYLOR Dated 
GLORIA RYDALCH Dated 
MARKJ. TAYLOR Dated 
VIRGINIA PORTER Dated 
R. JOHN TAYLOR Dated 
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RELEASE AND RECONVEYANCE 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That the undersigned, Stephen Sherer, an attorney duly licensed in the State of Idaho, and 
trustee under that certain deed of trust dated September 16,2003 recorded as instrument number 
102110538 on or about September 26,2002, in the Recorder's Office of the County of Ada, State 
of Idaho (hereinafter referred to as "Trustee"), for good and valuable consideration, heretofore 
delivered by BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC., a limited liability company with its principal 
place of business in Ada County, Idaho, grantor of said deed of trust, (hereinafter referred to as 
"grantor"), to Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, beneficiary of said Deed ofTrust, and for other 
good and valuable consideration, the Trustee on behalf of Grantor and Beneficiary does hereby 
remise, release, and forever discharge "grantor" and "beneficiary" together with their successors, 
representatives, assigns, agents, servants, personal representatives, and employees, from all and every 
claim, liability, demand and judgment, right or cause of action of whatever kind or nature, on 
account of or growing out of any claim predicated upon the obligation referenced in the above deed 
of trust, including the real property described therein, or any other claim arising out of said 
transaction including, but not limited to, any claim, liability, demand and judgment of any kind or 
nature, or any claims that could have or may have been asserted. 
Trustee hereby waive and release any interest or claim or right of such lien and reconveys all 
right and title to grantor, on the described premises se! forth said above referenced instrument 
recorded as instrument number 102110538. 
"Trustee" acknowledges that this Release is made and entered into, as a free and voluntary 
RELEASE AND RECONVEYANCE 1 
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act and that no promise, agreement, statement or representation not herein expressed has been agreed 
to or relied upon. This Release contains the entire agreement between the parties. This Release shall 
be fully binding upon all parties and entities. 
DATED this _(~ day of February, 2004. 
SHERER Trustee 
STATE OF IDAHO) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this L day of February, 2004, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public for said 
State, personally appeared STEPHEN SHERER, Trustee, known to me to be the person whose name 
is subscribed to the foregoing instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my and affixed my official seal the day and 
year first above written. 
L/I1Jlt!)( )J!f7/~ 
Notjib Publi_~ for Idaho . /J () '__)
R~iding at 2;JZeiL~UtL11L V'?
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JUDITH F CRAWFORD 
2500 NORTH BALI DRIVE 
BOISE JD 83713 
HELEN TAYLOR 
96 15 WEST WRlGHT STREET 







DALLAN J TAYLOR 
410 CLEAR CREEK DRNE 
MERIDIAN TO 83462 
CLA R. K AND FEE N EY 








Augusl 20, 2003 
Ir .... £.PHOtlE. 
120B)743'95'6 
(BOO) 865· 9516 
F"x 
(20B) 7~ 9/60 
cllaw@lsIYISlan.Com 
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1122 NORTH SATORl CIRCLE
 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAB 84116
 
KARL SEELY 
] 143 SOUTH DEl'NER STREET, APT. D 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841l I 
DOROTHY S DAYTON 
620 E 1250 SOUTH 
KAYSVILLE, UTAH 84037 
JANET S DENISON 
9 DAl'HELLE DRlVE 
DANVILLE, NH 03819 
NATI-IAN SEELY 
8518 SOUTH 4760 WEST 
WEST JORDAN, UTAH 84088 
LAW oFFicES ~F 
CLARK AND FEENEY 


























August 20, 200J .........
 
P<lge 3 
Re: Theodore L. Johnson Trusl 
Delll Ladies aml Gellllemen: 
As yOIl may be aware, Deth and Andrew Rogel's have deciJed (i1at they do not wallt to pursue an 
action against Ted's altomey, who purchased the forty acres of property on Linder Road. The 
Iawsui twill be proceeding reg,wlless ofllJeir involvement, <mel we need to confirm whether you wish 
to be involved in that action. . 
Ifyou do not wish to participale, please sign the enclosed Dlsclulmer ofBeueficiary and return it to, 
me so we will have documentation thaI you do not want to be involved. . 
I look forward to hearing flOm you. 
Sincerely, 
CLARK and FEENEY 
&/lrtlcW.idr({}i11tZL 
By: COIillie W. Taylor 
CWT:st 
Enclosure 
LAw offlCE6 OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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DlSCLAIr\IER OF BENeFICIARY 
I, _ (bef1erici~I)I), 
of (address), cily, slale) 
being ovel the age of eighteen ye<lrs, UO hereby [orevel' ,'ellOlillce and disclaim any righl, tille, anu 
inlerest w!J:llsoever in a lawsuit or seltlement relating 10 the sale ora 40·acre parcelofpropcrly easl 
ui' Liiidcr Ro~ll!, Eagle, Aua COUllty, ldaho, 10 Thomas TVlaile. I specifically do not disclLlill1 Illy 
inlerest in allY LIIHls paid or payal5\e by virtuc ortile contract willi 1'110111:15 Mailc to purchase said 
property. 
1 understand tll<lt other-beneficiaries of tile Theodore L. .Johnson Trust plan to pursue a 
lawsuit in regard to this property, and I waive allY righllo allY funus received as a result of said 
lawsui t whicll exceed the contract price. Ilillders[and tb,l[ by vi rlue of this lei crise and waiver, I w j II 
not he responsible for any expenses incurred relaling 10 lhallawsuit. 
In wi [Iless whereof, I have executed this disclaimer al _ .(city, state) 








ll r lIS f l ll i
t ll 01 t ll I - llr ll e t t
:d n d lil I n l li ll
t ll ll l u l 1 n i Thol llls
ll ili ll
ll [[ Lin
e COil l t lHlt Lle !l r u   
to
tn t __ ~~_  l
011
~-- ~- - -- -
 
April 14,2004 
SENT VIA FACSIMILE TO: 208-395-8585 
Bart W. Harwood' 
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A. 
702 W. Idaho Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ill 83701 
Re: Taylor v. Maile 
Dear Mr. Harwood: 
My clients have reviewed the documents you e-mailed to me, and have a number of concerns. 
First, Helen's Taylor's share ofthe trust should be distributed to her at this time. They realize they 
could make that distribution as soon as the current trustees have resigned, but they would like to 
avoid the incorrect impression that the funds are going to Helen's children rather than to her. 
Second, they are quite concerned with the demand that all of the Taylors release the trustees from 
any potential claims and waive their right to an accounting of the trust as a precondition to them 
being allowed to pursue the suit against Mr. Maile on behalf of the trust. It is extremely irregular 
for a trustee to refuse to provide any accounting, but none'~as been provided in this case. 
1bird, they need assurances that both Beth and Andy will be supportive ofthis lawsuit., as there is 
no getting around the fact that at least Beth will be an essential witness. This suit was filed based 
on Beth's totally unequivocal representations that Mr. Maile had never informed Ted Johnson that 
it was a conflict of interest for him to enter into a business transaction With a client" had never 
informed Mr. Johnson that he should seek independent counsel, had never advised he obtain an 
appraisal ofthe property at development value, and h~d never informed her or Andy ofany ofthose 
facts. In fact, she reported that she felt Mr. Maile bad treated her quite unfairly, putting pressure on 
her and demanding that the real estate transaction be closed right when she was planning a funeral 
for Ted., who had been like a father to her. She made these unequivocal statements at a meeting 
attended by a number offamily members on July 5, 2003, and acknowledged that it was the trustees' 
fiduciary duty to bring an action against Mr. Maile. She repeated these statements to Reed Taylor 
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Bart W. Harwood 
April 14, 2004 
Page 2 
and his son lud when they met with her in Boise on several occasions. The events which are 
concerning to us are as follows: 
1.	 On July 22, 2003, I received a letter informing me that the Rogers had decided the 
suit "has not the merit to benefit the trust." We have never received an explanation 
of the basis for this conclusion, which was entirely contrary to Beth's previous 
statements. The letter did, however, follow a request for an accounting made by 
DaHan Taylor. 'When I talked to Beth about the letter, she made overt threats against 
Dallan if he didn't "back off." 
2.	 On February 23, 2004, we received Mr. Maile's Answer and Counterdaim, which 
attachea the July 22, 2003 letter to me as an Exhibit. We most certa.inly did not 
provide him with a copy ofthat letter, and must assume he received it from Beth. 
3.	 Beth attended the hearing on Monday'with Mr. Maile and his attorneys. She 
appeared to be on very good tenus with all of them, and made comments in the 
hallway which have caused grave cont:ems about where her loyalties lie. 
4.	 After the hearing, Beth told me unequivocally that it will not be possible to obtain all 
ofthe signatures ofthe beneficiaries by the Monday deadline the court has given us. 
Because nearly all of the beneficiaries have already assigned their rights as 
beneficiaries under the Maile lawsuit to Reed Taylor and any oth(~r benefiiciaries who 
wish to pursue it, there is no valid basis for her insistence on obtaining all the 
signatures before she and Andy resign. 
My clients recognize ~eth and the sisters' concerns that this action must not in any way put Ted 
Johnson's reputation or physical state at the time of the Maile transaction in an unfavclrable light. 
Theyabsolutely share that view and have agreed to prosecute this case in a manner which will focus 
on Mr. Maile's conduct only. Beth has agreed to this ~trategy, but now attempts to frustrate. 
The Taylors are not willing to give up their rights as beneficiaries oftbe trust unkss Beth will affirm 
her prior factual statements in the form of an affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against 
Mr. Maile. Ifwe aren't able to reach an agreement 0ll that, they will seek a full accounting oftbe 
trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax returns. They will also require an accounting of all 
distributions from the estate and nontestamentary transfers, including copies ofall records relating 
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Bart W. Harwood 
April 14, 2004 
Page 3 
ever been given on where that money has gone. We will need records establishing whether the 
beneficiaries on the annuities were changed, when, by whom, and who received the funds. We also 
need a copy of the power of attorney given to Beth and a summary of the actions taken pursuant to 
that power of attorney. 
¥y clients will waive their right to these records only ifBeth executes an affidavit and expedites the 
signing of the documents so they may proceed with the suit against Mr. Maile. 
Judge Wilpur has given us only until close of-business on Monday, April 19th, to either join or 
substitute the trust as a plaintiff in the pending lawsuit. We would of course be able to refile, but 
deem it extremely unwise to provide Mr: Maile with a window ofopportunity to dispose ofthe real 
property, which may well be our only potential source of collecting on a judgment. 
Time is very critical. Dallan Taylor is in Boise and is Willing to meet with you and Beth to review 
and copy the changes to the documents described above. . 
. , 
Sincerely, . 
CLARK. and FEENEY 
By: Connie W. Taylor 
CWT:st 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, miLLAN TAYLOR, ) No. CV OC 04-00473D
 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS
 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY,
 
and Berkshire Investments, LLC,
 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, and 
Berkshire Investments, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
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DEPOSITI~ OF REED J. TAYLOR t~KEN 1-31-05 
Page 82 Page 84 
1 'With a date, January 26, 2004. 1 think. 
2 Have you seen these before? 2 MR. GJORDING: What number? 
3 A. Yes. 3 MR. MAILE: 54 (sic), I think. 
4 Q. And how is it that you came into possession of 4 MR. GJORDING: I think we should. 
5 these two exhibits; 52-A and 52-B? 5 MR. CLARK: And how many pages have you got? 
6 A. This is the original of the ones, 6 MR. MAILE: Three pages on 54 (sic). 
7 correcting -- there is a small difference between these 7 MR. COLLAER: That's 53. 
8 two, I believe. Beth writes -- writes this letter, and she 8 MR. CLARK: What is 53? 
9 sent it out to all the members. 9 MR. MAILE: Maybe I skipped ... 
10 Q. SO you and Beth drafted this together? 10 MR. CLARK: 53 is the one you just handed -­
11 A. Uh-huh. 11 the two-page exhibit.
 
12 THE COURT REPORTER: Is that a "yes"? 12 MR. GJORDING: I thought that was 52.
 
13 THE WITNESS: Yes. 13 MR. CLARK: You 'Ire right.
 
1 4 Q. (BY MR. MAlLE) And were you down in the Boise 1 4 MR. MAlLE: 52.
 
15 area when this was drafted? 15 I think this should be .- we're on fifty- -­

16 A. I was in Boise at her house and we talked 16 this is 53.
 
1 7 about it. And either she sent me a rough draft, or I sent 1 7 MR. GJORDING: .And off the record, so -- you
 
18 her one, you know, back and forth. And she sent the final 18 don't have to get all this.
 
19 one with a letler of her own. 19 (Discussion off the record.}
 
20 Q. SO the final version was not sent by you, 20 (Exhibit No. 53 was marked
 
21 then; is that correct? 21 for identification.)
 
22 A. Correct. 22 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Sir, I'm going to hand you
 
23 Q. And then, sir, you also prepared and 23 what is marked as 53 now, and it consists of four pages. 
24 distributed what was called a "Participation Agreement," a 24 And please identify, if you can, what they represent. 
25 "Disclaimer of Beneficiary," and an "Assignment Form," did 25 A. (Reviewing ..d..?cume~t.) Th~ qu:~~~ ,, . •._1----.-.--------------.-.----------------­
Page 83 page 85 
1 you not? 1 Q. What do they represent? 
2 A. Correct. 2 A. This is a letter that went to all family 
3 Q. And those particular forms were distributed by 3 members asking whether they wanted to participate or not 
4 you to the beneficiaries? 4 and sign one form or the other. 
5 A. I believe they went with this letter. 5 Q. And-­
6 Q. And was Beth Rogers supposed to send that out? 6 A. I think this went with the personal letter of 
7 Was it your understanding that she was to do 7 Beth's. 
8 that, or were you to do that? 8 Q. Am I correct in assuming that each member of 
9 A. She was going -- I -- I think, uh, we prepared 9 the Trust -- or beneficiary of the Trust received his or 
1 0 them, and she was going to prepare her letter and send with 10 her name substituted where Beth's name appears on this? 
11 it. I think they were mailed from -- I think she mailed 11 A. Correct. 
12 them. 12 If I recall, Beth actually did the mailing on 
13 Q. But you're the one that actually created the 13 this one. 
1 4 forms; is that correct? 14 MR. MAILE: That's all the questions I have. 
1 5 A. Correct. 15 
16 MR. MAILE: Well, I'm going to have this 16 EXAMINATION 
1 7 marked as 53, then. 1 7 BY MR. GJORDING: 
18 MR. GJORDING: How many pages? 18 Q. Mr. Taylor, my name is Jack Gjording -- I know 
19 MR. MAILE: Well, this one is already in this 19 we met before we started here -- and I represent Mr. Maile 
20 January 8th letter, isn't it? 20 in his capacity as an attorney -­
21 MR. GJORDING: Vh, I don't know. 21 A. Okay. 
22 MR. CLARK: Yeah. You'd asked me about it. 22 Q. -- just so that you'll know who the players 
23 MR. MAILE: It's in Beth's deposition, I 23 are. 
24 think. 24 I'm going to try not to duplicate anything 
25 We'll have it marked here as 54 (sic), I 25 that Mr. Maile has asked you, although I think I probably 
22 (Pages 82 to 85) 
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DEP~,TION OF REED J. TAYLOR TAKEN 1.,·05 
1 A. Yes. 1 Q. And you have no recollection if this person
 
2 Q. Okay. So three basic events during the day?
 2 was a family member?
 
3 A. (No verbal response.)
 3 A. No.
 
4 THE COURT REPORlER: You have to answer out
 4 Q. Do you recall where during the day you heard 
5 loud. 5 this?
 
6 THE WITNESS: Yes.
 6 A. No.
 
7 Q. (BY MR. COLLAER) Were th(~ initial services at
 7 Q. Was it actually at the filllleral services
 
8 a church or a funeral home?
 8 itself?
 
9 A. You know, I can't remember.
 9 A. I assume it was in gem:ral conversation 
~O Q. Okay. Do you recall, was it -- was -- the ~O somewhere, but I don't remember. I had no interest in it 
~1 drive from wherever the services were to the gravesite, was at that time, and I had been down here, and I knew nothing 
2 that very far away? about any of it, so ... 
3 A. No. Q. Okay. But it was the day of the filllleral prior 
4 Q. And did Beth ride with you out to the to traveling with Beth out to the graveside services? 
5 gravesite? Did you travel in the same vehicle? A. Yes. 
b.6 A. I don't remember. Q. When you were traveling out -- when you drove II~7 Q. Is that when the conversation with her about out to the graveside services, whose car was it in?
 
8 the properties occurred, is either going to or from -­ A. I think the conversation I had was after -- I
 
9 A. It was after. told you, as I remember, after the funeral; not before.
 ~: 
DO Q. -- the gravesite? ~O Q. I thought you just told me that your
 
121 A. It was after.
 l/1 conversation with her in the car was trawling back from
 
122 Q. After the graveside services?
 l/2 the graveside services to the recf:ption.
 
b3 A. (No verbal response.) In A. Okay. You're right.
 
~4 THE COURT REPORTER: You have to answer out
 [;:>4 Q. Okay. Then my next question is: Whose car?
 
~5 loud.
 D5 A. I don't remember. 
Page 129 Page 131 
I-----~,~-------------------=----+---------------------_-::--,-.-­
1 THE WITNESS: After. 1 Q. Do you remember what kind of car it was?
 
2 Q. (BY MR. COLLAER) Okay. But it was traveling
 2 A. No. I don't remember that.
 
3 fi-om the gravesite back to the reception?





5 Q. Okay. So that would explain Beth's obvious -­
 5 A. It was a -- I believe it was a, um, four-door,
 
6 she was upset because the graveside services are upsetting
 6 bigger car, and I don't know -- I don't remember.
 
7 fc)f the family. It's somewhat of a tearful event?
 7 Q. All right. When you spoke with Beth in the
 
8 A. Right.
 8 car about the Linder property being sold, did she indicate 
9 Q. Okay. Now, you said that prior to that time, 9 that it had been sold for the appraised value? 
o during the day, you had learned from somebody that the ~O A. No.
 
1 Linder property had been sold; is that correct? 11 Q. Through this lawsuit, if the jury ultimately
 
2 A. Correct.
 2 finds in favor of the plaintiffs in this matter, is your
 
3 Q. Was that somebody -- either your brothers John
 3 mother going to get anything?
b.4 or Dallan? 4 Do any of the proceeds from any Judgment 
b.5 A. No. 5 that's entered in this lawsuit -­
b.6 Q. Was it somebody associated with the family? 6 A. She will probably get it all.
 
7 A. Theyjust come up in general conversation. I ~7 Q. It all goes to your mother?
 
8 couldn't say where. 18 A. Most -- I assume most of it will. I don't
 
b.9 Q. Do you recall if the person that told you this 9 know about my other brothers arld sisters. 
120 was a male or a female? Q. Then why in the first lawsuit are you named 
~1 A. No. individually? 
1/2 Q. You have no recollection one way or another -­ ~~ A. Pardon? 
b3 A. No. 3 Q. Why in the first lawsuit are you a named 
?4 Q. -- if it was male or female? 4 individual plaintiff? 
~5 A. No. , 5 A. That's the way they do it, I guess. I don't 
Page 130 Page 132 ~
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DEP,,--.TION OF REED J . TAYLOR TAKEN 1,,-,-05
 
1 know. 1 fair market values for it.
 
2 Q. All right. But in the fIrst lawsuit, no money
 2 Q. Tell me, do you have llly reason to believe
 
3 is coming to yourself ifyou prevail; is that correct?
 3 that Ted Johnson wasn't motivated in the same manner to 
4 A. Are you talking about the fIrst lawsuit-­ 4 close everything out?
 
5 Q. Yes.
 5 A. I can't speak for Ted.
 
6 A. -- or the third one?
 6 Q. Okay. Can you tell me why Mr. Johnson, during 
7 Q. The first one. The one that's been dismissed. 7 his lifetime, couldn't have sold that property for anything 
8 A. We were basically doing it on account of my 8 he wanted to, or anybody he wanted to?
 
9 brother.
 9 A. He could have.
 
10 Q. My question is: In that first lawsuit, Q. He could have revoked that Tmst anytime he
 11 although you are a named plaintiff, if that were to -- if wanted to, couldn't he?
 
12 the Supreme Court were to reverse the Summary Judgment that A. Correct.
 
13 was entered, and it goes to trial and you prevail, if I'm Q. He could have given the property away if he
 
14 understanding what you've told me -- all right? -- quote, wanted to?
 
15 your understanding is you don't get anything; everything A. I assume so.
 11 
16 goes to your mother? Q. As long as he's mentally competent, he can do
 
17 A. My intent is -- I'm not going to say exactly ~~ anything with it he wants?
 
18 how it's going to be disbursed. My intent would be for my A. Right.
 
19 mother. ~~ Q. He could have given it to the City, to the
 
~O Q. In the second lawsuit, the one with the Trust, State, or he could have donated :it to the FFA?
 
~1 who gets the money if you prevail? A. Correct.
 
?2 A. Well, like I said, as far as, uh -- I haven't Q. And that wouldn't have: been the benefit of
 
?3 talked to, specifically, the ones that are out of town. As your -- ofany of the heirs?
 ~~ 
?4 far as John and I are concerned, uh, we're doing it for our 74 A. Correct.
 
~5 mother, so ...
 75 Q. He didn't have to benefit the heirs, did he? 
Page 135L-- Page 133 . . _ 
1 Q. So you and your brothers are not going to get 1 A. No.
 
2 anything?
 2 Q. The Trust didn't have to benefIt the heirs,
 
3 A. We're not looking for money out of it, if
 3 did they?
 
4 that's where you're going.
 4 A. Correct.
 
5 Q. All right. You indicated that -- when you
 5 Q. Tell me, other than today, have you ever met
 
6 were asked some questions about the purchase of the Star
 6 Mr. Maile?
 
7 property and the offer of $325,000, I think you -- what
 7 A. Who?
 
8 you -- I wrote it down, and your quote wa" "That was a hell
 8 Q. Tom Maile. Have you ever met Tom Maile prior 
9 ofa value." 9 to today? 
o A. In my opinion. ,10 A. No.
 
1 Q. That's what you testified. Was that a hell of Q. Prior to today, have you ever had any
 /11

2 a value for you, as the purchaser ..­ 12 discussions with him concerning the Linder Road property? 
3 A. Yes. 13 A. No. 
~4 Q. -- or for the Trust, as the seller? H/ Q. Are you aware ifany of your brothers, either 
~5 A. I think it was a hell ofa value for me at 15 John or Dallan, had ever met Mr. Maile prior to this 
!l6 that price. 16 lawsuit being filed? 
7 Q. Okay. All right. You also indicated that the 17 A. I'd have to ask them, but I don't think so. 
8 reason -- your understanding, with respect to the sale of 18 Q. Are you aware of any discussions between 
9 the Star property, is that the heirs wanted to close 119 John or Dallan and Mr. Maile com:erning the Linder Road 
~O everything out and disburse the dough? ~O property prior to the filing of this lawsuit? 
bl A. That was the general attitude. Yes. ~1 A. I am sure they had -- had some. You'd have to 
b2 Q. Okay. And now you think that's III appropriate ~2 ask them about that. 
b3 thing for the heirs to do -- or to Willt for the -- the 23 Q. You have no knowledge of it? 
I
74 tmstee to handle the property to get it sold? 124 A. Pardon? 
I
75 A. I think there's an obligation there to get 25 Q. You have no knowledge of it? 
Page 134 , Page 136 
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January 8, 2004 
Re: The Theodore Johnson Estate and Trust 
Dear Beth: 
It is my understanding from the previous letter to the beneficiaries of the Ted Johnson 
Trust, that there was little interest to have the Trust pursue an action against Ted's 
attorney. Connie didn't hear back in writing from anyone. 
I can understand that. you do not want to be involved in a lawsuit, however, I have 
decided, on behalf of Mom and myself, to pursue an action against Uncle Ted's attorney 
for violating his ethical and fiduciary duties when he bought the property on Linder Road 
from the Trust. I expect that it will take one to two years to resolve this, and estimate that 
the expenses could amount to $15,000 to $20,000 per person. If you want to he a part of 
the lawsuit, please sign the enclosed Participation Agreement and send it with an initial 
contribution of $3,000 to me. 1bis will be held in a Trust Account for future expenses. 
If you do not want to be a part of this lawsuit, I ask that you sign the enclosed 
Assignment. The lawsuit needs to be filed immediately because of filing deadlines, so I 
would appreciate your response as soon as possible. 
Please return one of the two enclosed fonns to me at P.O. Box 1165, Lewiston, ill 
83501. 























I would like to participate in the lawsuit, as an assignee, and am enclosing Three 
Thousand Dollars ($3,000), which will be held in a Trust Account and used towards my 













DISCLAlMER OF BENEFICIARY 
I, _ (beneficiary), 
of ____. -' (address), city, state) 
being over the age of eighteen years, do hereby forever renounce and disclaim any right, title, and 
interest whatsoever in alawsuit or settlement relating to the sale of a 40-acre parcel ofproperty east 
of Linder Road, Eagle, Ada County, Idaho, to Thomas Maile. I specifically do not disclaim my 
interest in any funds paid or payable by virtue of the contract with Thomas Maile to purchase said 
property. 
I understand that other beneficiaries of the Theodore L. JoImson Trust plan to pursue a 
lawsuit in regard to this propeliy, and I waive any right to any funds received as a result of said 
lawsuit which exceed the contract price. I understand that by virtue ofthis release and waiver, I will 
not be responsible for any expenses incurred relating to that'lawsuit. 
In witness whereof, I have executed this disclaimer at _ (city, state) 





1, _____________________________________________  
_ ____ ________________________________ 







I, , as one of the beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust (Assignor), do hereby assign to Reed Taylor and any 
additional heirs wishing to participate in the lawsuit, hereinafter referred to as Assignees, 
all my rights and interest in a dispute relating to a contract for sale of real property in Ada 
County, Idaho, between the Johnson Trust and Thomas Maile. 
This assignment is contingent on the following terms and condi60ns: 
1. I will not be required to return any portion of the money which has already 
been distributed to me relating to thatcontract. 
2. I will not be responsible for any expenses incurred relating to that lawsuit; 
all of those expenses will b advanced by the assignees. 
3. The balance now remaining due' under that contract ($300,000 plus 
interest) will be paid to the Theodore 1. Johnson Trust.so the amounts due me will not be 
affected. 
In witness whereof, I have executed this assignment at 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
2 OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
3 
4 REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR No. CV OC 04-00473D
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M1ULE REAL ESTATE COMPANY .)
 
















15 THOMAS MAILE IV and COLLEEN 
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DEPC nON OF HELEN J. TAYLOR TAKEN, 3-05 
~ ....., 
Page 27 
Were you aware that your brother intended to 
make provision for you through a trust? Meaning that your 
brother, after he died, you would receive money from -­
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. Okay. Did you become aware of that only after 
the funeral of your brother? 
A. Let's see. When did I know? I don't know 
when I knew. I knew he had a will, but I don't know. 
Q. Now, I ask you to look at the next page of 
Exhibit 53, and I want to know if you've seen this form 
before? 
A. (Witness complied.) 
Q. What does the top line :;ay? 
A. "Participation ofAgreement"? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I don't -- I don't think I had that. 
Q. Okay. Let's look at the next document on 
Exhibit 53. 
Does the ftrst line say "Disclaimer of 
Beneficiary"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I'd ask you to read that earefully. 
A. (Witness complied.) Okay. 
Q. Are you finished reading that? 






















A. Dallan, uh-huh. 
Q. And you can't think of any other occasion for 
the last four years where Reed and Ted were together with 
you at a family reunion? 
A. No. 
Q. Can you think of any occasion in that 
four-year period of time where John and you and Ted were 
together in a social setting? 
A. No. 
Q. Ifyou would turn to Exhibit 53 -- it should 
be the next tab over. 
A. (Witness complied.) 
Q. Is there a date up at the top of Exhibit -­
A. January the 8th. 
Q. And that's Exhibit 53. I'd ask you to review 
that January 8th, 2004, letter. 
A. (Witness complied.) 
Q. Are you ftnished with that January 8th letter? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did anyone ever talk to you about an 
e:stimated expense of$15,000 to $20,000 per person-­
A. No. 
Q. -- to file a lawsuit? 
A. No. 




























1 counterclaim that could be pursued by the defendants 1 Q. Have you ever seen this form before? 
2 against the Trust? 2 A. I don't -­ no. I don't remember really seeing 
3 A. No. 3 it. 
4 Q. Did anyone ever explain to you the risk ofa 4 Q. Okay. And I'd ask you to look at the next 
5 counterclaim against any of the individual-named 5 page of Exhibit 53. Tell me the top line, if you would, 
6 plaintiffs, your sons, in this case? 6 please. 
7 A. No. 7 A. "Assignment Form." 
8 Q. Did you receive a copy of this letter? 8 Q. Okay. Read that carefully. 
9 A. Uh, let's see. No. I don't think I got this 9 A. Okay. 
o one. 10 Q. Do you remember receiving this form called an 
1 Q. Okay. The ftrst sentence of Exhibit 53, the 11 "Assignment Form"? 
2 January 8th, 2004, letter, it says "It is my understanding i 2 A. No. 
3 from the previous letter to the beneficiaries of the 13 Q. Do you remember signing any forms and 
4 Ted Johnson Trust, that there was little interest to have 14 providing them to any of your sons relative: to Exhibit 53? 
5 the Trust pursue an action against Ted's attorney." 15 A. No. I don't remember anything-­
6 I'm going to ask you if you remember receiving 16 Q. Okay. 
~ 7 any other letters concerning the Ted Johnson Trust about 17 A. --like that. 
~ 8 pursuing litigation? 18 Q. Do you remember paying any money to your sons; 
9 A. No. 19 for example, $3,000? 
? 0 Q. And do you understand -- or did you understand /0 A. No. 
? 1 in 2004 that you were a beneftciary of your brother's / 1 Q. Have you paid any money to yow' sons in the 
t? 2 Trust; meaning that you would inherit money from your 22 last three years? 
t? 3 brother? 23 A. No. 
t? 4 A. I don't know what he means. / 4 Q. Have you paid any money to any law finn in the 
t? 5 Q. Okay. Let me rephrase it. /5 lastthree years? 
Page 26 Page 28 
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DEP(~TION OF HELEN J. TAYLOR TAKEN ........3-05
 
1 A. No. 1 A. No.
 
2 MR. MAILE (To Mr. Clark): Okay. I think it's
 2 Q. Do you recall if any of your sons gave you
 
3 Exhibit 25. Ifyou could, Mr. Clark, help the witness find
 3 this document?
 
4 Exhibit 25. I think that's the one.
 4 A. No, I don't.
 
5 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Mrs. Taylor, I'm going to ask
 5 Q. Did you have any meetings with
 
6 you to review Exhibit 25. The top line says "Disclaimer,
 6 Connie Taylor -­

7 Release & Indemnity Agreement."
 7 A. No.
 
8 Are we looking at the same piece ofpaper?
 8 Q. -- concerning documents?
 
9 A. Yes, sir.
 9 A. No. 
o Q. Okay. Ifyou can go ahead and read that ~O Q. Do you remember if your -- any of your sons
 
1 carefully, and I want to ask you a couple ofquestions ~1 asked you to review a document -­

2 about that. The actual document, excluding the signature 12 A. No.
 
3 lines, is two and a halfpages, approximately. i13 Q. -- before you signed it?
 
~4 A. (Witness complied.) tI.4 A. No, I don't.
 
~5 MR. MAILE: Mark this as 68.
 5 Q. Do you remember any of your sons sitting down 
'16 (Exhibit No. 68 was marked 6 and reading a document to you'?
 
7 for identification.)
 7 A. No.
 
8 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Okay. Are you done reviewing
 8 Q. Have you had any experience where anyone sits 
9 Exhibit 25? down and reads documents to you -­

~O A. I think so. A. No.
 
21 Q. Okay. It is a rather long document; wasn't Q. -- before you've signed them'?
 
?2 it? A. No.
!~?3 A. Right. Q. Is it your practice to sign docwnents after 
~4 Q. Do you remember seeing this document before? you've read them'?
 
~5 A. No.
 A. After I've read it'? Yes. 
1 Q. Do you have any independent recollection of 1 Q. Well, let me ask it this way: Would you sign
 
2 signing the document?
 2 something you didn't read?
 
3 A. No.
 3 A. Uh, I doubt it. I don't know.
 
4 Q. Go back, if you would, please -- flip back one
 4 Q. Okay. Well, that's all I can ask 1or.
 
5 page. And do you see a signature line that's blank that
 5 appreciate that.
 
6 says "Helen Taylor"?
 6 Go back to the first page of Exhibit 25; flip
 
7 A. I see that.
 7 back a couple ofpages.
 
8 Q. I've had this marked as Exhibit 68. And I'm
 8 A. (Witness complied.)
 
9 going to ask you to take a look at Exhibit 68, and identify
 9 Q. And this is the "Disclaimer, Release & 
~O that if you can. 10 Indemnity Agreement." 
~1 A. Yeah. 11 A. Yes. 
~2 Q. Do you recognize that signature as your own 12 Q. Did anyone ever explain to you that you and 
~3 signature? 13 your family members -- your direct family members -- were 
~4 A. It looks like it. H going to pursue a lawsuit through the Trust against the 
15 Q. Okay. What's the date that was signed? 15 purchaser of the property? 
6 A. 6/11/04. /16 A. Well, I knew -- I knew there was going to be a 
7 Q. Do you remember who gave you that document to lawsuit, but I don't know details. 117 ~8 sign? 18 Q. Okay. Did anyone ever explain to you the 
~9 A. No. language in the contract, Exhibit 25, that the Taylor 1 
~O Q. Where were you in June of2004? ~~ family may be responsible for indemnifying any other 
'71 A. I guess I was home. beneficiaries under your brother's Trust? 
?2 Q. Did anyone ever take you to a lawyer's b~ Let me ask you this: Do you know what the 
?3 office -­ b3 word "indemnification" means? 
~4 A. No. b4 A. No. 
t;>5 Q. -- in 2004? bs Q. Okay. Well, then that's -- I'm glad I asked a 
Page 301 Page 32 
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DEPOSI\....'J OF RAY JOHNSON TAYLOR TAKE,-,2-14-04
 
1 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 1 INDEX
 
2 OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY
 2 EXAMINATION 
3 3 RAY JOHNSON TAYLOR PAGE 4 REED TAYLOR,DALLAN TAYLOR ) No. CVOC 04-00473D 4 By: Mr. Maile	 4­
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, )
 
5 )










7 ) 9 EXHIB ITS 
THOMAS MAILE IV and COLLEEN 10 NO. DESCRIPTION PAGEMAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS ) 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and 11 44 - Letter dated July 7,2003, from 46
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, )




 45 .. Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants Supplemental 73 
) 13 Response to DefendantiCounter-Claimants' 
11 ) First Set ofDiscovery, with attaclunent, THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
1412	 TRUST, ) 





15 Petition for Appointment ofTrustees 
) 16 47 .. Motion to Set Aside Order Dated November 17, 78
 
14 vs. )
 2004 and/or Motion to Re-Consider ) 1715	 THOMAS MAILE IV and COLLEEN
 
\1AILE, husband and wife, and )
 48 - Affidavit ofThomas G. Maile in Support of 79
 
16 BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,
 18 Motion to Set Aside Order dated November 




) 49 - Excerpt from a document entitled ''Plaintiffs! 79 
18 20 Counter-Defendants Answer to DefendflntlCounter..DEPOSITION OF RAY JOHNSON TAYLOR
 
19









 (Copies ofexhibits from Beth Rogers' d,eposition
 
21
 23 taken 8/11/04 are attached for witness's reference 







Page 1 Page 3 
--------_.._-----------------'---+-----------------_._---_._-----­
1 DEPOSITION OF RAY JOHNSON TAYIDR 1 Whereupon the deposition proceeded as follows:
 
2
 23 BE IT REMEMBERED that the deposition of 
4 RAY JOHNSON TAYLDR was taken by the attorney for the 3 RAY JOHNSON TAYLOR,
 
5 Defendants/Counter-Claimants, Colleen Maile and Berkshire
 4 a witness having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, 
6 Investments, LLC, at the office of Burnham, Habel & 5 the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, testified as 7 Associates, Inc., located at 668 North Ninth Street, 
8 Boise, Idaho, before Jeanne M. Hirmer, a Court Reporter 6 follows:
 
9 (Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter Number 318) and Notary
 7 
10	 Public in and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, on the 
11	 14th day of December, 2004, commencing at the hour of 8 EXAMINATION 
12 I :30 p.m. in the above-entitled matter. 9 BY MR. MAILE: 
13 o Q. Sir, would you please state your name for the APPEARANCES: 
14 1 record.
 
For the Plaintiffs/ CLARK and FEENEY
 2 A. My name is Ray Johnson Taylor. 
15	 Counter-Defendants: Attorneys at Law 3 Q. And what's your address, sir? By: Connie W. Taylor
 
16 1229 Main Street ~4 A. 2020 Broadview Drive, Lewiston, Idaho.
 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
 Q.	 And how long have yon resided at that address? 17 
18 For Defendants/ THOMAS G. MAILE, IV A. Uh, 12, 13 years. 
Counter-Claimants, Attorney at Law Q. And prior to that where did you reside? 
19 Colleen Maile and 380 West State Street 
Berkshire Investments, Eagle, Idaho 83616 A.	 Uh, Ridgeway Drive -­
20	 LLC: Q. And where-­i~
21 A.	 -- in Lewiston. 
For the Defendant, GJORDING & FOUSER Q.	 That's in Lewiston? 22 Thomas Maile IV: Attorneys at Law 
By: Jack S. Gjording ~~ A. Uh-huh. 
23 509 West Hays Street Q.	 What's your Social Security number? 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
A.	 My Social Security number? 24	 ~~ 
25 Q. Yes. 
Page 21 5 Page 4 
1 (Pages 1 to 4) 
BURNHAM, HABEL & ASSOCIATES, INC. (208) 345-5700 
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DEPOSIl.,J OF RAY JOHNSON TAYLOR TAKEV-14-04 
1 of their reputation.
 
2 Q. And what is that?
 
3 A. Uh, they are a -- old man Knipe was a very,
 
4 very famous appraiser in this area; well-known.
 
5 I happened to go to high school with one of
 
6 the principals of this fInn. I know the fInn very well.
 
7 And, uh, the opinion is that they are, uh -- in my opinion,
 




~O Q. Why? 
~1 A. Because I think that they do not have the 
~2 professional standard -- or the standards that I would 
11.3 want. Some appraisers I like; some I don't. This one, I 
1 4 don't. 
5 Q. Which principal did you go to school with? 
6 A. Trina. 
~7 Q. Have you kept in contact with Mr. Knipe? 
~8 A. No. It's probably been 25 years since I've 
11.9 seen him -- 20. 
70 Q. What other facts were you aware of in July of 
?l 2003 that led you to the belief that there was unethical 
~2 behavior involving the purchase of the Linder property in 
t:>3 Eagle? 
t:>4 A. I believe -- it's my personal opinion -- that 
25 attorneys should not buy property from elderly people. And 
Page 33 
1 there are extensive Bar Association rules on that issue.
 
2 .And we -- I concluded that none of those had been followed.
 
3 Q. And what research have you done to make the
 
4 determination that none had been followed?
 
5 A. We have asked repeatedly for records and
 
6 received only minimal fIles from you.
 
7 Q. SO what is it that you are looking for that
 
8 would cause you to believe that there is any unethical
 
9 behavior involved in this transaction?
 




2 Q. And what are those?
 
1 about that, sir.
 
2 A. (Witness complied.)
 
3 Q. Is this a document that you saw -- or have
 
4 seen in the past?
 
5 A. I have seen that in the past.
 
6 Q. Was this, again, provided to you by your
 
7 attorney or by Beth Rogers?
 
8 A. Uh, as a result of the meeting -- I suspect
 
9 this was provided to me after the meeting with, uh,
 
10 Hartbrook -- Harwood -- Harwood -- Harwood -- whatever his 
11 name is. 
12 Q. Now, there's a date on the bottom that says 
13 "Balance" as of "07/23/04," and it looks like it has 
14 $2,672? 
15 A. lTh-huh. 
16 Q. Is that your understanding of what the Trust 
1117 consisted of in July of 2004; the Tlust assets? 
18 A. Yes. Approximately. Other than the 6,200 and 
119 the -- no. That was my understanding as to what the 
20 balance of the Trust would be after the distriibution of all 
21 the payments. But at the time of tt~s letter the balance 
22 was 293,000, uh -- around 200-, 300,000. 
23 Q. And you're the trustee of the Trust currently, 
24 are you not? 
25 A. lam. 
Page 35 
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1 Q. And what is the balance of the Trust assets 
2 today? 
3 A. Probably around $2,000. 
4 Q. And has that remained constant since 
5 Exhibit 40 was drafted on or about 7/23/04? 
6 A. Uh, yeah. 
7 Q. There's been no additions or no subtractions? 
8 A. No. 
9 Q. What value does the Tmst hold? 
0 A. The value of the lawsuit -- of this lawsuit. 
1 Q. All other assets have been distributed out of 
2 the Trust; is that correct? 
3 A. Well, one of them is a letter to Mr., uh -- to ~3 A. Yes.
 
4 Ted Johnson advising him to seek independent counsel, for 14 Q. And I think we have an agreement entered into
 
5 the first item.
 5 between the heirs authorizing that; is that correct?
 
6 Q. Any others?
 6 A. Yes.
 
7 A. Urn, I can't recall right now.
 7 Q. In your review of the Trust, in the terms of 
~8 Q. Did you do any independent research in July of ~8 the Trust, Ted Johnson appeared to make provision for the 
11.9 2003 to form the opinions that you did by reviewing any of ~9 Trust to remain during the life of his sisters; is that 
70 the regulatory rules associated with the Idaho State Bar? 120 correct? 
?1 A. I did not personally. No. A. Yes. As I recall, yes. 
t22 Q. Did anyone on your behalf do that? Q. And why did the family members choose to 
23 A. Yes. My attorney. liquidate the Trust and disburse the assets that ~~
 
74 Q. Going back to Exhibit 40, the last page of 124 Ted Johnson wanted to be held in the Trust? 
:/5 that exhibit, I'm going to ask you a couple of questions A. Uh, we thought that it was better for the -­f5Page 34 Page 36 
9 (Pages 33 to 36) 


























































DEPOSIT,..,J OF RAY JOHNSON TAYLOR TAKEV-14-04
 
1 the three sisters to receive their money now, since they're 
2 in their 80's, rather than receive a life estate only and, 
3 uh, I think all the heirs -- their disclaimer of the, uh, 
4 benefits of the Trust, except for this lawsuit. 
5 Q. Who initiated the idea of taking the Trust 
6 assets and transferring them to the sisters? 
7 A. Oh, I think -- actually, we were all surprised 
8 that, uh -- uh, actually -- it was kind a unanimous 
9 decision, actually, because of the age of the moms. 
o Q. Was there a group meeting that this unanimous 
1 decision took place? 
~2 A. No. I don't -- not specifically a group 
~3 meeting. 
4 Q. Do you know how the consensus was arrived at 
5	 between the beneficiaries? 
6 A. I think everybody was mailed a letter and
 
7 asked if they would do -- if they wanted to do that.
 
~8 Q. And to your knowledge, who authored that
 
9 ldter? 
70 A. I don't know. 
?l Q. Did you undertake any solicitation from the 
/2 beneficiaries as to, uh, attempt to alter the terms of the 
r3 Trust?
r4 A. I don't think so. 
:/5 Q. Did you have any discussions with Reed as to 
1 THE COURT REPORTER: Yes.
 
2 MR. MAILE: Okay. We'll do it that way.
 
3 MR. GJORDING: That's all right.
 
4 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Okay. Exhibit 39, have you
 
5 seen a copy of this before?
 
6 A. I have.
 






o	 Q. And did you see Exhibit 39 before it was
 
transmitted to Bart Harwood?
 
A. I would imagine. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. Did you approve of the contents of the ~~ 
exhibit?~4 A. Sure. 
Q. How is it that -- in the third paragraph on ~~ the first page -- actually, the bottom paragraph, the 
~8 statement that's made "Third, th,ey need assurances that 
~9 both Beth and Andy will be supportive of this lawsuit, as 
~O there is no getting around the fact that at least Beth will 
~1 be an essential witness." 
~2 What is it about Beth that would be an b3 essential witness, in your opinion? 
b4 A. She was (inaudible). 
b5 Q. And what -­
Page 39Page 37 
--------------------------+------------------------------­
1 whether Reed would be doing -- undertaking any activity to 
2 seek a consensus from the beneficiaries to liquidate the 
3 Trust? 
4 A. Well, certainly, in our family, we talked 
5 among ourselves; the kids. And I'm sure that, 00, the 
6 other kids did as well. 
7 Q. I'm going to hand you Exhibit 39 from the 
8 Beth Rogers deposition and ask if you've seen that before. 
9 MR. MAILE: (To Ms. Taylor) And, Counsel, I 
o thought we had an understanding that we could refer to
 
1 these exhibits as Beth Rogers' exhibits.
 
2 Do we need to have these all re-marked and
 
~3 reattached on this?
 




16 MR. MAILE: Mr. Gjording, do you have a
 
7 problem with that?
 
8 MR. GJORDING: No.
 
9 THE WITNESS: Okay.
 
~O MS. TAYLOR: Although, you know, it might 
'.11 be -- I don't think we need to have them re-marked, but I 
:/2 would like copies of them attached to the deposition so he 
23 can review them easily when he reviews the transcript. 
:/4 MR. MAILE: (To the Court Reporter): Can you 
75 do that? 
Page 381	 Page 40 
1 THE COURT REPORTER: "She was" what? I'm 
2 sony. 
3 THE WITNESS: Integral. Integral in much of 
4 these transactions. 
5 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) And what transactions are you 
6 referring to? 
7 A. She signed the papers with you. She was 
8 manager of the Trust for a period of time. She made 
9 distributions. 
10 Q. And now, relative to Beth, did you ever find
 




13 A. Ub, let me characterize Beth as a, 00 -- 00,
 
14 fairly uneducated lady who is probably over her head in
 
15 this type of activity.
 
16 Q. Would you have characterized her as
 
17 incompetent in handling in that position as a Trustee?
 
118 A. I'm not sure of that.
 
ii Q. Do you take issue with anything that she did relative to handling the Trust assets? A. Yes. I do. Q. And what are those? 
A. Urn, sold the property to you, nunlber one. And~3 
Number 2 is, she failed to give as accounting, ever, as a ~~ trustee of the Trust; 00, information. Vb, and that she, 
'I 
10 (Pages 37 to 40) 




























































EXHIBIT "F" TO AFFIDAVIT OF'
 









1 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 1
 





4 REED TAYLOR, DALLANTAYLOR
 












THOMAS MAILE IV and COLLEEN 
8 MAlLE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, 














15 DEPOSITION OF DALLAN TAYLOR
 





















) No. CV OC 04-00473D 
1 DEPOSITION OF DALLAN TAYLOR 
2
 
3 BE IT REMEMBERED that the deposition of
 
4 DALLAN TAYLOR was taken by the attorney for the
 
5 D~fendants!Counter-elairnants, Colleen Maile and Berkshire
 
6 Investments, LLC, at the office of Burnham, Habel &
 
7 Associates, Inc., located at 668 North Ninth Street,
 
8 Boise, Idaho, before Jeanne M. Hinner, a Court Repolter
 
9 (Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter Number 318) and Notary
 
10 Public in and for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, on 
11 TIlursday, the 9th day of September, 2004, commencing at the 







For the Plaintiffs! CLARK and FEENEY
 
15 Counter-Defendants: Attorneys at Law
 
By: Connie W. Taylor
 




17 1229 Main Street
 




1 9 For Defendants! THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
 
Counter-elaimants, 







For the Defendant, 
23 Thomas Maile IV: 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 836 I6 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
By: Phillip J. Collaer 
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42 - Purchase & Sales Agreement for 41
 
12601 W. New Hope Road 










4 a witness having been first duly sworn to tell the truth,
 







9 BY MR. MAILE: 
10 Q. Would you please state your name for the 
11 record, sir. 
12 A. Dallan Taylor. 
13 Q. And where do you currently reside? 
14 A. 410 Clear Creek Drive, Meridian, Idaho. 




17 Q. Sir, my name is Thomas Maile. And I'm here
 
18 representing Berkshire Investments, LLC, a named defendant
 1
 
19 in this action, and the counter-claimant in this action. 
20 Have you ever had your deposition taken 
'21 before?In A. Yes. 
23 Q. And under what circumstances was it taken? 
1
124 A. On an insurance contract.
 
125 Q. Is that the only occasion that you had your
 
Page 21 Page 4
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•1 Q. The question is: Have you agreed to the terms 1 so that the money can be distributed to Joyce Seeley.
 
2 of Exhibit 25?
 2 And Taylor, all children are disclaiming
 
3 A. Yes.
 3 interest in favor of their mother, Helen Taylor, so that
 
4 Q. Do you consider yourself currently a
 4 she can get the remainder of her assets in the Trust.
 
5 co-trustee of the -­ 5 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) And has that been accomplished
 
6 A. Yes. Excuse me.
 6 by the execution of Exhibit 25 by all the beneficiaries, to
 
7 Q. -- Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust?
 7 your knowledge?
 
8 A. Yes.
 8 A. To my knowledge, yes.
 
9 Q. And that is based on what reason?
 9 Q. Was there a final cash disbursem~nt made? 
o A. The Trust is now trustees, uh, for the, uh, 10 A. Yes.
 
11 Helen Taylor part of the Trust; of the Ted Johnson Trust 11 Q. As a result of Exhibit 25?
 
12 interest. We are co-trustees (inaudible)-- 12 A. I believe so.
 
1 
13 THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. What did you 13 Q. I'll have you look at Exhibit 25 -- excuse me,
 
14 say? 14 26.
 
5 THE WITNESS: We are co-trustees with an 15 A. (Witness complied.)
 
16 interest in my mother's part of the Trust; of the 16 Q. Have you seen Exhibit 26 before?
 
17 Ted Johnson Trust. 17 A. (Reviewing document.) Yes, I have.
 
'18 Q. You have not signed Exhibit 26.
 18 Q. (BY MR. MAILE) Who are the co-trustees, then, 1
 
19 currently of the Ted -- excuse me, Theodore L. Johnson





?1 A. It's, uh, John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and
 21 Do you recognize his signature on Page 8?
 
22 Reed Taylor, as far as I'm concerned.
 22 A. Yes.
 
n Q. Well, how about Mark Taylor; is he a
 23 Q. You're a party plaintiff in this present
 
24 co-trustee?
 24 lawsuit set forth in Exhibit 26.
 
?5 A. I am not aware of it. He might be.
 25 At what point in time did you conslider that 
Page 73 Page 75 
~------------------------------j-----------------­
1 Q. Do you know if this Exhibit 25 has been signed 1 you would file a lawsuit in this matter?
 
2 by eveIYone represented on the signature lines in
 2 A. WeIl, originaIly the common place of the
 
3 Exhibit 24?
 3 lawsuit was in July of2003, when we had the family meeting
 
4 A. I'm not -- I wouldn't know one way or another.
 4 at my place.
 
5 Q. Who would know such an answer to that
 5 Q. Have you ever personaIly deviated from that
 
6 question?
 6 determination that you were going to file a lawsuit?
 
7 A. Connie, probably, would know.
 7 A. Not that I'm aware of.
 
8 Q. And, presumably, Mr. Harwood _.. Bart Harwood?
 8 Q. SO your intent from July 2003, to the time of
 
9 Do you think he would know?
 9 the filing of this lawsuit in Exhibit 26 in January of 
o A. Probably. 10 2004, was that you always intended to file a lawsuit? 
11 Q. What was the purpose, then, of you executing 111 A. That's right. 
12 the signature page on Exhibit 24 that relate to the 112 Q. Okay. Let's go to Page 2 of Exhibit 26. I 
13 "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement"? 13 want to ask you a couple questions. 
14 Could you just explain to me, in your own 14 Did you see this Exhibit 26 before it was 
15 words, what Exhibit 25 accomplishes? 15 filed? 
16 A. We are the disclaimer of all interests. It is 16 A. (Reviewing document.) I don't know if! 
11717 being signed by -- 1, dash, 2, dash, 1 by Fishers, which received it before or after it was filed. I don't recaIl.
 
18 disclaims all the interest in the Trust in favor of their 118 Q. Okay. I want you to turn down to line 16 of
 
19 mother, Helen (sic) Fisher, so that they will distribute Page 2.
 
20 the money in the Trust to Hazel Fisher. Page 2. You had the right page, sir; just
 ~~
 
?1 1.2, dash, 2, Seeley, is so the money, uh -­ n line 16. 
22 the children are released (inaudible)-- b2 Do you see on the left-hand side the line 
b3 TIlE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. "The children 123 designation? (Reading) The attorney-client relationship 
[;;>4 are released" what? Speak up. 1z4 had continued until Mr. Johnson's death on September 14th, 
r5 TIlE WITNESS: -- their interest in the Trust b5 2002 (end reading). Do you see that? 
Page 741 Page 76 
19 (Pages 73 to 76) 
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Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £!k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE 
PART TWO 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 







1.	 Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch­
Maile and in addition is a named plaintiff herein. That the information and facts set forth 
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can 
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
2.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy of the Order entered on April 
23,2004, by the Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper captioned Order Granting Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss in the captioned matter Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number 
CV OC 04-00473D. 
3.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy of Berkshire Investm(:nt and the 
Mailes' Motion to DismisslMotion for Summary Judgment filed on October 20,2004 in 
the consolidated matter, captioned Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas 
Maile, IVand Colleen l'Jaile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Casl~ Number 
CV OC 04-05656D alleging that the Taylors had not properly obtained judicial 
appointment as successor trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. 
4.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "I" is a true and correct copy of verified Petition for 
Appointment of Trustees in the probate court filed on November 12,2004, including the 
attachments thereto (Revocable Trust Agreement, Resignation of Trustees, Disclaimer, 
Release and Indemnify Agreement) relating to the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. 
5.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "J" are true and correct copies of the cover page ofthe brief 
and pages 1, and 14 of Taylors' Appellants' Opening Brief in the Idaho Supreme Court 
case number 30817, dated October 15, 2004, appealed from the case captioned Taylor vs 














Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
6.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "K" is a true and correct copy of the Memorandum Decision 
and Order entered on July 28, 2005 in the consolidated case captioned Taylor vs Maile, 
Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
7.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "L" is a true and correct copy of the Taylors' Motion For 
Summary Judgment On Beneficiaries' Claim filed February 13, 2006, from the 
consolidated case captioned Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04­
00473D. 
8.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "M" is a true and correct copy of the Taylors' brief captioned 
"Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support ofMotion For Summary Judgment On 
Beneficiaries' Claim filed February 13, 2006, in the consolidated case captioned Taylor 
vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
9.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "N" is a true and correct copy ofthe Supplemental Affidavit 
of Elaine Lee filed June 3, 2005, in the consolidated case captioned Taylor vs klaile, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
10.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "0" is a true and correct copy of a portion of the trial 
transcript to wit: Tr. Vol. I p. pp. 32-33, 137-138, in the consolidated case captioned 
Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D 
DATED this ~ day of October, 20 . 













Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
i ~ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
_\1/_ day of October, 2008. 
7n~C!4~ 
Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30,2014 
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J. DAVID ~~rR 
IN THE DISTRfCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRfCT~~~~~j....,..,..-
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs"! Counter-Defendant!:>, Case No. CVOC0400473D 
vs. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants! Counter-Claimants. 
On March 15, 2004, the Defendants in this action moved to dismiss this case based on 
Plaintiffs' failure to prosecute the case on behalf of a real party in interest as required by Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 17(a). On April 12,2004, the Court heard oral arguments regarding the motion. 
Pursuant to Rule l7(a), the Court ruled Plaintiffs had until April 19, 2004 to join the tlUstee of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust as a named plaintiff in this matter. Because the Plaintiffs have failed to 
join the trustee as a named plaintiff by the deadline imposed by the Court, the Court now issues this 
"vritten Order dismissing the case in its entirety because the residual beneficiaries of the Theodore 1. 
Johnson Trust lack standing to pursue the causes of action against all Defendants. 
Because the Plaintiffs have failed to join the trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust as 
required by Rule 17(a), in accordance with the Court's ruling from the bench at the April 12,2004 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Pllge 1 00098 000588
~ '. 














 IT IS SO ORDERED. 







Ronald 1. Wilp~r 
7









































































































CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the o?6 day of den I ,2004, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be served by th method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Connie Taylor 





Phillip J. Collaer 





















(~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
 
( ) Hand Delivered
 
( ) Overnight Mail
 
(~.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(J.s. Mail, Po;1age Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered
 




J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the D' ict Court 
Ada COUll abo / 
)HNSC1N--­
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR 








Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 















DISMISS COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
JURY TRIALIMOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 vs. 
THOMAS MAILE IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC., 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 










































THOMAS MAILE IV. and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, and 










COMES NOW, all above named Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, , Jack 
Gjording, Phillip Collaer, Thomas G. Maile, IV, and moves this Honorable Court for it's Order 
dismissing Plaintiff s Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial pursuant to LR.c.P. RULE 12(b) and!or 
in the alternative pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 56 dismissing the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. 
This Motion is made ,md based upon the grounds that the current alleged Co-Trustees of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust are improperly and illegally serving as Successor Trustee(s) 
in violation ofthe terms and conditions ofthe underlying Trust agreement and further are in violation 
ofldaho State Law, and that the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, fails to state a cause of action 
and the alleged Co-Trustees lack standing to pursue this matter. In addition and!or in thE: alternative, 
pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56 there are no material factual issU{~ in dispute and the 
Defendants are entitled to a Judgment of Dismissal relating to all ofPlaintiff's claims as a matter of 
Law. 
In addition this Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Thomas Maile filed concurrently 
herewith, all prior Affidavits of Thomas Maile and the attachments thereto, which are incorporated 
by reference herein as if set forth in full herein, together with the Memorandum Brief In Support of 
the Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment, lodged with the Court concurrently, together with the 
























record and file contained herein. Oral Argument is requested. 
-; 
DATED this ~ ,?<)day ofOctober, 200C __~/ 
( 
rkshire Inv. L.L.C. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ::2v day of October, 2004, I caused a true: and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing MOTION TO DISMISSIMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; NOTICE 
OF HEARING RE: MOTION TO DISMISS/MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE, together with, the MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO DISMISSIMOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be delivered, addressed 
as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail 
Clark and Feeney (X) Facsimile Transmission 
1229 Main Street () Hand Delivery 
Post Office Drawer 285 () Overnight Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 8350 1 
Fax # (208) 746-9160 
Mr. Jack S. Gjording () u. S. Mail 
Gjording and Fouser (X) Facsimile Transmission 
509 West Hays Street () Hand Delivery 
Post Office Box 2837 () Overnight Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Fax # (208) 336-9177 
Mr. Phillip Collaer () U. S. Mail 
Anderson & Julian (X) Facsimile Transmission 
250 South 5th Street, Suite 700 () Hand Delivery 
Post Office Box 7426 () Overnight Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Fax # (208) 344-5510 




' oda      
T'llF'~]~, 
Attorney for Colleen Maile & 
       
n
1 
\    I .
THOMAWMAILE, IV
 
Attorney for Colleen Maile & Berkshire Inv. L.L.C.
 






EXHIBIT "I" TO AFFIDAVIT lOF
 
































CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
ISB No. 4837 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COtiNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF ) 
) 
THE THEODORE L. JOHNSON ) 




PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF TRUSTEES 
COMES NO\V the Petitioner and pursuant to Idaho Code 68-101 petitions this coun for an 
order appointing R. John Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor, and DaHan Taylor as Successor Co-Trustees to the 
above-entitled Trust, effective as of June 10, 2004. 
This Petition is filed on the grounds and for the reason that the Successor Trustees, Beth 1. 
Rogers and Andrew T. Rogers, resigned as Trustees on June 10, 2004, and nominated as Successor 
Co-Trustees R. John Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor, and DaHan J. Taylor. In addition, the: person designated 
as Successor Trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, Garth 1. Fisher, also declined and 
refused to serve as Trustee,joining in the nomination ofR. John Taylor, Reed 1. Taylor, and DaHan 
1. Taylor. That declination was also effective as of June 10, 2004. 
A copy of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust is attached as Exhibit A to this Petition. 
A copy of the resignation and declination are attached as Exhibit B to this Petition. 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEES 1 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FE EN l~. 


























































The petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this 
Trust by virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit C. Paragraph 4 of said agreement provided for the resignation of Rogers and 
Fisher and the appointment of John, Reed, and DaHan Taylor as successor co-trustees of the trust. 
WHEREFORE Petitioner prays for an order of this court appointing R. John Taylor, Reed 
J. Taylor, and DaHan J. Taylor as Trustees effective as of June 10,2004. 















COUNTY OF Nez Perce )
 
R. John Taylor, being sworn, says that the facts s¢fart~ in the foregoing petitjo are true, 
accurate, and complete to the best of applicant's kn0rle ge\and be ief. ­
r ~ _/.(
J . John Taylor I
 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 5-day of November, 2004.
 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEES 2
 
LAW OFFICE', OF 















































CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Ji day ofNovember, 2004, I caused to be served a true
 
1
 and correct copy of the above document by the method indicated below, ~md addressed to the 
following:2
 
Helen Taylor o u.s. Mail 
3
 8483 W Harmonica Way o Hand Delivered
 
Boise, ID 83709 o Overnight Mail
4










































.) PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF TRUSTEES 3
 
[.AW OFFIC:ES 01' 
CLARK AND FEE~l EY 
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REVOCABLE TRUST AGREEMENT ..-,1 
2 TIllS TRUST AGREE!vfENT is made and entered into this if day of November, 1997, 
3 between THEODORE L. JOHNSON, a single person, of Ada County, Idaho, hereinafter referred 
4 to as "Grantor", and THEODORE L. JOHNSON, hereinafter referred to as IITrustee", 
5 WIT N E SSE T H: 
6 \VHEREAS, the Grantor desires to create this Trust Agreement effective this date and 
'7 the Trustee agrees to act as Trustee thereof; 
8 NOW, THEREFORE, the Grantor and Trustee agree as foIIows: 
9 
10	 ARTICLE I 





2. TRUST PROPERTY: The Grantor hereby transfer, convey and deliver to the trust 
13	 the property set forth on Schedule "All which is attached hereto and by reference made part 
hereof. All the property transferred and delivered to the trust shall, upon written acceotance 
thereof by the Trustee, constitute the trust estate and shall be held, managed and distributed as 
hereinafter provided. That no consideration was or will be given by the Trustee for the . 
conveyance or transfer to it of any of the Trust Estate; that the Trustee accepts such title to the 
Trust Estate as is conveyed or transferred to it hereunder, without liability or responsibility for 
16	 the conditions or validity of such title; an.d that the Trust estate has been or willl:ie convey'ed or 
transferred to the Trustee, IN TRUST Wlth power of sale, for the uses and purposes herem 
17 provided. 
18 3. ADDITIONAL PROPERTY: The Grantor, or any other person, with the consent 
of the Trustee, may name the trust as beneficiary of life insurance policles, or de:posit property 
19 with the trust, or devise property to the trust. 
20 ARTICLE II 
21 1. WITHDRAWALS BY Grantor: \Vh.ile Grantor is livins, the Trust shall distribute 
to or/or the benefit of the Grantor such sums from income and principal as the Grantor may at 
22 any tune request. 
23 2. DISTRIBUTIONS BY TRUSTEE: The Trustee may distribute to or for the 
benefit of the Grantor, such sums from income and principal as the Trustee deems reasonable
 
24 for the maintenance, support and health of Grantor.
 
./' 
25 3, CHARACTER OF PROPERTY: All property transferred to this trust by the 
Grantor shall retain its character as separate property during the lifetime of the Grantor and any 
26 withdrawal from the trust by the Grantor of such property shall be his separate property, 4, 
LIFE INSURANCE: The following rights and obligations apply to any life insurance Dolicies 
27 which designate the trust as beneficiary,' 
t 28	 a. Premium Pavment: The owner or owners of any life insurance policies shall 
























01vfA.   
IJ, 
.1 pay all premiums an~ ot!1er charges to keep in force life insurance policies which. su~h owner or 
owners desire to malOtalO on the life of Grantor. The trust shall be under no 0 bllgatlOn to pay 
2 premiums or other charges but may make such payments if sufficient cash is available ta the 
trust. 
3 
b. Collection of Benefits: Upon the death of the insured, the trust shall collect 
4 · any benefits. The trust is authorized to take any action to collect the benefits which it deems 
reasonable and proper. The trust may compromise ar settle any claim and may execute any 
5 property release or acquittance. " 
6 c. Policv Rights:. The owner of each policy shall retain and have the right to 
change the beneficiary and to exercise any option, right or privilege relating to each policy, 
7 including the right to borrow in accordance with the provislOns of the policy and to pledge the 
policy as collateral. Nothing herein shall bestow upon Grantor, who does not own any policy, 
8 any nght, privilege or incident or ownership. 
9 ARTICLE III 
10 1. RIGHTS OF THE GRANTOR: The Grantor specifically reserves the follmMng
rights: 
11 
A. ADDITION TO THE TRUST ESTATE: The Grantor may, from time to 
12 time, by conveyance, a~signment:, transfer, or Wil}, add property of any kind of fl.ny part t.hereof, 
to the Trust Estate, which shall thereupon be subject to all the terms and provIsIons of ttus 
13 trust. 
B. ALTERING OR REVOKING TRUST: While Grantor is living and
 
14
 competent, the Grantor may, at any time or times, by written notice filed with the Trustee: 
1. Alter or amend any provision thereof; 
2. Revoke this Trust in whole or in part, and in such event, the Trust Estate 
16 Dr portion as Grantor's separate property. 
17 C. DIRECTION BY THE GRANTOR TO THE TRUSTEE: While Grantor is 




1. To retain as part of the Trust Estate, any securities, properties, or 
19 investments at any tie held hereunder, for such length of time as such directions may provide; 
2. Or to sell, encumber, lease, manage, control, or dispose of any prcperty
20 of the Trust Estate; 
. 3. Or to invest available income or principal in specific securities, properties 
21 or Investments. 
The Trustee shall not be liable for any loss sustained or incurred by reason of its 
22 compliance with any such written instruction of the Grantor. 
23 II. ADMINISTRATION BY THE TRUSTEE: 
24 A. THE TRUST BANK ACCOUNT: Deposits and withdrawals by the Grantor or 
Trustee to or from Bank or Savings and Loan accounts held by the trust shall automatically be 
25 deemed to constitute contributions to or withdrawals from the trust estate. 
26 B. PAYMENT OF TRUST EXPENSE: The Trustee shall pay or reserve 
~llffici~nt funds to pay all expenses of management and administration of the Trust Estate, 
27 lIlcludmg: 
28 1. The compensation of the Trustee; 
TRUST AGREE1v1ENT PREPARED BY DiE LAW OFFICES OF THOM.-\S G. lvfA.ll.E 



















2	 3. Payments of interest and principal on any outstanding notes.;...whether or 




C. DISTRIBUTION TO THE GR.c\.NTOR: All of the net income shall be
 
4 distributed to or for the use and benefit of the Grantor while he shall live, in convenient
 
installments, not less frequently than quarterly, as his separate property. In addition .to ~he net
 
5 income, the Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit ofth~ Grantor, out of the pnncIpal of
 
the Trust Estate, such sums as trustee deems necessary for his reason- able care, support, health
 
6 and comfort, if in trustee's discretion, the income to which he is entitled is considered
 




a. Distribution: The Trustee shall pay to or for the benefit of the Grantor such 
8 sums from the income and principal as the surviving Grantor may at any time request. 
I, 
9' . b. Grantor Disability: Should the Trustee at any time consider the Grantor to be
 
unable for any reason to direct the Trustee with respect to disposition of such sums from the
 
10
 trust estate, the Trustee is authorized in its sole and absolute discretion to expend for the
 
Grantor such sums from principal or income as the Trustee shall deem necessary or advisable
 
11
 for the Grantor's support, maintenance and health. 
12 D. UNDISTRIBUTED FUNDS: All undistributed funds in the Trust Checbng 




14 m.	 ADMINISTR<\TION OF THE TRUST UPON THE DEATH OF THE 
GRANTOR: 
'5 
A. FlTh.1f:RAL EXPENSES: Upon the death of the Grantor, the Trustee may pay

16
 the expenses of her last illness and funeral, from either income or principal, at the discretion of
 








1. Upon the death of the Grantor, any estate, inheritance, succession or 
19 other death taxes, duties, charges or assessments, together with interest, penalties, costs,
 
Trustee's compensation, and attorneysl fees incurred by reason of the Trust Estate or any
 
20
 interest therein being included for such tax purposes, may be paid by the Trustee ITom the Trust 
Estate, unless other adequate provisions shall have been made therefore. Any such payments
21 shall be charged to princIpal of the Trust Estate or the separate trust so included £Jr such tax 
purposes.
22 
2. The Trustee shall have full power and authority to pay from the Trust 
23 Estate any other taxes, charges or assessments for which the Trustee, the Trust Estate, or any 
interest therein becomes liable, and any such payments shall be made from and charged to either 
24 ~nca~e or: principal of the Trust Estate or any share or separate trust thereof, as the Trustee in 
Its dIscretlOn deems proper.
25 
3. The Trustee may make any payments directly or to a personal 
26 repre~entative or other fiduciary and shall be under no duty to see to the application of an funds 
so paId. 
27 
IV.	 DISPOSITION OF TRUST ASSETS UPON DEATH OF GR.c\.~TOR: 
28 
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and receive the interest, income of profits therefrom for the benefit of Grantor for the Ii::e of 
Grantor and thereafter and upon the death of the Grantor the corpus of the trust and all income 
and interest acquired hereafter, shall be held, applied and distributed in the following me-nner: 
a. After the death of Grantor, the Trustee shall hold, manage and control the 
property comprising the trust estate for the benefit of the HELEN TAYLOR (20%); HAZEL 
~ISHER (20%); BETTY FARN\VORTH (20%); JOYCE SELLEY (20%), and the surviving 
Issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B. JOHN"SON (20%), as foLlo~s: 
Twenty percent (20%) of the trust estate shall be distributed immediately upon
Grantor's death to the surviVIng issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RlCHARD B. 
JOHNSON share and share alike. In the event any of Grantor's nieces or nephews born the 
issue ofRlCHARD B, JOHNBON, should fail to survive the death of Grantor, and leaves issue 
then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share alike in the share of the 
predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime ofHELEN 
TAYLOR and upon her death then the r.emaining porti~n shall ~e distributed to her issu_e share 
and share alike. In the event any of her Issue should fall to survIve the death of HELEN 
TAYLOR and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and share 
alike in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as ifsaid beneficiary were alive. 
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime ofHAZEL 
FISHER and upon her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to her issue share 
and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death of HAZEL 
FISHER and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and shan~ alike 
in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime ofBETTY 
FARNWORTH and upon her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to her issue 
share and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death of BETTY 
FARNWORTH, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share an.d 
share alike in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as ifsaid beneficiary were alive. 
. Twenty percent (20%)ofthe trust estate shall be held in trust for the lifetime of JOYCE 
SELLEY and upon her death then the remaining portion shall be distributed to her issue share 
and share alike. In the event any of her issue should fail to survive the death of JOYCE 
SELLEY, and leaves issue then the issue of such deceased beneficiary will share and shan~ alike 
in the share of the predeceased beneficiary' share as if said beneficiary were alive. 
Discretionary Pavrnents to Helen Tavlor, Hazel Fisher, Bettv Farnworth, and JOVCI~ 
SelleY: The Trustee may pay to or apply for the benefit of Helen Taylor, Hazel Fisher, Betty 
Farnworth, and Joyce Selley such sums from the income of their 20% share of the corpus of the 
t11:1st, as the. Truste~ deem~ r~as<?nable for the maintenan~e, education, .support 3}1d health of the 
s::ild beneficiary dunng their lIfetIme. The balance of the Income of their respective trust not so 
distributed shall be accumulated and added to the principal thereof at the ena of each fiscal year
of the trust. 
A. Income for Grantor's life: The Trustee shall distribute all of the income oftbis 
Trust in convenient installments, but not less frequently than quarter-annually to or for the 
benefit of Grantor, so long as he shall live. ' 
B. Use of Principal for Grantor's life: So long as Grantor is li'v'in a the Trustee in 
the sale exercise of the Trustee's d:scretion, shall distribute to or for the bene5t of Grantor, 'so 
TRUST AGREENlENT PREPAR.i::D BY THE LAW OFFICES OF THOIvLA..S G, ]\1AJlE 



















































much of the principal of this Trust as Trustee shall deem necessary or desirable for his proper 
heath, education, maintenance and support. 
C. Creation of Beneficiaries' Issues Trusts if Issue are under the age of 35 years of 
acre: After the death of HELEN TAYLOR; HAZEL FISHER; BETTY F~\NORTH; 
JOYCE SELLEY and the surviving issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B. 
JOHNSON, and/~r in the event any such beneficiary fails to survive Grantor's death and leaves 
issue who have not attained the age of thirty-five (35) years, the Trustee shall immediately 
divide all of the remaining principal and undistributed income of this trust into as many equal 
shares as represent the surviving issue of said beneficiaries, one share to each, per stirpes, and 
the Trustee shall establish a separate trust (except as to the share of any issue then thirty-five 
(35) years of age or older) for each issue then living and one for the issue of each deceased
 
issue, to be held and distnbuted as follows:
 
1. Distribution When Separate Trusts for Issue Created. If any issue of:HELEN 
TAYLOR HAZEL FISHER; BETTY FARNWORTH; JOYCE SELLEY, and the surviving 
issue of the Grantor's deceased brother, RICHARD B. JOHNSON shall not have attained the 
age of twenty-five (25) years at the time of distribution of their respective share of the principal 
oftms trust is to conveyed to said issue, the Trustee shall immediately thereafter distribute 
absolutely to such issue one third (1/3) of his or her particular share; if any issue shall have 
attained the age ofthirty_(30) years at such time, the Trustee shall distribute absolutely to such 
issue one third (1/3) of his or her share; and if any issue shall have attained the a~e of thirty-five 




2. Distribution of Income and Principal for issue. The Trustee shall distribute to or 
for the benefit of each issue all of the income derived from his or her particular share. In 
addition, the Trustee, at any time and from time to time, shall distribute to or for the benefit of 
. each issue so much or all or none of the principal of his or her share as the Trustee, in the 
Trustee's absolute discretion, shall deem necessary or desirable for the proper health, education, 
maintenance and support of such issue. Further, the Trustee shall distnbute absolutely to or for 
the benefit for any issue one-third (1/3) of the principal of his or her share when such Issue 
attains the age of twenty-five (25), one third (1/3) of the remaining principal when such issue 
attains the age of thirty (30) years, and the remaining principal and undistributed income: of his 
or her share when such issue attains the age ofthirty-nve (35) years. 
3. Distribution to Issue of Beneficiaries. Except as herein provided, if a share of this 
trust is at any time set apart for surviving issue of Grantors deceased oeneficiaries above 
named, such share shalloe immediately aistributed absolutely to such issue, free and clear of
 
any trust unless said issue is under the age of thirty-five (35) years of age.
 
4. Distribution Upon Death of Issue. Should any issue of any of the above 
referenced beneficiaries die before his or her share has been distributed absolutely to him or her, 
the then remaining principal and undistributed income of such share shall be distributed, ':lpon 
the death of the issue, absolutely to his or her then living issue,per stirpes. In the event there 
are no such issue then living, the then remaining principal and undistriouted income of the share 
of the deceased issue shall be divided among the other beneficiaries above referenced or their . 
living issue, per stirpes; any portion thereorso divided and set apm for any issue who is the 
be?eficiary of a share of this trust which has not yet been fully distributed shall be added to the 
pnncipal of such share and held in further trusts and managed and distributed as a part thereof 
under the terms oft~js Article; and any portion thereof set apart for any issue who is the 
beneficiary of a share of this trust which has been fully distributed shall be distributed absolutely 
to such issue, In the event an of the beneficiaris last surviving issue shall die before the entire 
share set apart for such is~ue has been distributed absolutely to him or her and none of other 
beneficiaries issue a!"e then living, the then remaining principal and undistributed ir.come of such 
TRUST AGREE1v1E~T PREPARED BY THE LAW OFFICES OF THOMJ\S G. MAll.,E 
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share shall be distributed as follows: 
100% thereof to: The lawful heirs of Grantor consistent with the laws of intestate Succession 
under the Laws of the State ofIdaho. 
5. Retention for Minors. In the event any beneficiary of the trusts created 
hereunder has not attained majoriry at the time a share thereof is required under the terms 
hereof to be distributed absolutely to such beneficiary, the Trustee, In the Trustee's absolute 
discretion may retain the share of such minor beneficiary in further trust until he or she attains 
majority. 'In such event and during such time, the Trustee shall distribute to or for the benefit of 
such beneficiary so much of the incom~ and principal of such beneficiary's p~rticular sha.re. as 
the Trustee, in the Trustee's absolute discretIOn, shall deem necessary or deSirable to provIde 
for the proper health, education, maintenance and support of such beneficiary; any income from 
such share not so distributed shall be added to the pnncipal thereof at the end of each fiscal year 
of the trust. At the time such beneficiary attains majority, or upon is or her death, whichever 
occurs first, the trust shall terminate as to such beneficiary's particular share, and the then 
remaining principal arId undistributed income thereof shall be distributed absolutely, free and 
clear of any trust, to such beneficiary, or, if such beneficiary is then deceased, to his or her 
estate. 
D. PERPETUITIES AND ALIENATION: 
a. The absolute power of alienation of real property in the State ofIdaho shall
 
not be suspended by an provision of this trust agreement for' a period longer than the
 
continuance of the lives of the persons in being at the creation ofany such limitation or
 
condition and twenty-five (25) years thereafter. This trust agreement shall be construed to
 
eliminate or modify any Drovisions violating the fore~oing sentence, but in such a manner so
 
that the provisions of thIs trust agreement are carriea out to the greatest extent possible.
 
b. As to real property which is not in the State ofIdaho, each trust's interest in 
such real property shall teffillnate twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last survivor of 
such of the beneficiaries thereunder as shall be liVIng at the time of the death of the last Grarltor 
t9 die, and thereupon such real property w~ch is not i~ the State ofIdaho shall be ~istributed, 
dIscharged of trust, to the persons then entItled to the Income of such real property In the 
proportlOns to which they are entitled to the income. 
E. CHARACTER OF DISTRIBUTIONS: Unless otherwise specifically stated, all
 
~is~ri.bution~, v..:hether of tr:ust income or principal, shall be,the separate p~operty of each
 
mdividual dIstnbutee. AJI Income, rents, Issues, profits, gams and appreCIatIOn ofproperty
 
distributed to each individual distributee as separate propeny, shall also be the separare
 
property of each such distributee.
 
F. SPENDTHRIFT PROTECTION: Neither the principal nor the income of a.ny 
trust herein created shall be liable for the debts of any beneficiary or issue of a beneficiar", nor 
shall the same be subj eet to seizure by any creditor under the writ of proceedin!rs at law ()r in 
equity, nor bankruptcy proceedings, nor other legal process. No beneficiary otissue of a 
beneficiary, shall have the power to sell, assign, transfer, encumber or in any other manner to 
anticipate disposition of his or her interest in the trust estate or the income produced thereby, 
:\s used in this paragraph, the word beneficiary shall refer to any individual havin~ a beneficial 
~,nterest ~n the trust and not merely to an indiVidual that the trust may specifically Identify as a 
benefiCIary. " 
G. TR4.NSACTIONS WITH GRANTOR'S ESTATE: Upon the death of Gra.ntor 
or any beneficiary the Trustee may, if ir deems such action necessary or advisable for the 
protection of the estate of the deceased Grantor or beneficiary, or in the best interests of lny 
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'such estate or this trust and its beneficiaries: (a) purchase securities and other property from
 
the legal representative of such estate and retain such property as part of the trust estate, or (b)
 
made secured or unsecured loans to the legal representative of any such estate. The Trustee
 
shall bear no liability for any Ioss resulting to the trust estate by reason of any ~;uch purchase or
 
loan. H. Th-vESTMENT DIRECTION BY GRANTOR: The Grantor, during hi~ lifetime,
 
reserve the naht to direct the investment of the trust estate. The Trustee shall not be liable for
 
any investme~ts made at the direction of the Grantor or of the surviving Grantor in accordance
 
with the foregoing provisions,
 
VI. SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE: Should THEODORE 1. JOHNSON, be unable or unwilling
 
for any reason to continue to act as Trustee, ANDREW and BETH ROGERS, husband and
 
wife shall become co-successor Trustee of this trust and shall have all authority herein granted
 
to the "Trustee." Should ANDREW and BETH ROGERS be unable or unwilling for any
 
reason to act or continue to act as Co-Trustees, GARTH FISHER shall become Successor
 
Trustee of this Trust and shall have all authority herein granted to the "Trustee".
 
vn. POWERS OF TRUSTEE: To carry out the purposes of the trust created under this
 
Trust Agreement, and subject to any limitatIOns stated elsewhere in this Trust, the Trustee is
 
vested with the following powers with respect to the trust estate and any part of it, in. addition.
 
to those powers now or hereafter conferred by law.
 




2. To lease trust property for tems within or beyond the tenn of the trust; 
3. To borrow money, and to encumber or hypothecate trust property by mortgage,
 
deed of trust, pledge, or othef\V1se, provided sufficient security to manage the tnlst property.
 
4. To carry, at the expense of the trust, sufficient insurance m such kinds and in
 
such amounts as the Trustee shall deem advisable to protect the trust estate and the Trustee
 
against any hazard; .
 
5. To commence or defend such litigation with respect to the trust of any property
 
of the trust estate as the Trustee may deem advisable, at the expense of the trust;
 
6. To compromise or otherwise adjust any claims or litigations against or in favor
 
of the trust; .
 
7. To invest and reinvest the trust estate in every kind of property, re:al, p'ersonal or
 
mixed, and every kind of investments, specifically including, but not by way of limitation,
 
corporate obligations of every kind, stocks, common or preferred, shares ofinvestment trusts,
 
investment companies, and mutual funds, and mortgage participation, which men of prucence,
 
discretion, and to manage the trust property. However, that so long as an income: beneficiary is
 
also acting as Trustee herein, he shall not invest in any wasting assets; provided fu.rther that
 
during the lifetime of Grantor no real property or other investments shall be sold, traded or
 
disposed of without the written consent of Grantor. .
 
8. With respect to securities held in the trust, to have all the rights, powers, and 
privileges of an owner, mcluding, but not by way oflimitation, the power ofvotml~, give 
proxies, any pay assessments; to participate in voting trusts, pooling agreements, foreclosures, 
reorganizations, consolidations, mergers, liquidations, sales, and leases, and incident to such . 
partIcipation to deposit securities with and transfer title to any protective or other committee on 
such terms as the Trustee may deem advisable; and to exercise or sell stock subscription or 
conversion rights. 
9. In any case in which the Trustee is required, pursuant to the p'rovisions of the 
trust, t divide any trust 'property into parts or shares for the pUI])ose of distnbution, or 
otherwise, the Trustee IS authorized, ill the Trustee's absolute dIscretion, to make the division 
and distribution in kind, including undivided interests in any property, or partly kind and partly 
in money, and for this purpose to make ~~ch sales of the trust property as the Trustee may 
deem necessary on such terms and conditIOns as the Trustee shall see fit. 
TRUST AGREE1YlENT PREPARED BY THE LAW OFFICES OF THO!vIAS G.MAliE 
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. 1 VIII. BENEFICIARY STATUS: 
A. Upon the death of any beneficiary for whom a trust is then held, any accrued or 
2' undistributed net income thereon shall be held and accounted for, or distributed, in the same 
manner as if it had been accrued or received after the death of such beneficiary. 
3 B. Any instrument executed by the Trustee shall be binding on all parties hereto and 
on all beneficiaries hereunder. No person paying money to the Trustee need see to the
 
4 application of the money so paid.
 
C. The interest of any beneficiary in principal or income of this Trust shall not be 
5 subj ect to claims of his or her creditors or others, or liable to attaclunent, execution or other 
process of law, and no beneficiary shall have any right to encumber, hypothecate or alienate his 
6 or her interest in this Trust in any manner, except as provided for elsewhere herein. The 
Trustee may, however, deposit in any bank deSIgnated in writing by a beneficiary to his or her 
7 credit, income or principal payable to such beneficiary. 
8	 IX. TRUSTEE TO PAY CERTAIN EXPENSES: 
9	 . The Trustee shall pay from income or principal of the Trust Estate or partly from 
each, in his discretion, all expenses, incurred in the administration of the Trust and the 
10 protection of this Trust against legal attack, including counsel fees and a reasonable 
compensation for his own services as such Trustee, which compensation and expenses 
11 constitute a first lien on the Trust Estate. 
12 X. AI\1END.MENT AND REVOCATION: The Grantor may at any time eluring his life 
amend any of the provisions of this t'rust agreement by an instrument signed by Grantor a.;:1d
 
13
 delivered to the Trustee. During the life of the Grantor, the trust created by this agreement may 
be revoked in whole or in part, hI( an instrument signed by Grantor and de1Jvered to the 
."
14 Trustee. Upon revocation, the Trustee shall distribute all or the designated portion of the 
property to the Grantor. 
. 
;a. TRUST TITLE: This Trust shall be known and referred to as the THEODORE L. 
16 JOHNSON TRUST and shall be administered under the laws of the State of Idaho. 
17 xp:. CONSTRUCTION OF AGREEMENT: The headings and subheadings used throu.ghout 
this Agreement are for convenience only and have no significance in the interpretation of the 
18 body, ~fthis Agreement, and the Grantor directs that they be disregarded in constnting the 
prOVl.SlOnS of this Agreement.
19
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, THEODORE L. JOHNSON, as Grantor of the foregoim~
20 Trust Agreement, have hereunto set my hand and seal on the date aforesaid. • 
21 
22 ~~~~ REL~HNSON 
23 
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"'7 ACCEPTANCE BY TRUSTEE 
The undersigned hereby accepts the trusts imposed by the foregoing Trust Agreement and3 




5 Signed, sealed and delivered
 






















STArE OF IDAHO	 ) 
)S5. iCounty ofAda	 ) 
On this -f day of ~ .7jci.~ ,1997, before me, the undersigned, a Notary 
Public in and for selld State, person y appeared THEODORE L. JOHNSoN, a si:1gle person, 
knovm or identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed in the instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set y hand anzaffixe.my oflicial seai the 
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-' SCHEDULE "A" PROPERTY
 
I Theodore 1. Jolmson, a single person, Grantor, do hereby quitclaim, convey and
 
transfer to the Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust dated the day of November, 1997, all
 
of his right title and interest in and to the following described rearproperty, to-wit: 
Parcel I: 
Government Lot 5 and the Southeast 1/4 ofthe Northwest 1/4 of Section 6, 




The Northwest ~~ of the Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 1
 
West, Boise Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
In addition the I provide the following conveyance to the Theodore 1. Johnson 
Revocable Trust dated the 4th clay of November, 1997 the following personal property, to wit: 
~~~~
 DORE L. J 
;Notary Public in and for said State, persona:Ily appeared THEODORE 1. JOfIN"SON, known or 
STATE OF IDAHO J 
ss. 
County of Ada / / 
On this ~ day of I/a/~ ,1997, before me, the undersigned, a. 
Identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that he exeeu.ted the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal in said 
County the date and year first above written. .. / . 
~\'II-IIII""" 
....~"~ ~E.N Deb "'" 
....",.. -rr~ "
 ~ \ r-:; --w. 0 ':.

,: ..... ,. .. ~.". :~. fC"~D"" ~ 
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Commission ExpIres: v/e.-/5'J' 
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Effectively i.rrllr.ediately, the undersigned, Andrew T. Rogers and Beth 1. Rogers, hereby 
resign as trustees of the Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust utd Novemb~:r 4, 1997 and 
nominate as successor co-trustees Reed J. Taylor, DaHan J. Taylor and R. John Taylor. 
i4b: L ;i,{l",U-/ <i2 p-ol
Beth J. R,9gers Date 
U-~b ... )T ~('1'{ G-m-M 
Andrew T. Rogers Date 
DI~CLINA TION TO SERVE AS TRUSTEE 
The undersigned, Garth J. Fisher, as the designated successor trustee of the Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust, utd November 4, 1997, hereby declines and refuses. to sen': as 
trustee and joins in the nomination ofReed 1. Taylor, DaHan J. Taylor and R. John Taylor 













DISCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 
1. Disclaimers. 
1.1 Disclaimer of Claims bv Certain Beneficiaries. Except for those 
individuals identified in the last sentence of this Section 1.1, each of the beneficiaries of the 
Theodore 1. Johnson Trust, UTD November 4, 1997 (hereafter referred to as the "Trust"), 
hereby disclaims, in favor of the Trust, any ownership interest he/she may now or in the future 
have in any claims or causes of action by the Trust or the trustees of the Trust against attorney 
Thomas G. Maile, or his successors or affiliates, including, without lim itation, Thomas 
Maile, IV, Colleen Maile, Thomas Maile Real Estate Company and Berkshire Investments, LLC, 
in connection with the purchase of real property from the Trust ("Claims"); and by this 
Disclaimer, the same individuals confirm in the Trust complete ownership and control of any 
such Claims. No warranty or representation is made as to the existence or efficacy of such 
Claims. The following beneficiaries do not join in this disclaimer: Helen Tay lor, Reed 1. Taylor, 
Dallan J. Taylor, Mark 1. Taylor, Gloria Rydalch, Virginia Porter and R. John Taylor. 
1.2 Disclaimer of All Other Interests. 
1.2.1 Fisher. Gordon E. Fisher, Garth J. Fisher and Judith F. Crawford, 
comprising all of the children of Hazel Fisher, hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the 
Trust, not previously disclaimed in Section 1.1 above, in favor of their mother, Hazel Fisher, and 
hereby approve immediate distribution to Hazel Fisher. 
1.2.2 Seelv. J. David Seely, Karl J. Seely, Dorothy S. Dayton, Janet S. 
Denison and Nathan L. Seely, comprising all of the children of Joyce Seely, hereby disclaim all 
interests whatsoever in the Trust, not previously disclaimed in Section 1.1 above, in favor of 
their mother, Joyce Seely, and hereby approve immediate distribution to Joyce Seely. 
1.2.3 Jaylor. Reed 1. Taylor, DaHan J. Taylor, Mark J. Taylor, Gloria 
Rydalch, Virginia Porter and R. John Taylor, comprising all of the children of Helen Taylor, 
hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the Trust, in favor of their mother, Helen Taylor, and 
hereby approve immediate distribution to Helen Taylor. All of the individuals identified in this 
Section 1.2.3 are sometimes hereafter referred to as "Taylors". 
2. Receipt in Full -- Income Tax. The undersigned acknowledge receipt in full of all 
property, money and benefits which he/she is entitled to receive from Andrew T. Roge:rs and 
Beth 1. Rogers, in their capacity as trustees of the Trust. This includes a full share of the final 
payment received in 2004 from the sale to Thomas G. MailelBerkshire Investments, LLC, in 
2002, of the real estate located in Ada County. (Except for the Taylors, to the extent they are 
retaining a beneficial interest in the Claims), the undersigned have no further e:xpectation of 
receiving anything from the Trust. The undersigned further understand that the trustees have not 
paid income tax on the final payment received in 2004 and that he/she will receive an IRS form 
K-1 indicating his/her share of such tax, which is to be included on the beneficiary's own federal 
and state income tax returns for 2004. 













3. Release of Trustees - Estimated Expenses. The undersigned nereby release and 
discharge Andrew T. Rogers and Beth J. Rogers from all claims or causes of action, whether 
known or unknown, he/she may have against them (i) in their capacity as trustees of the Trust, or 
(ii) arising in any way out of their service as trustees of the Trust. The undersigned further 
acknowledge that the trustees have distributed, and he/she has received, all of the property, 
money and benefit:s to which he/she is entitled under the terms of the Trust, except an amount 
which shall not exceed Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000), which has been retained for the sole 
purpose of paying accounting, legal and other expenses associated with the Trust. Any surplus in 
such retainage will be distributed to the beneficiaries proportionately. The undersigned 
acknowledge the financial information he/she has received will constitute a final accounting; and 
he/she waives any right to a court-approved formal final accounting. 
4. Resil!nation of Trustees. The undersigned understand Andrew 1. Rogers and Beth 
J. Rogers intend to resign as trustees of the Trust, leaving in the Trust the Claims described in 
Section 1.1 above; and the undersigned approve of such resignation. The undersigned further 
understand and agree that the successor trustee, Garth Fisher, will decline to serve as trustee, and 
that Reed J. Taylor, Dallan J. Taylor and R. John Taylor will be nominated and appointed to 
serve as successor co-trustees of the Trust. 
5. Indemnification. Taylors, jointly and severally, agree to defend, indemnify and 
hold harmless (i) Andrew T. Rogers and Beth J. Rogers, and (ii) all of the other beneficiaries of 
the Trust against all suits, claims, expenses, costs, attorney's fees, losses or monies that they may 
incur or be required to pay as a result of any lawsuit by Taylors, or any of them, or their 
successors, based upon the Claims, including, without limitation, any third-party claim or 
counterclaim advanced by the defendants. . 
6. Enumeration of Beneficiaries. This will certify the twenty-five (25) individuals 
identified below as signators constitute all of the beneficiaries of the Trust. Exhibit A attached is 
a graphical depiction of the relationship of the signators and grantor Theodore L. Johnson. Blair 
Johnson predeceased the Grantor, Theodore Johnson, leaving no issue; and the beneficial interest 
of Blair Johnson therefore lapsed. 
7. Binding Effeq. This instrument shall be effective as of the latest signature by all, 
and not less than all, of the signators indicated below; and this instrument shall be binding upon 
the heirs and successors of the parties. 
8. Attorney's Fees. If any party commences legal proceedings for any relief against 
the other party(ies) arising out of this agreement, the prevailing party(ies) shall be entitled to an 
award of hislher/their legal costs and expenses, including, but not limited to, re2.sonable 
attorney's fees as determined by the court. The prevailing party(ies) shall be that party receiving 
substantially the relief sought in the proceeding, whether brought to final judgment or not. 
9. Counterparts and Facsimile. This instrument may be executed in several 
counterparts and all so executed shall constitute one instrument, binding on all the parties hereto, 
even though all the parties are not signatories to the original or the same counterpart. A signed 
document transmitted by fax shall be the equivalent of execution and delivery of an original 
signed document. 





10. Entire Agreement. This agreement, together with all exhibits attached hereto and 
other agreements and written materials and documents expressly referred to herein, constitutes 
the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the matters set forth herein. All prior or 
contemporaneous agreements, understandings, representations, warranties and statements, ora! or 
written, are superseded. 
11. Further Assurances. The parties agree to perform such further acts and to execute 
and deliver such additional documents and instruments as may be reasonably required in order to 
carry out the provisions of this instrument and the intention of the parties. Each of the signators 
warrants and represents that in executing this instrument he/she is dealing with his/her sole and 
separate property. 
12. Governing Law. This agreement shall be governed, construed and eaforced in 
accordance with the laws of the State ofIdaho. 
13. Modification/Waiver. No modification, waiver, amendment or discharge of this 
instrument shall be valid unless the same is in writing and signed QY all parties. 
HAZEL FISHER Dated 
GORDON E FISHER Dated 
GARTH 1. FISHER Dated 
JlJDITH F CRAWFORD Dated 
JOYCE SEELY Dated 
DOROTHY S DAYTON Dated 
J DAVID SEELY Dated 




KARL J SEELY Dated 
NATHAN L SEELY Dated 
JANET S DENISON Dated 
BRENT B JOHNSON Dated 
BETH J ROGERS Dated 
SCOTT B JOHNSON Dated 
D GRANTFAR.NWORTH Dated 
LU DAWN FARl\TWORTH Dated 
LAURlE DUNKLEY Dated 
KARLA FARNWORTH Dated 
RUTH F STEPHENS Dated 
REED 1. TAYLOR Dated 
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HELEN TAYLOR Dated 
DALLAN J. TAYLOR Dated 
GLORIA RYDALCH Dated 
MARK J. TAYLOR Dated 
VIRGINIA PORTER Dated 
R, JOHN TAYLOR Dated 









BEITY FARNWORTH) (DICK JOHNSON 
DECEASED DECEASED 
DOl'omy Dayul/I 
* Family contact 













KARL] SEELY Dated 
NATHAN L SEELY Dated 
JANET S DENISON Dated 
BRENT B JOHNSON Dated 
BETH J ROGERS . Dated 
SCOTT B JOHNSON Dated 
D GRANT FARNWORTH Dated 
LU DAWN FARNWORTH Dated 
LAURIE DUNKLEY Dated 
KARLA FAR.~WORTH Dated 
RUTH F STEPHENS Dmed 
Dated 
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HELEN TAyLOR I~ I Dated 
DALLAN 1. rAYLOR Dated 
GLORIA RYDALCH Dated 
MARK J. TAYLOR Dated 
VIRGINIA PORTER Dated 
R. JOl{N TAYLOR Dated 
D1 SCLAl MER, RELEASE & !l'·iDEiVfNITY AGREEMENT - 5 
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12067469150 T-ZS9 P.005/00a F-e64OT-15-2004 [0:30am Fram-CLARK&FEH /( 
GLORIA RYDALCH Dated 
MARKJ. TAYLOR Dared 
VIRomlA PORTER Dated 
R, JOHN TAYLOR D£I1ed 
DISCLAIMER, RELEASE & rNDEMNITY AGREEMENT - 5 
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120874.69160 T-Z89 p.ooa/aoa F-BB4 
-' 
HELEN TAYLOR Dated 
. MARKJ. TAYLOR Dated 
VIRGINIA PORTER Dated 
R. JOHN TAYLOR Dated 
DISCLAIMER, RELEASE & INDEMN1TY AGREEMENT- 5 
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HELEN TAYLOR Dated 
DALLAN J. TAYLOR Dared 
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HELtN' TAnOR Dated 
DALl~AN1. 'fAYLOR Dated 
~-:-:--:--~::::-~~---------GLORtA RYD.A.LCH [)atod 
R.JOHNtAYLOR 
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'-' 9. Counteroarts and Facsimile. TIlls instrument may be executecl in several 
~unteIparts and all 30 executed shall constitute one instnrment, binding on all the parties 
hereto, even though all the parties are not signatories to the original or the same 
counterp2rt. A signed document transmitted by fa."{ shall be the equivalent of execu!i'Jn 
and delivery of an original signed document. 
10. wtire Agreement. This agreement, together with all exhibits attached 
hereto and other agreements and written materials and documents expressly refer:red :~o 
herein, constitutes the entire agreement between the parnes with respect to the matters set 
fonh herein. All prior or contempora."1e()us agreements, understandings, representations, 
warranties and statements, oral or written, are superseded. 
11. Further Assurances. The parties agree to perform such further acts and to 
execute and deliver such additional documents and instruments as may be reasonably 
required in order to carry out the provisions of this instrument and the intention of the 
parties: Each of the signatorS warrants and represents that in executing this instrumen'~ 
he/she is dealmg with hislher sole and separate property. 
12. Governing Law. This agreement shall be governed, construed and 
enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho. 
13. ModificationlVlaiver. No modification, wmver, amendment or discharge 
of this instrument shall be valid unless the same is in writing and signe.d by all parties. 
HAZEL FISHER Dated 
GORDON EFISHERDated 
GARTH J. FISHER Dated 
JUD1TH F eRAVlFORD Dated 
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9. Cqunlerparts and J:Q.c_sirnile. l11is instrument may he executed in several
 
counterparts ami all so ~xecuted shall canst; lute one instrument, binding on ~tll the parties
 
herdo, even though all the prtrties are nol signatories to the original or the same
 
counterpart. A signed document (nmsmilled by [<LX shall be the equivalent of' execution
 
and delivery oran original signed document.
 
J O. Entire Agrecmel~t, This agreemerrl. together with all exhihiLc:; Hllnched
 
hereto nnd other agreements and written materials and dClcumenls expre!;~ly referred to
 
herein. conslitulcs the enUre Elgreemcnl betweell the partie::: with rcSpcctlO the maMers set
 
forth herein. 1\11 prior or contemporaneous agreements, unJer.::lnndings, rcpr!:s~ntations,
 
warranties and statements, oral or wriLt~l1, are superseded,
 
! I. Further !\.SSUnlJ1ces. 'I11e parties agree to perfonn such further acts and to 
eXCl:ule and deliver such ~ddi[ional documents and insirumenLs as may be reasunably 
re41lireJ in orucr to carry out the rn.wision~ oCthis instrument ano the Intention of lhe 
rartics. Each of the signntors wnrran{s amI represents that in executing this ins1..."Unlcnt 
he/she i::; dealing with his!her sole and scparntc property. 
12. G()y'~min[ L-A~. Tbis agreement shall he governed. com:trued and 
cIl[on,;ed in accordance wHh tim laws of the State of Idaho. 
13. MotJincalhw'Walvcr. No modi lication, waiver, amendment or dischan'c 
of this instrument shall be vafid unless the same is in writing and signed by al1 partjes~' 
J ...' '-, . 
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!lAZE[. FlSl fER. Dated 
~..Lc.i 5-2b-. 
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JOYCE SEELY Dated 
DOROTHY SDA YTON Daled 
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f ~'.1 S-I-, J DAVID SEELI Dated 
101;)
(
/')7 2--? 2-00 I'( K.¥i~iEhY Dared 
/ 
NATHAN L SEELY Dated 
JANET S DENISON Dated 
BRENT B JOHNSONDated 
BEn! J ROGERS Dated 
scarr B JOHNSONDated 
D GRANT FARNWORTH Dated 
LV DAWN FARNWORTti Dated 
. LAURIE DUNKLEY Dated 
KARLA FA.R..."NWORTrl Dated 
RUTH F STEPHENS Dated 
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J DAVID SEELY Date.cl 
KARL J SEELY 
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JANET S DENlSON Dated 
BRJiNT B JOHNSONDated 
BE111 J ROGERS l)l\.!c;j 
----SCOTf B JOHNSON [r.Hcd 
D GRANT fARNWORlll Dated 
LU DA \lIN ~ARNWORTH Dated 
LAURIE DUNKLEY Dated 
KARLA FARNWORTH Dated 






I { ! O\.!c
l
J DAVID SEELY Dated 
Kf\RL ] SEELY Dated 
NATIiA.N L SEELY Dated 
BRENT B JOHNSONDated 
BETH J ROOERS Dated 
SCOTT B JOHNSON Dated 
D GRANT FA.R.~-ORTH Da1~~d 
LV DA \VN FA.RNWORTH Dated 
LAURlE DL'NKLEY Dated 
KARLA FARNWORTH Dated 










NATHAN L SEELY Uated 
JANFf S D~NjSON Dated 
4 ~~I /:( (~ ;~:k1'r-' 
BRENT B )01 ONDaLed S--'-;]c',-..;;'vy 
._­
SCOTT H JOt JNSON Dated 
D GRANT FI\IU';WORTIT Doted 
LU DAWN F/\R\JWORTH Da[~d 
LAURIE DUNKJ .FY f}at~d 
l<"...\RLA FARN'WORTJI ThlCU 
RUTH FSTEPHENS Dated. 














J DAV1.D SEELY Dated 
KARL J SEELY Dated 
NATHA1"l L SEELY Dated 
JANET S DENISON Dated 
BREN-r BJOHNSO~'Dated 
-




LV DA\VN FARNWORTH Dat(~d 
LAURIE DUNXLEY Dated 
KARLA FAR.~WORTH Dated 
RUTH F STEPHENS Dated 
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J DAVID SEay Dated 
KARL J SEELY Dated 
NATHAN LSEELY Dated. 
jA.~£T S DENISON Dated 
BRENT B lOHNSOND.ated 
BETH J ROGERS Dated 
~~ ~ 3 .r~~<. .l.o~f 
/~HNSONDated 
D GRANT FARNWORTII Dated 
LV VA WN FARNWORTH Dated 
LAUlUE DUNKLEY Dated 
K.AJU.A FARNWORTH Dated 
.RUTH F STEPHENS Dated 
000631
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J DAVID SEaY Dated 
l<..!'.RL JSEELY Dated 
NADlAJ'\l L SEELY ~ed 
JANET S D.l::...l\([SON Dated 
BRENT B JOHNSONDated 
BETH J ROGERS Dated 
SCOTT B JOHNSOND8tc.d 
~U~1L. b/2.(O~
 
D GRANT f.,o\,RJ,rWORTH Dated 
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Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.
 
The Honorable Ronald J. Wilper, District Judge presiding
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: 
The Taylors are beneficiaries of the The'€ldore Johnson Trust, and have filed an action 
against the attorney for that trust alleging that his purchase of real property from the Trust was a 
breach of his fiduciary duties and was negligent, both in his capacity as an attorney ,md as a 
realtor. This is an appeal from the District Court's order granting the Respondents' (for ease of 
reference, at times hereafter referred to as "Mailes") Motion to Dismiss the Appellants' case in 
its entirety because the Appellants (hereafter referred to as "Taylors"), as beneficiaries, lacked 
standing to pursue the causes of action. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF SALIENT FACTS: 
The Taylors are beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust (hereafter referred to as 
"Trust"). (R. p. 3-4). Theodore Johnson was the settlor of the Trust and acted as the original 
trustee. Thomas Maile, IV (hereafter referred to as "Thomas Maile") is engaged in the practice 
of law in the State of Idaho. (R. p. 4). Additionally, Thomas Maile is a licensed real estate 
broker D/B/A Thomas Maile Real Estate Company. (R. p. 4). Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile 
are husband and wife. (R. p. 4). Respondent Berkshire Investments, LLC, is an Idaho l:imited 
liability company which was formed by Thomas G. Maile and Colleen Maile. (R. p. 4). 
Thomas Maile, as an attorney, represented Theodore Johnson on a variety of matters for 
a period of many years. (R. p. 4). He drafted the trust agreement for the Trust and oversaw the 







C. THE TAYLORS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
The Taylors are entitled to reasonable attorney fees under the statutes and case law of the 
State ofJdaho, specifically Idaho Code 12-120(3), 12-121 and 12-123. 
VII.'~ 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in dismissing the Appellant's causes of actions against the 
Respondents in entirety because the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure clearly allows, or does not 
prohibit, beneficiaries from bringing suit against third parties that have committed or 
participated in a breach of trust. Furthermore, the District Court erred in the application of the 
Harrigfeld test to the facts of this case. A correct application of said test establishes that 
Thomas Maile owed a duty to the Taylors. As such, the District Court's order granting the 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss because the Taylors lacked standing and failed to join the trust 
or the trustees as parties in the action should be reversed. 
Based on the reasons set forth above, the Taylors respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the District Court's decision dismissing the Taylors' claims in its entirety against the 
Respondents, and require the Respondents to pay the costs and attorney fees incurred by the 
Taylors in this appeal. 
>'> 
DATED this ~ day of October, 2004. 
By:_~---!!:~a4.~~_-==--__~--\--
Connie Wright Taylor, a member of the 
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.) Ul 28 2005 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DI 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY j F ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Case No. CVOC0400473D Plaintiffs'; Counter-Defendants, 
MEMOF~A...1\IDUM DECISION & ORDERvs. 
THOMAS MAll-E, N and COLLEEN 
MAll-E, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAll-E REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/ Counter-Claimants. 
This matter came before the Court on the Defendants' Motion to DismisslMotion for 
Summary Judgment, the Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, PlaintitTs' Motion to 
Amend, Defendants' Motions to Strike, and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike. On June 13,2005, the Court 
heard oral arguments regarding the motions. After considering the briefs and arguments ofthe 
parties, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, DENIES De~endants' Motion to 
Dismiss, GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, 
DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and refuses to consider Defendants' Motions to Strike. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Thomas Maile, IV was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included 
drafting the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and overseeing the 
administration of the tmst. After Johnson's death, Maile represented Johnson's estate. 
The underlying transaction in this case is a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Page I 
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of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson entered into an earnest 
money agreement for the purchase of 40 acres in Eagle, ID. The purchase price was $400,000. 
Maile later assigned his interest in the purchase money agreement to Berkshire Investments, LLC. 
The assignment was approved by Beth Rogers acting for Theodore Johnson through a power of 
attorney. Johnson died of cancer before title was conveyed. After Johnson's death, co-trustees Beth 
Rogers and Andrew Rogers conveyed title to Berkshire Investments and executed a warranty deed on 
behalfof the trust as seller. The title was subject to a deed of trust, which was paid in full on January 
04,2004. 
On January 22, 2004, Plaintiffs, certain residual beneficiaries of the: Theodore L. Johnson 
Trust, filed a lis pendens against the 40 acres in Eagle. On January 23, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a 
lawsuit, alleging three causes of action and seeking damages and/or rescission of the sale. Plaintiffs 
claimed the property at the time Maile entered into the earnest money agreement with Johnson was 
worth at least $1.2 million. Plaintiffs asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Maile, 
arguing Maile owed Theodore Johnson a fiduciary duty by virtue of their attorney cli(:nt relationship 
and that Maile breached this duty by not dealing fairly with Johnson, not advising Johnson to consult 
independent counsel, paying less than fair market value for the property, and offering to purchase the 
property on terms unfavorable to Johnson. Plaintiffs also asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim 
against Maile in his capacity as a realtorlbroker, alleging he breached his fiduciary du~y by failing to 
deal honestly with Johnson and by purchasing the property for less than fair market value. Finally, 
Plaintiffs asserted professional negligence claims against Maile in his capacity as attorney and as real 
estate broker. 



















































































Maile answered the complaint and then moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the residua 
beneficiaries lacked standing to bring every asserted cause of action. On April 23, 2004, the Cou 
dismissed the claims of the Plaintiffs based upon a lack of standing. The Court found that th 
Plaintiffs were beneficiaries of the trust and only the trustee could bring a claim. The Plaintiffs hav 
appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court. However, a Counterclaim filed by Defendants is stil 
ongoing on that case. 
On July 22, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a new action against Defendants. Plaintiffs were believed t 
be the new co-trustees of the trust. The original trustees supposedly transferred their status as trustee 
to the Plaintiffs. 
On September 29, 2004 the Court ordered that the two cases be consolidated. 
On November 17, 2004, the Honorable Christopher Bieter entered an order appointing th 
Plaintiffs as co-successor trustees of the Trust. On April 13, 2005, Judge Bietl~r set aside th 
November 17, 2004 order. On May 2, 2005, Judge Bieter allowed the Plaintiffs to be appointed a 
successor trustees, but denied their request to be appointed retroactively. 
n. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND 
Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint to clarify their status as trustees. 
amendments to relate back to the time of the filing of the complaint. Basically, Plaintiffs seeks t 
have their status as trustees applied retroactively to the time of the filing of the complaint. 
The trial court has the discretion to determine whether to grant or deny a motion to amend.
 
Trimble v. Engelking, 134 Idaho 195, 196 (2000). Motions to amend a pleading under IRCP Rul
 
15(a) should be liberally granted by the court. Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp., 136 Idaho 342
 
345 (2001). Rule 15(a) states that motions to amend at this stage in a case should be "freely give
 
































































when justice so requires." IRCP Rule 15(a). The Court must consider the potential prejudice to th 
opposing party when deciding on a motion to amend. Jordan v. Cnty of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311 
(9th Cir. 1982). 
Plaintiffs argue that IRCP 15(c) and 17(a) allow for the amendment to relate back to the tim 
of the filing of the complaint. IRCP 15(c) allows amendments to relate back to the time of the filin 
of the complaint if they arose out of the same conduct set forth in the complaint. IRCP 17(a) provide 
that all actions shall be prost;:cuted in the name of the real party in interest. 
In Hayward, the Idaho Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to change the representativ 
capacity in which he brought the suit. The plaintiff had sued as a personal representative of 
decedent's estate and he wanted to sue as an heir of the estate. The court allowed him to make thi 
change. 
. The Hayward court noted that "the good faith of the plaintiff and prejudice experienced by the 
defendant are factors to consider .... Rule 17(a) is not intended to validate claims filed without any 
real basis but with the hope that a proper party will eventually materialize in order to benefit from 
suspended statutes of limitation. However, this principle has no application to cases in which 
substitution of the real party in interest is necessary to avoid injustice." Id. at 348 (citing Conda 
Partnership, Inc. v. M.D. Constr. Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 902,922 (Ct. App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
The Hayward court also noted "that courts from other jurisdictions have applied a more 
lenient standard to the relation back of a motion to amend that primarily centers around the capacity 
in which the plaintiff brings the action." Id. 
Defendants argue that the suit was not filed in good faith, but they do not claim any prejudice. 
Because Title 68 of the Idaho Code specifically provides that a trustee may not delegate his office and 





























































mandates that a court must a appoint a trustee, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should have known 
that they were not legal trustees when they filed suit on June 21, 2004. 
The Court finds no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff. It appears that they were 
not aware of their error until receiving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in October. Plaintiffs then 
applied to the court to be appointed as trustees. Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' 
Motion to Amend. The Court finds that the amendments relate back to the time of the filing of the 
complaint. 
III. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is based on the failure of the Plaintiffs to file suit as trustees. 
Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs were not properly appointed trustees when they filed suit, 
the case should be dismissed.. However, due to the Court's granting of Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, 
this argument fails. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. 
IV. DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendants have also filed motions for partial summary judgment seeking the dismissal of (1) 
Plaintiffs' claims against Maile as a real estate broker; (2) Plaintiffs' claims against Maile as an 
attorney; and (3) Plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief. 
A. MAILE AS A REAL ESTATE BROKER 
Maile argues that there was no relationship between himself as a broker and Plaintiffs. Idaho 
Code §54-2084 provides: 
(1) A buyer or seller is not represented by a brokerage in a regulated real estate 
transaction unless the buyer or seller and the brokerage agree, in a separate: written 
document, to such representation. No type of agency representation may be assumed 
by a brokerage, buyer or seller or created orally or by implication. 
Ie 54-2084. 























































































There was no written representation agreement in this case. As a result, The Court finds that 
there was no broker-client relationship, and thus no claims against Maile in his capacity as a broker 
can survive.
 
Plaintiffs also argue that Maile violated Idaho law by acting as a realtor and failing to
 
obtain a written representation agreement in violation ofIdaho Code §54-2085. However, the 
Court finds that while Maile could be subject to discipline for violating Idaho Code §54-2085,
 
the disciplinary sections provided for in this section do not allow for clients suing the: broker.
 
The Idaho Real Estate Commission handles disciplinary matters in this area.
 
Plaintiffs further argue that because Maile did not disclose to the Tmst that the appraisal 
conducted was defective and the property was worth more, he violated his Idaho Code §54-2086 
duties as a customer. However, as Maile points out, a customer owes "no duty to independently 
verify the accuracy or completeness of any statement or representation made by the seller or any 
source reasonably believed by the licensee to be reliable." IC §54-2086(2). Maile also argues that the 
appraisal was an opinion, not a material fact that required disclosure. The Court agrees with Maile's 
arguments and consequently finds that no issue ofmaterial fact exists with respect to this claim. 
B. MAILE AS AN ATTORNEY 
To establish a claim for attorney malpractice arising out ofa civil action, the plaintiff 
must show: (I) the creation ofan attorney-client relationship; (2) the existence of a 
duty on the part of the lawyer; (3) the breach of the duty or the standard of care by the 
lawyer; and (4) that the failure to perfonn the duty was a proximate cause ofthe 
damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586,590 (2001). 
. Plaintiffs have provided the affidavit ofRichard Mollerup, their legal expert, who claims that 
Maile violated his fiduciary duties, violated his ethical duties and was negligent, all of which were the 
proximate cause of damages to the Plaintiffs. 































































































Plaintiffs claim that Maile had a conflict of interest. On one hand, as a lawyl;:r, he was 
supposed to help the Trust get the best price for its land, on the other hand, as a purchaser, he wanted 
get the land for the lowest possible price. 
1. Attorney-Client Relationship 
Defendants argue that no attorney-client relationship existed between Maile and the Trust at 
the time Maile purchased the property. Maile had represented Johnson in various matters in the ten 
years prior to the land purchase. Maile represented Johnson with respect to an offer (the Witte offer) 
that was made in May 2002 on the same property that Maile later bought. Maile claims his 
representation ended after his work dealing with this offer because he performed no further work for 
the Trust. Beth Rogers wrote Maile a letter in May 2003 declining further representation by him. 
Maile never did formally terminate the relationship. The Court finds that Rogers did terminate the 
relationship in May 2003. The Comment to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 states: 
If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the 
client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing 
basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client­
lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, 
so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client's 
affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. 
IRPC 1.3 cmt. 
Maile had served the Trust in various matters for the past ten years. The Court finds that 
there is a material issue of fact about the existence ofan attorney-client relationship. 
2. Breach of the Standard of Care 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot show that Maile breached the standard ofcare for an 
attorney. Plaintiffs' legal expert, Richard Mollerup, states that he felt that Maile breached his 

























































































fiduciary obligations to the Trust because the terms of the transaction under which Maile purchased 
the subject property from the trust were not fair and reasonable. 
Mollerup notes that several provisions in the Purchase Agreement and Deed of Trust were 
irregular and favorable to Maile. Defendants contend that these irregularities are irrelevant to the 
issue of whether the deal was fair. However, Mollerup also states that the purchase price itself was 
unfair, considering it was identical to an offer previously rejected by Maile. 
Additionally, Defendants argue that Maile complied with Rules 1.8 and 1.9 of the Idaho Rules 
of Professional Conduct because Maile told Johnson of his right of seek independent counsel at least 
twice. Plaintiffs claim that Maile made no such representations. Based on the above, the Court finds 
that a material issue of fact exists as to whether the representations were made and as to whether a 
breach of the standard of care occurred. 
3. Damages 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot prove any damages because Maile paid the market 
value for the property. However, Plaintiffs have submitted appraisals and affidavits stating that the 
$400,000 price was far too low and that others were ready, willing and able to pay for the property. 
Also, Maile himself had previously stated that the $400,000 price was too low. Based on these 
assertions, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs' have adequately demonstrated damages. 
Based on the above, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs' claims against Maile as an attorney. 
c. EQUITABLE RELIEF 
1. Rescission 




























































Rescission is an equitable remedy that totally abrogates the contract and seeks to 
restore the parties to their original positions. It is normally granted only in those 
circumstances in which one of the parties has committed a breach so material that it 
destroys or vitiates the entire purpose for entering into the contract. 
Blinzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 485 P.2d 957 (1971). 
The Rogers, as trustees, were informed by the Taylors that the purchase price was unfair 
before the deal was done. The Rogers chose to ignore the Taylors and to accept the payment for the 
property. Maile argues that the Plaintiffs are bound by the decision made by the trustees. On July 22, 
2003, Beth Rogers told Maile that no legal action would be pursued by the Trust. "Under the 
common law, it is well established that the party seeking rescission must act promptly once the 
grounds for rescission arise. Once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts 
givin~ rise to a right of rescission, the right of rescission is waived." White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 
888 (2004). 
Maile argues that he relied on the Rogers' assurances in obtaining financing to develop the 
subject property. Plaintiffs argue that Maile was on notice in July 2003 that th<;:y were upset about the 
sale and that legal action was imminent. Maile argues that he did not worry about the Plaintiffs at tha 
time because they were not trustees and had no standing to sue. Their first lawsuit was dismissed due 
to a lack of standing. Maile relied on the assertions of the trustees, at that time, Beth and Andy 
Rogers. 
, The Court finds that the Plaintiffs, now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to 
pursue rescission once the grounds for it arose. Therefore, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' 
motion with respect to this claim. 
2. Constructive Trust 




































Constructive trusts are raised by equity for the purpose of working out right and 
justice, where there was no intention of the party to create such a relation, and often 
directly contrary to the intention of the one holding the legal title.... If one party 
obtains the legal title to property, not only by fraud or by violation of confidence or of 
fiduciary relations, but in any other unconscientious manner, so that he cannot 
equitably retain the property which really belongs to another, equity carries out its 
theory of a double ownership, equitable and legal, by impressing a constructive trust 
upon the property in favor of the one who is in good conscience entitled to it, and who 
is considered in equity as the beneficial owner. 
Hanger v. Hess, 49 Idaho 325, 328, 288 P. 160, 161 (1930). 
In this case, it is alleged that Maile obtained the property by violating his fiduciary obligations. 
The Court finds that there is an issue of fact about that claim. Therefore, the Court DENIES 
Defendants' motion with respect to the Plaintiffs' constructive trust claim. 
Maile asserts the equitable defenses of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel against the 
Plaintiffs. He argues that he relied on the trustees' July 2003 assertions that litigation would not be 
pursued when he obtained financing for the development of the property. He argues that the trustees 
cannot now change their position. The Plaintiffs argue that Maile has unclean hands because of his 
alleged misconduct and thus cannot assert equitable remedies. 
Because the Court finds that there is an issue of fact about Maile's unclt~an hands, it will not 
consider estoppel as a defense at this time. 
v. DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE 
Defendants seek to strike Richard White's affidavit and portions of Richard Mollerup's 
affidavit. Richard White is Plaintiffs' expert real estate broker. Mollerup is Plaintiffs' expert on lega 
malpractice. 





























Plaintiffs have objected to even hearing Defendants' motions to strike at the June 13,2005 
hearing because Defendants did not comply with IRCP 7(b)(3) in filing the motions. IRCP 7(b)(3) 
requires that motions be filed at least 14 days before the hearing. In this case, the motions to strike 
were filed on June 6, 2005 for a June 13, 2005 hearing. No motions to shorten time wlere filed. 
Plaintiffs claimed that they did not have enough time to respond to the motions. At th(~ hearing both 
parties rested on the record regarding the motions to strike and no arguments were presented. 
Because IRCP 7(b)(3) was not complied with, the Court will not entertain Defendants' 
Motions to Strike. 
VI. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE 
Plaintiffs seek to strike the testimony of Maile as it relates to any unwritten corrmmnication or 
agreement with the decedent, Ted Johnson, relating to the property which forms the subject matter of 
this litigation because they argue that it be inadmissible hearsay. Plaintiffs do not articulate exactly 
what they wish to exclude. 
Defendants argue that as a trustee of the Trust which is now suing Maile, Johnson's 
statements are admissions of a party-opponent pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2). The 
Coourt finds that Johnson's statements are admissions of a party-opponent and thus DENIES 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend, DENIES 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motions for 
Partial Summary Judgment, DENIES Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and refuses to consider Defendants' 
Motions to Strike. 
































































IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~ ( . 
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COME NOW Plaintiffs Reed, DaHan, and John Taylor (hereafter referred to as "the 
Beneficiary Plaintiffs"), by and through their attorney of record, Paul Thomas Clark of the finn of 
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Clark & Feeney and, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(b), move this Court for an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Beneficiary Plaintiffs on their claim against the Defendants. 
1 
This motion is made upon the pleadings and records of the above-entitled action and 
.2 
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment filed concurrently herewith. 3 
4 Oral argument is requested. 
/" 
.
~.) DATED this _~ day of February, 2006...
6 
7 
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COME NOW Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor (hereafter referred to as "the 
Beneficiary Plaintiffs"), by and through their attorneys of record, and, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(b), 
submit this memorandum in support of their motion for an order granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Beneficiary Plaintiffs on their constructive trust claim against the Defendants. 
SUMMARY OF PERTINENT FACTS 
The facts have been well developed as this matter has progressed and have been cited to the 
court innumerable times, most extensively in the Plaintiffs' Summary of Facts and Exhibits and 
Submission of Transcripts dated March 2, 2005. Rather than repeat the information yet again, we 
incorporate that document and will only cite the specific facts which are pertinent to this motion for 
summary judgment in this memorandum. 
In 1997, Thomas Maile drafted a Revocable Trust Agreement for Theodore Johnson. A true 
and correct copy of the Revocable Trust Agreement is attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit ofR. 
John Taylor dated February 8, 2006. Under the terms of the trust agreement, Mr. Johnson's niece 
Beth Rogers and her husband, Andy, were named as successor co-trustees. Because Beth Rogers' 
father (Richard Johnson) had predeceased Ted Johnson, under the terms of the trust, Beth Rogers 
and her brothers were entitled to receive immediate payment oftheir share ofthe trust. Affidavit of 
R. John Taylor, '1 3. Mr. Johnson's surviving siblings (who were all sisters) were entitled to 
receive income only during their lifetime, at the discretion of the trustees; the sistl~rs' children were 
to receive the corpus of the trust after their mother's death, but nothing until that occurred. See 
paragraph IV.a, page 4 ofthe Trust Agreement. 
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Thomas Maile represented Ted Johnson in negotiations for the sale ofhis 40 acres on Linder 
Road in Eagle, Idaho to Franz Witte. Mr. Maile wrote a letter to Witte's attorney rejecting the 
$400,000 offer as "extremely low" based on comparable sales in the area. Mr. Maile has testified 
he recommended that Johnson detennine the value of the Linder Road property by getting three 
opinions from real estate agents and, ifpossible, getting extra opinions from "some" appraisers and 
then averaging those values. An excerpt of that testimony is attached as Ex. 5.C to Plaintiffs' 
Submission of Transcripts dated March 2, 2005. After the Witte transaction fell through, Maile 
prepared an Earnest Money Agreement offering to purchase the same property on essentially the 
same tenns. Mr. Maile was aware of the fact that when Mr. Johnson signed the Maile Earnest 
Money Agreement on July 25, 2002, Johnson had gotten only a single appraisal. Mr. Johnson (who 
had terminal lung cancer and a brain tumor) had a heart attack on August 2, 2002; he was placed 
in a nursing home where he died on September 14, 2002. 
The successor trustees, Beth and Andy Rogers, signed the documents closing the 
Defendants' purchase of the Linder Road property only two days after Ted Johnson's death. 
Affidavit ofR. John Taylor, ~ 2. There is no evidence to indicate the successor co-trustees carried 
out their fiduciary responsibility to carefully examine the fairness and propriety of the transaction 
before closing it. The record is clear that the Rogers did not obtain the multiple opinions which Mr. 
Maile had opined were necessary in order to detennine the value of the property prior to closing the 
sale. They did nothing more than have the language of the Eamest Money Agreement n:viewed by 
a lawyer. This was done only btcause the Rogers weren't "familiar with legal reading," not because 
Maile advised that they do so. That attorney, David Wishney, wrote a letter advising that because 
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the agreements had already been executed by the respective parties, it was really too latl~ for him to 
provide any substantive input. 
The successor trustees proceeded with the closing of the transaction without informing the 
other trust beneficiaries of the terms of the sale or of their interest in the property (Affidavit ofR. 
John Taylor, ~ 2). The transaction was closed without obtaining court approval for the sale as 
required by I.e. § 68-1 08(b). All the dealings between Mr. Maile and the Rogers have been explored 
thoroughly through depositions, and Maile never advised the Rogers that court approval was 
required. 
When the PlaintiffBeneficiaries contacted Beth Rogers about their concerns over the sale, 
she initially agreed to bring an action on behalf of the trust, then abruptly changed her mind. It is 
uncontroverted that the Rogers, in a letter dated July 22, 2003 which has often been cited by the 
Defendants, refused to seek remedial action to recover the property when it was brought to their 
attention that the Mailes may have taken advantage of the Trust. This letter was written right after 
the Taylors had asked Rogers for a copy of the Trust tax return, which she refused to provide. The 
Rogers agreed to step aside as trustees only after all the beneficiaries agreed not to sue them and 
to waive any accounting for the Trust. Affidavit of R. John Taylor, '\ 2. 
ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiff Beneficiaries seek summary judgment against the Defendants on their 
constructive trust claim and an order quieting title in the Linder Road property to them. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMAR Y JUDGMENT
 
ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIM 4
 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
























































































I. Summary Judgment Standard
 
A motion for summary judgment is to "be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.c.P. 
56(c); State v. Continental Casualty Co., 121 Idaho 938, 939,829 P.2d 528 (1992). 
Because a constructive trust is an equitable remedy, the Court is free to arrive at the most
 
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Loomis v. City ofHailey,
 
119ldaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991).
 
II.	 Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their t:onstrUictive trust 
claim. 
The PlaintiffBeneficiaries are entitled to summaryjudgment on their constructive trust claim 
against the Defendants pursuant to the Idaho Supreme Court decision dated December 23, 2005. 
A.	 The fact that the Rogers had a conflict of interest is uncontroverted. 
There is no dispute that there was a conflict of interest between the beneficiariles and the 
successor trustee, Beth Rogers. That fact has been acknowledged by the Mai:les in the briefing 
submitted to the Supreme Court, which stated as follows: 
Thus, even now there are classes of beneficiaries with conflicting inten~sts in the 
administration of the trust. Mr. Johnson's siblings have an interest in seeing that the 
corpus of the Revocable Trust is invested to provide greater present income rather 
than protecting the value of the corpus. The beneficiaries with an interest in the 
corpus are interested in protecting and increasing the value of the corpus, 
Respondents' Brief (11/15/04), pg. 7. 
This statement by the Defendants constitutes a judicial admission that a conflict of interest 
existed. A judicial admission is a statement made by a party or attorney, in the course of judicial 
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proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the 
opposing party ofsome fact. Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 6l8-i 9,930 P.2d 1363 (Ct. App. 
1997) (citing McLean v. CityojSpirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783, 430 P.2d 670, 674 (1967); 29A AM.
 
JUR.2d Evidence § 770 (1994); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 48 (6th Eel. 1990». Judicial 
admissions may be considered for the purposes which they were made without admission into 
evidence, and a party making an admission may not controvert the statement on appeal. Strouse, 
supra, at 619,930 P.2d at 1364. 
In actuality, the Defendants have understated the extent ofthe Rogers' conflict. They failed 
to discuss the fact that successor trustee Beth Rogers was not only a beneficiary, she was one of a 
few beneficiaries who were entitled to receive their share of the corpus of the trust without delay, 
unlike Mr. Johnson's surviving siblings and their children. This created a conflict of interest on the 
issue ofwhether the trust real property should be sold, which would result in an immediate financial 
benefit to Rogers and her brothers, or held to take advantage of the escalating property values in the 
area at the time, which would be ofmore benefit to Ted's surviving siblings and their children. See 
Affidavit ofR. John Taylor, ~ 4 and 5. 
The fact that the successor co-trustees, Andy and Beth Rogers, had a personal interest in the 
trust which conflicted with their duties as trustees is uncontroverted, by the Defendant's own 
admission. This conflict became even more pronounced when the Taylors finally learned that the 
Linder Road property was owned by a trust in which they were named as beneficiaries, which did 
not occur until several months after the sale had been closed. After investigating the circumstances 
of the sale, they asked the successor trustees to pursue an action against the Defendants. By that 
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time, it had been months since theMailes.initial down payment of $1 00,000 had been paid. The 
majority of the beneficiaries were not entitled to receive and had not received any portion of that 
payment, but the successor trustees were in a situation where rescinding that sale would have 
required them to return any of the money from that sale which they had already distributed to 
themselves. That prospect created a huge conflict between their personal self-inten::st and their 
fiduciary duty to the other beneficiaries, and could very well have played a part in their decision 
not to pursue an action. 
The conflict ofinterest is even more evident when you look at the circumstances surrounding 
the Rogers refusal to file suit and ultimate withdrawal as trustees. Rogers hadinitialJ!y agreed to 
bring an action on behalf of the trust, then abruptly changed her mind immediately after she had 
received, and denied, as request from the Taylors to review the Johnson Trust tax return. It is 
uncontroverted that the Rogers, in a letter dated July 22, 2003 which has often been cited by the 
Defendants, refused to seek remedial action to recover the property. The Rogers would not agree 
to step aside as trustees until all the beneficiaries agreed not to sue them and to waive any 
accounting for the Trust. In essence, the lawsuit against Maile was used to negotiate away their 
fiduciary duties as trustees. 
The Rogers' stated reason for not seeking a return of the property was that they were 
following Ted Johnson's wishes, but the Idaho Supreme Court has pointed out that a trustee is not 
exempted from his duty ofloyalty by virtue of the fact that he is carrying out the presumptive intent 
of the trust settlor. Taylor v. Maile, __ Idaho , citing Edwards v. Edwards, 122 ldaho 
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963, 970, 842 P.2d 299, 306 (Ct. App. 1992). In the appeal of this matter, the Court stated as
 
follows: 
The defendant in the Edwards case admitted he had not obtained judicial
 
authorization to sell trust property but suggested that the conflict of interest should
 
be exempted from his duty ofloyalty by virtue ofthe fact that he was carrying out the
 
presumptive intent of the trust settlor. Jd. at 970, 842 P.2d at 306. The Court of
 
Appeals disagreed. The Rogers make a similar argument in their letter to Taylors'
 




Taylor v. Maile, supra. 
B.	 The sale ofthe Linder Road Property to the Defendants is voidable because the 
Trustees did not obtain prior court approval for the sale. 
Where a trustee has an individual interest in the trust that poses a conflict in the exercise of
 
a trust power, such as the power to close a sale of real property, under Idaho Code § 68-1 08(b) that
 
power may be exercised "only by court authorization." Because the sale to the Defendants was not
 
authorized by a court, it is voidable. See Edwards v. Edwards, 122 Idaho 963, 842 P.2d 299 (CL
 
App. 1992), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals held that an agreement relating to real property
 
which was entered into by a trustee in 1977lfifteenyears earlier) was voidable be,cause ofa conflict
 
of interest and the lack of court approval.
 
The Idaho Supreme Court has, since 1929, recognized a trust beneficiary's right to pursue 
redress where trust property has wrongfully made its way into the hands of a third party. In Zohos 
v. Marefolos, 48 Idaho 291, 294, 281 P. 1114, 1115 (1929), the Court said:
 
Whenever property in its original state and form has once been impressed with the 
character of a trust, no subsequent change of such state and form can divest it of its 
trust character, so long as it is capable of clear identification; and the beneficiary of 
the trust may pursue and reclaim it in whatever form he may find it, unless it has 
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Zohos, 48 Idaho at 294. See also Kite v. Eckley, 48 Idaho 454, 460, 282 P. 868, 870 (1929).
 
The general rule in trusts is that a third person who "has notice that the trustee is committing
 
a breach of trust and participates therein is liable to the beneficiary for any loss caused by the breach
 
of trust." Brixeyv. Hoffman, 101 Idah02l5,2l8-l9,6ll P.2d 1000, 1003-04, citing Restatement
 
(Second) of Trusts, § 326 (1969); see LaHue v. Keystone Investment Co., 6 Wash. ApI'. 765, 496
 
P.2d 343 (1972); 4 A. Scott, The Law ofTrusts, § 326.5 (1967). The remedy provided for under the
 
circumstances is imposition of a constructive trust. See Taylor v. Maile, Idaho _
 
(December 23,2005 slip opinion), citing Fenton v. King Hill Irr. Dist., 67 Idaho 456, 466-67, 186
 
P.2d 477, 483 (1947), Restatement (2d) of Trusts, § 291.
 
Mr. Maile knew all ofthe facts surrounding the sale of this property, and Defendants cannot 
be deemed to be bonafide purchasers. Because ofhis position as the attorney who drafted the initial 
trust, he knew that Beth Rogers was both a successor trustee and a beneficiary, and that she was in 
a small class of beneficiaries which would be entitled to immediate distribution oftheir share ofthe 
corpus ofthe trust. He knew that Ted Johnson had not foHowed his advice that he should determine 
the value ofthe property by obtaining three opinions from real estate agents and "'some" appraisals, 
then averaging them. He knew that the $400,000 price he paid was extremely low based on 
comparable sales in the area, and he affirmatively made that statement during his repres1entation of 
Mr. Johnson when he wrote a letter rejecting a previous offer for the same amount. He never 
advised the Rogers of their duty to carefully examine the fairness and propriety of the transaction 
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before closing it, nor did he give them the same advice he had given Mr. Johnson about determining 
the value of the property. 
As the attorney who drafted the purchase documents, Mr. Maile also knew that the Earnest 
Money Agreement contained a number of terms which substantially limited the rights of the Trust 
and were not in the best interest of the beneficiaries. These provisions included a waiver of trial 
by jury; venue in an improper county; a reduction in the statute oflimitations from five years to one 
year; and binding arbitration in lieu of court proceedings. 
Even a layman would have been aware that it was a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty to 
enter into this transaction; as an attorney and a realtor, Mr. Maile must be held to a much higher 
standard. Neither he nor his LLC is entitled to the protection which is given to bonafide purchasers. 
CONCLUSION 
The uncontroverted facts which have been established in this case, and the reasonable 
inferences which this Court may draw therefrom, indicate that the Plaintiffs are entitled as a matter 
of law to entry of an order quieting title in the Linder property to them. 
C(
DATED this __I day of February, 2006. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of February, 2006, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of this document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas Maile 
Attorney at Law 
380 W. State 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Jack S. Gjording 
Gjording & Fouster 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, ID 83702 
Dennis Charney 
Attorney at Law 
951 E. Plaza Dr. Ste. 140 
Eagle, ID 83616 
U.S. Mail ~ Hand Delivered 
0 Overnight Mail 
0 Telecopy (FAX) 
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0 Overnight Mail 
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Hand Delivered 
o Overnight Mail 
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Jack S. Gjording, ISB No. 11 05 
Elaine H. Lee, ISB No. 6217 
GJORDING & FOUSER, PLLC 
509 W. Hays Street 
P.O. Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208)336-9777 
Facsimile: (208)336-9177 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas Maile, IV 
IN. THE DISTRICt COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and) Case No. CV OC 0400473D 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, ) 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
VS. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County ofAda ) 
ELAINE H. LEE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says that she is one of 
the attorneys of record for the Defendants in this action and makes this affidavit having pt~rsonal 
knowledge of the facts herein contained. 
1. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a tme and correct copy of pages 20-22, 53-59, 
85-90,97-107, 118-121, 134-135, 137-138, and 184-185 of the deposition transcript of Thomas 
Maile taken on February 1 and 3, 2005. 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 










SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~ day of June, 2005. 
IT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
;J­
I hereby certify that on the :5 day of June, 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served upon the following individual(s) by the means indicated: 
Connie w. Taylor ('U.S. mail, postage prepaid 
Paul Thomas Clark _ express mail 
CLARK and FEENEY _ hand delivery 
1229 Main Street facsimile 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Phillip 1. Collaer .0r.S. mail, postage prepaid 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL, LLP _ express mail 
P.O. Box 7426 _ hand delivery 
Boise,ID 83707 facsimile 
Thomas G. Maile' ~.s. mail, postage prepaid 
380 W. State _ express mail 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 _ hand delivery 
facsimile 
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Page 18 Page 20 ~ 
1 in carrying the license. You do have dues that are 
2 required for the state licensing. And then 
3 continuing education. I just think it was a benefit 
4 to me personally to have that source of education. 
S Continuing education. And had I, which I had in the 
6 past, acquired real property, I could save a small 
7 commission in doing so. 
8Q Sathe idea being primarily so you can bUy 
9 and sell properties for your own benefit and not 
10 have to pay somebody else the entirE~ commission? 
11 A That was a factor. 
12 Q Over the years have you listed properties 
13 for third parties? 
14 A Just recently. Just within the last -­
15 I'm trying to think if it was 2002 when Ire-upped 
16 :in the ML5. I never listed any property that I can 
17 recall in the early '80s or late '70s. Nor in the 
18 '96, '97 period of time. I think I had real estate 
19 commis$ion sales in the year 2004. In one sale In 
20 2.003. 
21 Q And these were commission sales for 
22 property owners other than yourself or entities in 
23 which you were associated? 
24 A That's true. 
25 Q The office that you have in Eagle, I 
Page 19 
1 assume it has identification of you as an attorney? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q How Is that designated?
 
4 A There a sigh out in front of the office.
 






8 Q Is there a sign out in front of the office
 




H Q Does Leonard work out of that office?
 
12 A His license is there.
 














20 Q Is there a phone for the real estate
 
21 company at the Eagle property?
 
22 A No. If I have something to list I'll use
 
23 939-1372. Or my cell number. Like if an ad runs,
 
24 for example, that relates to property that I may
 
25 have ownership of, that we have for rentals, for
 
1 example, we might use the line 939-1372' for that. I 
2 
3 
Or my cell phone number. 
Q Is the 939-1372 just a rotating line on 
~ i 
4 your office phone? ~ 
5 A Yes, it is. ~ 




A I can't speak- in '96 and '97. And since 
~i 
9 '97 up through 2.003 there really hasn't been ij 
10 anything related to real estate calling other than ~ 
11 my personal real estate. So it has varied/, I guess, ; 
12 is the answer. i 
13 
14 
Q Have you had as part of your educational 
training or continuing education courses training in 
f. ~ i 
15 appraisal work? 
16 A Have I -- say that again. Have I ever had 
17 any training in appraisal work? 
18 Q Right. 
19 A None whatsoever. 
20 Q That is not a standard class that is 
21 offered to realtors and/or brokers? 
22 A I can't answer that as to whether it is 
23 offered as a standard class. I have never -- there 
24 has been no licensing requirement for education for 
25 appraisal classes, as you have described it. I have 
Page 21 
1 never taken one. Every two year:s you an~ required 
2 to have a certain number of hours of real estate 
3 fundamentals, I think it is called. But there is no 
4 appraisal portion of those classes,,' Training. 
5 Q Going back to your work as an attorney. 
6 Have you handled any litigation that has dealt with 
7 the issue of appraisals? Real estalte appraisals? 
8 A' In what sense? 
9 Q Well, why don't you tell me if you have 
10 handled any first. And then I will -­
11 A Gosh, I have to go through 25 years of 
12 practice. I can't think of anythln91 in a broad 
13 sense involVing an appraisal. I know I have had 
14 cases where there has been appraisals involved in 
15 cases. 
16 Q Have you had cases wher·e there have been 
17 disputes with respect to values established by one 
18 appraiser versus another? 
19 A Now we know why we have computers. I 
20 can't think of a case where there have been legal 
21 issues, or contentions, or disputes over appraisals. 
22 Q In your work as a real estate broker have 
23 you had the experience in dealing with appraisers? 
24 A I would have to say yes. 
25 Q Have you learned in the 20-some years of 
6 (Pages 18 to 21) 
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1 being a broker in general term:. now property is 
:2 appraised? 
:3 A Yes. Sure. 
4 Q And tell me what your understanding is in 
5 that regard? 
6 A Well, with residential property, for 
:7 example, comparables are probably the essential 
8 approach that appraisers use. With commercial 
9 property, I think, In my opInion, Income approach 
10 might be the most Widely accepted. Although, 
11 comparables are used in that sense, as well. 
1:2 Commercial property. You would have to use, here 
13 again, a combination of comparables. And, of 
1,4 course, If the commercial property generates income 
15 you would be able to utilize an income approach. 
16 Q' Let'$ go back to your business interests 
17 in addition to your law office and real estate 
18 company that we have already talked about. 
19 What o~er businesses, enterprises, do you 
20 own or own a controlling interest in? 
21 A Own or have a controlling Interest in? We 
22 have talked about Horizon Properties. Thomas Maile 
23 Real Estate, LLC. We have a law office that is a 
24 corporation, Subchapter S. I have a family-owned 
25 corporation, Hope Development, which I neither own. 
Page 23 
l Nor do lawn a controlling interest in it. But for 
2 the sake of hying to understand your question I'll 
3 include that. And there is a Macchu Pichu limited 
4 family partnership. 
MR. COLLAER: can you spell that? 
() THE WITNESS: M-a-c-c-h-,u P-i-c-h-u. So 
~7 those are all of the entities that I can think of. 
B Q (BY MR. CLARK) How about Berkshire 
9 Investments? , 
10 A Thank you. I forgot that. That also is 
1:l owned wholly by my wife and I.
 
12 Q And what type of business is that?
 
13 A Well, it is a limited liability company
 
14 that was formed for development purposes.
 
is Q When was it formed?
 
16 A Probably 2002. Perhaps July or early
 
17 August of 2002.
 
18 Q What assets did it have at the time of
 
19 Exhibit 12, the assignment of earnest money
 
20 agreement, was executed?
 
21 A The $100,000 either through a line of
 
22 credit or in cash. Or a pOItion in cash.
 




25 Q Am I correct in understancflng then that it
 
Page 24 6 
i was formed WILli the Idea initially of acquiring the ~ 
2 property from the Ted Johnson Trust? ij 
3 A As an assignment from the contract, yes. ~ 
4 Q Was it formed for any other purpose? ij 
5 A No.. . ~ 
6 Q Has It acqUired any other assets other ~ 
7 than that land? ~ 
8 A No. g 
9 Q And why did you feel it was necessary to I 
10 have that formed? ~ 
11 A Here again, it was tax advice and '!' 
12 accounting advice to create a separate entity. ;. 
13 Separate legal entity. i 
14 Q And what was the benefit of that? 
15 A Well, as best as I can understand there 
16 we're some benefits for the'cost basis. And also 
17 benefits in having an entity that would be In a 
18 joint venture, if you Will, with the development 
19 company, Thomas Maile Real EstatE;! Company. 
20 Q So as far ,as developing the Linder Road 
21 property were y<?u going to do any of that 
22 personally? Or was it going to be through these two 
~3 entities? Developing sale and ownership? 
24 A What do you mean by personally, then? 
25 Because I am involved with the various entities. 
Page 2S . 
1 Q You're involved as an owner of the 
2 entities; right? Beyond that are you personally 
3 involved? 
4 A Yeah, I'm personally involved. Y,es. 
5 Q How is that? 
6 A I materially participate in those 
7 enterprises. 
8 Q As an owner? 
9 'A Yes. 
10 Q And as an agent? 
11 A At times. 
12 Q Any other participation? 








17 A I don't think so.
 
18 Q So my understanding of your testimony is 
19 that Berkshire Investments was 90in9 to own the land 
20 on Linder Road? 
21 A It would be the titled owner of the land. 
22 And titled owner of the Improvements on the land. 
23 Q And then the developer was goln!~ to be 
24 Thomas Maile Real Estate Company? 
25 A Yes. 
7 (Pages 22 to 25) 
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15 the law offices of Anderson, Julian & Hull, 250 So. 15 
16', Fifth $treet, Suite 700, \3oise, Idaho, commencing at '16 
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1 APPEARANCES: 1 EXAMINATION 
2 2 BY MR. CLARK: 
3 For the Plaintiff: CLARK and FEENEY 3 Q When we broke the other day I had asked 
4 BY: Paul Thomas Clark 4 you about the dates that you had seen Ted Johnson in 
5 The Train Station, Suite 201 5 2002. And the dates that you had b~lephone contacts 
6 13th and Main Streets 6 with him in 2002. And I want to work through those 
7 Post Office Drawer 285 7 in chronological order. 
8 Lewiston, Idaho 83501 8 First, with respect to the meeting on ~1ay 
9 9 22, 2002. Where did that occur? 
10 For Thomas Maile GJORDING & FOUSTER 10 A That would have been at my law office in 
11 as Attorney: BY: Jack S. Gjording 11 Eagle.
 
12 509 West Hays Street 12 Q Who was present?
 
13 Post Office Bo)( 2837 13 A Ted Johnson and myself.
 
14 Boise, Idaho 83702 14 Q And how is it that meeting took place?
 
15 15 A Well, Ted Johnson had either called to set
 
16 For Thomas Maile ANDERSON JUUAN & HULL 16 up an appointment or come to the office with a
 
17 as Realtor/Broker: BY: Phillip J. Collaer 17 proposed real estate contract without an office
 
18 250 So. Fifth Street, Suite 700 18 appointment.
 
19 Post Office Box 7426 19 Q And you're looking at something to refresh
 
20 Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 20 your memory. What are you looking at?
 
21 21 A Exhibit 8.
 
22 22 Q And other than ExhIbit 8 do you have any
 
23 23 documentation as It relates to this meeting?
 
24 24 A Not with me, no. ~
 
25 25 Q What other documentation d(:> you have as it ~
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relates to this meeting? 
. A Well, I know that the file was provided to
 
Hawley Troxell. The file related to the Franz Witte
 




6 Q And what documentation would be in that
 
:7 file as it relates to this meeting?
 
8 A Without having it in front of me it is
 
9 hard to remember.
 
10 Q What part of it do you remember?
 
11 A Well, everything that is the part here in
 
12 our exhibits before us, I certainly remember as
 
13 being a part of it.
 
14 Q Did you take any notes at that meeting?
 
1.5 A I don't recall.
 
16 Q Would that be your practl~e to take notes?
 
17 A In some cases I do and some I don't. I
 
18 don't know how to answer that.
 
19 Q So you don't have a routine as far as
 
20 taking notes to document each meeUng that you would
 
21 have with a client? Or in this time frame did you?
 
22 A No. Like I said, sometimes I take notes .
 
23 and sometimes I don't. It depends on the complexity
 
24 of the facts.
 




A Oh, somewhere between a half an hour to 45 
3 minutes.··· 
4 Q What was discussed In the meeting? 
t· 
.) A Well, Ted came with the WI.tte contract. 
6 And he presented the contract to me for me to 
~1 review. And he had commented to me about, you know, 
fl his Intentions relative to his property. 
9 Q What did he say in that regard? 
10 A Oh, it came up rather early In the 
11 conference. As I looked through the contract I saId 
12 to Ted, "Well, Is this the 40 acres on Under Road? 
13 Is this the offer on the 40 acres?" And he saId, 
14 "Yes." And then I continued to review the terms. 
15 And he saId, "This is the same property that you 
16 have said you were Interested In buying." And he 
1:7 said, "Are you still Interested In buyinn it?" And 
18 I saId, "Yes." And then I said to him, "Does the 
19 fact that I have expressed an Interest buying the 
20 property cause you any difficulty in me reVieWing 
21 thIs contract?" And he said, "No." And I said, 
22 "Well, what do you really Intend to do with your 40 
23 acres?" And he said, "Well, I'm not really sure. 
24 But I would consider selling it." 
25 So I revIewed the contract. I think at 
~)
...:--_._---------, 
Page 56 ~ 
1 that point in t""d I hadn't made a copy of the ~ 
2 contract. So I reviewed it. He was on the other i 
3 side of the desk. And I said, "Well, do you know I 
4 .what the property is worth?" And he said, "No, not I 
5 really." So then I discussed with him the necessity i 
6 of trying to determine what the property was worth. ~ 
7 And I told Ted there is a variety of ways he can try ~ 
B to do that. He can get some appraisals. He can get ~ 
9 some real estate agents to provide their opinions. ~ 
10 And typically what is the best approach is to get an I 
11 average. To get three opinions from real estate ! 
12 agents. And, if possible, get extra opinions from ! 
13 appraisers. And you take an average to see what the ~ 
14 property might be worth. ~ 
15 He didn't really have any comment to that, ~ 
16 that I can remember. And I said, "Well, let's .Ii 
17 consider what could also be some tax GDnsequences ~I. 
18 for you. Because you have to consider those issues ' 
19 involVing a real estate transaction." And I'm I 
20 pretty sure I asked him when he had acquired the ~ 
21 property. And it seemed to me that he had it for 
22 about 20 years. And since it was real estate 
23 without any improvements on it the depreciation 
24 isn't really a factor. But I saidl "Who Is your 
25 accountant? We need to check with YOlLlr accountant 
Page 57 ' 
1 and see how she has handled the record keeping for 
2 your tax basis." . 
3 So I guess in that first conference the 
4 majority of it was related to the review of the 
5 contract. And a discussion surrounding the 
6 contract. Tax implications. And whether he, in 
7. fact, wanted to proceed in selling the property. 
8 Q Do you remember the substanCE! of anything 
9 else that was discussed? 
10 A I think I asked hIm if he had other family 
11 members -- I knew that he had co-trustees of the 
12 trust. Whether he was getting any help from other 
13 family members•.Andl of COUrSE!, he mellltioned Beth 
14 Rogers as being Involved with him. He really didn't 
15 have a lot of input other than that, that ][ can 
16 recall. 
17 Q So you have told me the substance of 
18 everything you can recall from that meeting? 
19 A I think that covers the substantive nature 
20 of the conference. 
21 Q Did he ask you any questions in relation 
22 to your suggestion to get three real estate agents 
23 to express their opinion, and to !~et an appraisal, 
24 and to take t~e average to see what the property was 
25 worth? 
~~~,JI:.Sl'~o,;,;:~'~~~~I.J~'JA,Wx.Y.l!~~~~~'u","·*t'.&::I'lZoQMU:a.A02.~'ool ..;lo:I~~";;"'''':-'M';,(~".l.z:l<ti'f"-.-,,(,~..'r"..c l.O:. jj;)~'p,.",,\",,,,,,,-.a~'~.1L.'~~:~ 
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Page 58 Page 60 
1 A NOt I don't think he did. \r,~ talked about 1 development of gr.....lOdt will yield a higher price for 
2 commissions related to real estate agents. I know 2 a property owner. To which he said he didn't want 
3 that was discussed in that first conference. But 3 any part of the hassles of development. So that 
4 that was all kind of part and parcel of the real 4 option was explored with him. And that was not 
5 estate -- you know, the option of pursuing it with a 5 something that he wanted any part of. 
6 real estate agent. Or as in this case you have an 6 Q And this was discussed agai'n at the May 22 
7 offer from a third party not involved with a real 7 meeting? 
8 estate agent and how much you can save by providing 8 A It was discussed In 'the first meeting I 
9 a sale without real estate agents involved. 9 had with Ted. I wish I had my calendar with me. 
10 Q How much did you tell him he could save? 10 And hopefully there would be a reference in the 
11 A Well, I can't specifically recall if I 11 calendar of an appointment on the :22nd. Because I 
12 did. But if I did I would have said -­ because I 12 notice in my billing on Exhibit Bthat it talks 
13 believe this Is based on my experience-- a range of 13 about a telephone conference with client. But it 
14 five to seven percent in real estate commissions. I 14 does not say "conference with client." But I would 
15 probably did discuss that with him. 15 not have been able to review a real estate purchase 
16. I asked Iiim th~ relationshipt if he' had 16 and Selle agreemen.t if I didn't have the contract. 
17 anYt with this fellow FranzWitte. And it seemed 17 So I had to have a first meeting with Ted either the 
18 that Ted had indicated to me that Franz Witte was a 18 22nd or shortly there before. So when I'm 
19 friend of l\.1r. Rosti who had rented the real estatt:; 19 describing this first meeting it probably did occur 
20 for a number of years as a tenant. 20 on the 22nd. But it may have oCQu·red·a IitUe bit 
21 Q At the time of the discussions about real 21 earlier. I just can't recall. 
22 estate agentst and the cost of using a real estate 22 Q Let's go back to your testlmony of two 
23 .agent, were you aware of the advantages, if any, to 23 days ago. And I asked you at that time specifically 
24 a seller to have a realtor involved representing 24 to tell me all of the dates that you had meetings 
25 them as opposed to a seller not being represented by 25 with Ted Johnson. And at that trme you gave me four 
Page 59 Page 61 
1 a realtor? 1 dates of in-person meetings. You gave me-May 22, 
2 MR. COLLAER: Objection; vague. Lacks 2 May 31, July 19, and July 25. And then I clsked you 
3 foundation. If you understand what he is asking, go 3 about dates of any telephone conferences with him. 
4 ahead and answer. 4 And at that time you told me you had two telephone 
5 MR. GJORDING: Join. 5 conversations in 2002. One on May 29 and one on 
6 THE WITNESS: I am pretty sure I explained 6 July 25, 2002. 
7 to Ted that area of discussion or topic. 7 Do you want to change your earlier 
8 Q (BY MR. CLARK) What did you tell him? 8 testimony? 
9 A Well, I suspect -- you know, I really 9 A No, I just want to clarify It. Because 
10 can't recall in detail anything that I would have 10 May 22t in all Iikelihoodt Is that first conference 
11 said on that topic. 11 with Ted. My billing record doesn'lt say "conference 
12 Q Do you recall -­ 12 with client." It says "telephone conference with 
13 A I do remember, however, as we discussed 13 client.n There is a possibility that it could have 
14 the concepts of a possible sale, I asked him if he 14 been on the 21st. I don't have a calendar in front 
15 knew the surrounding areas, value of property, and 15 of me. I am 95-percent accurate that that first 
16 whether, If he wanted to sell, he should also want 16 conference was on the 22nd. 
17 to develop the property. And I said, "Ted, anybody 17 Q At that time was it your office pradtice 
18 that is going to pay that kind of money for 18 or procedure to document with your billing records 
19 agricultural ground Is not going to be able to raise 19 the dates of conferences with clients? 
20 onions or sugar beets on property that is valued at 20 A Yes, it would be. 
21 $10t OOO an acre. You can't make it worle" 21 Q And you have been 100kin!;l, I think, at 
22 So I had discussed with him just the 22 Exhibit 8. And I have Exhibit 65 from Beth Rogers 
23 general knowledge of the fact that property valued 23 deposition. 
24 that way you can't make agriculture work on it. But 24 Does that help you in answering the 
25 in the area, development ground, and the ultimate 25 question? 
4 (Pa!Jes 58 to 61) 































1 Q Either of you. 
2 A I had no comparables. 
3 Q Did she have any? 
4 A She had, I guess, one property that she 
5 knew of. Whether that is a comparable in her mind, 
6 I don't know. But she did discuss, as she outlined 
7 in this letter of May 24, a 40-acre parcel on 
8 McMillan Road. And that is why, you know, her task 
9 was well, as long as he is inquiring as to tax 
10 consequences give some different sCE~narlos. 
11 Q And she told you about this 4O-acre parcel 
12 on McMillan Road in the telephone conversation and 
13 then reconfirmed it with a letter? 
14 A I think so. It makes sense. Because that 
15 is why we asked for a scenario. 
16 Q Anything else discussed in the telephon~ 
17 ca II with her? 
18 A Not that I can recall. You know, I think 
19 there was -­ let me add to that. Because I think 
20 there was some discussion. about Ted's intent. And, 
21 in my opinion, he hadn't really even determined if 
22 he really wanted to sell. So that was discussed as 
23 part of that conversation. 
24 Q At any time did you determine the location 
25 on TVlclVJi1Ian Road of the property that she describes 
Page 83 
1 ' in Exhibit 4? 
2 A No. 
3 Q Have you since determined the location of 
4 that? 
5 A No. 
6 Q Old she tell you in the telephone 
7 conversation that she thought the $400,000 offer was 
8 too low? 
9 A Yes, I think she did. 
10 Q What was your response? 
11 fA I didn't know. 
12 Q And this is a property that was within a 
13 reasonable driving distance of your office? 
14 MR. COLLAER: Which property are you 
15 referring to? 
16 MR. CLARK: The Linder Road property and 
17 his office? 
18 THE WITNESS: I would say a reasonable 
19 distance. 
20 Q (BY MR. CLARK) How far was it away? 
21 A It remains the same distance. 
22 Q Good clarification. 
23 A Five miles. Five or six miles. 
24 Q You were familiar with this location? 
25 A Yes. 
~~, 1M' 
10 (Pages 82 to 85) 
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1 Q Had you ,.dd dealings with properties in . 
2 that area? ~ 
3 A Dealings in what sense? ~ 
4 Q Buying,.selling, inspectin9 for listings. ~ 
5 ValUing for clients in your real estate practice or ~ 
6 law practice. ~ 
7 A Well, first off, I never IistE~d any ~ 
8 property as a real estate broker. So it wouldn't be ~ 
9 that. I have purchased hay from people in the area ~ 
10 
11 
for 25 years. I have hunted pheasant in that area. 
But dealings? Maybe within a couple miles an 
~ l 
12 easement dispute. That's the best "I can answer it. ~ 
13 Q Okay. Between May 22 and the time of ~ 
14 Mr. Johnson's death did you have any further ~ 
15 
16 
conversation with his accountant, ImaJean? 




Q Did you have any further correspondence or f, 
share any documentation with her after your i 
19 telephone, call of May 22 other than Exhibit 4? 
20 A I might have called her. 1 have no 
21 records to indicate that. And I didn't make any 
22 billing entry to reflect that I called her again. 
23 So I can't recall. 
24 Q So as we sit here now yOll only recall one 
25 conversation with her as it relates to Ted Johnson? 
Page 85 
1 A I think so. 
2 Q As I understand it, then, on May 22, after 
3 you talked to Ted Johnson's accountant, you have a 
4 telephone call with Ted Johnson? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q What was the purpose of tllat call? 
7 A You know, in hindsight, I would have to 
8 'say I called him to tell Ted that I made contact 
9 with the accountant and we would be getting a 
10 letter. So I'll fOlWard the letter to you when it 
11 comes in. 
12 Q Anything else said In that call, that you 
13 remember? 
14 A I don't believe so. 
15 Q As I understand it, the next: contact after 
16 May 22 that you had with Ted Johnson is on May 29? 
17 And that is a telephone conference? Both parts of 
18 the question. 
19 A I would have to go back to my billin!J 
20 statement. "May 29, review transmittal from 
21 accountant and draft letter to client." That is 
22 what my bill says. 
23 Q So did you have a telephone call with 
24 Mr. Johnson on May 29? 
25 A I believe I did. 



























Did you initiate that? Q
 
A I think so.
 




5 A Well, I did a follow-up letter, Exhibit 5.
 
6 And I would have to rely on Exhibit 5 to refresh my
 
7 recollection as to what we discussed. Tried to
 
8 explain the letter from the accountant. I can't
 
9 remember if he told me he received the letter
 
10 himself. Because I think the accountant sent it to 
11 both Ted's home address and to my office address. 
12 But I said he had to, you know, look at the 
13 consequences of selling the property. Make a 
14 determination ~s to what tax issues that he would be 
15 confronted with as compared to holding the property 
16 until his death. 
17 And I wanted him to try to decide if he 
18 wanted to present a counteroffer to try to move the 
19 potential tran?actlon along. And I also referenced 
.20 ' that the accountant thought there was some necessity 
21 of looking into the buyer's fiscal responsibility. 
22 And wanting him to' come back into the office to make 
23 an appointment so we could keep the ball rolling, if . 
24 he chose to. 
25 Q So these are basically all of the things 
Page 87 
1 you confirm by your letter of May 29, Exhibit 5? 
2 A I believe so. 
3 Q When you asked him on the telephone on May 
4 29 if he wanted to consIder a counteroffer to move 
5 things along, what was his response? 
6 A He didn't have a response. 
7 Q Now, wasn't that a concept that you had 
8 kind of warned him about in the May 22 meeting? 
9 A Yes. 
10 Q Why were you suggesting it then in the
 
11 telephone call, as well as your letter?
 
12 A I'm suggesting to Ted that if he wants to
 
13 pursue with this sales transaction the ball is in
 
14 his court. He has got to do somethin!}.
 




17 A Not that! can recall.
 
18 Q And then Exhibit 5, first sentence,
 
19 concludes With, "I have completed the review of the
 
20 real estate contract."
 
21 Did you continue to review the real estate
 




24 Q And what was there to continue to review
 
125 after that meeting? 
Page 88 ~. 
1 A Well, I i I~ -' a conference with Ted on the 
2 22. I didn't consider that a complete review of the ~ 
3 contract was done at that point In time. I had the ~ 
4 essentials of the contract. But certainly wanted to ~ 
5 look at it more carefully. So I am pretty sure I ~ 
6 concluded my re~iew either when he came In in the ~ 
7 morning or [n the afternoon. And I was Just waiting ~ 
8 for the accountant to provide some input:. ~ 
9 Q In your letter of May 29, Exhibit .5, In i 
10 the sentence that says, "I deem it prudent that you .~ 
11 contact our office to discuss the possibility of I 
12 providing a counteroffer to the potential purchaser « 
13 to determine the fair market value of the real 6 
14 estate.II i 
15 How does a counteroffer determIne the I 
16 value of real estate? I 
17 A I think it is a choice that you coul:d ~ 
18 present counteroffers to a potential buyer and see 
19 if that potential buyer bUdges or f1loves off his or 
20 her first offer. And.that is one of the ways, in my 
21 opinion, to establish what a willing buyer and a 
22 willing seller would be Willing to do to consummate 
23 a real estate transaction. 
24 Q So if you decided to counter at $100,000, 
25 for example, would that be a way of determining the 
Page 89 
1 value of the real estate if the buyer then said, 
2 "Well, yeah, I'll take that"? 
3 A So you have a $400,000 offer on the table 
4 and you offer to sell it for $100,OOO? 
5 Q Right. 
6 A Boy, oh, boy. I don't know about that. 
7 That wouldn't be very prudent. 
8 Q It wouldn't be prudent. But in your 
9 situation you have one buyer, one seller,. and you're 
10 suggesting a. counteroffer between two people is a 
11 way to determine the fair market value of this 
12 particular property? 
·13 A I think a willing buyer and a Willing 
14 seller, if a price is established, is one indication 
15 of a fair market value. 
16 Q But that is not the way of determining the 
17 fair market value in this case, Is it? It's just 
18 one indication? 
19 MR. COLLAER: Objection. It misstates his 
20 testimony. 
21 THE WITNESS: I don't know how to answer 
22 that, really. 
23 MR. COLLAER: Tom, we have be,:!n going 
24 about an hour-and-a-half. Is this a good time to 
25 take a break? 
11 (Pages 86 to 89) 
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Page 90 Page 921 
1 MR. CLARK: Absolutely. 1 financial responsiLJllity? 
2 . (Recess taken.) 2 A Well, It was recommended by the 
3 Q (BY MR. CLARK) When you talked to Ted 3 accountant. Discussed by the accountant.. And I ~ 
4 
5 
Johnson on May 29 about the concept of making a 
counteroffer to determine the fair market value of 
4 
5 
wanted it presented to Ted for his consideration, 
Q So after your letter to Teel Burton of May 
~ I 
6 real estate, did you suggest an amount of a 6 29 the next contact you had with him Is a conference ~ 
7 counteroffer? 7 with him. Is that right? ~ 
8 A No. 8 MR. GJORDING: Ted Johnson? ~ 
. 9 Q Did he? 9 MR. CLARK: If I said Ted Turner -­ II 
10 A No. 10 MR. GJORDING: You said Burton this time. I. 
11 Q And when you talked to him on May 29 did 11 MR. CLARK: I do know a Ted Burton, Thank i 
12 you also talk to him about doing some due diligence 12 you for correcting me. : 
13 relative to the buyer's potential and fiscal 13 Q (BY MR. CLARK) The next contact~ as I ~. 
14 responsibility? 14 understand it, with Ted Johnson after your letter of 1 
15 A I can't remember. 15 May 29 is a meeting on May 31. Is that rl!~ht? 
16 Q WhC!t did' you mean by "Due. diligence 16 A That's correct. 
17 relative to the buyer's potential and fiscal 17 Q Where did that meeting take place? 
18 responsibility"? 18 A It was in the Eagle office at 380 West 
19 A Well, just if the bl;lyer could perform on 19 State Street. 
20 the contract as presented. 20 Q Who was present? . 
21 Q Meaning whether he' could corne up with the 21 A Ted and myself. 
22 $100,0001 Or make the payments? If you're looking 22 Q How long did that meetin9 last? 
23 for the contract it Is Exhibit 3, I think. 23 A Probably 15 minutes. Maybe 20. 
24 A Well, due diligence would Include, as the 24 Q What was discussed? 
25 accountant had suggested, obtaining a financial 25 A Well, we were conferring over the 
Page 91 Page 93 
1 statement from the buyer. 1 discussion of May 29. And then I wrote a letter for 
2 Q You're referencing what? Exhibit 4? 2 Ted on his behalf on June 4. Probably dictated the 
3 29th and didn't go out until June 4.3 A Yes. 
4 Q And you're looking at your billing and 4 Q Anything else? 
5 what other document to answer that questIon? 5 A No. 
6 Q Did you think that obtaining a financial 6 A Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 8. 
7 statement after your review of the contract was 7 Q Did you discuss anything with Ted Johnson 
8 on May 31 that Is not referenced in your letter to 8 important? 
9 him of May 297 9 A The accountant had referenced it. And I 
10 A Well, I think that the conve,rsation in10 was deferring, in essence, to her recommendation. 
11 Q Did you agree with her recommendation? 11 that conference dealt with prior discussions. And 
12 that prior letter of May 29. But the goal, from my12 A I didn't disagree with it. And I didn't 
13 agree. It was up to Ted, I felt. 13 perspective, was to present the letter of June 4, 
14 Q Well, you were advising him; weren't you? 14 and that came out as a result of the conference, 
15 A I advised him, as my letter Indicated, 15 showing to the potential buyer that: don't consider 
16 that we need to do some due diligence relative to 16 the transaction or the potential transaction dead. 
17 the buyer's potential and fiscal responsibility. So 17 But I was trying for Ted's benefit to see if there 
18 I was making the recommendation that it be done. 18 was anything that we could perceive that they would 
19 be willing to come up on their offer Without 19 Q Wasn't the offer, Exhibit 3, one where the 
20 seller could assign his'rights to a limited 20 committing to a counteroffer. So I guess really the . 
21 liability company and be released from any further 21 explanation given to Ted was some sort of a 
22 liability? Exhibit 3, page 12, paragraph G. 22 solicitation on our part to see when:! the buyer 
23 really is as far as their offer of $400,000.23 A That is what page 12, paragraph G, 
24 Q In your meeting of May 31 did you discuss 24 indicates. 
25 comparable sales prices?25 Q So why the due diligence regarding 
12 (Pages 90 to 93) 
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1:1 3 A We had talked about the accountant's
 
4 reference to the various scenarios of sale prices.
 
.) I­ But comparables, no.
 
6 Q Did you discuss the comparable -- or the
 
? property that was identified on McMillan Road with
 














is Q What did you discuss about that?
 
16 A Well, I said what we could do in'
 
1'7 fashioning a letter to the other side was to
 
18 reference the fact that there is comparable that we
 
19 know of or think we know of -­
20 Q Comparable singular? .
 
21 A That is the only-one that I knew of and
 
22' Ted knew of. And this is coming, of course, from
 
2:3 the accountant. And I don't think Ted knew where 
24 that property was that she was referencing. And I 
2.5 certainly didn't know where it was that she was 
~~ 
:L referencing. But by referencing comparable values
 
:2 in a letter to the other side, my advice to Ted was,
 
3 by doing so, it may solicit from them an indication
 
'l of some response to increase their initial offer.
 
S And, of course, talking in terms about doing the due
 
6 diligence and asking for the buyer's financial
 
? statement was discussed with Ted. Because it is
 
B recited in the Jetter.
 
9 Q So in your meeting with Ted, as I
 
10 understand, on May 31, with respect to the
 
11 comparable, you discuss one property with him that
 
12 mayor may not be a comparable; right?
 
13 A That's all we had. .
 
14 Q Because you didn't know anything about it?
 
15 A I didn't know anything about the
 
16 accountant's quote, unquote comparable. I did not
 
17 know anything about that.
 
18 Q And you only discussed one comparable?
 




21 A That's correct.
 
22 Q And you told him that you were going to
 
23 write a letter telling the other side that you had a
 
Page 96 ~ 
1 Q What h<:!re you going to say? . ~ 
2 A What w~s I going to say to Ted? . ~ 
3 Q What did you tell Ted at the meeting about I 
~ it? A I said we would use IrnaJean's comparable. ~ 
6 Q Singular? 1 ~ 
7 A That's all we had, of course. ~ 
8 Q Sure. And arising out of this meeting -- 9 
9 well, was there anything else discussed in the ~ 
10 meeting with Ted on May 31? Ii 
11 A I don't think so. I don't recall anything i 
12 more. ~ 
13 Q And so arising out of that meeting you put ~ 
14 together Exhibit 7? Your letter of June 4, 2002? ~ 
1156 A Yes. I. Q And in your letter, June 4, 2002, you ~ 
17 indicate that Mr. Johnson would be willing to sell 
18 his property. 
19 Was that an accurate statement at the 
20 time? 
21 A Well, yes, because. 
22 Q Because why? 
23 A I thought you might ask that. 
24 Q It sounded like you wanted m"! to. Go 
25 ahead. 
~~ 
1 A Because I believe that anybody would be 
2 willing to sell their property. 
3 Q Then you go on in that same sentence, 
4 "However, based upon comparable values In the area 
5 we feel your offer is extremely low." 
6 Was that an accurate statement by you? 
7 A I would have to say It Is slightly 
8 inaccurate. 
9 Q And what part of It Is Inaccurate? 
10 A I was only aware of OnE! compai·able. And I 
11 didn't think it would be to Ted's advantlge to 
12 reference a singular comparable. 
13 Q And what comparable was it that you were ~ 
14 aware of? 
15 A I'm relying on the letter and the 
16 accountant's indication that in her opinion there 
17 was at least one comparable. And I'm not so sure 
18 that she didn't make -- allude to the fact that 
19 there were other comparables. So I felt: comfortable 
20 in saying what I did in the letter. 
21 Q What Is the language in Exhibit 4 where R~ 
22 she alludes to other comparabIE!s? 
23 A It is not in the letter. • 
~:-~~~:~~~~~.::~--~~..::~~~~~~::::E~:' ..~J
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Page 98 Page 100 B 
1 A You know, I don't think she said the words 1 
2 "other comparables." 2 
3 Q And what language in Exhibit 4 makes the 3 
4 property on McMillan Road -- or made the property on 4 
5 McMillan Road, In your opinion, in 2002, even a 5 
6 comparable? 6 
7 A I had no Idea where the property was. I 7 
8 had no idea of the nature of the quote, unq~ote; 8 
9 comparable. But she is working for Ted. And I felt 9 
10 we could ethically tell the other side other 10 
11 comparables would indicate that this offer was too 11 
12 low. 12 
13 Q Did you believe that to be a true 13 
14 statement at the time? 14 
15 A I had no way to know either way. 15 
16 Q So ,you made a statem'ent not knowing , 16 
17 whether it is true or not in your letter? 17 
18 A I believe the letter can be construed as 18 
19 being truthful. 19 
20 Q ·"$0 we believe your offer Is extremely 20 
21 low" was atruthful statement you made on June 4, 21 
22 200n 22 
23 MR. GJORDING: Object to the form. That 23 
24 mischaracterizes his testimony. 24 
25 MR. COLlAER: Join. 25 
and you being part of the team authoring the letter, ~ 
not knowing If that statement Is true or not? ~ 
MR. COLLAER: Objection. It's been asked ~ 
and answered. .' ~ 
~~E ~~~~~./~~~~ no response. It's ~ 
~ been asked and answered. ~ 
Q (BY MR. CLARK) Other than the letter from ~ 
the accountant, ImaJean, did you have anything to ~ 
base this statement on? ~ 
A This statement being the letter? ~ 
Q "Based on comparable values in the area we ~ 
feel your offer is extremely low." ~ 
A That is the only thing I had to base that I 
letter on was the accountant's sta1tement to me. ~ 
Q And the last.sentence in the first 
paragraph. "We will need to review his current 
financial statement, year-to-date profit and loss 
statements, and his federal and state income tax 
returns for the last three years.," 
Again, was that your idea or the 
acrountant's? Or both? 
A Well, I wrote the letter based on what the 
acrountant had requested. Or her input. 
Q Do you think it was important for your 
Page 99 Page 101 
1 Q (BY MR. CLARK) Is that your testimony? 1 client to have that information? 
2 A It is. The "we" is the element of the 2 A If he wanted to; absolutely. 
3 team here. You have an accountant that comes up 3 Q Well, as his legal representative was it 
4 with her opinion. So I felt that that was what she 4 your recommendation that he get it? 
5 was opining. 5 A I am making that recommendation In this 
6 Q So "we" included who? 6 letter, yes. 
7 A The team. 7 Q And why did you make a recomme:ndation? 
8 Q Who Is the team? 8 A Because the acrountant had referenced that 
9 A The accountant, myself, and Ted. 9 it would be something to explore. 
10 Q And so you are included in the "we" feel 10 Q And when the property was ultimately 
11 the offer to be, not just low, but extremely low. 11 purchased similar information was never pmVided to 
12 Right? 12 Ted Johnson or his trust; was it? 
13 A That is what the accountant was alluding 13 A When I purchased the prolPerty? 
14 to. 14 Q Yes.
 
15 Q Did you feel that way? 15 A That's true.
 
16 A No, I did not. I didn't know. 16 Q By you or by Berkshire.
 
17 Q You didn't know? 17 A That's true.
 
18 A I did not know, sir. . 18 Q Why not?
 
19 Q So you didn't know whether that was an 19 A I have no idea. Ted didn't want any
 
20 accurate statement or not if you didn't know? 20 financial information. Didn't request me to provide
 
21 MR. COLLAER: Object. Misstates his 21 any finandal information.
 
22 testimony. Asked and answered. 22 Q Well, Ted didn't request that Mr. Witte
 
23 THE WITNESS: What statement? From the 23 provide any, either; did he?
 
24 accountant? 24 A No. But we know if you look throunh the
 
25 Q (BY MR. CLARK) No. We, being the team, 25 response to this letter it seemed to have ruffled
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~J .,". Page 102 Mr. Witte's feathers. Becaus... de wrote a letter that Ted received a copy of that made it very clear 3 that he wasn't going to give a financial statement 
~~ to Ted. 
I"
.J Q And that is Exhibit 6, the second page? 
6 A Yes. 
Q I note that the second page of Exhibit 6, 
8 which is Mr. Witte's letter to you dated June 7, 
9 2002, doesn't have ~- didn't have a received stamp 
10 by your office. 
11 A That's true. 
12 Q Do you know when your office received 
13 that? 
14 A I don't. 
lS Q And it appears from looking at the dates 
11~ that you didn't forward that letter to Mr. Johnson 
1:7 until ten days after the date of the Witte letter. 
18 A That's correct. 6"17"02. 
19 Q Was there a delay by your office in 
20 sending that out? 
21 A I don't believe so. 
22 Q And' your office mails it Ollt three days 
23 before Mr. Witte's offer is going to expire. 
24 A He says in his letter June 20. That's 
2S correct. 
Page 103 
1 Q ,And you didn't have any further contact 
2 with Mr. Johnson, as I understand it, either 
:I personal contact, or by telephone, until July 19? 
4 A That's correct. 
S QSo with respect to the July 19 meeting 
{) where did that occur? 
i' A In the Eagle office at 380 West State 
8 Street. 
9 Q How is it that you remember that date? 
10 A I have tried my best to recall the date 
11 when I saw Ted in the lobby of my office. And I 
12. believe, to the best of my recollection, that was 
13 the date that he came back to my office. , 
14 Q Was he alone or was somebody with him? 
1S A He was by himself. 
16 Q So just the two of you met? 
17 A Yes. 
ill Q And how long did that meeting take? 
19 A Oh, maybe 15 minutes. No more than 30. 
20 Q And what was the purpose of that meeting? 
21 A It appears as though Ted had come to my 
22 office to present a proposal that my wife and I buy 
23 the 40-acre parcel. 
24 Q Do you have any documentation as It 
2S relates to the July 19 meetjng? 
Page 104 i.' 
1 A I don't ..,dfeve so. , ~ 
2 Q Did he bring anything with him? ~ 
3 A He had an appraisal with him. ~ 
4 Q And that is Exhibit 9? ' 
5 A Yes· f i 
6 Q And tell me what the substance 0 the l 
7 conversation was that day? ~ 
8 A Well, I greeted him. I said "Ted, how are i 
9 you doing? Good to see you." I said, "What are you ~ 
10 up to?" He said, "I want to talk to you." I said, ~ 
11 "Well, come on back." And once we sat down he goes, I 
12 "I had an appraisal done on the 40 acres. Are you '~ 
13 still interested in buying it?" And I said, "Well, ~ 
14 Ted, I have always been interested in buying it. I 
15 What is it that you want for the property'?" He 
16 goes, "I want the ClPpraised value." 
17 So at that point In time I think he handed 
18 me the appraisal. I looked through it. SlPent some 
19 time reviewing it. And I said, "What are the terms 
20 that.you want?" And he goes, "Well, I would like to 
21 have $100,000 down and the thing to be paid off In 
22 'five years." And I said, "Well, I'll have to 
23 consider It and talk to my wife. But I would very 
24 much like to buy the property." And at that point 
25 tn time I saId, "Because I have n~presented you In 
Page 105 
1 the past there may be a question of a mnflict of 
2 interest. So if you want, and it's your c1hoice, if 
3 you want another attorney to draw up the real estate 
4 agreement, you have the right to seek independent 
5 counsel to do so, If you want to." And he replied, 
6 "No, I trust you." 
7 Q Anything else said in that conversation? 
8 A Oh, I think I asked him if he hael 
9 contacted any real estate agents. Because I had no 
10 contact with him for this Interim period of time. 
11 And he IndIcated that he had not done that. And he 
12 didn't want to pay commission for the sale of his 
13 property. And I think I reiterated with Ted, as I 
14 have done in the past, that he could do better 
15 financially if he chose to develop the property 
16 himself. And he, again, reiterated his position 
17 that he didnIt want the headaches of all of the 
18 governmental hoops to jump through. I don't think 
19 he used the words "hoops." But he didn't want to 
20 deal with all of the problems with developing the 
21 property. 




A I think we discussed the prospects of 
how long it would take me to prepare a contract. 
And I said, "Well, I'm going to prepare it and have 
~ jll 
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5 A Yes. 
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Page 105 Page 108 I 
1 it ready in a few days after my wire and I discuss 1 offer. And then gOing out with her to walk the , 
2 
3 
thls." And then I said, "I'll either call you or 
call Beth to pick up the contract for your review." 
2 
3 
property. Which we did. And then a contract was 
created. And Exhibit 10 indicates that my wife and 
~ I 
4 I'm pretty sure again that we dIscussed in that-­ 4 I signed It on the 22nd of July. With the addendum. ~l;' 
5 because when I went through the appraisal it was 5 Q I guess my question was, is, Exhibit 10, . 
6 
7 
confirmed, as I had earlier indicated, that you 
can't grow onions on ground that is appraised at 
6 
7 
which is the earnest money, and attachments, 






such a level. 
So I told Ted that there was a section in 





Q When you prepared Exhibit 10 Is there a 





probably be a developer. And I remember discussing 
with Ted in great detail the circumstances of how I 
11 
12 
potential conflict that you had dealing with your 
client? 
~I 
13 wanted to build a house. And have a couple of lots 13 A Well,) disagree. Because page four was ~ 
14 available for my kids. And I think he liked that 14 my attempt to spell out, by the use of this I 
15 concept. 15 language, ''That parties acknowledge that Thomas 
.16 Q Anything else discussed? 16 Maile, dba, Thomas Maile Real Estate Company is a 
17 A How long would it take you to read that 17 real estate licensed broker and representing himself 
18 back? I can't remember what I covered and what I 18 and Colleen Birch Maile, husband and wife, and/or 
19 didn't. 19 their assigns In this transaction (hereinafter 
20 (Record was read back.) 20 referred to collectively as buyer)." . 
21 THE WITNESS: I think there was also 21 Q Isn't that language where you were 
22 discussion with Ted about how he obtained the 22 attempting to comply with Idaho Code Section 54-2055 
23 appraisal. And I asked him if he had contacted 23 that requires you to disclose in writing your 
24 other appraisers. And he said that he didn't want 24 position that you held an Idaho real estate license? 
25 to pay for any more opinions. That he felt 25 A I think it does that. And I think it also 
Page 107 Page 109 
1 spells out that I'm not representln9 Ted or his1 comfortable wIth this appraisal. 
2 MR. GJORDING: Now, Tom, let me say this 2 trust. I'm representing myself arid my wife. He 
3 knew I was an attorney.3 to you, though. If you're concerned that the 
4 comment that you mentioned to me isn't in there, go 4 Q I have seen a lot of documents drafted by 
5 lawyers over the years. Maybe you haven't seen5 ahead and put it in there. Because Mr. Clark asked 
6 these. Where the lawyer Is preparing a contract for 6 you if there was anything else. 
7 THE WITNESS: Okay. I just want to be 7 his client and the other side isn't represented. A 
8 very standard provision that I have seen over the 8 clear on this that I know I discussed with Ted that 
9 years is that the lawyer specifically spells out9 because I had done legal work for him in the past, 
10 that if he wanted me to draft the agreement, which 10 that "l am drafting this contract fOIr my client. I 
11 he Indicated he did, I said, "You should, and It Is 11 am not representing the other side. The other side 
12 your choice, seek Independent counsel either to 12 Is admonished or advised that they should seek 
13 review the contract or create the contract. Write 13 independent legal advice In reviewling the 
14 documents."14 the contract." To which he replied, "No, I trust 
15 you." I proceeded to then tell him that, of course, 15 Are you familiar with similar language 
16 we would have the contract done in a few days. 16 that commonly appears In contracts? 
17 Q (BY MR. CLARK) Anything else said In the 17 MR. GJORDING: Object to the form of the 
18 question. Go ahead.18 conversation? 
19 A I don't think so. 19 THE WITNESS: I have seen language of that 
20 Q And between the July 19 meeting, and the 20 nature. Whether it is common or not, I don't know. 
21 next time you saw or talked to Mr. Johnson, did you 21 Q (BY MR. CLARK) Is it somE~thing that you 
22 have done in the past?22 create and draft the earnest money agreement, 
23 Exhibit 10, and the attachments thereto? 23 A I have put language in contracts i 
24 A Well, In the process of leading up to 24 indicating that I am representing Siide A and not 
25 representing Side B. Is that your question?25 that, of course, I was telling my wife about the 
16 (Pages 106 to 109) 
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Page 118 
Q So you didn't comply \1...,1 it? 
A I don't know how you could. Or how you 
couldn't. 
4 MR. COLLAER: Are you asking did he give 
S him the blue brochure? 
6 THE WITNESS: No. 
7' MR. CLARK: Why don't we break now for 
lunch. 
9 MR. GJORDING: That would work for me. 
10 (Luncheon recess taken.) 
1l Q (BY IVIR. CLARK) After the meeting that we 
1_' have talked about, July 19, as I understand it, your I.. 
13 next contact with Ted Johnson was on July 25. And 
14 you told me the day before yesterday that you had a 
1['.l telephone meeting and an in-person conversation.
 
16 Which one occurred first?
 




19 Q Who initIated that?
 
20 A I called him.
 
. 2Jl Q For what purpose? 
2,-_' A Beth Rogers had Instructed me or told me 
23 that they had reviewed the contract and everything 
24 looked fine. And to call Ted and make arrangements 
21­.J to get the original signed contract to him. Which I 
Page 119 
1. did by initiating the telephone conference. And 
2 getting directions to his house out in Star. 
3 Q What was said in that telephone 
4 conference? 
S A It was relatively brief. Just the fact 
6 that "I spoke with Beth. She told me to contact 
i' you. Do you want to come Into the office or do you 
8 want me to come out to your house to get the 
9 paperwork finalized?" And he said, "Come on out 
10 here." And I got directions. 
1:l Q What arrangements had been made for him to 
12 get a copy of this contract before this telephone 
13 call? 
14 . A I called Beth Rogers and told her the
 
is contract was available. And my wife and :r had
 
16 signed it. And she could come in and pick it up.
 
17 And that is what she did.
 
18 Q Is there a reason that you had called her
 
19 about that as opposed to Ted?
 
20 A I think Ted had requested that I get ahold
 
21 of Beth when the documents were finalized.
 




















































A Ted arl_ :oyself. 
Q And what was said at that meeting? 
A Oh, we sat down at his kitchen table. 
He 
I 
saId, ''Ted, have you reviewed tlhe contract?" 
indicated he had. And I said, "L.et's go through it 
and I'll explain it to you." Which I reme:nber doing 
with him. And I didn't read the contract with him. 
But I tried to explain to him the general provisions 
of the contract. And then, of course, the addendum 
was also explained to Ted. And we read that. 
Provisions of that. I then told him again about the 
issue of being able to see an independent attorney, 
if he wanted to. Which he again indicated he did 
not. 
We talked about the provisions. .About 
the lease. I knew that there was a crop lease 
agreement -- I knew there was a tenant farmer. I 
don't know if I knew his name or not at that point 
in tim~. I probably did. And that is an area that 
Ted was concerned about. BeCiluse there was a five­
acre parcel that was in onion seeds. And Ted wanted 
to make sure that the onion seeds could be harvested 
the second year. Because my addendum had a 
provision that indicated something Ted was concerned 
about. So we Initialed and made some changes for 
Page 121 
the onion seed portion of the contract. 
I explained to him the circumstances again 
of what I would be trying to do. And the 
significance of this provision in the contract that 
allowed for testing on the ground to dEtermine oh, 
bedrock, which may include lava or hard pan. And 
also testing for water levels. And I told him that 
high water level .- because he had acknowledged to 
me that he knew of a high water table out there on 
the ground. And that would bE! of concern for an 
ultimate development of the ground is just how bad 
the high water was. 
So the addenc!um dealt with provisions 
related to testing to establish groundwater levels. 
And that I would have the right to go on the 
property to conduct testing on the property. And if 
it appeared as a result of thOSE! tests, I think 
within 30 days -- I have that test done within 30 
days. And if it appeared under my Impressions that 
It would create problems, then I explained to him I 
had the right to cancel the·contract and notproceed I 
with It. And he understood that and was agreeable 
to that. ~ 
~._~~~~:~ ...__...~_~_~~~~~~~~~~-.J
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Page 134 
1 provided to the appraiser lxiv, to obtaining the 
:z written appraisal, Exhibit 9? 
:3 A Wellt way back in our first discussions I ~ 
-4 told Ted not to tell a real estate agent or any 
.5 appraiser that he had an offer on the table. So 
6 apply that as you want. 
'7 Q And that is where I was ~lolng with my 
;3 questions. Why did you advise him not to tell an 
9 appraiser or a real estate agent what a prospective 
1.0 purchase price would be?
 
11 A It would have been handy to have it done
 
12 as an independent appraisal.
 
1:3 Q Wellt what makes It -- I guess I'm not
 
14 tracking. What is less independent jf an appraiser
 
15 knows a sales price on a said property?
 




1.8 Q Is it your experience in real estate that
 
19 when appraisers know what the sales price is that
 




22 A I can't answer that. '
 




2.5 Q So if that wasn't your experience -- I'm 
Page 135 
1 still having trouble here. How would, in your 
2 opinion, or experience, the appraiser having a· 
3 prospective sales price influence their report? 
4 A It could. 
S Q Why? 
6 A Sometimes, I believe, like with a 
7 residential property, if there is a need for 
B financing, and the parties strike a dealt then the 
9 appraiser may be inclined to say wellt this 
10 represents a fair market value because we have a 
1:1 deal. 
12 Q But you have never seen an appraisal that 
13 bases an appraiser's c(;>nclusion as far as value of a 
H particular piece of property on the fact that there 
15 is a deal for a particular price on that property, 
16 have you? 
17 A I can't say that I have. But I think it 
1.8 is safer to err on the more conservative side. 
19 Q Prior to you purchasing this property 
20 entering into the earnest money, t:xhibit 10, what 
21 access to information did you haVE! as a broker as it 
22 relates to comparable sales? 
23 A Boy. As a broker? I wasn't actively 
24 holding myself out as a real estate broker. I 
Page 136 i 
1 question, bec.<..o..Jse it really doesn't apply to me. ~ 
2 Q Let me ask it this walf. What access did ~ 
3 you have prior to July 25 of 2.002 to obtain i 
4 information regarding comparable sales? 9. 
5 A Wellt everybody has access to newspapers. ~ 
6 Is that what you mean? ~ 
7 Q I'm asking whatever source. I want to ~ 
8 know. ~ 
9 A Really, I didn't have any source. I was ~ 
10 not a member of the MLS. Which is the Multiple ~ 
11 Listing Service. And with thatt of course, you can I 
12 pull up on your screen on your computer and "
 
13 determine what is for sale and what has sold. j
 
14 Q I'm not asking what you didn"t have. I'm ~
 
15 asking you what information you had access to.
 








20 Q (BY MR. CLARK) Other thant I. think you .
 
21 saidt newspapers? .
 
22 A I could study the newspapers to figure out
 
23 what is for sale out there. I £Iuess I should add
 
24 something to that Because I think In 2002 -­




1 Q Right. Pripr to July.
 
2 A I think anybody could also access not only
 
3 newspaperst but web sites and web Information. And
 
4 you could study what is for sale on the web. But I
 
5 don't think there was any servlc,e that provIded any
 
6 sold Information on the web that is available for
 
7 the general public either now or back in 2002.
 
8 Q Did you have relativest or friends, or
 
9 acquaintances that you called from time to time to
 
10 discuss comparable sales?
 
11 A No. I had a real estate license that I
 
12 had for 20-some years.
 
13 Q Well, in 2002 how did you decide that
 




16 A How did I decide that that was the
 




19 A There was a licensed appraisal done by a
 
20 firm that was very reputable.
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1 the one appraisal when you hau suggested to your 
2 client, Mr. Johnson, to look at additional 
3 information and average the information out? 
4 A Just as I told Ted. There was costs 
5 involved. And to me I wasn't inclined to spend 
6 $1,500 to $2,500 for an additional appraisal 
7 opinion. 
8 Q Have you had experience in doing 
9 comparative market analysis? 
10 A I never listed a property for anybody 
11 prior to 2002. And in that extent I didn't have any 
12 experience. Using my MLS back in '96 and '97 I 
13 certainly had the ability to type in square footage 
14 of a house, location, and then determine what was 
15 being sold in 1996 and 1997. I don't even know if 
16 that is really even comparable yalues. 
17 Q Did you understand Exhibit 9, the 
18 appraisal, to attempt to value this property for 
19 developmental purposes? 
20 A You mean appraise it to give an opinion as 
21 to what it would be worth after development? 
22 Q Prior to development. In other words, 
23 what a developer would likely pay to develop? 
24 A I think there is a common in the appraisal 
25 that says that the entity or the buyer most likely 
Page 140 I 
1 had called and salu that Uncle Ted had a heart I~ 
2 attack. I think I called her back then. 
3 
4 
Q AnythIng else said in that conversation? 












A It was probably right around the time that 





Q Do you recall If that was an in-person 
conversation as opposed to a telephone conversation? 
~I 
12 A I can't remember. I think it was ~ 
13 
14 
telephone. I think she told me that she was going 
to take it to an attorney to review. Vel)' short. I 
~I 
15 said, "Get back In touch with us." ~ 
16 Q Did you tell her that -­ ~ 
17 A And then I wrote a letter to her and I may . ~ 
18 have had a follow-up conversation about removing the 
19 c~lI1tlngencles from the earnest money contract after 
20 we did our site tests. Had a conversation there. 
21 That would be another one. And then I think I had 
22 another one with her either by phone or letter, 
23 maybe both, talking about Sam Rostj's position on 
24 the onion seed and the oral lease to stay on the 
25 remainder of the ground. We talkl~ about that, I'm 
Page 139 Page 141 , 
1 to buy this would be a developer. 1 sure. And then we talked about water rIghts being 
2 Q Old you consider the property's highest 2 assigned. And then, of course, before the closing I 
3 and best use to be for development purposes? 3 think she called and said Ted passed away. 
4 A I would think so. 4 Q Any other conversations? 
5 Q Did you personally investigate any of the 5 A I can't recall any. There may have been 
6 comparables that were listed in the appraisal, 6 some. I need to look at all of the files to see if 
7 Exhibit 9? 7 I wrote another letter.. 
8 A Did I personalty do what with the 8 Q Did you deal with anyone on behalf of the 
9 comparables? 9 trust other than Ted Jolinson and Beth Rogers? 
10 Q Did you personally investigate any 10 A I never met Andy Rogers until dosIng 
11 comparables? 11 date. Because I remember writing a letter to Beth 
12 A r looked at them, read them, knew of the 12 saying It was a privilege to meet hE!r husband. 
13 location. I knew the location of two of the 13 Q So the only two people you de(jlt with up 
14 comparables. 14 to the dosing date with respect to the trust would 
15 Q As a part of your due diligence did you go 15 be Ted and Beth? 
16 out and physically inspect any of the comparables? 16 A Yes, I think so. 
17 A I don't recall if I did. I don't think 17 Q Did you ever tell Beth that you had a 
18 so. 18 conflict? 





signed, did you stay in cont.act then with Beth 
Rogers up through the dosing? 
A I might have had two conversations by 





when she picked up the eamest money agreement, feel ~ 
free to take it to another attomey to have It I 
evaluated. I know she doesn't remember that. ~ 
Q Did you tell her anything else about I 
24 Q Okay. When was the first one? 24 potential conflict other than the day she picked up 
25 A I think it was in early August when she 25 the earnest money? 
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A Yes. As I recall, it just ·,._d a generic 
opinion of values for a five-acre parcel in a small 
3 subdivision. 
Q So after the Improvements and development, 
S if you had sold all seven lotsr for example, you 
6 would have put an asking price on them, of all seven 
i' lots, in the range of 1.4 million? 
B A I think that would be -- although, a range 
9 denotes an upper and a lower. I would say that that 
10 in theory would be a price that could have been 
11 obtained on the parcels. 
12 Q What has happened to the market since 2002 
13 in the area of these lots? Has It gotten stronger? 
14 Weaker? Remained the same? 
is A I haven't really considered going in and 
16 doing anY,sort of updates on 100kiQg at what has 
1"7 sold in the area. From my casual observation of 
lB some of the subdivisions in Eagle that have two- to 
19 .three-acre parcels, there seems to be a lot of 
20 vacant lots. Unsold lots. So I would -- you knowr 
2l qUite honestly, I would need to consider something 
22 to determine if the market is softer or if there is 
23 a higher demand for these lots over the last year or 
24 18 months. Sitting today I can't answer that. 
25 Q Other than the two appraisals that we have 
Page 183 
1 discussedr Exhibit 9, and the more recent one that 
2: you have p'rovlded In discovery from the bank, have 
3: there been any other appraisals on the property that 
4 you have asked for and/or someone has asked for on 
5i your behalf? 
6 A No. 
j' Q Have any realtors done a comparative 
B market analysis of the value of part or all of the 
9 Linder Road property since you acquired itr to yoUr 
10 knowledge? . 
it A Afellow named Dennis McCrackett. 
12 Q And who is he with? 
13 A He is one that signed the affidaVit. 
14 Q Anyone else? 
is A No. 
16 Q With respect to the appraisal, Exhibit 9. 
1:7 My understanding of Beth Rogers testimonYr in 
18 substancer was that there was some kind of flyer or 
19 other information sent out from the appraisal 
20 company to Ted Johnson about the possibility of 
21 this firm providing an evaluation of that property. 
22 Are you familiar with appraisal companies doing 
23 things like that in this area? 
24 A Wellr I don't -- as Beth testifiedr people 
2S in this area were targeted, in so many words. I was 
Page 184 f. 
1 not aware of a, ... (hing like that. And I'm ! 
2 paraphrasing what she testified to the other day. 2 
3 Q Were you involved enough in mal estate in I 
4 2002 to know how long it would customarily take an ! 
5 appraiser to complete a projed:? ~ 
6 A I would say -- are you talking about a ~ 
7 residential appraiser? Or a commercial appraiser? ~ 
8 I think they have some level of different ~ 
9 timetables. But I think if you just lump them all fi 
10 together I think two weeks to six weeks would be a ~
 
11 range that seems to be normal to me. ij
 
12 Q Have you experienced ;a chang{~ in how long ~
 
13 it takes to get appraisals outr dependin9 on what is ~
 
14 happening in the market? In other words, if there ~
 
15 is more sales going on in the marketr have you
 
16 experienced'a change in the tin)e frame?
 
17 A I thinkr you knowr when that hE~ated
 
18 refinancing hit there might have been ci blip on the
 
19 screen. But I don't ~now of any personal knowledge.
 
20 I don't study the industry of appraising. So I
 
21 don't know how to answer that.
 
22 Q When did things charig.::! as far as the
 
23 number of people refinancing in the referen~e that
 
24 you just made?
 




1 Q There was a blip on the screenr if I
 
2 understood you properlYr as far as the amount of
 
3 refinancing. What time frame are you referencing?
 
4 A There could be bllps 011 the screen when
 
5 there is changes in the market condition reflected
 
6 by interest rates. But I don't know when the blips
 
7 occur. And the degree of the blips. I guess I'm
 
8 assuming. I shouldn't do that.
 




11 A I think three. Maybe 1:''''''0. Maybe three.
 
12 I would have to check.
 
13 MR. CLARK: Let's mark Exhibit 72.
 
14 (Exhibit 72 marked.)' .
 




17 A Yes, I recognize it. I mean, I think I
 










23 Q Which parcel?
 
24 A It says Lot 6. ~
 
25 Q Did you respond to this offer? ~
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since I had seen Ted, or heard from Ted, and he was in my 
lobby of my office in Eagll~. And I think my door was 
open, so I saw him out there, and I just came down the 
hallway. I remember waving at him. I said, Ted, what 
are you doing here? 
And, of course, he stood up. And he goes, . 
well, I want to talk to you. So we ended up having a 
conference. And he said, are you still interested in 
buying the property? 
I said, well, Ted, I've always been 
interested in buying your property. 
And he said, well, I had an appraisal done. 
I said, oh? Well, how mw;h do you want for your 
property? And he handed the appraisal to me, and he 
goes, I want the appraised value. 
So I said okay. I looked at it. And, at 
that point in time, I said well, Ted, you know, I need to 
check this out with my wife. You always have to do that. 
And I said, we'll get back to you. But I would be very 
interested in buying the property. 
I said I can prepare the real estate
 
contract, but since I have represented you in the past, I
 
said, I have an obligation, ethically, to tell you that
 
you have the right to seek independent counsel.
 
To which he replied, you know, if you do the 
Page 33
 
contract, it's fine. I trust you on that. Just do the 
same terms that were in the other contract, as far as the 
length of time, the down payment. 
I said, well Ted, it will take: me a couple of 
days. I'll get back to you, or Beth, because he had 
referenced that he wanted either -- well, I had asked 
him, I said, do you want Beth involved with this 
transaction? 
He goes, yeah. That's-­
Q. Could we stop just a second. We've talked 
about Beth having some interplay here with Ted Johnson. 
But, did you know Beth Rogers at this point? 
A. No. No. I don't believe I had ever met her 
prior to July of 2002. 
Q. Who was Beth Rogers, in relation to 
Mr. Johnson? 
A. Well, I -- he had described her as someone 
that was very active in his life. It was a niece. You 
know, her and her husband, Andy, had cared for Ted's cows 
out on the Star property. They were active in his health 
care issues. you know. And I knew that he had put a lot 
of trust in her. 
Q. You know, anmher thing we haven't 
established in this record is, how old was Mr. Johnson? 




 Ted Johnson allegedly said at a certain time before hi:!,
 
2




4 MS. TAYLOR: That is Correct. 
5 THE COURT: You're basing that objection on -­
6
 MS. TAYLOR: Primarily, Your Honor, on the dea.d
 
7
 man statute. And we have argued that previously',i:'the 
8
 Court found it didn't apply.	 I 8
 
I 9
9 We were in a completely different context at
 
10 the time. Now, we're solely looking at a cause of unjust 110
 
11 enrichment, which I think is virtually identical to a II
 
12 claim against an estate. 12
I

13 Because of the fact that Mr. Maile was the 113
 
18 MR. CHARNEY: Exactly. 118
 




21 Q. BY MR. CHARNEY: So where I was, Mr. Maile'j 21
 
22 was asking you to tell Judge Wilper about the next time ! 22
 
23 that Mr. Johnson showed up in your office. I believe i 23
 
24 this was the unannounced visit. 24
 
25 A. Right. Approximately six weeks had gone by 25
 
14 one that did the estate planning, there was a pour over 
15 will, all of the assets went into the trust. 
16 Essentially, the trust is the estate and the situation is 
17 indistinguishable from filing a claim against the estate. 
18 He is seeking repayment from the trust. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 How do you respond, Mr. Charney? 
21 MR. CHARNEY: I would disagree with the assertion 
22 that the dead man statute operates to prohibit the 
23 statements regarding Mr. Johnson. But it's also 
24 important to note that most of what we're talking about 
25 here, with respect to the unjust enrichment claim, and 
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1 what Mr. Johnson did or didn't say, isn't being offered 
2 for the truth of what he did or didn't say, but rather 
3 just to explain why Mr. Maile took the next steps along 
4 the way as he proceeded to purchase the property. 
5 And, as the Court is aware, most of this case 
6 is going to involve things that occurred after 
7 Mr. Johnson's death anyway. So everything we have done 
8 thus far is kind of historical groundwork and foundation, 
9 if you will, to explain why Mr. Maile, and the other 
10 parties defended here, arc: entitled to the moneys that 
11 they're going to be talking about later on. 
12 THE COURT: All right. 
13 The objection is overruled, to the extent 
14 that the information elicited from this witness is not 
15 being offered for the truth of the matter asserted in the 
16 statements by Ted Johnson, but simply to explain why 
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1 never been to Ted's house before. 1 you must know, Ms. Taylor, the limitations of what you're 
:2 Q. And she also asserted that when she was 2 doing here. 
3 present at the signing, you just gave them the earnest 3 Ifyou want to get Beth Rogers in, in front 
4 money agreement -- .·4 of JTle to testify in the trial, you're certainly free to 
5 MR. CHARNEY: Objection; hearsay. All the stuff 
6 Beth Rogers said -- . 
7 THE COURT: Well, J -- do you want to respond? 
8 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. I do want to respond. I am 
9 using this to impeach. 
10 THE COURT: I understand. The objection is 
1.1 overruled.
 
12 You are -- as I understand it, this entire
 
1.3 line of questioning, Ms. Taylor, is your attempt to
 
14 impeach Mr. Maile's testimony regarding what he says he
 
15 told Ted Johnson about, at two different meetings, in
 
16 connection with the sale; correct?
 
17 MS. TAYLOR: Correct.
 
18 THE COURT: You're attempting to impeach that by
 
19 showing that another witness, at another time, said that
 
20 these meetings occurred at a different location and no
 
21 such thing was -- was discussed; right?
 
22 MS. TAYLOR: Correct.
 
23 THE COURT: Have you made your point?
 
5 do so. And I understand that you're just using her
 
6 testimony for the limited purpose of making an assertion,
 
7 to this witness, that on another occasion somebody who
 




10 And he has answered those questions; right.
 
11 MS. TAYLOR: Correct.
 
12 THE COURT: Okay.
 




15 THE COURT: Okay. you may proceed.
 
16 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: Mr. Maile, you have testified
 
17 that you went over the earnest money agreement with
 




20 Q. I will represent to you that Beth Rogers
 
21 said, when they came into the office, you handed it to
 




24 MR. CHARNEY: That is not a proper manner in whi h24 She was asked if anything else was said, she 
25 to impeach somebody. She needs to call that witness to 25 says, not that I can remember. 
+-------------­
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1 come in and say he's not being truthful about that. 
2 THE COURT: Well, essentially though, as I see it, 
3 Ms. Taylor is making these assertions to the Witness, to 
4 Mr. Maile, and has said, look, this other witness said 
5 that, how do you explain it, essentially. 
6 MR. CHARNEY: That's different. 
7 THE COURT: Right. She's not offering this 
8 Beth Rogers transcript testimony, the deposition 
9 testimony, for the truth of the matter that's asserted or 
10 as substantive proof of where these meetings took place 
11 and what was discussed, hut just attempting to knock 
12 Mr. Maile off his pins, with respect to his prior 
13 testimony in court today; right? 
14 MS. TAYLOR: Correct. 
15 THE COURT: Okay. I'm with you. I -- now, when 
16 I say I'm with you, what I mean is, I understand the 
17 reasons for this line of questioning. 
18 The objection that this is improper 
19 impeachment is overruled. The reason I explained my tak 
20 on what you're doing here, on this line of questioning, 
21 is to demonstrate that I'm not confused about how this is 
22 being used. 
23 I think it would be problematic in ajury 
Paqe 137 
1 THE COURT: Is that a question?
 
2 MS. TAYLOR: Yes.
 
3 THE COURT: What is the question?
 
4 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: How to you square her
 
5 testimony with what you have said?
 
6 A. Well, I'm the one that drove the car to his
 
7 house. She wasn't there. I just don't think she
 
8 remembers it accurately.
 
9 Q. Let's go to your Exhibit No.1, the earnest
 
10 money agreement. You indicate that you recognized there 
11 was a potential conflict of interest on two coums; you 
12 had expressed an interest in buying this properly, 
13 yourself, for years, and you also had represented the 
14 Trust in regard to the Witte offer; correct? 
15 A. No. I advised Ted. I said, in that first 
16 conference concerning the Witte offer, that I could have 
17 a conflict here, because we had expressed a willingness 
18 ~for you to sell and me to buy, if you ever decide to sell 
19 .it. And do you have a problem with me representing you 
20 with the Witte offer, and he said no. 
21 So that's the issue there. 
22 Q. Okay. Was that the only conversation you had 
23 about there being a potential conflict of interest? 
24 trial; you know what I mean? But I think that I 1"~4 A. No. When I explained on the two other 
25 understand what you're doing here. And I understand that 25 occasions that he had the right to seek independent 
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1 counsel, it was -- I can't remember if I used the word 1 it significant. 
2 conflict of interest on the second time. I certainly 2 Q. But you agree that that would have been 
3 used. it on the first time, saying that I had represented 3 inappropriate, to try to have any proceedings in 
4 him in the p·ast. And his current offer deals with 4 Canyon County, under the circumstances? 
5 property that we had talked about buying and selling, s" 5 A. I suspect you can have an agreement that 
6 there's a conflict there. 6 people agree to litigate their issues in any county. 
7 . And on the other occasions, speC'ifically told 7 Q. But there was no reason for it to be there; 
8 him that he had the right to seek independent counsel, i 8 right? 
9 he chose to. 9 A. In Canyon County, no. 
10 Q. You agrel: that as -- that Mr. Johnson was a 10 Q. After the Trust filed the lawsuit, you filed 
11 former client? I' 11 a motion for change of venue to Canyon County, didn't 
12 A. Yes. 12 you? 
13 Q. At the time you entered into your earnest 13 A. Sam Hoagland and I did that, that's true. 
14 money agreement? 14 Q. And you also included, in your pleadings, 
15 A. Yes. 15 that Ada County wasn't the appropriate venue under the 
16 Q. And you agree that under the ethical rules, 16 terms of the earnest money agreement? 
17 you had an obligation to only enter into an agreement 17 A. We did initially, that's true. 
18 that was fair and reasonable? 18 Q. Even knowing that that was just a mistake you 
19 A. That's tru(:. 19 had made? 
20 Q. If you'll tum to page 2 of the earnest money 20 A. That's true. 
21 agreement. 21 Q. Going on -- and these provisions, by the way, 
22 THE COURT: Defense Exhibit I; correct? 22 are all included in the paragraph entitled Attorneys Fees 
23 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. Defense Exhibit I. I'm so ,23 and Costs, aren't they? 
24 Your Honor. 24 A. Yeah, they are. Yep. 
25 THE WITNESS: Okay. 25 Q. Then, beginning at the bottom of page 2, and 
{-----_. 
Page 139 Page 141 
1 Q. BY MS. TAYLOR: You elected to include a 1 going on to page 3, you included a provision in this 
2 provision wherein the parties would waive a trial by 2 agreement that would limit the statute of limitations to 
3 jury, didn't you? 3 one year? 
4 A. I didn't elect to include this. This was a 4 A. That's right. 
5 form that I had used on a number of times, for both 5 Q. Regardless ofwhether damages were othelwise, 
6 buyers and sellers. So there was nothing inteJjected 6 as of said date, calculatable, didn't you? 
7 here. This was one ofmy standard real estate forms. 7 A. Yes. That was included, yes. 
8 Q. You drafted the agreement? 8 Q. And as an attorney, at the time 25-some years 
9 A. Yes. 9 of practice, you knew that the statute of limitations on 
10 Q. And you included that provision? 10 a written agreement was five years? 
11 A. Yes. 11 A. Yeah. That's true. 
12 Q. You also included a provision that the 12 Q. That is not a provision that is fair and 
13 parties would submit to the jurisdiction and venue in 13 reasonable? 
14 Canyon County, didn't you? 14 A. Well, I think it cuts both ways. It was a 
15 A. Yes. It says that in there. 15 form that I had -- that I had used a number of times, 
16 Q. And is that fair and reasonable, when all 16 and -- both for buyers and sellers, and I think it cut 
17 the parties live in Ada County and the property is 17 both ways. So I didn't -- I really didn't have a problem 
18 Ada County? 18 with it as being unfair or unreasonable. 
19 A. It was included and not corrected. It has 19 Q. Okay. Can you name a single cause of action, 
20 nothing to do with being fair and reasonable. It's a 20 in the state ofIdaho, that has a one year statute of 
21 clerical mistake. 21 limitations? 
22 Q. 11 was a mistake? 22 A. Not off the top ofmy head, no. 
23 A. Yes. 23 Q. And when you were initially contacted, the 
24 Q. That you did not catch? 24 attorney for the trustees and the beneficiaries had to 
25 A. Could have caught it. Didn't really consider 25 ask you to waive that one year statute of limitations, 
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Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
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v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/'k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
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an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
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MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN 
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MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR RULE 11 SANCTIONS - Pg I 
000696
-~- tD;  -  
'




Judgement as follows: 
STATUS OF THE PLEADINGS 
The Plaintiffs' Complaint and Demand For Jury Trial in this action was filed on 
December 31, 2007. An Amended Complaint and Demand For Jury Trial in this action was 
filed on March 25, 2008. Thereafter the Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs 
filed a motion to have the same converted to a motion for summary judgment, since th{: 
defendants had provided affidavits with attachments. Thereafter the defendants, Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust and the individual Taylors filed their Amended Motion to Dismiss and 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS 
The Plaintiffs have filed concurrently a Statement of Uncontested Facts and the same is 
incorporated herein as if set forth in full herein. 
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In ruling on a summary judgment motion pursuant to LR.C.P. 56©, all facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor ofthe party opposing the motion for summary judgment, IBM Corp. 
v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194,677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984). The non-moving party is also given 
the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence in the record. Thomas v. 
Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984). The non-moving party "must respond to the 
summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Tuttle v. 
Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150,868 P.2d 473,478 (1994). Summary judgment is 
appropriate where a non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 





existence of an element essential to its case when it bears the burden of proof, see, Samuel v. 
Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303,306 (2000). 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. THIS COURT CAN NOT DISMISS THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT 
TO I.R.C.P. 12(B)(8). 
The defendants miss the mark by stating "there is another action pending between these 
parties relating to the same cause of action" (defendants' brief p. 4). The current proceedings 
involve completely new causes of actions against different parties, in addition to the Taylors and 
the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. 
The defendants advance the argument that another case is pending consequently, this 
court should dismiss the current proceedings. There is not technically another case pending. 
There has been an appeal filed on a judgment, but that does not qualify to meet the requirements 
of l2(b)(8). 
The defendants cannot point to any other action pending involving the issues framed by 
these pleadings, to wit: (1) whether the defendants and their attorneys committed wrongful acts 
that are prohibited under the Idaho Racketeering Statue (Count Eleven); (2) whether the' 
defendants committed acts that constitute abuse of process (Count Five); (3) whether these 
defendants committed a fraud upon the court (Count One); (4) whether these defendants 
committed wrongful conduct in filing a verified pleading which was diametrically opposite to an 
earlier verified pleading previously submitted by the defendants before another tribunal, 
requiring an imposition of a constructive trust (Count Two); (5) whether the defendants 
committed acts constituting negligence and/or gross negligence (Count Six and Eight); (6) 
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whether the defendants committed acts which constitute equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel and/or 
judicial estoppel, (Counts Nine, Ten, and Twelve). 
The plaintiffs have asserted multiple valid claims against the defendants in their 
Amended Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. Under LR.C.P. 12(b)(8), a trial court 
may dismiss an action where there is "another action pending between the same parties for the 
same cause." The trial court's determination under LR.C.P. 12(b)(8) whether to proceed with an 
action where a similar case is pending in another court is discretionary. See Zaleha v. Rosholt, 
Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 129 Idaho 532, 533, 927 P.2d 925, 926 (Ct.App.1996). 
However, arguably if this case is dismissed because ofpending appeal in the case Taylor 
v. Maile, the defendants may advance an argument that the refiling ofthe same claims would be 
barred by applicable statute oflimitations. The case ofEastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n 
v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 412, 987 P.2d 314, 324 (1999) considered the argument that if a 
district court were to dismiss an action, it could deny a litigant its "day in court" becausl~ the 
statute oflimitations has run, citing Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 129 Idaho 
532,927 P.2d 925 (Ct.App.1996). 
No other actions are pending which involve the current issues before this court. If for 
example a jury is to determine that defendants obtained property by abuse ofprocess and/or 
committed violations of the Idaho Racketeering Statutes, the plaintiffs will demonstrate damages 
including statutory damages beyond the issues that were germane in Taylor v. Maile 1 or 2. The 
defendants' attempt to construe LR.C.P. Rule 12(b)(8) to apply to these facts and law is tortured 
and should not be considered by this tribunal. 
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2. RES JUDICATA AND/OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL HAS NO APPLICATION TO 
THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS. 
A. There Can Be No Cause of Action until a Party Has Been Damaged. 
It is a fundamental principle of law that there is no civil claim for relief for damages, until 
a party has been damaged. The plaintiffs were never damaged by the actions complained of in 
the present matter until a Judgment was entered in the prior proceedings which was based upon 
fraud, peIjury, and ultimately resulted in the entry of"Judgment on Beneficiaries Claims". We 
know from the record that as of July 15,2004, as a result of the "Disclaimer, Release & 
Indemnification Agreement", there was only one beneficiary of the Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust, Helen Taylor (see verified Petition ofNovember 12, 2004). Until the entry of 
the "Judgment on Beneficiaries Claims" and the improper recording of the Judgment with the 
Ada County Recorder's Office, the plaintiffs had no cause of action for damages in the prior 
litigation relating to the loss ofthe real property. 
The plaintiffs at no time had a right to seek a compulsory counter-claim under the 
I..R.C.P., since the plaintiffs sustained no damage caused by the current defendants' actions until 
a Judgment was entered and recorded based upon the improper use of the judicial process by the 
collective defendants. The case of Fuller v. Wolters, 119 Idaho 415, 422,807 P.2d 633,640 
(1991), illustrates the issue of the necessity ofdamages in light of the defense of collateral 
estoppel. The Supreme Court held at 419 of 119 Id. Reports: 
The trial court applied the doctrine ofcollateral estoppel and concluded that the 
Idaho Funding judgment had preclusive effect only with regard to the crop 
damages in 1986. We agree with the trial court's conclusion. In Anderson v. City 
of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171 (1987), we discussed the test for 
determining when collateral estoppel should apply. 
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The more appropriate test for whether collateral estoppel should apply includes 
the following: (1) Did the party "against whom the earlier decision is asserted ... 
have a 'full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case.'" ... (2) 
Was the issue decided in the prior litigation "identical with the one presented in 
the action in question?" ... (3) Was the issue actually decided in the prior 
litigation? ... (4) "Was there a final judgment on the merits?" ... (5) "Was the party 
against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication?"(citations omitted). 
Applying Anderson, we conclude that the trial court correctly ruled that the 
Idaho Funding judgment should only have preclusive effect with regard to the 
damages incurred by the Wolters in 1986. First, the Wolters had a "full and fair 
opportunity to litigate" only the 1986 damages which arose through their inability 
to farm after Idaho Funding took their farm equipment. As the Wolters pointed 
out in their brief, they could not have brought suit against appellants until the 
Idaho Funding case established that they were entitled to the return of their famL 
equipment. Only after the entry of the Idaho Funding judgment, when the Woltt:rs 
were not able to regain possession of the equipment because of Idaho Funding's 
violation of the court's restraining order and disposition of the equipment to othler 
people, did the Wolters begin to suffer additional damages. Thus, since the 
Wolters suffered those additional damages only after the Idaho Funding case was 
over, they could not have recovered those damages in their suit against Idaho 
Funding. Applying the second part of the Anderson test, the issue actually decided 
in the prior litigation had to do only with the 1986 damages. The Wolters were 
awarded a "final judgment" of $76,952.90 for those damages. Thus, according to 
Anderson, supra, the Wolters were not precluded from raising the issue of 
additional damages in the subsequent malpractice proceeding against Fuller & 
Meservy and Mink. We therefore affirm the trial court on this issue. 
The same principles apply against the defendants in the present action. There were no 
damages sustained by the plaintiffs relating to the loss of the real property until the erroneous 
judgment was entered for the benefit ofthe alleged "beneficiaries". 
LR.C.P. Rule l3(a). Compulsory counterclaims, provides in part: 
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving 
the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim 
and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties ofwhom the 
court cannot acquire jurisdiction. 
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The plaintiffs never had a claim which could be construed as a compulsory counterclaim 
within the purview ofLR.C.P. 13(a). The application ofthis procedural rule is a question oflaw 
on which is subject to free review upon appeal. The failure to plead a claim properly classified 
as a compulsory counterclaim bars any subsequent action on the claim. The consequence is 
consistent with general principles of res judicata. Blaser v. Cameron, 116 Idaho 453, 776 P.2d 
462 (1989). 
In the present matter there are a number of claims asserted against the collectivt:: 
defendants. An examination of only a few claims are warranted to defeat the defendants' attempt 
to have the matter dismissed. There must be damages incurred for a civil claim alleging 
wrongful behavior to filed. In the present matter the damages alleged do not stem from the same 
transaction in the prior litigation. However, prior to a discussion relating to some of the claims 
for relief, the following needs to be considered by the court. 
In the present case, the plaintiffs filed the verified pleadings alleging a number of counts. 
The premise of the allegations are centered upon the defendants and their counsel committing 
wrongful conduct which among other things involve perjury. There is no justification or excuse 
for the defendants' actions before the probate court and the district court. There is no dispute 
that Connie Taylor, notarized her husband's signature on November 14th 2004, wherein her then 
husband stated under oath in the verified petition before the probate court, on page two '''the 
petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by 
virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement". Immediately above the 
signature the verification provides, ""R. John Taylor, being sworn, says that the facts set forth in 
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the foregoing petition are true, accurate, and complete to the best of applicant's knowledge and 
belief' (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Exhibit "I"). 
The case of Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315, 322, 63 P.3d 441, 448 
(2003), provides, " admission constitutes a binding judicial admission -- "a formal ...statement 
made by ... [an] attorney, in the course ofjudicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the 
effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact." Strouse v. 
K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618, 930 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing McLean v. City of 
Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783,430 P.2d 670, 674 (1967)). Judicial admissions maybe 
considered for the purposes which they were made without admission into evidence, and a party 
making an admission may not controvert the statement on appeal. Id. at 619,930 P.2d at 1364. 
(emphasis added). 
After the Idaho Supreme Court rendered its decision in Taylor v. Maile 1, on December 
23, 2005, the Taylors individually and acting as trustees sought to take advantage of the: decision. 
The Supreme Court decision related to the issue of standing. On March 9, 2006, a Verified 
Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, before the district court which was prepared by the 
co-defendant attorneys. Page I of the Verified Amended Complaint states under oath, "Reed and 
R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a resident of Ada 
County Idaho. All ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe Theodore L Johnson 
Trust." (The verified amended complaint is annexed to Amended Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial as Exhibit "B") (emphasis added). 
Specifically, the promoting, drafting, and ultimately filing of the verification of lhe 
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amended complaint in March 2006 constituted criminal behavior and/or fraud. Idaho Code 
Section 18-5401 provides: 
PERJURY DEFINED. Every person who, having taken an oath that he will 
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, before any competent tribunal, legislative 
committee, officer, or person in any of the cases in which such an oath may by 
law be administered, wilfully and contrary to such oath, states as true any material 
matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of perjury. 
The case of State V. Wolfrum; 175 P.3d 206 (C.A.2007) provides relevant standards 
involving a criminal case of perjury. Commencing at p. 210 of 175 P.3d Reports, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals provides: 
The test for materiality is whether the testimony probably would or could 
influence a tribunal or jury on the issue before it. The false statement relied upon 
need not bear directly upon the ultimate issue of fact. A statement is material if it 
is material to any proper point of inquiry, and if it is calculated and intended to 
bolster the witness' testimony on some material point or to support or attack his 
credibility. The degree ofmateriality is not important. Instruction No. 22, which 
quoted I.C. § 18-5406, stated: It is no defense to a prosecution for perjury that the 
accused did not know the materiality of the false statement made by him; or that it 
did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which it was made. It is sufficient 
that it was material, and might have been used to affect such proceeding. 
In addition to the above, the Taylors did not commit only one material misrepresentation 
to a judicial tribunal. The Taylors lost at the trial level on their individual claims in eady 2004. 
They appealed the decision and provided a material misstatement in their opening briefbefore 
the Idaho Supreme Court in case number 30817, 004, "The Taylors are beneficiaries of the 
Theodore Johnson Trust.. ..". We know that such a statement was a false statement made with a 
false pretenses to obtain property from the plaintiffs. The Taylors were attempting to have their 
cake and eat it at the same time. 
B. The plaintiffs have sufficiently stated valid claims which must survive 
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The plaintiffs have asserted a claim for abuse of process. 1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process 
§ 19 further provides: 
§ 19. Persons procuring, aiding, abetting, advising, consenting, or ratifying 
abusive acts. Liability for the abuse of process tort generally extends to all who 
knowingly procure, participate in, aid, or abet the abuse, and those who advise or 
consent to the abusive acts, or who subsequently adopt or ratify them, are liable as 
joint tortfeasors. 
The plaintiffs have alleged a claim for abuse ofprocess centered primarily upon the 
peIjured sworn statement advanced by the Taylors with the aid oftheir attorneys. The ease of 
Cunningham v. Jensen (2005 Idaho 31332 _ P.3d _ S.C. 2005) provides: 
To establish a claim for abuse of process there must be a showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant has (1) affirmatively used a legal process 
against the plaintiff; (2) primarily to accomplish an improper purpose outside of 
simply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation for which the process was 
not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff by misuse of the 
process external to the litigation that cannot be compensated in the underlying 
proceeding. Again, the allegations in a complaint pleading abuse of process must 
be made with specificity, alleging the facts supporting each element of the caus{: 
of action. 
The plaintiff could not have litigated the current claims against the Taylors, the trust, nor 
the attorneys prior to the actual entry of the Judgment and wrongful filing of the same with the 
Ada County Recorder's Office. This action is what gives rise to a claim for damages and 
consequently gives rise to a claim for relief. 
The plaintiffs have further alleged violations under the Idaho Racketeering Statue. There 
are multiple actions committed by the defendants which give rise to valid claims under the 
Statute. "Racketeering" means any act chargeable under the enumerated list of predicate acts in 
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Idaho Code § 18-7803(a)(l )-(21). Idaho Code § 18-7804(c) provides: 
It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to 
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of such 
enterprise by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity. Whoever violates the 
provisions of this subsection is guilty of a felony. 
The case ofMannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007), provides 
the following: 
An "enterprise" is defined as "any sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, 
business, labor union, association or other legal entity or any group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit 
entities." I.C. § 18-7803(c). A "pattern of racketeering" is defined as: 
engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same: 
or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission, or 
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated 
incidents, provided at least one (1) of such incidents occurred after the effective 
date of this act and that the last of such incidents occurred within five (5) years 
after a prior incident of racketeering conduct. 
I.C. § 18-7803(d). A single scheme may be sufficient to establish a pattern of 
racketeering if the plaintiff establishes "that the predicate acts themselves amount 
to, or constitute a threat of, continuing racketeering activity." Spence v. Howell, 
126 Idaho 763, 775, 890 P.2d 714, 726 (1995). 
The plaintiffs have previously addressed the elements of peIjury above and need not 
recite the same here. In addition the actions alleged against the defendants constitute obtaining 
money or property by false pretenses. The Taylors' repeated assertions that they are "residual 
beneficiaries" before the Idaho Supreme Court and the district court meets the threshold required 
of the plaintiffs. Such misrepresentations are in violation of the Idaho Racketeering Stalute. 
Idaho Code 18-7803, provides" (l0) Fraudulent practices, false pretenses, insurance fraud, 
financial transaction card crimes and fraud generally (sections 18-2403, 18-2706, 18-3002, 18­
3101, 18-3124, 18-3125, 18-3126, 18-6713,41-293,41-294 and 41-1306, Idaho Code)". 
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The Racketeering Statute gives rise to an independent cause of action, completdy 
different and distinct from any claims involved in the prior litigation. Once again there was no 
claim of damage that accrued until the defendants were successful with their perjury and false 
pretenses before the courts. 
The plaintiffs have alleged fraud. A claim of fraud requires the plaintiff to establish nine 
elements with particularity: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its 
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be 
reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) 
justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 
368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (2005) (citing Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 226, 46 P..3d 518, 
522 (2002) (citing Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 851, 934 P.2d 20, 24 (1997). Once again 
there can be no claim for fraud until a "resultant injury". The loss of the real property based 
upon the "Judgment on Beneficiaries Claims" which was obtained by individuals that no interest 
as beneficiaries of trust was fraudulent (established by judicial admission of record). 
It is noteworthy to consider the state of the record in the prior litigation. The Honorable 
Judge Wilper had earlier entered the court's Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28,2005 
allowing the "trust" to amend its complaint after the successor trustees received the required 
appointment by the probate court. The district court did grant the current plaintiffs' motion in 
part ruling that the Taylors and the trust had waived rights to rescind the contract as "once a party 
treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recision, the right of 
recision is waived." The District Court further found that the Plaintiffs (Theodore L. Jolmson 
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Revocable Trust and the Taylors), now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to pursue 
rescission once the grounds for it arose. The district court prior to the Supreme Court decision 
would not allow the trust or the Taylors to rescind the real estate transaction (Affidavit of 
Thomas Maile Part Two Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28, 2005 Exhibit "K"). In 
essence the trust conceivably had a claim for monetary damages but not a claim to have the real 
property restored. It was restored to the trust solely based upon the misrepresentations of the 
Taylors and their counsel. It was at that point in time a new claim for relief accrued that was 
separate and apart from the transaction involved in the prior litigation. 
The claims in the present matter cannot be determined to be arising from the same 
transaction involved in the prior litigation. An example ofwhat could be considered "arising out 
of the same transaction" would be a claim ofmisrepresentation relating to the purchase of the 
real estate transaction, a claim for monies overpaid on the real estate transaction, a claim relating 
to whether the real property had a cloud on its title, etc. 
In the present case the multiple claims advanced against all the defendants cannot 
remotely be inferred to arise out ofthe same transaction involved in the prior litigation. For 
clarity the plaintiffs could not have advanced any claim relating to the loss ofproperty, in the 
prior litigation as they sustained no damages until the entry of the "Judgment on Beneficiaries 
Claims" and the same was recorded of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office. Had the 
plaintiffs attempted such a course of action they would have been subject to a Rule 11 sanction 
for attempting to do so. 
3. NEITHER THE PLAINTIFFS AND/OR THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD ARE 
RESPONSIBLE FOR COSTS AND SANCTIONS IN THESE PROCEEDINGS. 
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Pursuant to I.R.C.P. II(a)(I), pleadings, motions, and other papers signed by an attorney 
must meet certain criteria, and failure to meet such criteria will result in the imposition of 
sanctions, see Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 638 (1990). Rule l1(a)(1) 
requires that pleadings be: (1) well grounded in fact; (2) warranted by existing law or a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (3) not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increases in the 
costs of litigation. 
The case of Riggins v. Smith, 126 Idaho 1017, 1021,895 P.2d 1210, 1214 (1995) 
provides the following: 
In evaluating an attorney's conduct in filing a pleading, the district court must 
determine whether the attorney exercised reasonableness under the circumstances 
and made a proper investigation upon reasonable inquiry into the facts and legal 
theories before signing and filing the document. 
The Idaho Supreme Court rendered its decision in Taylor v. Maile 1, which dealt entirely 
with the issue of standing. The defendants after reading the decision, provided false sworn 
statements to the district court, asserting they were residual beneficiaries of the same trust, which 
was judicially admitted by the Taylors, and consequently judicially determined to have only one 
beneficiary pursuant to the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement" dated July 15, 
2004, Helen Taylor. Under the terms of the Agreement the Taylors released the trustees Beth and 
Andy Rogers from all liability relating to the administration of the trust, so they could gain 
control of trust as successor trustees (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One deposition of Beth 
Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing deposition exhibit 25). 
Connie Taylor, acting for the benefit ofthe Taylors in negotiating the terms ofthe 
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Disclaimer Agreement, drafted a letter to Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004 which stated, "The 
Taylors are not willing to give up their rights as beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth will affirm 
her prior factual statements in the form of an affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against 
Mr. Maile. Ifwe aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they will seek a full accounting of the 
trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax returns". (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One 
deposition of Beth Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing deposition exhibit 39). The Taylors got what 
they wanted from Beth Rogers and agreed to give up their rights as beneficiaries. The Taylors 
later judicially admitted the same in the verified petition in the probate proceedings. 
Things changed after the Supreme Court decision. The verified amended complaint 
executed under oath on January 13, 2006 by R. John Taylor was an attempt to take improper 
advantage of the Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Maile 1. The Judgment on Beneficiaries 
Claim entered on June 7, 2006 was entered pursuant to the misrepresentation of the Taylors as to 
their status as beneficiaries in January 2006. 
In determining whether the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions was proper for a lower court 
to impose, the appellate court must determine: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its 
discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 
it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Vall(~ 
Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). There are 
multiple claims involved in the present matter that did not rise to a valid cause of action until the 
"Judgment on Beneficiaries Claim" was entered on June 7, 2006 and recorded. This proceeding 
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is far from frivolous, the defendants' motion for sanctions is not warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
That based upon the facts of record in this matter and the law provided herein, the 
defendants' motion to dismiss and their motion for summary judgment must be denied. 
Furthennore there is no basis for the imposition of sanctions as requested by the defendants. 
DATED this -6- day ofOctober, 2008. 
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Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka 
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
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COME NOW Connie Wright Taylor, fka Connie Taylor, Paul T. Clark, and Clark 
and Feeney, by and through their undersigned counsel, Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, 
Chartered, and respectfully move this Court for an order granting summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants and against the plaintiffs, Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. Maile, and 
Colleen Birch-Maile, on the basis that the plaintiffs are barred from proceeding in this matter 
pursuant to (a) Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l2(b)(8), and (b) the doctrine of res judicata. 
This motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment submitted simultaneously herewith. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 2008. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
vBy 7 J.,4'. (/ 
Mark S Prusynski - Ofth Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright 
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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3649 N. Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, 10 83703-6913 
Facsimile (208) 853-0117 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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Connie Wright Taylor, Paul T. Clark, and Clark and Feeney, (collectiv::ly "Clark 
and Feeney"), submit this Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Obviously, Clark and Feeney agree with the memorandum filed in support of the co-defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, since Clark and Feeney wrote it. This briefwill attempt to 
address those issues that pertain solely to Clark and Feeney without unnecessary duplication. 
Although plaintiffs, Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. Maile, and Colleen Birch-Maile 
(collectively the "Mailes"), name new parties and attempt to raise new theories, they are barred 
from pursuing this matter pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata and Idaho Rule of Clvil 
Procedure 12(b)(8). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The facts pertaining to this matter are set forth in Taylor v. Maile, 142 ldaho 253, 
127 P.3d 156 (2005), and the Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claim, entered by the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper on May 11, 2006. Those facts 
are summarized in the brief filed by codefendants and the supporting affidavit. 
In addition, this suit alleges that Clark and Feeney engaged in fraudulent conduct 
with regard to the Taylors' standing to bring suit against the Mailes. All oftIle allegatIOns are 
based upon Clark and Feeney's conduct in the prior litigation. The Mailes assert that "defendant 
Connie Wright Taylor on or about July 19th, 2004, improperly filed a complaint and demand for 
jury trial" identifying the Taylors as successor trustees of the Theodore Johnson Trust when 
"defendants knew that they had failed to obtain court approval" of the Taylors' appointment 
pursuant to Idaho statutes. See the Mailes' Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, ~11. 
Also, the Mailes assert that Clark and Feeney improperly "executed a proposed amended 
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complaint" in 2006 again fraudulently representing the status of the Taylors as "residual 
beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust." See the Mailes' Amended Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial, ~16. Fmiher, the Mailes contend that the conduct described above 
"amounted to a misuse and/or abuse of their [Clark and Feeney's] position as public servants by 
engaging in conduct within or related to their official duties, and/or by failing or refusing to 
perform an official duty" in their capacities as attomeys. See the Mailes' Amended Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial, ~~ 11 and 16. 
The Mailes' claims in this matter are all based upon Clark and Feeney's alleged 
misconduct in other pending or completed litigation. Those claims against Clark and Feeney are 
barred by the doctrine of res judicata and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8), and summary 
judgment in favor of Clark and Feeney is therefore proper. 
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
The court is well aware of the Idaho law conceming summary judgment motions, 
so it will not be repeated here. There are no genuine issues of material fact, since all of the 
alleged facts are based upon the prior litigation and the pleadings filed by Clark and Feeney. The 
key issue for summary judgment purposes is whether the court can say, as a matter ofIaw, that 
the claims made by the Mailes in this lawsuit involved the same claims and parties in a prior 
lawsuit or whether the claims could have been litigated in a prior lawsuit. Although the Mailes' 
complaint is lengthy and appears to attempt to raise every conceivable tort theory against Clark 
and Feeney, all of those claims are barred as a matter of law. 
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Perhaps it goes without saying that the Mailes' lack standing to assert any claims 
based upon the purported obligations of attorneys to clients. Mr. Maile was successful in 
arguing that he, as an attorney, owed no duty to the Taylors, since they were not his clients in 
Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253,127 P.3d 156 (2005). For the same reason that the Taylors did 
not have standing to sue Mr. Maile for legal malpractice, the Mailes do not have standing to sue 
Clark and Feeney for legal malpractice. 
The Mailes' claims in this matter arise from the same series of events involving 
the sale and possession of the property litigated in prior proceedings. More specifically, the 
Mailes' fraud-based claims against Clark and Feeney allege that Clark and Feeney made 
improper representations regarding the Taylors' status as trust beneficiaries in pleadings 
submitted to the court in 2004 and 2006. See the Mailes' Amended Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial, ~~ 11, 16. Paragraph 12 of the Mailes' complaint alleges, "On October 20,2004, the 
plaintiffs [the Mailes] filed their motion to dismiss the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial 
relating to the "trust's" complaint." The complaint then goes on to detail the issues concerning 
the identity of the beneficiaries that were disputed in the earlier litigation. The complaint on its 
face shows that the same issues concerning the identity or status of the trust's beneficiaries and 
trustees were litigated in the earlier suit. The only difference between the Mailes' claims in the 
earlier case and their claims in this case is that they are now suing Clark and Feeney over 
statements made in the pleadings filed during the prior proceedings. Therefore, the Mailes are 
barred from pursuing their claims in this matter by the doctrine of res judicata and Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(8), which is discussed more fully below. 
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Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8), a case may be dismissed when 
there is "another action pending between the same parties for the same cause." I.R.c.P. 
12(b)(8) (emphasis added). When a similar action is pending in another court, the court should 
consider whether the other case has proceeded to judgment, in which case the doctrine of res 
judicata likely bars additional litigation. Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437, 440, 988 P.2d 211, 214 
(1999); see also Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar, 106 Idaho 905, 908, 648 P.2d 307, 310 (Ct.App. 
1984), overruled on other grounds. NBC Leasing Co. v R&T Farms, Inc., 112 Idaho 500, 733 
P.2d 721 (1987). 
In Roberts v. Hollands'worth, 101 Idaho 522, 616 P.2d 1058 (1980), the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a case in state court because another action was 
pending in federal comi. Roberts sued in federal court, claiming that defendants defrauded them. 
While the federal case was on appeal, they sued in state court for quiet title and a constructive 
trust to the same property involved in the federal suit. Although the theories were different and 
the federal case was on appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(8) was proper. 101 Idaho at 524. The court said in a footnote that it would not have to 
reach the second issue involving res judicata. Similarly, even though the claims here involve 
fraud and the claims in the earlier action, now on appeal, involved title to property and a 
constructive trust, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(8). Due to the similar 
elements ofIdaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8) and the doctrine of res judicata, the 
application of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8) will be discussed more fully within the 
analysis of res judicata. 
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The Doctrine of Res Judicata: Claim Preclusion. 
The doctrine of res judicata essentially provides that a final judgment bars 
subsequent litigation of claims by parties or their privies based upon the same cause. Ticor Title 
Co. v.	 Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, ,157 P.3d 613,617 (2007). The purpose of res judicata is to 
relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources and, by 
preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication. Marin v. HEft; Health 
Care Financing, 769 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,94 
(1980). In order "for claim preclusion [or res judicata] to bar a subsequent action, there are three 
requirements: (1) same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) final judgment." Ticor Title Co. v. 
Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, _, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007). 
1.	 The current proceeding involves the same parties to previously 
adjudicated matters. 
Similar to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8), in order for res judicata to bar 
subsequent litigation, the proceedings at issue must involve the same parties or their privies. 
Ticor at 618 (citing Foster v. City 01St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 888, 841 P.2d 413,418 (1992)). 
For an individual or entity not a party to a former action to be in privity with a party to the 
former action, the individual or entity "must derive his interest from one who was a party to it, 
that is, ... he [must be] in privity with a party to that judgment." Ticor at 618 (emphasis added). 
Idaho courts have not specifically addressed the issue of privity between attorneys and their 
clients for purposes of res judicata. However, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has provided 
that when law firms or attorneys appear as defendants in subsequent litigation "by virtue oftheir 
activities as representatives" of named parties to prior litigation, such attorneys or law firms are 
in privity with their clients for purposes of res judicata. Plotner v. AT&T Corporation, 224 F.3d 
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1161, 1169 (10th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added) (citing Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 
1228, 1235, n. 6 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that for purposes of res judicata privity exists between 
a party and its attorneys)). 
Clark and Feeney's interest in this proceeding is derived entirely from their 
participation in prior related proceedings as legal counsel for the Taylors. As stated, the Mailes' 
fraud-based allegations pertain to the status of the Taylors set forth in the pleadings submitted to 
the court by Clark and Feeney. See the Mailes' Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, 
~~ 11,16. Moreover, the Mailes specifically allege that Clark and Feeney's conduct represented 
a "misuse and/or abuse of their position as public servants", which clearly shows that Clark and 
Feeney are named parties in this matter as a result of their conduct as legal counsel for the 
Taylors. As a result, Clark and Feeney clearly derived their interest in this matter from their 
relationship with the Taylors who were named parties in the prior proceedings at issue. 
Therefore, Clark and Feeney are in privity with the Taylors for purposes of resjudicata. 
2.	 The Mailes' claims in this matter represent the same claim from 
previously adjudicated proceedings for purposes of res judicata. 
Res judicata bars subsequent litigation involving the same claim at issue in prior 
litigation. Tical' at 633. In addition, the application of "res judicata is not limited to theories 
that were actually litigated in the prior lawsuit." Ticor at 633 (emphasis added). Importantly, 
the Idaho Supreme Court has long provided that: 
[T]he former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as 
to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, 
but also as to every matter which might and should have been 
litigated in the first suit. 
Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P. 241, 242-243 (1922) 
(emphasis added). More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court has reiterated this position by 
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providing that a prior adjudication "extinguishes all claims arising out ofthe same transaction 
or series oftransactions out ofwhich the cause ofaction arose." Diamond v. Farmers Group, 
Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150,804 P.2d 319,323 (1990) (emphasis added); see also Ticor at 620 
(citing Magic Valley Radiology, FA. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434,437, 849 P.2d 107, 110 (1993)). 
Further, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has provided that "it is immaterial whether the 
claims asserted subsequent to the judgment were pursued in the action that led to the judgment; 
rather, the relevant inquiry is whether they could have been brought. United States ex rel. 
Barahas v. Northrop Corp., 147 F.3d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). 
In the present case, all the Mailes' claims arise from the same series of events 
regarding the property that was the subject of the prior lawsuit. Thus, while the Mailes' fraud-
based claims were not specifically pled or litigated in the prior proceedings, such claims should 
have been raised and litigated by the Mailes because they arise out of the same factual 
circumstances at issue (i.e., the sale and possession of the Property) and relate directly to the 
pleadings filed by Clark and Feeney in such proceedings. See the Mailes' Amended Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial, ~~ 11,16. As stated, the fraud-based claims against Clark and 
Feeney pertain to representations made regarding the Taylors' status as trust beneficiaries in the 
pleadings submitted by Clark and Feeney on behalf of the Taylors in prior litigation. See the 
Mailes' Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, ~~ 11, 16. As a result, the Mailes' 
addition of fraud-based claims in this proceeding does not defeat the application of res judicata 
because such claims should have been raised and pursued by the Mailes in the prior proceedings 
in which the allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred and the underlying cause at issue was 
litigated. Therefore, the Mailes' claims in this matter represent the same claim at issue in prior 
litigation for purposes of res judicata. 
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3.	 Final judgment was entered in the previously adjudicated matters at 
issue. 
Finally, for the doctrine of res judicata to bar subsequent litigation, there must 
have been a valid final judgment on the merits in the former proceeding. Andrus at 634. 
However, "the finality of judgment element does not require the precise point or question in the 
present action be finally resolved in the prior proceeding." Farmers Nat 'I Bank v. Shirey, 126 
Idaho 63, 70, 878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994). Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court has provided that: 
In an action between the same parties upon the same claim or 
demand, the fOlmer adjudication concludes parties and privies not 
only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the 
claim but also as to every matter which might and should have 
been litigated in the first suit. 
Id.	 (emphasis added). 
In this case, valid final judgments were entered on the claims raised by the parties 
concerning the sale and possession of the property in Taylor v. Maile and before Judge Wilper. 
The parties to those proceedings had sufficient opportunity to raise any claims they wished to 
pursue regarding the property or conduct potentially effecting the property, and the Mailes' 
failure to raise their fraud-based claims against Clark and Feeney during such proceedings 
waived any right to later pursue such claims based upon the same facts and circumstances. 
Therefore, the Mailes' fraud-based claims at issue in this proceeding should have been raised and 
litigated in prior proceedings and the final judgments in such proceedings foreclosed the Mailes' 
ability to now pursue such claims. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the Mailes are attempting to circumvent the 
appeals process and initiate a separate lawsuit alleging claims based upon the same series of 
transactions at issue in former and ongoing litigation. Such conduct is barred by the doctrine of 
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res judicata and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8). Therefore, Clark and Feeney 
respectfully request that this Court enter its order granting their Motion for Summary Judgment 
with respect to all the Mailes' claims against them. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 2008. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
./7 1 /7 
By//t J./ ~ l' 
Mark . Prusynski - Oj~CFirm---­
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright 
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of October, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following:
 
Thomas G. Maile IV
 
LA w OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A.
 










1229 Main St., Suite 201
 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston,ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 386-5055 
Wyatt B. Johnson 
ANGSTMAN, JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
3649 N. Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703-6913 
Facsimile (208) 853-0117 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(.,.J Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(.I) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, N 
Attorney at Law J. DAVID NAVARRO, ClBrf,380 West State Street evA GARDE~; 
CEPI.;'C\Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kIa 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust~ JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County ofAda ) 










THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 Your Affiant is a Pro Se litigant in the above captioned matter and attorney of 
record for the Co-Plaintiffs. That the information and facts set forth hen:in are 
based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify 
as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
2.	 Wyatt Johnson was retained as co-counsel in this matter on or about September 9, 
2008. That sometime thereafter, Connie Taylor alleged that she had conversations 
with TJ Angstman involving the legal matters involved in either the CutTent 
litigation and/or the litigation on appeal. 
3.	 Based upon information and belief, a telephone conference was held with Idaho 
State Bar counsel Brad Andrews, Connie Taylor and Wyatt Johnson and Wyatt 
Johnson thought it best that he recuse himself from representing the Plaintiffs 
interests in this matter. 
Consequently, Plaintiffs request additional time to find co-counsel to represent the 
interests of the Plaintiffs in this matter. 
Wherefore, your Affiant prays that this Court enter it's Order vacating and continuing the 
current Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment to a time and date later determined 
after new counsel is retained. 
DATED this 22 day of October, 2008. 
T 









Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
;)i) day of October, 2008. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho Mary Sue Chase
 
NOTARY PUBLIC
 My Commission Expires July 30,2014 
STATE OF IDAHO 
~~"''''''''''--_-I 







THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
FILED '7ll"Z\-~A.M. __P.M~+ _ 
OrT 2 D?rnaoJ ",J{,I 
,J. DAVID NAVARRO. Clerk 
~Iy A. GARDEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
COMPELIMOTION FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. Your Affiant is the attorney of record for the above-named Plaintiffs, Berkshire 
Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-Maile and pro se, and makes this Affidavit in support of 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel/Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs. That the information and 
facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and 
can testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at th{: trial of 
this matter. 
2. Annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference is a true 
and correct copy of Defendants Connie Wright Taylor, Paul T. Clark, and Clark and Fe,eney's 
Responses to Plaintiffs' First Set ofDiscovery. Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
such discovery requests were not fully and/or completely answered by the Defendants. That the 
objections set forth by the defendants are not proper pursuant to the I.R.C.P., and the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence. 
3. Annexed hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the September 16, 
2008 letter from your Affiant to Mr. Prusynki regarding outstanding discovery responses and the 
same is incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.. 
4. Annexed hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy ofthe September 26, 
2008 letter from Mr. Prusynki to your Affiant and the same is incorporated by reference herein as 
if set forth in full herein. 
Further, pursuant to the failure of the Defendants to provide such discovery responses, 
Plaintiff asks that this Court award their attorney fees in the amount of $1250.00 as and for 
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reasonable expenses incurred for this Motion to Compel. 
DATED this 20th day ofOctober, 2008. 
TH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
AS G. MAIL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
20th day ofOctober, 2008. 
Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30, 2014 
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DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
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Defendants. 
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COME NOW defendants Connie Wright Taylor, Paul T. Clark, and Clark and 
Feeney, by and through undersigned counsel of record, and respond to Plaintiffs' First Set of 
Discovery as follows: 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I: Admit that Defendants provided legal 
services to the individuals DALLAN TAYLOR, R. JOHN TAYLOR, and REED TAYLOR. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. I: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.2: Admit that Defendants provided legal 
services to the defendant Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.2: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.3: Admit that Defendants provided legal 
services to the co-defendants in the consolidated captioned matters known as Theodore 1. 
Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, 
LLC, Ada County Case Number CY OC 04-056560, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case 
Number CY OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.3: Objection. This request 
is unintelligible, since the "co-defendants" in the referenced cases are the plaintiffs in this case. 
Defendants did not provide legal services to the Mailes or Berkshire Investments. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4: Admit that Defendants providecllegal 
services to the individual co-defendants prior to providing services in the captioned matters 
known as Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and 
Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CY OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs 
Maile, Ada County Case Number CY OC 04-00473D. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.4: Objection. This request 
is unintelligible, since the "co-defendants" in the referenced cases are the plaintiffs in this case. 
Defendants did not provide legal services to the Mailes or Berkshire Investments. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.5: Admit that Defendant provided legal 
services to the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust prior to providing services in the captioned 
matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile 
and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs 
Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.5: Clark and Feeney drafted 
documents for the remainder beneficiaries to sign so their mothers (Ted's sisters) could be paid 
their share of the principal of the trust. Other than that, any representation of the Trust was 
related to the lawsuits which were filed. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6: Admit that Defendant Connie Taylor 
provided false pleadings executed by her client as a verified pleading under oath in the 
consolidated captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas 
Maile. IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number 
CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.6: Deny. The pleadings 
accurately stated the status at the time. Helen Taylor was the only remaining direct beneficiary 
to the corpus of the trust, which at that time did not include the Linder Road property or a lawsuit 
by the trust to regain the property. The Taylors all specifically retained their rights to pursue 
that lawsuit, in which they ultimate prevailed. 
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REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.7: Admit that Defendant Clark and Feeney 
provided false pleadings executed by its client as verified pleading under oath in the consolidated 
captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand 
Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, 
and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.7: See Response to 
Request for Admission No.6. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8: Admit that on January 13, 2006, 
defendant Connie Taylor, an [sic] licensed Idaho attorney and acting as an officer of the court 
executed a proposed amended complaint which was executed under oath by R. John Taylor in 
the consolidated captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas 
Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number 
CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.8: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.9: Admit that on March 9, 2006, defendant 
Connie Taylor, an [sic] licensed Idaho attorney and acting as an officer of the court executed an 
amended complaint which was executed under oath by R. John Taylor in the consolidated 
captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand 
Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, 
and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.9: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.1 0: Admit that DALLAN TAYLOR, 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, and REED TAYLOR had renounced and disclaimed their interests in the 
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Theodore L. Johnson Trust and were no longer residual beneficiaries of the trust effective in July 
2004. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO.1 0: Deny. All of the 
Taylors specifically retained their interest in the lawsuit to recover the Linder Road property. 
The Rogers had distributed all the corpus of the trust except the amount which was to go to 
Helen Taylor, and the Taylor children merely agreed to disclaim any interest in that money so it 
could be distributed to their mother. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Admit that you were the attomeys for 
DALLAN TAYLOR, R. JOHN TAYLOR, and REED TAYLOR during the time they renounced 
and disclaimed their interests in the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 11: Admit. We were the 
attomeys, but deny (as set forth specifically in the preceding response) that the disclaimer 
extended to the Maile lawsuit, which the Taylors very specifically retained the right to pursue. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit that you were the attorneys of 
record for DALLAN TAYLOR, R. JOHN TAYLOR, and REED TAYLOR acting as "successor 
trustee" during the proceedings in the probate matter involving the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 12: Admit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: Admit that while you were acting as 
attomeys of record for DALLAN TAYLOR, R. JOHN TAYLOR, and REED TAYLOR [sic] 
drafted a petition for appointment of trustees, which stated "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, 
Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of trust by virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, 
Release, and Indemnity Agreement". 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 13: 
Admit Helen Taylor was the sole remaining direct beneficiary to the assets in the 
trust at the time of that petition, as explained in Response to Request for Admission No.1 O. 
The trust had not filed suit against Maile at that time, and the Taylor beneficiaries all retained 
their rights to pursue that lawsuit. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Admit that while you were acting as 
attorneys for DALLAN TAYLOR, R. JOHN TAYLOR, and REED TAYLOR you drafted a 
"Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity Agreement" for execution by all beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 14: Deny. Bart Harwood 
drafted it. 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO.1: Please identify each and every person, by name and 
address, know [sic] to you, or to your attorney, who had knowledge of, or who purports to have 
any knowledge of the facts which are the subject matter of this litigation. By this Interrogatory, 
we seek the identity of all persons who have knowledge of any facts regarding damages or 
liability or both. 
ANSWER NO.1: Defendants are not aware of any persons with knowledge other 
than those who were disclosed in the prior lawsuits. 
INTERROGATORY NO.2: With regard to those persons identified in 
Interrogatory No.1, please set forth in detail what knowledge each such person has with regard 
to the facts of this case. 
l. 
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ANSWER NO.2: Any discoverable infonnation responsive to this interrogatory 
was disclosed in the prior lawsuits. 
INTERROGATORY NO.3: Please state the names, addresses, and telephone 
numbers of all persons you intend to call at the trial of this matter. 
ANSWER NO.3: Defendants are not aware of any witnesses who were not 
disclosed in the prior lawsuits. 
INTERROGATORY NO.4: Please identify in full and complete detail each and 
every document, writing, or other physical evidence which you intend to offer as an exhibit in 
the trial of this matter. 
ANSWER NO.4: Defendants are not aware of any exhibits that were not 
disclosed in the prior lawsuits. 
INTERROGATORY NO.5: Please provide the names, addresses, telephone 
numbers of all current employees, independent contracts, agents, servants, etc. of Defendants 
full-time or part-time) from the date of January 1, 2002 to the present, who had any involvement 
with the claims against the plaintiffs in the captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number 
CV OC 04-00473D, and relative thereto, please indicate the following: 
(a) The dates they commenced their employment and or relationship with 
Defendant; 
(b) Their job description and any previous job description. 
ANSWER NO.5: Objection. This interrogatory is overly broad and is an attempt 
at harassment, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
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INTERROGATORY NO.6: Please identify each and every litigation in which 
you have been a party by providing the caption of said case, the case number and the coilli in 
which said action has or was filed, including, but not limited to, actions brought against you by 
any governmental agency or body. 
ANSWER NO.6: Objection. This interrogatory is overly broad and is an attempt 
at harassment, not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 
INTERROGATORY NO.7: Please identify each and every expert you intend to 
call at the trial of this case and with respect to each witness you listed, describe: 
(a) The subject matter on which each expert may testify; 
(b) The substance ofthe facts to which each expert may testify; 
(c) The substance of the opinions to which each expert may testify; 
(d) The expert witnesses' credentials which you allege qualify the witness as 
an expert. 
(e) The description of any and all reports prepared or used by persons who 
mayor will testify as expert witnesses at any hearings or trial of this action 
(0 The description of all documents in which the expert has reviewed in 
arriving at his opinion 
(g) The description of all the data or other information considered by the 
witness in forn1ing the opinions 
(h) The description of the qualifications of the witness, including a description 
of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years 
(i) The detailed description of any and all cases in which the witness has 
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
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(j) Is the expert to be compensated for his work and efforts in cOIUlection 
with this action? If so, please state how much he is to be paid. 
ANSWER NO.7: Defendants have not yet formed an intent to call any expert 
witnesses. 
INTERROGATORY NO.8: Please identify each expert you intend to call as an 
expert witness in this matter. With regard to each such witness, please state: 
(a) The substance ofthe facts and opinion to which each such expert will 
testify; and 
(b) The identity of any document or documents upon which each such expert 
will rely in giving testimony. 
ANSWER NO.8: Defendants have not yet formed an intent to call any expert 
witnesses. 
INTERROGATORY NO.9: Relative [sic] any ofthe documents described in 
your responses to the Requests for Production accompanying these Interrogatories please 
identify in full and complete detail each and every document, writing, or other physicaI evidence 
which has either been lost, misplaced or is otherwise not available at this time. Relative thereto 
please explain your inability to produce the same. 
ANSWER NO.9: We are not aware of any documents which are unavailable at 
this time. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 22 [SIC]: Please identify in full and complete detail 
each and every document, writing or other physical evidence which you relied upon in answering 
any of the interrogatories contained herein. 
ANSWER NO.1 0: None. 
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or 
copies of any correspondences, writings, e-mails, notes, memos, etc. that were provided by and 
between Clark and Feeney and/or their employees, independent contractors, agents etc., directed 
to any individual co-defendants and/or the defendant Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust 
and/or in the captioned matters known as Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas 
Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number 
CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04- 00473D . 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Objection. All 
requested documents are subject to the attorney-client privilege or are privileged work product. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or 
copies of all letters, memoranda, records, receipts, invoices, agreements, contracts and other 
documents and exhibits which Defendants, or Defendants' attorney, intend to use or oJIer in 
evidence at the trial of this case. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: No final determination 
has been made, but it is likely that any or all of the documents which were introduced as exhibits 
during depositions and the trial of the prior lawsuits may be used as exhibits. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or 
copies of any and all reports prepared or used by persons who mayor will testify as expert 
witnesses on behalf of Defendants at the trial of this action, together with all documents in [sic] 
which the expert has reviewed in arriving at his opinion, all documents which relate to all 
opinions to be expressed and the documents which relate to the basis and reasons therefore, 
together with all documents demonstrating the data or other information considered by the 
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witness in fonning the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support tor the 
opinions; any documents including but not limited to resumes demonstrating the qualifications of 
the witness, including all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; 
any and all documents indicating the compensation to be paid or which has been paid for the 
testimony; any and all documents which list of [sic] any other cases in which the witness has 
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Defendants have no 
reports at this time. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or 
copies of documents that indicate or establish the defendants were retained to provide the legal 
services of [sic] to any lndividual co-defendants and/or the defendant Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust and/or in [sic] any of the co-defendants in the captioned matters known as 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: The contingent fee 
agreement has already been provided to these plaintiffs in the prior lawsuits. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or 
copies of records or contracts that indicate the relationship (business or professional, including 
any memorandum, agreements, letters, etc. defining your relationship including but not limited to 
partnership, corporation, office sharing, co-counsel contracts, joint venture agreements, etc.) that 
existed between you and any other persons or entities relative to your professional relationship to 
wit: contracts, writings, memorandums, etc., that establish what type of business relationship 
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you and all said individual or entity were working under during all relevant times you provided 
services to any individual co-defendants and/or the defendant Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust and/or in the captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trusl vs Thomas 
Maile, IV and Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 
04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: Objection. This 
request does not seek relevant information and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or 
copies of any interoffice correspondences, writings, notes, memos, etc., that were provided by 
and or between you and anyone else who worked or which relate in any way to any individual 
co-defendants and/or the defendant Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and/or in the 
captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IV and 
Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-·05656D, 
and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.6: All documents of the 
nature requested are protected work product. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or 
copies of any correspondences, writings, notes, memos, etc., that were provided by and or 
between you and anyone else involved or which relate in any way to any individual co­
defendants and/or the defendant Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and/or in the captioned 
matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IV and Colleen Maile 
and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs 
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Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D, including any secretary, agent,. employee, 
or legal assistant directed to any third party or any other individual and/or entity referenced in the 
above Requests for Production or in your answers to Interrogatories relating to anyone you were 
associating with such cases. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7: This request is 
unintelligible. To the extent it is an attempt to request documents covered by the attorney client 
privilege and the work product privilege, defendants object to this request. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or 
copies of any records, notes, memos, time-slips, time-sheets, billing material, bills, or other 
writings that reflect the time, costs, and services associated with all matters and work performed 
on or which relate in any way to any individual co-defendants and/or the defendant Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust and/or in the captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IV arid Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number 
CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.8: Full billing records 
have already been provided to this plaintiff with the cost bill in the prior lawsuits. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or 
copies ofany and all copies of all pleadings, transcripts, legal research, work product, records, 
notes, memos, material, letters, telephone billing information documenting any and all telephone 
calls made or other writings that reflect the services rendered and associated with all matters and 
work performed on or which relate to any individual co-defendants and/or the defendant 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and/or in the captioned matters known as 17Jeodore L. 
DEFENDANTS CONNIE \VRIGHT TAYLOR, PAUL T. CLARK, AND CLARK AND 




Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments,
 
LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case
 
Number CV OC 04-00473D.
 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9: Objection. This
 
request is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and requests documents covered by both the
 
attomey-client privilege and work product privilege.
 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce the ORIGI1'JAL and/or 
copies of [sic] reflecting all telephone records, billings, charges, statements provided by 
Defendants (and/or anyone else which Defendants were associated with), long distance and/or 
local telephone company for all the months in which Defendants were providing services directly 
or indirectly or which relate to any individual co-defendants and/or the defendant Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust and/or in the captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number 
CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1 0: Object on relevance, 
and on the basis that the telephone records would contain confidential information on all the 
other clients of the firm. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: Please produce the ORIGWAL and/or 
copies of all insurance policies, binders, cover-sheets, declaration sheet, etc., indicating the 
insurance policy insuring Defendants (and/or anyone which Defendants were associated with) 
for the claims set forth in these present proceedings, including any and all documentation 
indicating the extent and dollar value of said policy including the Defendant's deductible[.] 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 11: A copy of the policy 
has been requested. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or 
copies of office calendars, personal calendars, or any other writing ofDefendants (or anyone 
which Defendants were associated with) for the period during the months in which Defendants 
were providing services directly or indirectly to any individual co-defendants and/or the 
defendant Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust and/or in the captioned matters known as 
Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 12: Objection. This 
request is overly broad. Office and personal calendars would contain confidential information 
unrelated to this lawsuit, and no information that is relevant to this action. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or 
copies of any correspondence, writings, notes, rough drafts, research notes, pleadings, memo, 
etc. that were provided by Defendants and/or anyone else who worked on any matters involving 
services directly or indirectly to any individual co-defendants and/or the defendant Theodore 1. 
Johnson Revocable Trust and/or in the captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IV and Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number 
CV OC 04-00473D. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Objection. This 
request seeks documents protected by the work product and attorney-client privilege. 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Please produce the ORIGll-TAL and/or 
copies of all items of advertising and/or business announcements related to Defendam's business 
and practice oflaw, including all web-site information (examples include all yellow page 
advertising; general notices published in any newspapers, periodicals, flyers, papers, magazines, 
continuing legal education seminars, internet advertising, internet promoting, internet history, 
internet personnel history, etc.) utilized by Defendants or anyone or any entity which Defendants 
were associated with during the proceeding five (5) years from this date. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 14: Objection. This 
request is overly broad, seeks irrelevant information and is not reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: Please produce the ORIGn-TAL and/or 
copies of all pleadings associated [sic] divorce between co-defendants Connie Taylor and 
R. John Taylor, including complaints, decrees, settlement agreements, marital agreements, 
contracts and/or any documents indicating the payments and/or sums relating to the litigation 
Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IV and Colleen Maile and Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs. Maile, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
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RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 15: There are no such 
documents. 
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2008. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
~ By----f------''---'''''V-''--''------'''------,6L---­
Mark S. rusynski - Of the F rm 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright 
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
DEFENDANTS CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, PAUL T. CLARK, AND CLARK AND 
FEENEY'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY - 17 Clienl9650731 000748
7 ~~~~~_,6L --
t
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
") ) ss. 
County ofM Z<' i~?c?-C) 
PAUL T. CLARK, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
I am a partner in the law firm of CLARK & FEENEY, and make this verification on 
behalf of myself and Clark & Feeney. 
I have read the foregoing DEFENDANTS CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, 
PAUL T. CLARK, AND CLARK AND FEENEY'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF'S' 
FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY, knows the contents thereof, and the same are true to the best of 
my knowledge, information, and belief. 
. Clark 
IJ 7 ()r(.. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to befor me this ~ day of August, 2008. 
----- /\/ ttl) 71 t( )~__ L'?& jr~2L_. __. 
NOTARY PU~LIC FOR IDAHO
 
Residing at _ (i ttl, S[l?) ( _
 
My Commission Expires _(ii/li2/2L!/~
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ) ss. 
County of _M-t:.lJ::C--.:0 ) 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
I have read the foregoing DEFENDANTS CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, 
PAULT. CLARK, AND CLARK AND FEENEY'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' 
FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY, know the contents thereof and that the same are true to the best 
of my knowledge, information, and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2l11V~y of August, 2008. 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at It" iUI 51Th 
My Commission Expire~O&/20 1'1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of August, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, PAUL T. 
CLARK, AND CLARK AND FEENEY'S RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SET 
OF DISCOVERY to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV (, ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State St. ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616-4902 ( ) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Connie W. Taylor ~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 ( ) Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 285 (-1 Facsimile 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 386-5055 
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LAw OFFICE OF 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, P.A. 




(208) 939-1000/ FAX (208) 939-1001 
EMAIL: EAGLELAW@GMAIL.COM 
SEPTEMBER 16, 2008 
BY FAX TRANSMISSION 
TO (208) 385-5384 
Moffat Thomas 
Attn: Mark S. Prusynki 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829 
Re: Berkshire Investment vs Taylor et al
 





Our office has received your discovery responses with your clients' objections interposed 
within the discovery responses. It is our position that such objections are inappropriate. Under 
the Rules of Civil Procedure, I request a conference for outstanding discovery, relating to the 
answers and production of documents which are now required and must be forthcoming. The 
rules require that we hold a conference to discuss outstanding discovery issues before requesting 
a court hearing. Consequently, I will be calling your office to discuss the status of the 
outstanding discovery requests. 
For clarification the following answers and/or responses to request for production need to 
be provided by your clients: 
INTERROGATORY NO.5.: Please provide the names, addresses, telephone numbers 
of all current employees, independent contracts, agents, servants, etc. of Defendants (full-time or 
part-time) from the date of January 1, 2002 to the present, who had any involvement with the 
claims against the plaintiffs in the captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case 
Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04­
00473D, and relative thereto, please indicate the following: 
a. The dates they commenced their employment and or relationship with Defendant; 
b. Their job description and any previous job description. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: any and all correspondences, writings, e-mails, 
notes, memos, etc. that were provided by and between Clark and Feeney and/or their employees, 
independent contractors, agents etc., directed to any individual co-defendants and/or the 













Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.7: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or copies of any 
correspondences, writings, notes, memos, etc., that were provided by and or between you and any 
one else involved or which relate in any way to any individual co-defendants and/or tht: 
defendant Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and/or in the captioned matters known as 
Theodore L Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile" Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-00473D, including any secretary, agent, employee, or legal 
assistant directed to any third party or any other individual and/or entity referenced in the above 
Requests for Production or in your answers to Interrogatories relating to anyone you were 
associating with such cases. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.9: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or copies of any 
and all copies of all pleadings, transcripts, legal research, work product, records, notes, memos, 
material, letters, telephone billing information documenting any and all telephone calls made or 
other writings that reflect the services rendered and associated with all matters and work 
performed on or which relate to any individual co-defendants and/or the defendant Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust and/or in the captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV 
OC 04-00473D. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 10: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or copies of 
reflecting all telephone records, billings, charges, statements provided by Defendants (and/or 
anyone else which Defendants were associated with), long distance and/or local telephone 
company for all the months in which Defendants were providing services directly or indirectly or 
which relate to any individual co-defendants and/or the defendant Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust and/or in the captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust 
vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case 
Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04­
00473D. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 13: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or copies of 
any correspondence, writings, notes, rough drafts, research notes, pleadings, memo, etc., that 
were provided by Defendants and/or anyone else who worked on any matters involving services 
directly or indirectly to any individual co-defendants and/or the defendant Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust and/or in the captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust 
vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case 















As you know the multi-count amended verified complaint has alleged a number of 
violations of Idaho Law by your clients and the co-defendants the Taylors and the Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust. There is based upon the attachments to the amended complaint 
sufficient allegations to support the numerous claims pursued in the present matter. The pleadings 
are verified in the current proceedings and have the verified pleadings contained from thl~ probate 
petition and amended complaint. Both documents were drafted by your clients representing R. 
John Taylor as well as other plaintiffs in the proceedings captioned Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada 
County Case Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 
04-00473D. The amended complaint in the Taylor v.s. Maile matter was verified under oath by 
Mr. R. John Taylor and was prepared and finalized by your clients who were active participates in 
the probate proceeding. 
There is no dispute that Connie Taylor, was an employee of Clark and Feeney and she 
executed the documents. Nor is there any dispute that your clients prepared the documents 
knowing the full status of the facts involved in all legal proceedings. The amended complaint was 
fashioned after the Supreme Court of Idaho authored its decision in Taylor v.s Maile. There was a 
clear motive and intent by your clients to fashion a verified amended complaint asserting "All of 
the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust." 
Such conduct, by your clients leads to the inescapable conclusion they participated and 
prepared the necessary documents to the district court in an attempt to materially affect the legal 
proceedings. A review of the Idaho Rules of Evidence does not support your objections to the 
relevant discovery requests propounded which you interposed a work product and/or an attorney­
client privilege. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 502, specifically provides exceptions to the claim 
of any attorney-client privilege and/or work product in the present matter. The illustrative 
provisions ofRule 502 provide: 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) Client. A "client" is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or 
other organization or entity, either public or private, who is rendered professional 
legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining 
professional legal services from the lawyer. 
(2) Representative of the client. A "representative of the client" is one having 
authority to obtain professional legal services, or an employee of the client who is 
authorized to communicate information obtained in the course of employment to the 
attorney of the client. 
(3) Lawyer. A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the 
client to be authorized, to engage in the practice of law in any state or nation. 
(4) Representative of the lawyer. A "representative of the lawyer" is one 
employed by the lawyer to assist the lawyer in the rendition ofprofessional legal 
service. 
(5) Confidential communication. A communication is "confidential" ifnot 






















made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or 
those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication. 
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the 
purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client which 
were made (1) between the client or the client's representative and the client's 
lawyer or the lawyer's representative, (2) between the client's lawyer and the 
lawyer's representative, (3) among clients, their representatives, their lawyers, or 
their lawyers' representatives, in any combination, concerning a matter of common 
interest, but not including communications solely among clients or their . 
representatives when no lawyer is a party to the communication*, (4) between 
representatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the client, 
or (5) among lawyers and their representatives representing the same client. 
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client or 
for the client through the client's lawyer, the guardian or conservator, or by the 
personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar 
representative of a corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in 
existence. The person who was the lawyer or the lawyer's representative at the time 
of the communication may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the client. The 
authority of the lawyer or lawyer's representative to do so is presumed in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary. 
(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule: 
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or 
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew 
or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; 
(4) Document attested by a lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue 
concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness. 
There is no dispute that Connie Taylor, notarized her husband's signature on November 
14th 2004, wherein her then husband stated under oath in the verified petition in the probate 
proceedings, at page two "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining 
beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement". 
The attorney client privilege does not exist under exception (4) for any document attested by your 
client. Furthermore, the notary who witnessed Mr. R. John Taylor verification in the amended 
complaint dated January 13, 2006 was an employee of Clark & Feeney who describes herself as a 
paralegal of the firm. Mr. Taylor in that verified amended complaint commencing at page stated 
under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a 
resident of Ada County Idaho. All of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. 
Johnson Trust". The two notarized signatures for both of Mr. Taylor's sworn statements were 
attested by representatives and/or employees of Clark and Feeney. I am attaching for your benefit a 
copy of Ms. Crane's email to the Idaho Supreme Court in December of 2007. The attorney client 
privilege does not exist in light of the exception above referenced. 



















John Taylor, on pleadings which were prepared by your clients. Both Connie Taylor and her then 
husband R. John Taylor are licensed attorneys at the time of the commission of the specific 
conduct alleged. Rule 502 exception specifically excepts from the attorney-client privilege 
activities which are alleged in the verified amended complaint of record. There are suffident 
allegations currently of record to establish that the exceptions exist and your discovery n:sponses 
and the objections are inappropriate in light of the record. 
Your clients' objection contained in your answer to interragatory number 4, is unfounded, 
escpecially in light ofMs. Crane's involvement in the matter as above referenced. There are other 
individuals whose names and job description may lead to discoverable material. Consequently, we 
deem this an appropriate interragotory that must be answered. 
Your clients' failure to immediately provide the outstanding discovery responses with the 
removal of the inappropriate objections relating to the attorney client privilege will result in the 
filing of a Motion to Compel wherein costs, attorney fees, and sanctions will be requested. Your 
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Thomas G. Maile 
Law Offices of Thomas G. Maile, IV 
380 W. State 
Eagle, ill 83616 
Re: Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, et al. 
MTBR&F File No. 17136.0306 
Dear Tom: 
I reviewed your letter of September 16 with my client, considered your requests and did some 
research. I also had a coincidental discussion with Merlyn Clark concerning your claim that the 
"attesting lawyer" exception to the privilege rule applied. We stand by our objections. and 
assertions of the attorney-client and work product privilege. 
Frankly, I believe that your arguments would render the attorney-client privilege totally useless, 
requiring an attorney to open the files to the opposing party whenever the attorney signed a 
pleading. Attesting to the authenticity ofa signature by an attorney merely allows the attorney 
to testify that the signature was authentic. There is no question here concerning the authenticity 
ofMr. Taylor's signature. In that regard, I am not sure why you are attempting to obtain the 
files. As you state on page 3 of your letter, "there is no dispute that Connie Taylor, (sic) was an 
employee of Clark and Feeney and she executed the documents. Nor is there any dispute that 
your clients prepared the documents knowing the full status of the facts involved in all the legal 
proceedings. The amended complaint was fashioned after the Supreme Court of Idaho authored 
its decision in Taylor v. Maile. There was a clear motive and intent by your clients to fashion a 
verified amended complaint asserting "all of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Tmst." If, as you say, all of those facts are undisputed, what is the 
purpose of requesting the files? 
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Thomas G. Maile 
September 26, 2008 
Page 2 
I also agree with your conclusion that my clients drafted documents in an attempt to materially 
affect the legal proceedings. I have always understood that was what attorneys do. Your 
numerous statements of supposed fact lead me to the conclusion that you are not attempting to 
discover facts, but are pursuing discovery for some other inappropriate purpose. I look forward 
to your motion to compel, since I understand you have already scheduled a hearing. 
Very truly yours, 
'-~7~ 
Mark S. Prusynski 
MSP/vrg 
Client: 10112531 000760h t: 53.
.......... FILED =mt-.---­"NO. 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
A.M P.M. ~-
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Counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile, and Pro Se 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. 




CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR flk/a CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; 
CLARK. and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. 
CLARK., an individual; THEODORE L. 
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho 
revocable trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; 
AND ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO COMPEL/MOTION 
FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS 
On July 23,2008 the Plaintiffs in the above captioned matter served Plaintiffs' First Set of 
DiscoveryDirected to Defendants Connie Taylor, Paul T. Clark and Clark and Feeney, a partnership 
to the Defendant's attorney ofrecord. Thereafter on or about August 25, 2008, defendants Connie 
Wright Taylor, Paul T. Clark, and Clark and Feeney provided their responses to Plaintiff:;' First Set 
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ofDiscovery (see Exhibit "A" attached to the Affidavit ofThomas Maile In Support ofMotion to 
Compel and Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs). The Plaintiffs incorporate by refen:nce herein 
their pleadings in opposition to Defendants' Motion Dismiss/Summary Judgment and Motion for 
Rule 11 Sanctions filed October 8, 2008 as further authority for the current motion to compel and 
sanctions. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The facts are rather straight forward and simple for the court to analyze the request to 
compel discoverable documents from defendants, Taylor and Clark and Clark and Feeney. 
Relevant to this Court's detennination, an analysis ofthe Idaho Rules of Evidence and Idaho 
Code is necessary to detennine if the requested discovery documents are in fact discov{:rable. 
The Court has before it a Verified Petition before the probate court, attached as Exhibit 
"A" to the Amended Complaint herein, wherein John Taylor verified under oath "the petitioner's 
88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the 
tenns of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement". Black's Law Dictionary R'evised 
Fourth Edition (1968) defines sole as "comprising only one person". That document was 
prepared by the law finn, Clark & Feeney and was signed by Connie Taylor, the wife ofR. John 
Taylor. 
In essence, the position of the Taylors before the probate court as indicated in the verified 
petition was that pursuant to a global settlement, disclaimer and indemnification agreement the 
Taylors' mother was the sole beneficiary of the trust. The probate proceeding before Judge 
Bieter involved the sworn testimony ofR. John Taylor, who once again, affinned the fact that his 
mother, Helen Taylor was the beneficiary of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL & 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS - Pg 2 
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The Supreme Court, in rendering its decision in the case Taylor v. Maile, decided in 
December of2005, did not have the benefit ofthe Taylors prior statements under oath before the 
probate court. The record before the Supreme Court in essence only contained the initial 
pleadings and a short transcript regarding the motion to dismiss relating to the lack of standing. 
The Supreme Court issued its decision regarding standing of the individual Taylors in the filing 
oftheir complaint in January 2004. The Supreme Court did not have the benefit ofthe global 
settlement, disclaimer and indemnification agreement nor did it have the Verified Petition before 
the probate court. 
After the issuance of the Memorandum Decision, the Taylors by and through their 
attorneys and law firm, caused to be prepared an Amended Complaint wherein R. John Taylor, 
once again, verified under oath the correctness and truthfulness of the facts relevant herein. That 
Amended Complaint provided "All ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. 
Johnson Trust." That particular Amended Complaint is annexed to the Amended Complaint 
filed in the current action as Exhibit "B". 
Based upon the transcript, Verified Petition and Verified Amended Complaint there is no 
doubt that the representations made to the District Court in January of 2006 amounted to an 
intentional misrepresentation of facts that were verified as truthful. The prior litigation filed by 
the individual Taylors in January 2004, and thereafter by the Theodore L. Johnson Trust in July 
2004, alleged negligence and breach of fidicuary by the plaintiff Thomas Maile, allegedly arising 
from paying the fair market value for real property, based upon an appraisal obtained 
independently by the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. The record in the prior case established that 
the Theodore L. Johnson Trust obtained independent legal counsel prior to the closing ofthe 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL & 









transaction and consistent with the advise from independent counsel, the Theodore L. Johnson 
Trust chose to close the real estate transaction approximately thrity (30) days after receiving 
advise from independent counsel. 
The Plaintiffs above named were subjected to litigation initially filed by R. John Taylor, 
Reed Taylor and Dallan Taylor who commenced their individual action in January 2004 as 
beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. The present plaintiffs appeared through counsel 
in the district court proceeding and filed a motion to dismiss the beneficiaries complaint based 
upon a lack of standing as beneficiaries to the trust. The motion was granted by the Honorable 
Judge Ronald Wilper in May of2004. Thereafter in an attempt to gain control of the trust the 
individual Taylors entered into the "Disclaimer, Release and Indl~mnity Agreement" with all 
beneficiaries of the trust, to gain control of the trust as alleged successor trustees. The second 
lawsuit was filed by the Taylors as successor trustees without court approval, for the benefit of 
the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust in July 2004. The Supreme Court issued its decision 
on the issue of standing of the Taylors as beneficiaries to pursue a claim in December 2005. In 
January 2006, the Taylors filed their Verified Amended Complaint which stated under oath, 
"Reed and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez Perce County, Idaho; DaHan Taylor is a resident 
ofAda County Idaho. All ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe Theodore L. 
Johnson Trust." (The verified amended complaint is annexed to Amended Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "B"). 
A Motion to Compel Discovery has been filed in this caSt: based on The Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 34, which provides the rules for discovery service after the commencement 
of the case: 
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Rule 34(b). Procedure. 
(2) The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a written respons1e 
within 30 days after the service of the request. The response shall state, with 
respect to each item or category, that inspection and related activities will be 
pennitted as requested, unless the request is objected to, in which event any 
reasons for objection shall be stated. If objection is made to part of an item or 
category, the part shall be specified.... The party submitting the request may move 
for an order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or other failure to 
respond to the request or any part thereof, or any failure to pennit inspection as 
requested. If the court orders the responding party to comply with the request, the 
court may also order that the requesting party pay the reasonable expenses of any 
extraordinary steps required to retrieve and produce the illfonnation. 
The defendants, have improperly objected to the discovery and consequently, this court 
should grant Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and impose sanctions in the 
fonn of costs and attorneys fees against the defendants. PlaintifU;; maintain that the objt~ctions 
interposed based upon attorney/client privileges does not apply to the records requested. 
A.	 The verifiedpleadings prepared, circulated, witnessed, and notorized by 
defendants, Connie Taylor, Paul T. Clark and Clark and Feeney acting 
on behalfoftheir collective clients establishes the truth that the 
individual Taylors were not beneficiaries ofthe trust at the time oftheir 
misrepresentations to the district Court in 2006. 
The case of Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315, 322, 63 P.3d 441, 448 
(2003), provides, "admission constitutes a binding judicial admis.sion -- "a formal ...statement 
made by ... [an] attorney, in the course ofjudicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the 
effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact." Strouse v. 
K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618,930 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing McLean v. City of 
Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783,430 P.2d 670,674 (1967». Judicial admissions may be 
considered for the purposes which they were made without admission into evidence, and' a party 
making an admission may not controvert the statement on appeal. rd. at 619,930 P.2d at 1364. 
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IDAPA 16 - Department ofHealth and Welfare Rule 16.03.05 provides the definition ofa 
sole beneficiary, "The only beneficiary ofa trust, including a beneficiary during the grantor's life, 
a beneficiary with a future interest, and a beneficiary by the grantor's will. (7-1-99)". 
Interpretation of a statute is an issue oflaw over which a court exercises free review. In Re State 
ofElliott, 141 Idaho 177, 181, 108 P.3d 324, 328 (2005). Administrative regulations are subject 
to the same principles of statutory construction as statutes. Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 
581, 586, 21 P.3d 903, 908 (2001). An agency's interpretation of its statutes is entitled to 
deference if (1) the agency is entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute in 
question, (2) the agency's statutory construction is reasonable, (3) the statutory languag4;: does not 
treat the precise issue, and (4) any of the rationales underlying the rule ofdeference are present. 
Pearl v. Board ofProfessional Discipline, 137 Idaho 107, 113,44 P.3d 1162, 1168 (2002). 
The matter is not complicated. Pure and simple, sole me:ans only. It is settled law in this 
state that a formal admission made by an attorney at trial is binding on his client as a solemn 
judicial admission. McLean v. City ofSpirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783, 430 P.2d 670,674 (1967), 
Hill v. Bice, 65 Idaho 167, 139 P.2d 1010. See, Bell, Handbook of Evidence (1957), p. 159. It is 
well recognized that a judicial admission, applied to the judicial proceedings in which ill is made, 
limits the issues upon which the cause is to be tried and obviates the necessity for proof of facts 
within the ambit of a distinct and unequivocal admission or stipulation so made. 31A C.J.S. 
Evidence § 299, p. 765, § 381e, p. 926; 29 Am. Jur.2d Evidence § 615, p. 668; 9 Wigmore, 
Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940), §§ 2588, 2590, pp. 586,587. 
Furthermore, "a verified pleading that sets forth evidentiary facts within the personal 
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knowledge of the verifying signator is in substance an affidavit, and is accorded the same 
probative force as an affidavit". Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 693 P.2d 1080 (Ct.App.1984), 
Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 594, 861 P.2d 1253, 1259 (Ct. App. 1993), Loveland v. State, 141 
Idaho 933, 120 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2005). State v. Badger, 96 Idaho 168,525 P.2d 363 (1974). 
The word "affidavit" is defined by Webster's Third International Dictionary (1967) as fl)llows: "a 
sworn statement in writing made especially under oath or on affinnation before an authorized 
magistrate or officer." Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition (1968), defines the term 
as follows: 
"A written or printed declaration or statement of facts., made voluntarily, and 
confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before an officer 
having authority to administer such oath. Cox v. Stem, 170 Ill. 442, 48 N.E. 906, 
62 Am. St. Rep. 385; Hays v. Loomis, 84 Ill. 18. A statement or declaration 
reduced to writing, and sworn to or affirmed before some officer who has 
authority to administer an oath or affirmation. Shelton v. Berry, 19 Tex. 154, 70 
Am.Dec. 326, and in re Breidt, 84 NJ.Eq. 222, 94 A. 214, 216." 
The consequences of the behavior ofthe defendant attorneys and their clients establishes 
a prima facie case of fraud, false pretense, peIjury and subordination ofpeIjury. For the purpose 
ofobtaining the legitimate discovery which the plaintiffs are entitled, all that is necessary is for a 
prima facie case to be established. The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege 
applies only if a prima facie showing is made of contemplated fraud. In re Monsanto Co., 998 
S.W.2d 917 (Tex. App. Waco 1999). 
B.	 The interjection and assertion by Defendants, Connie Taylor, Paul T. 
Clark and Clark and Feeney that the attorney clientprivilege and/or a 
work productprivilege exists is improper. 
The Affidavit of Thomas Maile has the defendants' answers to interrogatories and 
responses to request for production. The defendants have repeatedly inteIjected the objection to 
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the request for productions based upon attorney-client privilege and/or work product. The 
verified amended complaint sets allegations of"fraud upon the court", violations ofIdaho 
Racketeering Statute (encompassing allegations of specific criminal activity by all the defendants 
acting in unison). The amended complaint involves allegations that defendants, Connie Wright 
Taylor, flk/a Connie Taylor, and Paul T. Clark, and Clark and Feeney, a partnership 
participated, directly or indirectly, and engaged in multiple instances of"theft", "false pretense", 
and "peIjury"in violationofIdaho Law. Specifically, the allegations of the complaint assert the 
defendants engaged in multiple instances of"false pretense", "theft" and "peIjury" in violation of 
Idaho Code Sections 18-2403 and 19-2116. Idaho Code Sections 18-2401, 18-2403, 18­
2407(l)(a)(2)(3)(b)(l), 18-7803, 18-5401, 18-5410, 18-5406, 18·-5408, I.C. 19-1430, 19-1431 
(peIjury) and Idaho Code Sections 18-3401 18-2403,18-2407(1)(a)(2)(3)(b)(I), and Section 
19-2116 (theft-obtaining property by false pretense) Code Sections 18-2403. 
Mr. R. John Taylor was sworn under oath and provided testimony before the Honorable 
Judge Beiter on May 2, 2005 and testified: 
page 14, In 4: Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why it is that you 
want to serve? 
6 A. Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always 
thought it was a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is 
the beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this 
claim. 
Specifically, the promoting, drafting, and ultimately filing of the verification of the 
amended complaint in January 2006 constitutes criminal behavior and/or fraud. The 
attachments to the present amended complaint sufficiently set forth allegations to support the 
numerous claims pursued in the present matter. The pleadings are verified in the current 
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proceedings and have the verifications by Mr. R. John Taylor from the probate petition and the 
amended complaint which were both drafted by the defendant lawyers representing John R. 
Taylor as well as the other litigants in the proceedings captioned Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust vs Thomas Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Case 
Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV OC 04­
00473D. The amended complaint in the Taylor v.s. Maile matter was verified under oath by R. 
John Taylor in January 2006, and was prepared and finalized by defendant attorneys and/or their 
staff who were active participates in the probate proceeding. 
It may be true that none of defendant attorneys actually executed the documenta.tion as a 
verification ofthe facts in either the probate proceeding or the civil case above referenced, there 
is no dispute that Connie Taylor, was an employee ofClark and Feeney who executed the 
documentation under Idaho Rules ofCivil Procedure Rule 11. Nor is there any dispute that the 
defendant attorneys prepared the documents knowing the full status of the facts of both 
proceedings in the probate matter and the district court matters. The amended complaint was 
fashioned after the Supreme Court ofIdaho authored its decision in Taylor v.s Maile. There was 
a clear motive and intent by the defendant attorneys to fashion a verified amended complaint 
asserting "All ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Tmst." 
Such conduct, by the defendant attorneys and individual Taylors and the trust leads to the 
inescapable conclusion they participated and prepared the necessary documents to the district 
court to attempt to materially affect the legal proceedings. Idaho Code section 18-5410 states: 
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY. Every person who wilfully procures another 
person to commit peIjury is guilty of subornation ofpeIjury, and is punishable in 
the same manner as he would be ifpersonally guilty of the peIjury so procured. 
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A review of the Idaho Rules of Evidence is no avail to the defendants objections to the 
relevant discovery requests propounded by the plaintiffs to which the defendants have interposed 
improper objections. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 502, specifically excepts from the legitimate 
claim ofany attorney-client privilege conduct that amounts to criminal behavior and/or fraud. 
The illustrative provisions ofRule 502 
(d) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule: 
(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to 
enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should 
have known to be a crime or fraud; 
(4) Document attested by a lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue concerning an 
attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; 
There is no dispute that Connie Taylor, notarized her husband's signature on November 
14th 2004, wherein her then husband stated under oath in the verified petition before the probate 
court, at page two "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining 
beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the terms ofa Disclaimer, Rdease and Indemnity 
Agreement". Immediately above the signature the verification provides, ''''R. John Taylor, being 
sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing petition are true, accurate, and complete to the 
best of applicant's knowledge and belief'. The attorney client privilege does not exist under 
exception (4) for any document attested by the lawyer. Furthermore, the notary who wiltnessed 
Mr. R. John Taylor verification in the amended complaint dated January 13, 2006 was an 
employee ofClark & Feeney who describes herself as a paralegal of the firm. 
The defendants have failed to answer the following interrogatory: 
INTERROGATORY NO.5.: Please provide the names, addresses, telephone 
numbers ofall current employees, independent contracts, agents, servants, etc. of 
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Defendants (full-time or part-time) from the date of January 1, 2002 to the 
present, who had any involvement with the claims against the plaintiffs in the 
captioned matters known as Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust vs Thomas 
Maile, IVand Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments, LLC, Ada County Casle 
Number CV OC 04-05656D, and Taylor vs Maile, Ada County Case Number CV 
OC 04-00473D, and relative thereto, please indicate the following: 
a. The dates they commenced their employment and or relationship 
with Defendant; 
b. Their job description and any previous job description. 
The record before the court clearly indicates that at least one employee had involvement 
in the preparation, and/or notarizing ofthe false amended verified complaint. The material 
requested in interrogatory number 5 certainly may lead to relevant admissible evidence. The 
defendants were wrong in their blanket objection whereby they state, "Objection. This 
interrogatory is overly broad and is an attempt at harassment, not reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence." The court must allow the plaintiffs the opportunity to 
determine what other individuals worked on the cases outlined in the interrogatory. 
The two notarized signatures for both ofMr. R. John Taylor's sworn statements under 
oath were witnessed by representatives and/or employees ofClark and Feeney. The Affidavit of 
Thomas Maile in Support of the Motion to Compel has attached his letter to opposing counsel 
dated September 17,2008, which contained a copy of Ms. Crane's email to the Idaho Supreme 
Court in December of2007. Any attorney client privilege does not exist in light of exception (4) 
above referenced and documents must be provided. 
Finally, there should be no doubt concerning the actual subornation ofperjury committed 
by the defendant attorneys. Both Connie Taylor and her then husband R. John Taylor were 
licensed attorneys at the time of the commission of the specific criminal conduct alleged. There 
are a number of additional criminal acts referenced in the amended complaint, however, for the 
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purpose of the present matter, the court need only consider the allegations of perjury and 
obtaining money by false pretenses, for compelling the defendant attorneys to provide answers to 
interrogatories and responses to request for production. Rule 502 exception specifically excepts 
from the attorney-client privilege activities which are in furtherance of a crime or fraud. 
The recent case by the Idaho Supreme Court of In Re Dodge, 141 Idaho 215, 108 P.3d 
362 (2005 S.C.) provides 
Dodge does not argue she did not know the underlying fa.cts but instead contends 
her statement "was not deliberate on my part." The structure of the Code shows 
there is no need for an intent to deceive to violate I.R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1). Rule 8.4(c) 
states "it is unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." This Court held in Idaho State Bar 
v. Malmin, 139 Idaho at 309, 78 P.3d at 375, and Warner v. Stewart, 129 Idaho 
588,595,930 P.2d 1030, 1037 (1997), that clear and convincing evidence both of 
misrepresentation and the intent or purpose to deceive is needed to demonstrate a 
violation of the rule. Unlike Rule 3.3(a)(1), the application of Rule 8.4(c) is not 
limited to conduct before a tribunal and therefore is very broad. Rule 3.3(a)(1) 
states that a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a 
tribunal. "Knowingly" means actual knowledge of the fact in question and a 
person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. I.R.P.C. 1.0(t). To 
require an intent to deceive in Rule 3.3(a)(l) would be duplicative of Rule 8.4(c). 
If an attorney does not know if an assertion is true or (;annot point to a 
reasonably diligent inquiry to ascertain the truth of the statement, the attorney cam 
remain silent, profess no knowledge, or couch the assertion in equivocal terms so 
the court can assess the assertion's probative value. The standard of affirming facts 
to the court cannot be the negligence standard, which is the argument presented to 
the Court by Dodge. 
The finding by the hearing committee that there was no evidence to rebut 
Dodge's assertion her false statements were unintentional was clearly erroneous. 
First, Dodge did not testifY before the hearing committee but instead presented an 
"unsworn" letter in her defense and therefore there was no chance for the hearing 
committee to judge her credibility. Even if the letter is taken as sworn testimony, 
it is clear Dodge had actual knowledge of the facts of the "goose" case. She was 
the handling attorney in the "goose" case so she had the probable cause statement 
where there was no mention of a gun being "pulled" on an officer. She 
participated in plea negotiations prior to the sentencing hearing. She was present 
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at the sentencing hearing when it was explained by Ford exactly what happened, 
which was consistent with the officer's original probable cause report. The 
circumstances surrounding Dodge's statement show she knowingly misstated the 
facts to the magistrate, and therefore this Court upholds the finding that Dodge 
violated I.R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1). 
II. Was Dodge's Statement Material?
 
When Dodge made her false representation to the court on June 8,2000,
 
I.R.P.C. 3.3(a)(1) prohibited false statements only ifthey were "material." I.R.P.C. 
3.3(a)(1) (2000).(fnl) The rule at the time provided that "[a] lawyer shall not 
knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal." Id. 
This Court has defined the test for materiality as whether 
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in 
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or 
(b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient 
regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of 
action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it. 
Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 134 Idaho 338, 343,:2 P.3d 147, 152 (2000). 
By simply substituting the name Connie Taylor for Dodge the facts are virtually identical 
(excluding the reference to the goose). Defendant Taylor actively participated in the global 
disclaimer agreement between the beneficiaries of the trust and the successor trustees. Prepared 
under the letterhead of Clark & Feeney the verified petition in probate, notarized her husband's 
signature, signed the verified petition. Presumptively read the Supreme Court case involving 
Taylor v. Maile. Presumptively read the issues of standing contained in the court's decision. 
Drafted the proposed amended verified complaint in January 2006, signed the complaint, had 
Clark & Feeney's employee witness her ex-husband's verified signature. There are sufficient 
verified allegations in the present amended complaint to establish that exceptions exist to the 
attorney client privilege and discovery responses and the objections are inappropriate in light of 
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98 C.l.S. Witnesses § 336 Communications regarding commission of crime or 
perpetration of fraud, provides: 
Generally, communications made by a client to his or her attorney before or 
during the commission of a crime or fraud, for purposes of being guided or 
assisted in its commission, are not privileged. A communication is excepted from 
the attorney-client privilege if it is undertaken for the purpose of committing or 
continuing a crime or fraud. The attorney-client privilege: does not permit a 
litigant to commit a fraud upon a court. Communications made by a client to his 
or her attorney before or during the commission of a crime or fraud, for purpoS{~S 
of being guided or assisted in its commission, are not privileged. 
There is no lawyer-client privilege under the applicable Uniform Rule of Evidence if the 
services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or phm to 
commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud. 
Uniform Rules. of Evidence 502(d)(1). The purpose ofthe crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege is to assure that the seal of secrecy between attorney and client does not 
extend to communications made for purpose of getting advice for commission of fraud or crime. 
Olson v. Accessory Controls and Equipment Corp., 254 Conn. 145, 757 A.2d 14 (2000). 
Attorney-client privilege does not permit a litigant to commit a firaud upon a court. Owens 
Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Watson, 243 Va. 128,413 S.E.2d 630, (1992). Communications are 
excepted from the attorney-client privilege if it is undertaken for the purpose of committing or 
continuing a crime or fraud. State ex reI. Nix v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio S1. 3d 379, 700 N.E.2d 12 
(1998). 
Privileged communication between attorney and client may be shield of defense as to 
crime already committed, but it cannot be used as sword or weapon of offense to enable: person to 
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carry out contemplated crimes against society. Jafarian-Kennan v. Jafarian-Kennan, 424 S.W.2d 
333 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967). In the present matter the plaintiffs have provided ample evidence to 
support their claims advanced in the Amended Complaint and Demand For Jury Trial. There 
can be no justification for the improper interjection ofthe attorney client privilege to shield the 
wrongful conduct of the defendants. 
B. THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
AND THE DEFENDANTS ARE SUBJECT TO SANCTIONS. 
For the reasons and logic set forth above, the plaintiffs an~ entitled to their costs" attorneys 
fees and sanctions. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 37 provides for the award of 
sanctions/costs and attorneys fees in the event that the motion is improperly filed with the court. 
LR.C.P. Rule 37(a) provides authority for this Court to award sanctions, attorneys fees and/or 
costs. Rule 37 provides: 
Rule 37(a). Sanctions for violation oforders - Motion for order compelling 
discovery. 
a party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected
 
thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows:
 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court shall, 
after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose conduct 
necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of 
them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining th~ 
order, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the opposition to the 
motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust. If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for 
hearing, require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of 
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable 
expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the 
court finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. If the motion is granted in part 
and denied in part, the court may apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in 
relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a just manner. 
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This is clearly an attempt on the part of the defendants to stonewall the plaintiffs' lawful 
right to obtain documents surrounding the fraud and/or crimes perpetuated by the defendants. 
The record contains substantial proof that the plaintiffs have mel~t a prima facie case to establish 
an exception to the attorney client privilege and/or work product objections wrongfully 
interposed by the defendants. 
The Idaho Court ofAppeals case of Peterson v. McCawl§Y; 135 Id. 282, 16 P.3d 958 
(C.A. 2000), provides the guidelines for a trial court to follow in considering the imposition of 
sanctions, and commencing at page of286; of 135 Idaho Reports, the Court held: 
Permissible sanctions include those outlined in Rule 37(b)(2) for violation of 
discovery orders, and the imposition of sanctions under Rule 16(1) is subject to the 
same standards as sanctions for discovery violations. See Fish Haven Resort, 
supra. The use of such sanctions is discretionary with the trial court.... 
When such a discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court 
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (l) whether the lower court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason... 
In fashioning sanctions, a trial court should "balance the equities by comparing the 
culpability of the disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the innocent 
party." ....Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has established certain factors that a 
trial court must consider before imposing the most severe sanctions: "The two 
primary factors are a clear record of delay and ineffective lesser sanctions, which 
must be bolstered by the presence of at least one 'aggravating' factor, including: I) 
delay resulting from intentional conduct, 2) delay caused by the plaintiff 
personally, or 3) delay causing prejudice to the defendant." ...The trial court's 
consideration ofthese factors "must appear in the record in order to facilitate 
appellate review." 
The actions of the defendants are not justified in their blanket objections in their 
discovery responses. There is no basis for defendants' objections on the grounds of attorney-
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client privilege and/or work product to the first set of discovery. The Motion to Compd must be 
granted and the Court should award costs, attorneys fees and sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants in this matter have refused to provide documents pertinent to the 
preparation of plaintiffs' case for trial. Improper objections have been submitted by the 
defendants in an effort to sidestep the obligations of discovery provided under the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Plaintiffs pray that this court put an end to 
these games and compel the defendants to provide meaningful answers and documents for 
plaintiffs' preparation of this case for trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 2i.day of October, 2008. 
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BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
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v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
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COMES NOW, the undersigned, Thomas G. Maile, IV, pro se and attorney ofn~cord for 
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continuance pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) and further pursuant to the 
Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile, Iv., in Support ofMotion to Continue Summary Judgment 
Hearing Filed by Defendants Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark, filed 
concurrently herewith for this Court to reset all current hearing relating to the Motion to 
Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment for the facts and circumstances set forth in th(;: Affidavit 
ofThomas G. Maile which is incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in full herein. 
This Motion is based upon the Affidavits of Thomas G. Maile, IV, filed concurrently 
herewith and upon the file and record in this matter. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 23rd day of October, 200 
T AS G. MAILE, IV 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments, LLC 
and Colleen Birch-Maile 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day of October, 2008, I served the foregoing (1) 
MOTION TO CONTINUE SUMMARY JUDGMENT/MOTION TO DISMISS HEARING SET 
FOR NOVEMBER 6, 2008, (2) AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE and (3) NOTICE OF 
HEARING by having a true and complete copy personally delivered, by facsimile and/or by 
depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski () U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 8370 I () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
RENEWED MOTION TO CONTINUE SUMMARY JUDGMENTIMOTION TO 





           
 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
THOMAS G. MAILE, N.
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MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County ofAda ) 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV., IN SUPPORT OF 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 Your Affiant is a Pro Se litigant in the above captioned matter and attorney of 
record for the Co-Plaintiffs. That the information and facts set forth herein are 
based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify 
as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
2.	 Wyatt Johnson was retained as co-counsel in this matter on or about September 9, 
2008. That sometime thereafter, Connie Taylor alleged that she had conversations 
with TJ Angstman involving the legal matters involved in either the cun"ent 
litigation and/or the litigation on appeal. 
3.	 Based upon information and belief, a telephone conference was held with Idaho 
State Bar counsel Brad Andrews, Connie Taylor and Wyatt Johnson and Wyatt 
Johnson thought it best that he recuse himself from representing the Plaintiffs 
interests in this matter. 
4.	 That your affiant previously filed a Motion to Continue the motion to 
dismiss/motion for summary judgment by DaHan Taylor, R. John Taylor, and the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. That similar issues oflaw and £lcts are 
presented in both the motions filed by the collective defendants. 
5.	 That your affiant has filed previously affidavits and statements of uncontested 
facts, memorandum brief, relating to the plaintiffs' opposition to the motions filed 
by Dallan Taylor, R. John Taylor, and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust 
and said pleadings are incorporated by reference as opposition of the Defendants 














Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark's current motion for 
summary judgment. 
6.	 Because co-counsel Wyatt Johnson was requested to be disqualified from representation 
of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs have not been able to timely find replacement counsel to 
respond to the motion for summary judgments herein. 
Wherefore, your Affiant prays that this Court enter it's Order vacating and continuing all 
the current Motions to DismisslMotion for Summary Judgment to a time and date later 
determined after new counsel is retained. 
DATED this 13day of October, 
THOMAS G. L" Pro Se and 
Attorney for Berks . e Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
~ day of October, 2008. 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, IdahoMary Sue Chase
 
NOTARY PUBLIC
 My Commission Expires July 30,2014
STATE OF IDAHO 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £'k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FJlLED 
BY DEFENDANTS CONNIE 
WRIGHT TAYLOR, CLARK and 
FEENEY, AND PAUL T. CLARK 
AND IN SUPPORT FOR MOTION 
TO CONTINUE HEARINGS 
The plaintiffs above named, by and through their attorney of record, Thomas Maile N, 
and provide this Memorandum Brief In Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
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Judgement and further in support of the plaintiffs' motion to continue all dispositive motions, 
and provides: 
STATUS OF THE PLEADINGS 
The Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all their pleadings filed in opposition to the 
motion to dismiss/motion for summary judgment by Dallan Taylor, R. John Taylor, and the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, together with the briefing, and pleadings relating to the 
plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery. 
STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS 
The Plaintiffs have previously filed a Statement ofUncontested Facts and the same is 
incorporated herein as if set forth in full herein. 
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW: SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In ruling on a summary judgment motion pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56©, all facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, IBM Corp. 
v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194,677 P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1984). The non-moving party is also given 
the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence in the record. Thomas v. 
Campbell, 107 Idaho 398, 690 P.2d 333 (1984). The non-moving party "must respond to the 
summary judgment motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Tuttle v. 
Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150,868 P.2d 473,478 (1994). Summary judgment is 
appropriate where a non-moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to its case when it bears the burden of proof, see, SamYcl..Y. 
Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000). 
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1. THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE DEMONSTRATED SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR THE 
COURT TO GRANT A CONTINUANCE ON ALL DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 56(C). 
The plaintiffs have set forth sufficient reasons justifying this court to grant a continuance 
on the motions until new co-counsel can be obtained. Connie Taylor raised a conflict relating to 
the representative ofWyatt Johnson in the current proceedings. That issue was just rec:ently 
raised by Connie Taylor. Pursuant to a telephone conference with Brad Andrews with the Idaho 
State Bar, Wyatt Johnson determined a prudent approach would be to withdraw as co-counsel of 
record for the plaintiffs. Pursuant to Rule 56(c) the plaintiffs must be granted a continuance for 
the preparation of a full response to the pending motions. 
Rule 56{c) provides: 
Motion for summary judgment and proceedings thereon. 
The court may alter or shorten the time periods and requirements of this rule for 
good cause shown, may continue the hearing, and may impose costs, attorney ft:es 
and sanctions against a party or the party's attorney, or both. 
It is a well-established principle that a motion for continuance is addressed to the trial 
jUdge's sound discretion, Fitzgerald v. Walker, 113 Idaho 730, 747 P.2d 752 (1987), Krepcik v. 
Tippett, 109 Idaho 696, 710 P.2d 606 (Ct. App.1985). In the present matters before the court the 
plaintiffs have attempted to provide ample opposition to all pending dispositive motions, 
however, new co-counsel needs to be obtained to fully prepare and defend against the current 
motions. The plaintiffs have done nothing to hinder, delay, or obstruct the timely administration 
ofjustice, however, additional time is warranted for the retention ofnew counsel. A continuance 
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is certainly warranted under the present facts. In the event the court denies the motion to 
continue the following is provded. 
20 THIS COURT CAN NOT DISMISS THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT 
TO 10R.CoPo 12(B)(8). 
The defendants Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark's have not 
stated sufficient reasons for a dismissal pursuant to Rule 56 or Rule 12(B) (defendants" briefp. 
2). The current proceedings involve completely new causes of actions against different party 
defendants, in addition to the Taylors and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. 
The defendants cannot point to any other action pending involving the issues framed by 
these pleadings, to wit: (1) whether the defendants and their attorneys committed wrongful acts 
that are prohibited under the Idaho Racketeering Statue (Count Eleven); (2) whether the 
defendants committed acts that constitute abuse ofprocess (Count Five); (3) whether these 
defendants committed a fraud upon the court (Count One); (4) whether these defendants 
committed wrongful conduct in filing a verified pleading which was diametrically opposite to an 
earlier verified pleading previously submitted by the defendants before another tribunal, 
requiring an imposition of a constructive trust (Count Two); (5) whether the defendants 
committed acts constituting negligence and/or gross negligence (Count Six and Eight); (6) 
whether the defendants committed acts which constitute equitable estoppel, quasi estoppel and/or 
judicial estoppel, (Counts Nine, Ten, and Twelve). 
The plaintiffs have asserted multiple valid claims against the defendants in their 
Amended Verified Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. Under LR.C.P. 12(b)(8), a trial court 
may dismiss an action where there is "another action pending between the same parties for the 
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same cause." The trial court's determination under LR.C.P. 12(b)(8) whether to procel~d with an 
action where a similar case is pending in another court is discretionary. See Zaleha v. Rosholt, 
Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 129 Idaho 532, 533, 927 P.2d 925,926 (Ct. App.1996). 
However, arguably ifthis case is dismissed because ofpending appeal in the case Taylor 
v. Maile, the defendants may advance an argument that the refiling of the same claims would be 
barred by applicable statute oflimitations. The case of Eastem Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n 
v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 412, 987 P.2d 314,324 (1999) considered the argument that if a 
district court were to dismiss an action, it could deny a litigant its "day in court" because the 
statute oflimitations has run, citing Zaleha v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, Chtd., 129 Idaho 
532,927 P.2d 925 (Ct. App.1996). 
No other actions are pending which involve the current issues before this court. Iffor 
example a jury is to determine that defendants obtained property by abuse ofprocess and/or 
committed violations of the Idaho Racketeering Statutes, the plaintiffs will demonstrate damages 
including statutory damages beyond the issues that were germane in the appeals in Taylor v. 
Maile 1 or 2. The defendants' attempt to construe LR.C.P. Rule 12(b)(8) to apply to these facts 
and law is tortured and should not be considered by this tribunal. 
3. RES JUDICATA AND/OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL HAVE NO APPLICATION 
TO THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS. 
A. There Can Be No Cause of Action until a Party Has Been Damaged. 
Once again, It is a fundamental principle of law that there is no civil claim for rdief for 
damages, until a party has been damaged. The plaintiffs were never damaged by the actions 
complained of in the present matter until a Judgment was entered in the prior proceedings which 
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was based upon fraud, peIjury, and ultimately resulted in the entry of "Judgment on Beneficiaries 
Claims". We know from the record that as of July 15, 2004, as a result ofthe "Disclaimer, 
Release & Indemnification Agreement", there was only one beneficiary of the Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust, Helen Taylor (see verified Petition ofNovember 12, 2004). Until the 
entry of the "Judgment on Beneficiaries Claims" and the improper recording of the Judgment 
with the Ada County Recorder's Office, the plaintiffs had no cause of action for damages in the 
prior litigation relating to the loss ofthe real property. See the case ofFuller v. Wolters, 119 
Idaho 415, 422,807 P.2d 633, 640 (1991), cited in the plaintiffs' prior brief of record. 
In the present matter there are a number of claims asserted against the collective 
defendants and the same logic and reasoning addressed in the prior briefing of the plaintiffs 
relating to the motions filed by defendants Dallan Taylor, R. John Taylor, and the Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust, applies equally here. The defendants are alleged to be joint tortfeasor, 
improperly using the judicial system by perpetuating false verified pleadings and submj;tting 
other pleadings before judicial tribunals that were materially false in light of the judicial 
admissions ofboth the defendant attorneys and their clients. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process § 21 Attorneys provides: 
A non-client may bring a cause of action against an attorney for abuse ofprocess. 
The absolute privilege that protects attorneys from liability for defamation 
occurring in the course of a judicial proceeding does not provide an attorney with 
an absolute defense to liability for abuse of process. Thus, an attorney may be 
liable for damages for abuse ofprocess where the acts complained of are personal 
acts, or are the acts of others wholly instigated and carried on by the attorney. 
Observation: The scope ofan attorney's implied authority as an agent should not, 
as a matter oflaw, extend to acts which constitute an abuse oflegal process. In 
order to state a claim for abuse ofprocess against an attorney, a plaintiffmust 
establish that the alleged misconduct resulted primarily from the attorney's ulteriior 
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motive or malice. However, the mere institution of legal action by an attorney 
does not constitute abuse ofprocess, even where it is purportedly done with an 
improper purpose or motive; there must be a showing that the attorney performed 
some additional act in the use of the legal process that is not proper in the regular 
prosecution of the proceedings. 
The facts of record establish that the defendant attorneys participated before the probate 
court in judicially admitting that Helen Taylor was the sole beneficiary of the trust. The 
attorneys participated in providing testimony before the probate court, confirming that Helen 
Taylor was the beneficiary of the trust as a result of the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification 
Agreement". There was only one beneficiary of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, 
Helen Taylor (see verified Petition ofNovember 12, 2004 executed under oath by the R. John 
Taylor and prepared by his then wife, Connie Taylor). Connie Taylor, acting for the benefit of 
the Taylors in negotiating the terms of the Disclaimer Agreement, drafted a letter to Bart 
Harwood on April 14, 2004 which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up their rights as 
beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth will affirm her prior factual statements in the fOffiL of an 
affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. Ifwe aren't able to rea<;h an 
agreement on that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate 
tax returns". (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One deposition ofBeth Rogers Exhibit "B" 
referencing deposition exhibit 39). The Taylors got what they wanted from Beth Rogers and 
agreed to give up their rights as beneficiaries. The Taylors and their attorneys judicially admitted 
the same in the verified petition in the probate proceedings. 
Idaho Law is in accord with the authority above referenced. The case of Heinz v. Bauer, 
(2008 IDSCCI 33579 - 012508) provides ample authority recognizing the validity ofthl~ 
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plaintiffs claims against the attorneys and their clients. The decision the Idaho Supreme Court 
held: 
Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process by deliberate 
shifting ofpositions to suit the exigencies of a particular action. Id. at 153, 937 
P.2d at 1227.... 
For guidance purposes and to avoid misapplication ofjudicial estoppel, it should 
be made clear that the concept should only be applied when the party maintaining 
the inconsistent position either did have, or was chargeable with, full knowledge 
ofthe attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position. Stated another way, the 
concept ofjudicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party states undt:r 
oath in open court, but also what that party knew, or should have known, at the 
time the original position was adopted. Thus, the knowledge that the party 
possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the statement is made is 
determinative as to whether that person is "playing fast and loose" with the 
court.... 
In reaching our conclusion that statements made on behalf of a client in the 
course of representation are not personal admissions that may be used against the 
attorney in subsequent litigation, we note the potential impact of a different result. 
"If statements and arguments made by counsel in furtherance of a client's claim 
were routinely deemed to constitute binding admissions against a lawyer in a 
subsequent legal malpractice action, it could conceivably have a chilling impact 
upon the vigor and resulting effectiveness of counsel's advocacy.... 
This conclusion does not mean that every statement by a lawyer in the course 
of earlier litigation may not be used against that lawyer in a subsequent 
malpractice action. Representations of fact, purporting to be on the basis of the 
lawyer's personal knowledge, may well be used against that lawyer in subsequent 
proceedings. Barcola, 82 Pa D & C 4th at 408 n.3. Certainly, statements in an 
affidavit of an attorney purporting to be based upon personal knowledge would 
not be governed by our holding today. 
In the present matter the record is complete establishing that the attorneys representing 
the Taylors and the trust, were fully aware of facts which were verified under oath before the 
probate court. In fact Connie Taylor admitted in her letter to Bart Harwood, her clients would 
disclaim their interests in the trust after assurances were provided from Beth Rogers, the 
nominated successor trustee to Theodore L. Johnson. The Disclaimer Agreement was executed 
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by the Taylors under the watchful eye of Connie Taylor, and then later was affinned under oath 
in the verified probate petition, prepared by Connie Taylor that Helen Taylor was the "sole 
remaining beneficiary". 
Things changed after the Supreme Court decision. The verified amended complaint 
executed under oath on January 13,2006 by R. John Taylor was an attempt to take improper 
advantage of the Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Maile 1. The Judgment on Beneficiaries 
Claim entered on June 7, 2006 was entered pursuant to the misrepresentation of the Taylors 
acting in unison with their counsel as to their status as beneficiaries in January 2006. All party 
defendants had sufficient facts based upon their own admissions, pleadings, testimony, that the 
verified amended complaint contained significant material falsehoods. 
There must be damages incurred for a civil claim alleging wrongful behavior to filed. In 
the present matter the damages alleged do not stem from the same transaction in the prior 
litigation. In the present case, the plaintiffs filed the verified pleadings alleging a number of 
counts. The premise ofthe allegations are centered upon the defendants and their counsel 
committing wrongful conduct which among other things involve perjury. There is no 
justification or excuse for the defendants' actions before the probate court and the district court. 
There is no dispute that Connie Taylor, notarized her husband's signature on November 14th 
2004, wherein her then husband stated under oath in the verified petition before the probate 
court, on page two "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining 
beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the tenns of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity 
Agreement". Immediately above the signature the verification provides, ""R. John Taylor, being 
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sworn, says that the facts set forth in the foregoing petition are true, accurate, and complete to the 
best of applicant's knowledge and belief' (Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part Two Exhibit "I"). 
The case of Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315, 322, 63 P3d 44 ll, 448 
(2003), provides, " admission constitutes a binding judicial admission -- "a formal ...statement 
made by ... [an] attorney, in the course ofjudicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the 
effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact." Strouse v. 
K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618,930 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing McLean v. City of 
Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783, 430 P.2d 670,674 (1967)). Judicial admissions may be 
considered for the purposes which they were made without admission into evidence, and a party 
making an admission may not controvert the statement on appeal. Id. at 619,930 P.2d at 1364. 
(emphasis added). 
After the Idaho Supreme Court rendered its decision in Taylor v. Maile 1, on D(xember 
23, 2005, the Taylors individually and acting as trustees sought to take improper advantage ofthe 
decision. The Supreme Court decision related to the issue of standing. On March 9,2006, a 
Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, before the district court which was 
prepared by the co-defendant attorneys. Page 1 of the Verified Amended Complaint states under 
oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a 
resident of Ada County Idaho. All ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe Theodore L. 
Johnson Trust." (The verified amended complaint is annexed to Amended Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "B") (emphasis added). 
Specifically, the promoting, drafting, and ultimately filing ofthe verification ofthe 
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amended complaint in March 2006 constituted criminal behavior and/or fraud. Idaho Code 
Section 18-5401 provides: 
PERJURY DEFINED. Every person who, having taken an oath that he will 
testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, before any competent tribunal, legislative 
committee, officer, or person in any of the cases in which such an oath may by 
law be administered, wilfully and contrary to such oath, states as true any mateJial 
matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of perjury. 
The case of State V. Wolfrum; 175 P.3d 206 (C.A.2007) provides relevant standards 
involving a criminal case of perjury. Commencing at p. 210 of 175 P.3d Reports, the Idaho 
Court ofAppeals provides: 
The test for materiality is whether the testimony probably would or could 
influence a tribunal or jury on the issue before it. The false statement relied upon 
need not bear directly upon the ultimate issue of fact. A statement is material if it 
is material to any proper point of inquiry, and if it is calculated and intended to 
bolster the witness' testimony on some material point or to support or attack his 
credibility. The degree ofmateriality is not important. Instruction No. 22, which 
quoted I.C. § 18-5406, stated: It is no defense to a prosecution for perjury that the 
accused did not know the materiality of the false statement made by him; or that it 
did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which it was made. It is sufficient 
that it was material, and might have been used to affect such proceeding. 
In addition to the above, the Taylors and their counsel, did not commit only one material 
misrepresentation to a judicial tribunal. The Taylors initially lost at the trial level by a dismissal 
on their individual claims in early 2004. They appealed the decision and provided a material 
misstatement of fact in their opening brief before the Idaho Supreme Court in case number 
30817,004, "The Taylors are beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson Trust.. ..". We know that 
such a statement was a false statement made with a false pretenses to obtain money and/or 
property from the plaintiffs. The Taylors were attempting to have their cake and eat it at the 
same time. 
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B. The plaintiffs have sufficiently stated valid claims which must survive 
summary judgment. 
The plaintiffs have asserted a claim for abuse of process, among other claims. ] Am. Jur. 
2d Abuse of Process § 19 further provides: 
§ 19. Persons procuring, aiding, abetting, advising, consenting, or ratifying 
abusive acts. Liability for the abuse of process tort generally extends to all who 
knowingly procure, participate in, aid, or abet the abuse, and those who advise or 
consent to the abusive acts, or who subsequently adopt or ratify them, are liable: as 
joint tortfeasors. 
The plaintiffs have alleged a claim for abuse of process centered primarily upon the 
perjured sworn statement advanced by the Taylors with the aid of their attorneys. The case of 
Cunningham v. Jensen (2005 Idaho 31332 _ P.3d _ S.C. 2005) provides: 
To establish a claim for abuse of process there must be a showing by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant has (1) affirmatively used a legal process 
against the plaintiff; (2) primarily to accomplish an improper purpose outside of 
simply gaining an advantage in the underlying litigation for which the process was 
not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff by misuse of the 
process external to the litigation that cannot be compensated in the underlying 
proceeding. Again, the allegations in a complaint pleading abuse ofprocess must 
be made with specificity, alleging the facts supporting each element of the cause 
of action. 
The plaintiff could not have litigated the current claims against the Taylors, the trust, nor 
the attorneys prior to the actual entry of the Judgment and wrongful filing of the same with the 
Ada County Recorder's Office. That action is what gives rise to a claim for damages and 
consequently gives rise to a claim for relief. 
The plaintiffs have further alleged violations under the Idaho Racketeering Statue. There 
are multiple actions committed by the defendants which give rise to valid claims under the 
Statute. "Racketeering" means any act chargeable under the enumerated list of predicate acts in 
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Idaho Code § 18-7803(a)(1)-(21). Idaho Code § 18-7804(c) provides: 
It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to 
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of such 
enterprise by engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity. Whoever violates the 
provisions of this subsection is guilty of a felony. 
The case of Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007), provides 
the following: 
An "enterprise" is defined as "any sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, 
business, labor union, association or other legal entity or any group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit 
entities." I.C. § 18-7803(c). A "pattern of racketeering" is defined as: 
engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering conduct that have the saffii~ 
or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of commission, or 
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated 
incidents, provided at least one (1) of such incidents occurred after the effective: 
date of this act and that the last of such incidents occurred within five (5) years 
after a prior incident of racketeering conduct. 
I.C. § 18-7803(d). A single scheme may be sufficient to establish a pattern of 
racketeering ifthe plaintiff establishes "that the predicate acts themselves amount 
to, or constitute a threat of, continuing racketeering activity." Spence v. Howe11" 
126 Idaho 763, 775, 890 P.2d 714, 726 (1995). 
The plaintiffs have previously addressed the elements of perjury above and need not 
recite the same here. In addition the actions alleged against the defendants constitute obtaining 
money or property by false pretenses. The Taylors' repeated assertions that they are "n::sidual 
beneficiaries" before the Idaho Supreme Court and the district court meets the threshold required 
ofthe plaintiffs. Such misrepresentations are in violation of the Idaho Racketeering Statute. 
Idaho Code 18-7803, provides" (10) Fraudulent practices, false pretenses, insurance fraud, 
financial transaction card crimes and fraud generally (sections 18-2403, 18-2706, 18-3002, 18­
3101, 18-3124, 18-3125, 18-3126, 18-6713,41-293, 41-294 and 41-1306, Idaho Code)". 
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The Racketeering Statute gives rise to an independent cause of action, completely 
different and distinct from any claims involved in the prior litigation. Once again thef(~ was no 
claim of damage that accrued until the defendants were successful with their peIjury and false 
pretenses before the courts. 
The plaintiffs have alleged fraud. A claim of fraud requires the plaintiff to establish nine 
elements with particularity: (1) a statement or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its 
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that there be 
reliance; (6) the hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) 
justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant injury. Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 
368, 109 P.3d 1104, 1110 (2005) (citing Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222, 226,46 P.3d 518, 
522 (2002) (citing Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847,851,934 P.2d 20, 24 (1997). Once again 
there can be no claim for fraud until a "resultant injury". The loss of the real property based 
upon the "Judgment on Beneficiaries Claims" which was obtained by individuals that no interest 
as beneficiaries of trust and was fraudulent and constituted peIjury (established by judicial 
admission of record). 
It is noteworthy to consider the state of the record in the prior litigation. The Honorable 
Judge Wilper had earlier entered the court's Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28,2005 
allowing the "trust" to amend its complaint after the successor trustees received the required 
appointment by the probate court. The district court did grant the current plaintiffs' motion in 
part ruling that the Taylors and the trust had waived rights to rescind the contract as "once a party 
treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recision, the right of 
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recision is waived." The District Court further found that the Plaintiffs (Theodore L. Johnson 
Revocable Trust and the Taylors), now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to pursue 
rescission once the grounds for it arose. The district court prior to the Supreme Court decision 
would not allow the trust or the Taylors to rescind the real estate transaction (Affidavit of 
Thomas Maile Part Two Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28, 2005 Exhibit "K"). In 
essence the trust conceivably had a claim for monetary damages but not a claim to have the real 
property restored. The real property was restored to the trust solely based upon the 
misrepresentations ofthe Taylors and their counsel. It was the entry ofthe Judgment and 
recording with County Recorder's Office, which divested Berkshire Investment of title that a new 
claim for relief accrued that was separate and apart from the transaction involved in tht: prior 
litigation. 
In the present case the multiple claims advanced against all the defendants cannot 
remotely be inferred to arise out ofthe same transaction involved in the prior litigation. For 
clarity the plaintiffs could not have advanced any claim relating to the loss of property, in the 
prior litigation as they sustained no damages until the entry of the "Judgment on Beneficiaries 
Claims" and the same was recorded of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office. Had the 
plaintiffs attempted such a course of action they would have been subject to a Rule 11 sanction 
for attempting to do so. 
4. THE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS WERE NOT RIPE CONSEQUENTLY THE 
DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DO NOT APPLY. 
The case Rodriguez v. Dep't ofCorr., 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 403 (2001), 
provides an analysis of the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel and states: 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 








Whether collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues adjudicated in prior 
litigation between the same parties is a question of law upon which we exercise 
free review. See Richardson v. Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Three Dollars, 
United States Currency, 120 Idaho 220, 814 P.2d 952 (Ct. App.199l); Gilbert v. 
State, 119 Idaho 684,809 P.2d 1163 (Ct. App.1991). B. Collateral Estoppel 
Before considering the application of collateral estoppel to this case, it is helpful 
to discuss the term as it relates to the doctrine of res judicata and identify the 
values it serves. Although the literal definition of the term "res judicata" is 
expansive enough to cover both preclusion ofrelitigation ofthe same cause of 
action and relitigation of the same issue, the modem tendency is to refer to the 
aspect of the doctrine that precludes relitigation of the same issue in a separate 
cause ofaction as "collateral estoppel," and to refer to that aspect preventing 
relitigation of the same cause of action as "res judicata." See 46 AmJur.2d 
Judgments s 516 (1994). Collateral estoppel thus applies to protect litigants from 
the burden oflitigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy. See 
D.A.R., Inc. v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141, 144, 997 P.2d 602, 605 (2000). \Vith this 
background in mind, we tum to the question *128 of whether collateral estoppel 
should have been applied in this case. 
This Court has determined that five factors must be evident in order for 
collateral estoppel to bar the relitigation of an issue determined in a prior 
proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue 
decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present 
action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior 
litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and 
(5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a 
party to the litigation. See Sheffer, 134 Idaho at 144,997 P.2d at 605; see also 
Western Indus. & Envtl. Serv., Inc. v. Kaldveer Assoc., Inc., 126 Idaho 541, 544, 
887 P.2d 1048, ]051 (1994); Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 184, 
731 P.2d 171, 179 (1987). 
Once again, the simple facts demonstrate that the plaintiffs did not have a cause of action 
until they were damaged. The damage that give rise to the cause of action arose upon the entry of 
the judgment and the recording of the same based upon the wrongful conduct of the defendants. 
There was no cause of action that existed until the entry of the judgment which created damages 
to the plaintiffs. 
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The court needs to consider the issue of ripeness in analyzing the defense of res judicata 
raised by the defendants. Prior litigation does not bar new cause of action that was not ripe in 
prior proceedings. Gaige v. City of Boise, 91 Idaho 481, 485,425 P.2d 52, 56 (1967). The 
'sameness' of a cause of action for purposes of application of the doctrine of res judicata is 
detetmined by examining the operative facts underlying the two lawsuits. Houser v. Southern 
Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441, 649 P.2d 1197 (1982), Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho 
Department ofWater Resources, 138 Id. 831, 839, 70 P.3d 669,677 (2003). 
The case of Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983)" involved 
a claim of res judicata in light ofthe ripeness of the claims and the court detetmined that a 
judgment in the first lawsuit did not preclude litigation in the second lawsuit if the issues were 
not ripe for trial. See also Nash v. Overholser, 114 Idaho 461, 757 P.2d 1180 (1988). 
The claim preclusion component of res judicata does not apply if there has not been a 
final adjudication on the merits, Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Bannon, 128 Idaho 41, 44, 
910 P.2d 155, 158 (1995), Gilbert v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 137, 140,657 P.2d 
1,4(1983). 
The plaintiffs could not have presented a claim in the prior litigation since there was no 
damage in the prior litigation until the Berkshire Investment lost its title to the real property, 
based upon the defendants collectively committing wrongful acts under the Idaho Racketeering 
Statue, the defendants collectively committing acts that constituted abuse of process, the 
defendants collectively committing a fraud upon the court; the defendants committing acts 
constituting negligence and/or gross negligence, the defendants collectively committing acts 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND IN SUPPORT FOR CONTINUANCE - Pg 17 
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which constitute judicial estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should allow the plaintiffs time to obtain new counsel to pursue their defenses 
to these motions and a continuance should be granted. However, in the event, the court denies 
the motion for a continuance, there are abundant facts of record in this matter to defeat the 
defendants' attempt to have these proceedings dismissed. There is no legitimate basis or 
application of res judicata or collateral estoppel barring the present claims of the plaintiffs. The 
defendants' motion to dismiss and/or their motions for summary judgment must be denied. 
DATED this 23rd day of October, 2008. 
THOMAS G. MILE, 
Pro Se and counse or Berkshire Investments, LLC 
and Colleen Birch-Maile 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 23rd day ofOctober, 2008, I served the foregoing (l) 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND IN SUPPORT FOR CONTINUANCE by having a true and complete copy personally 
delivered, by facsimile and/or by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid 
thereon, and addressed as follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski () U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
THOMAS G. MAILE, 0 Se and 
Attorney for Berkshire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 






THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
'I..,f" -, 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STAY 
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS UNTIL 
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
PROVIDES A DECISION IN 
COMPANION CASE AND/OR SET 
THE MATTER FOR JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord, Thomas G. Maile, 
IV, and move this Court for an Order staying further proceedings pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rules 
62(f), 62(g), 83(1) and further pursuant to the Affidavit in Support of the p1aintifrs' Motion to 
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Stay Further Proceedings until the Idaho Supreme Court Provides a Decision in Comp~mion Case 
And/or Set the Matter for Jury Trial. 
This Motion is based upon the Affidavit ofThomas Maile filed concurrently herewith and 
upon the file and record in this matter. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 1 day of January, 2009_._~~~--"",--~----....;... _ 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and pro se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 17 day of January, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing (1) PLAINTIFFS' MahON TO STAY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
UNTIL THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT PROVIDES A DECISION IN COMPANION CASE 
AND/OR SET THE MATTER FOR JURY TRIAL, (2) AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STAY FURTHER PROCEEDINGS UNTIL THE IDAHO 
SUPREME COURT PROVIDES A DECISION IN COMPANION CASE AND/OR SET THE 
MATTER FOR JURY TRIAL and (3) NOTICE OF HEARING to be delivered, addressl~d as 
follows: 
Mark Stephen Prusynski 
PO Box 829 
(0
( ) 
u. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor 
CLARK and FEENEY 
(vi
( ) 
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and pro se 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
' •• ...;; .~<~'... ~. \'.. ' }, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS l\IAILE 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO STAY FURTHER 
PROCEEDINGS UNTIL THl!: 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
PROVIDES A DECISION IN 
COMPANION CASE AND/OR SET 
THE MATTER FOR JURY TRIAL 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STAY - Pg 
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County ofAda ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, N, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 Your Affiant is the counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch-
Maile and in addition is a named plaintiffherein. That the infonnation and facts set forth 
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can 
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
2.	 That the court previously held a status conference via telephone, on June 24, 2008, 
wherein the parties and/or their attorneys of record indicated that the matter Taylor 
v. Maile, was set for oral argument before the Idaho Supreme Court in Novembe:r 2008. 
That no scheduling order was entered based upon the hearing before the Supreme 
Court. That the Supreme Court has not rendered its decision to date. 
3.	 That there are pending motions before the court, which have all been vacated by 
the various parties. That the plaintiffs herein had retained counsel, however, defendants 
objected to counsel. 
4.	 Co-counsel Wyatt Johnson was requested to be disqualified from representation of the 
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have not been able to obtain new co-counsel regarding these 
proceedings, in part, because the Idaho Supreme Court has not rendered its decision. 
5.	 That judicial economy would be promoted to stay the current proceedings to allow the 













Idaho Supreme Court to render its decision in the matter Taylor v. Maile. That in the
 
alternative, a scheduling order should be entered and/of a trial date be set allowing the
 
plaintiffs to obtain new counsel.
 
DATED this -1- day of January, 20 9.
 
THOMAS G. MX L , IV, ro se and 
Attorney for Berkshire vestments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
__ day of January, 2009. 1 
Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30,2014 
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~::/ L .•\ .;:,-~Attorney at Law ,-, "'?,-,r 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £'k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS MAILE 
PART THREE 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County ofAda ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
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1.	 Your Affiant is the counsel ofrecord for Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Birch­
Maile and in addition is a named plaintiffherein. That the information and facts set forth 
herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can 
testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial 
of this matter. 
2.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "P" is a true and correct copy ofthe Appellants/Cross­
Respondents' Amended Motion to Augment Record filed before the Idaho Supreme 
Court dated November 12,2008. 
3.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "Q" is a true and correct copy of the Amended Affidavit in 
Support ofAppellants/Cross-Respondents' Motion to Augment Record, and the 
attachment referenced therein. The original affidavit to augment was amended to reflect 
that the only exhibit which was attached was a true and correct copy ofthe reporter's 
transcript from the hearing dated May 25,2005 before the Honorable Christopher Bieter, 
Judge ofthe Probate Court in case number CY-TR-2004-22118 filed and bearing a file 
stamp of July 07,2008. That the transcript provided to the Idaho Supreme Court is 
annexed hereto in Exhibit "Q". 
4.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "R" is a true and correct copy of the Appellants/Cross­
Respondents' Memorandum in Support ofAmended Motion to Augment Record. 
5.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "S" is a true and correct copy ofthe Idaho Supreme Court 
Order denying Motion to Augment Record relative to the Amended Motion to Augment. 
6.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "T" is a true and correct copy of the Amended Affidavit in 
Support ofMotion to Augment Clerk's Record filed by the Taylors & the Johnson Trust 


















Defendants in this action in the Supreme Court Docket No. 33781 dated November 7, 
2008. 
7.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "U" is a true and correct copy of the Appellants/Cross-
Respondents' Objection to Respondents/Cross-Appellants' Motion to Augment Record. 
8.	 Annexed hereto as Exhibit "V" is a true and correct copy ofthe Idaho Supreme Court 
Order to Take Judicial Notice dated November 7, 2008. 
9.	 DATED this 31st day ofDecember, 20 8. 
THOMAS G. IL, IV, pro se and 
Attorney for BerK Ire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
31st day of December, 2008. 
Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE. OF IDAHO 
..... .-.;;o'... li.~""' .......__...... 
NOtary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30,2014 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Co-Counsel for Appellants/Cross Respondents 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Respondents/Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Appellants/Cross-Respondents. 





THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
 





Supreme Court Docket No. 33781 
District Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
APPELLANTS/CROSS­
RESPONDENTS' AMENDED 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 
COMES NOW, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Thomas G. Maile, IV, and pursuant to Rules, 30,32, and 44 ofthe Idaho Appellate Rules, 
and hereby move that this Court augment the record with the a true and correct copy of the 
reporter's transcript from the hearing dated May 25,2005 before the Honorable Christopher 
Bieter, Judge of the Probate Court in case number CV-TR-2004-22118 filed and bearing a file 




 (: ' 
- -
i ' '













stamp of July 07,2008 also known as case number SP aT 0400874M and/or the court take 
judicial notice of the same for these proceedings. Said transcript was annexed to the Affidavit 
filed on November 10, 2008 in support of the motion and is incorporated by reference herein. 
That said transcript containing testimony and statements is requested to be augmented for the 
Court's benefit in determining if the individual Taylor plaintiffs lacked standing and/or the court 
lacked jurisdiction over their individual claims as beneficiaries ofthe trust. 
This Amended Motion is made and based upon the record and files in this action, together 
with the Amended Affidavit in Support of the Motion, and the Memorandum Brief in Support 
of Amended Motion to Augment filed herewith. 
DATED this 12th day ofNovember, 2 8. 









, co-counsel for 
Berkshire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
'.... ' .... 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12th day ofNovember, 2008, I served the foregoing 
(1) APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' AMENDED MOTION TO AUGMENT 
RECORD, (2) AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS/CROSS­
RESPONDENTS' AMENDED MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD together with (3) 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' 
AMENDED MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD, by having a true and complete copy 
personally delivered, by facsimile and/or by depositing the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows: 
Dennis M. Charney () U. S. Mail 
Charney & Associates (X) Facsimile Transmission 
1191 E. Iron Eagle Drive () Hand Delivery 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 () Overnight Delivery 
Fax# (208) 938-9504 
Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
(// t
 ~ /IW7'- _ 
!HOM S G. LE, IV., Co-counsel 
for Appellants/Cross-Respondents 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Co-Counsel for Appellants/Cross Respondents 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Respondents/Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Appellants/Cross-Respondents. 
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Supreme Court Docket No. 33781 
District Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF 
APPELLANTS/CROSS­
RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County ofAda ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 Your Affiant is co-counsel of record for appellants in the above-entitled action, and 
makes this amended affidavit in support of the appellants' Amended Motion to Augment 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' 












the Record filed concurrently herewith and said Motion is incorporated herein as if set 
forth in full herein. 
2.	 That your affiant inadvertently stated in paragraph two ofthe Affidavit to Augment 
Record filed November 10, 2008 the following, "attached hereto as Exhibit "A'" and 
incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full herein are a true and correct copies 
ofpages 1,82,83,84,85, ofthe deposition ofReed J. Taylor, taken on January 31,2005, 
together with Exhibit 53". That paragraph was in error and should not have been 
contained in the earlier affidavit. 
3.	 That the only exhibit which should and was attached was a true and correct copy of the 
reporter's transcript from the hearing dated May 25,2005 before the Honorable 
Christopher Bieter, Judge of the Probate Court in case number CV-TR-2004-22Jl18 filed 
and bearing a file stamp of July 07,2008. That the same is incorporated by reference 
herein and is the only transcript which is sought to be augmented into the record.. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that the Court augment the record with the transcript from the 
probate case proceeding which is the same proceeding relating to the Order dated November 7th, 
2008 allowing Judicial Notice to be taken ofthe Amended Petition to Appoint TlUstees in Ada 
County Case number SP OT 0400874M. 
THOMAS G. MAIL, IV co-counsel for 
Berkshire Investments and Colleen 
Birch Maile 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD Page 2 
000815
 





DATED this 12thdaYOfNOVernber~~//, I-
'---_-..L 'J V [~1J! ( 
..... , 
'-" 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
12th day ofNovember, 2008. 
Mary Sue Chase 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires July 30,2014 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' 
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I N D E X o F EXAMINATION 
Witness's Name PcLge No. 
R. JOHN TAYLOR 
Direct Examination by Mr. Clark 
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1 THE COORT: -- 74M. 3 the hearing I
'l_"
2 smuld have conducted a few JOC)nl'ls ago to narre successor 
3 trustees in the trust. 
Mr. Clark is here with the petitioners; and 
5 Mr. Gjording, representing Mr. Mlile, is also here. 
6 Gentlffilen, I have read all of the ITI3terial 
filed since our hearing last rronth; and I think I have a 
8 sense of your positions. I will let you ITBke whatever 
9 record and argunent you care to. 
10 Mr. Clark, whenever you 're ready. 
11 MR. CIARK: Thank you, Judge. In the oourtrcan 
12 with Ire I have two of the - I have the petitioner, John 
13 Taylor, and another proposed co-trustee, his brother 
14 Wen Taylor. Reed is not here today. 
15 It seems to me that there are really three 
16 issues. One is the standing of Mr. Maile in this 
17 proceeding. 
18 It seems to me that the court should rrake a 
19 ruling with reSf€ct to that issue before proceeding 
20 further. And then if we get beyond that -­
21 THE COORT: Sure.
 
22 MR. CIARK: -- beyond that, the second point is
 
23 who we are going to appoint as trustee, or trustees.
 





1 And so with the court's pennission, it l;Ould 
2 seffil to ITBke judicial sense to acklress the first issue, 
3 whether or not Mr. Maile has standing in this 
4 proceeding, because I think that could affect hew we 
5 proceed with the next two issues. 
6 THE axJRT: That's a fair suggestion, and I 
7 will hear roth sides' argunents on that question. 
MR. CIARK: And I ap:l1cgize; I'm not familiar 
9 with your courtrocm here. [)) you prefer Ire to te here 
10 or-­
11 THE COORT: I prefer -- wherever you are 
12 canfortable, Mr. Clark, is fine. 
13 MR. CIARK: '!hank you, Judge. 
14 First, as we talked about last day, the 
15 argurrent of Mr. Maile is a circular argurrent. He first 
16 says that the action, the pending action between the 
17 trust where the trust is the naIred plaintiff and him and 
18 his entities, is void. 
19 And if that -- in oller words, because a 
20 trustee was not validly appointed, bringing that action, 
21 that action is void. Within this file, he has presented 
22 copies of briefing fran the other case that stands for 
) 
23 the proposition that that action is void. 
24 Now, if that action is void, his counterclaim 
25 against the trust is void because the tnst was not a 
6 
party to	 that. -..; 
And if that's correct, he is not a creditor of 
3 the trust and, therefore, has no standing to even 
4 particip3te in this as a creditor. 
5 And I think, before he can particip3te in this 
6 proceeding, he has to advise the court that the 
CX1ffB!l.ion case, the lawsuit, is valid because, if he 
cla.ims it's invalid or void, then his posbon must be 
that he's not a creditor. 
10 And in that case, he actually has two hats. 
11 One is the hat of the debtor. And as I pointed out 
12 before, as a debtor in that action, if he tas 
13 pmicip3tion in this case and input in this case to 
14 decide who the trustee or trustees are going to be, it's 
15 putting -- potentialIy putting the fox in be hen house 
16 because he would have every reason in the world to want 
17 the court to select saretxxiy that is friendly to his 
18 position. 
19 COrrespondingly, if that case is valid and if 
20 his position is correct that he I S a creditor -- and I 
21 say "if" b2ca;use, in that ease, our position is that 
22 they are sinply unfounded allegations. 
23 But if he has a claim because he is a debtor on 
, 24 the one hard, a defendant -- and a plaintiff -- a 
I25 cross -- has a counterclaim on the other hand, he has	 a 
7 
1 conflict of interest.
 
2 Because of that conflict, he should not be
 
3 allowed to participate in this proceeding because
 
4 whether it's -- whether it's on the -- as a defendant,
 
5 he wants a trustee that will give hjn the best position.
 




This is not like sarething that yoo Fainted out 
9 last day about a creditor wanting an interest in the 
10 case because they want to IlBke sure that the trustee 
11 dces the right thing to preserve the assets of the 
12 estate and to protect his interests as a creditor. 
13 It's -- it isn't that. And we think, one, that 
14 the court - I guess, first, that the court sinply 
15 should say that, if you are a creditcr, you have 
16 conflict and we don't want to hear fran you in this 




THE CUJRT: Mr. Gjording?
 
MR. GJORDlliG: Well, Judge, ciS I sit here
 
thinking abJut this ease and listening to counsd, this 
phrase keeps going through my mind; "I was rom at night 
but not last night." 
And I can I t help but think that you could be 
8 
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1 thinking that. You've got a i.J )f lail)'ers dav.n here 
2 kind of tap dancing in order tha~ey can j:ersuacE you 
3 to cane to a decision, care to a ruling, that will aid 
4 what these resr:ective parties are trying to do. 
5 Basically, what we're wrestling over here, Your 
6 Honor, is whether or not the order of this court ­
whether you apfX)int a neutral trustee or the trustees 
that have applied, what is happening here is that the 
9 parties in this case are t[1Jing to speak to you in terms 
10 of the effective date of the appJinlID2nt of the trustee. 
11 Now, I could go on and argue all of the issues 
12 here atout vlny Mr. Maile has standing. I don't thir:k I 
13 need to do that. You rrentioned that you have read the 
14 briefs. I think you probably l<n<:Y.l the law better tlBn I 
15 do. We presented to you why we b2lieve that we have 
16 standing. 
17 But the major point that ,Ie are trying to rrake 
1B here, Judge, is that -- whether or not we have standing, 
19 what we are hoping will happen in this case is that you 
20 interpret the law. 
21 All of these issues - whether Mr. Maile has 
22 standing, whether the p:titioners should b2 trustees and 
23 what the effective date of the ar:p:lintrrent should b2 -­
24 we are sinply asking you to interpret the law and rrake 
25 your ruling consistent with the law in a way that does 
) 9 
1 not allow the parties to IPanipulate the orders that you 
2 enter in a way that will help them in a lawsuit that I s 
3 upstairs. 'That's what it <::ares down to. 
We feel that we have a valid position here to 
5 talk about the app:lintment of the trustee. And I 
6 suppose one -- counsel says if you let -- if you let Mr. 
7 I13ile have input into the appointment of the trustee, 
B it's like letting the fox in the hen house. 
9 I would rephrase that to, "allowing another fox 
10 in the hen house," so that there are two foxes in the 
11 hen house. We all know what this is about. 'That I s vlny 
12 I'm saying, "I was tom at night but oot last night." 
13 We think we have standing. I certainly leave 
14 that to you, Your Honor. 
15 I do wish to sp:ak to t'1e issue of the 
16 effdive date of the order, regardless of how you rule 
17 on this. 
IB THE CCXJRT: Thank you, sir. 
Well, my sense of vlnether Mr. M:1ile has 
20 standing cares fran -- his status is sort of contingent. 
21 1 rrean, his status really defends on that lawsuit. His 
22 interest in any actions of the trustee cares fran its ) 
19 
23 effect on the lawsuit. 
24 So he's a creditor. Mayt;e you muld call him a 
25 contingent creditor or an alleged creditor or a clainEd 
10 
1 creditor but I think :hink the credii:or-debtor 
2 possibilities of that la':'suit give him sme interest to 
3 be part of this proceeding. 
4 Now, I think the fact that the statute 
5 characterized it as "an interested party" suggests, 
6 j:erhaps, that interest may be a self-interest. '!bat 
7 doesn I t necessarily disquali fy SWleone fran having a 
B caTI1l2nt on how the app:lintrrent p:cocess goes and who 
9 might be appJinted as a trustee. 
10 But I think that interest can be IXJinted out, 
11 Mr. Clark, as you've done, that his intereEt may b9 to 
12 have saneone not all that eager to pursue the case. I 
,13 think it's fair to -- it's fair tel point out that 
1 14 position. I think that I s what gives him a :::asis to want 
115 to have sore ccmrent here. 
16 So I am going to fird that, while the interest 
17 may be contingent, it llI3y not be -- it llI3y not b2 as 
1B clear as saneJxxJy that sold him his last p:llr of shoes 
19 or sarething. 
20 But I think he sold the trust sorre :?rqJerty or 
21 llBy have s~ rrore direct status as a creditor. I think 
I22 it's enough to have a cament here, but it's fair for 
23 all of the prrties to discuss the nature of that 
24 interest and how that might rolor the decision that the 
25 rourt might llI3ke. 
11 
1 So I .ill find that there .is -- that Mr. M3.ile 
2 has sane status that would allow him to have il ccmnent, 
3 an argurrent into the process. 
4 So with that, Mr. Clark, if you will, continue 
5 with the other points that you wanted to rrake. 
6 MR. CIl\RK: Yes, Your Honor. With respect to 
7 tre iJWlintrrent, I would like to call John Taylor and 
8 just have him testify briefly in sUWJrt of his 
position. We have sul:rnitted affidavas, and I would 
10 like to present sare acilitional evidence. 
11 THE ClllRT: All right. Sir, would YOl care up, 
12 please, and take the oath? Paise your right hand, 
13 please. 
14 ** * 
15 R. JOHN TI\YlCR,
 
16 having been first duly sworn, testified as follcws:
 
17 THE CaJRT: 'Thank yOJ, sir. If you would, have
 
I 1B a seat. 
19 Whenever you're ready, Mr. Clark. 
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DIRECT E.\ '100 
~-,,, 
BY MR. CIARK: 
3 Q. Please state your nama for the reo:ml. 
4 A. R. John Taylor. 
Q. And wlJere cb you resida? 
6 A. Lewiston, Idaho. 
7 Q. OkEy. And what is your t:rada or ocx:upatiOll? 
5 
A. I am President of Crop USA Insurance and AlA 
9 Insurance. 
10 Q. And awroximately how mmy Slployees are under
 




13 Q. Okay. And how long have you been associate:! 
14 with AIA Insuranre? 
15 A. Since 1977. 
16 Q. And ttilat type of CXIlpally is AIA Insura.na:!? 
17 A. AlA and Crop USA provide renefit plans and crop 
18 insurance for ID2l'lt€rs of various farm associations 
19 around the United States. 
20 Q. Okay. And acmrding to your affidavit, you are 
21 liCEnSed as an attomey with the Idaho State Bar? 
22 A. Yes. I am a ~r of the fur. 
23 Q.!loII long have you b:!en lic:msed? 
24 A. Since Septerru:er 1976, I telieve. 
25 Q. You have asked the CXlUrt for pmnission to 
) 13 
1 serve as a oo-trustee with your 00 brothers in this 
2 mtter? 
3 A. Yes, sir. 
4 Q. Will j'OU explain to the CXlll!t just briefly trtIy 
5 it is that j'OU want to serve? 
6 A. Well, prirrarily, to pursue the claim for the 
7 trust. We have always thought it was a valid claim 
8 mcause I think that, for the benefit - my oother is 
9 the mneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will 
10 eventually win on Uris claim. 
11 serre of the other meml::€rs of the trust were not 
12 interested in pursuing the claim, and they agreed to 
13 withdraw as beneficiaries or contingent beneficiaries in 
14 exchange for us allcwing -- going forth with the claim 
15 and consented to our b2ing tmstees. 
16 That, of course, creates SC1!€ liability for me, 
17 evPJ] if it is contingent, that if we end up losing the 
18 ease, we ooy end up owing sare costs or other 
19 liabili ties for the ease. 
20 Q. So j'OU personally have sane expJsure? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And cb j'Ol feel that you and your brothers are 
) 
23 all qualified to act as cxH:mstees? 
24 A. I do. 
25 MR. ClA!1K: That's all I have, Judge. 
14 
I 1 THE 01JRT: .....,jording, any qt;estions?I 2 MR. GJORDIN;: Just a couple. 
3 
4 
5 BY MR. GJORDIN:;: 
6 Q. Mr. Taylor, the feI'SOll that you f:eek to 
7 substiblte for or replace is Beth Rogers? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. And !lad Beth PDgers been interest:rl in pursuing' 
10 this claim that you talk alxlut, I asstme yt)U w:mldn't 
11 b:! -- there wouldn't b:! arrj need for you to b:! the 
12 trustee? 
13 A. Not necessarily. She's 00 a Monocn mission in 
14 Canada, so she no longer lives in the country. 
15 Q. But she did not favor this cla.iJn, did she? 
16 A. She -- sanetimes she favored the c.Laim; 
17 saretimes she didn't. 
18 Q. Mr. Taylor, I don't have to ranind you yoo're 
19 under oath here. It is true, is it not, Mr. Taylor, 
20 that Beth ~ did not want to pursue this claim 
21 against~. Mille? Isn't that true? 
22 A. No, sir. 
23 Q. bt's not b:ue? 
24 A. That is not true. 
2S Q. Okay. Is it true, Mr. Taylor, that theIe ware 
15 
1 a m.mi:ler of the beneficiaries and the a:miliqant
 
2 I::eneficiaries that didn't want to plISlle the daim
 
3 against Mr. Maile?
 
4 A. There were several mneficiaries. Ard,
 
S generally, tcwards the end, I would say that seven of us
 
6 decicEd to continue the claim and the rest did not.
 
Q. (iJe of the reasons they didn't want Ol do that 
8 is they didn't want to b:! exp:>sed to the exp:nse of 
pursuing the lawsuit? 
10 A. That ooy te true, yes.
 
11 Q. And the only thillq that is left in the ttust,
 






15 Q. All of the m:mey has b:en distributed?
 
16 A. Pretty much.
 
17 MR. GJORDIN:;: That's all I have.
 
18 THE CXXJRI': Anythi~g else, Mr. Clark?
 
MR. CIAFK: Yes, I do, Your Honor. 
16 
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REDIRECT D ,'100 
'-0"BY MR. CIAI1K: 
Q. Mr. Taylor, trmo dist:rihlted the JImey?
-") 4 A. Beth Rogers, prior to her resignation. 
5 MR. CIARK: That's all I have, Judge. 
6 THE CWRT: All right. Thank you, sir. 
7 MR. CIARK: I have no addi tional evidence to 
8 present, Judge. 
9 TIlE CWRT: Mr. Gjording, any evidence? 
10 MR. GJORDrNG: NO, sir. 
11 TIlE CWRT: Any other argurrent, Mr. Clark? 
12 MR. CIARK: Yes. Just briefly, Judge. 
13 It seems to me that, based upon, first, the 
14 agroorent of the beneficiaries -- they have all 
15 indicated that the Taylors should serve as co-trustees. 
16 The Taylors, prrsuant to that same agreement, 
17 have a guarantee in the disclaiJrer. So they have sane 
18 interest:in the proceed:ing. Their rother stands to gain 
19 and, thereby, they have an interest in the proceed:ing. 
20 'Ihere has been no evidence presented that they 
21 are in any way disqualified for any reason. In fact, 
22 they are -- we have a lawyer, pecple that have been in 
23 hJsiness. TIley have exp:rience. TIley are knowledgeable 
24 with resfBct to the claims. 
25 No one else has been suggested to even serve as 
)	 17 
trustee. TIlere is no alternative profX)sal. 
2 And while there isn't anything in the statute 
3 that talks about priority as far as iJ!¥lintnffit, just if 
4 we were looking at a persooal representative fX)sition, 
5 anyone that would have interest in a prolBte estate, for 
6 example, wouldn't have a greater interest than them. 
7 So it seems to me it I S very appropriate to 
8	 aPfOint then, and we would ask that the court enter such 
9 an order. 
10 THE CWRT: If you want to ad:Jress the 
11 effective retroactivity, it would probably be a gocd 
12 t.iJre to do that. 
13 MR. CIARK: Yes. Well, first, it I s our 
11 fX)sition with respect to the retroactive order that it's 
15 a discretionary tlling and that the court, lBsically, 
16 acts under an abuse of discretion standard. 
17 It's interesting that one pmy here is 
18 opposing retroactive awlication when it seems to rre 
19 that it's a benefit to roth pmies for the reason that, 
20 if Mr. M:!ile's argurr:ent that the suit is void is valid, 
21 he's not a beneficiary -- or he's not a creditor and 
22 doesn't have a lawsuit against the trust. 
23 And if a retroactive aPfXlintment or, simply, an 
24 order awroving what the Taylors have done in bringing 
25 that action, in the alternative, is entered, it gives 
18 
1 roth sides benefit....,.; 
2 It gives the trust the benefit of reing able to 
3 p.rrsue that lawsuit. It gives Mr. M3ile the benefit of 
4 l:eing able to fillsue his counterclaim. 
5 So it seems to me that the -- it I S a situation 




8 TIle idea of the awointnent is cor.sistent with
 
9 the agreement retween the parties. The intent of the
 
10 beneficiaries, all of the beneficiaries, was to
 
11 iJrrrediately have the Taylors act as trustee.3.
 
12 And it seems to me that that's in the best
 
13 interests of the trust, the best interests of the
 
14 beneficiaries; and it I S a situation where every!xxiy
 
15 thcught that that was the case.
 
16 TIle trust, by executing the agreement, and the
 
17 beneficiaries, the Taylors, by bringing the ~ction that
 
18 they did -- they were all acting under the Ulderstanding
 
19 that they were in ~r.
 
20 And in that regard, Idaho Co:le Sect:.oo
 
21 68-106(c! gives the trustee authority to delegate
 
22 gocdies. And it specifically provides that the trustee
 
23 can errploy people to do anything, any act of
 
24 administration, whether or not it's discretionary.
 
25 And it would se€lll to me that if the order isn't
 
19 
1 entered appointing the trustee nunc pro tunc that this
 
2 court can say, well, we approve the actions of the
 
3 filing of this lawsuit on behalf of the trust.
 
And because the -- pursuant to that statute,
 
the then-trustees could give the Taylors authority to
 
act on behalf of the trust.
 
7 So we're simply asking the court, reidy, to
 
6 ratify what's reen done.
 
Now, of course, Mr. M3ile's fX)sition is, well, 
10 gee, you have to have sanelxxly validly appointed. You 
11 can't do that. 
12 Well, what would be the situation if W'3 had a 
13 trustee who passes away without sClTffixly awoin":ed and 
14 the statute of limitations is about to run and sanebcdy 
15 steps in and files a lawsuit before that t.iJre? 
16 There Is a lot of gocd reasons, and there 1s sene 
17 argments why the retroactive aWlication or the 
18 approval of the actions by the court make a lot of 
19 sense. 
20 It seems to me that it will aEfect what the 
21 pmies thought was hawening. As you peruse that 
22 file - it's a very thick file - I think that it's 
23 awarent that ~e .pmies thought for sare tlire that 
24 that-was a valid - that there "wasn't -aIly questiori-aJ:dJt ):L~:;~""'",. 'j 
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They had been proceed ch the lawsuit. 
There had been a lot of discove~ne in it, and we 
have proceeded in grxxi faith to prepare that case for
,0',,\ 
further procee::li.ngs and, eventually, trial. 
,.I 
All we are asking is that the court enter an 
order approving the actions of the Taylors and/or 
7 entering an order nunc pro tunc. 
8 Thank you. 
9 THE CCXJRT: Mr. Gjording? 
10 MR. GJORDIN:;: And, of course, Your Honor, we 
11 have opjXlsed that. Again, I will try to be brief. 
12 k3 the court is aware, a lawsuit was filed by 
13 the petitioners against Mr. M3ile. That was dismissed 
14 J:ecause -- this is upstairs, and I know you know atout 
15 this. 
16 It was dismissed because they weren I t the real 
17 party in interest. In any event, Ju::lge Wilper dismissed 
18 it because he did not feel that the law justified the 
19 continuing existence of that lawsuit. 
20 Then these petitioners filed another lawsuit. 
21 In that lawsuit, the plaintiff was the trust -- the 
22 trustee but there was one prcblem with that. And that 
23 is that, .indeed, the trustees were not legally the 
24 trustees. 
25 S:J they carre down to your court and they asked 
21 
you to appoint them as trustees. And I, of course, 
2 wasn't here because it wasn't a contested hearing; but 
3 there must have been sene request of the litigants that 
4 you pre-date or me the effective date of the 
5 apjXJintment retroactive. 
6 My guess is, Your Honor, that they didn't 
7 rother to rrention to yoo that there was a reason for 
8 that, other than they wanted it to be -- they wanted it 
9 to be continuous and they wanted to have continuity. 
10 They probably diOO I t mention to you that they 
11 needed to have your retroacti ve order in order for them 
12 to rraintain their status in the court up above. 
13 That brings me to when we caIre into your court 
14 a few weeks ago and you kin:! of announced to the parties 
15 that it wasn't your interest to get involved in the case 
16 up a!xJve, that you didn't want to interpret the law and 
17 issue orders j}at would have the effect of iJlFacting or 
18 affecting the outcare of the :::ase up alxJve. 
19 And I think you used the phrase, "Let the chips 
20 fall where they may;" in other words, let the parties 
21 find themselves in the status of the law as the law 
;	 22 goes. 
I	 
23 And I agree wi th counsel. I think yoo probably 
24 do have the discretim to do what you want in this case. 
25 But, of course, it's our request, Your Honor, that, 
22 
indeed, consistent wi II earlier pronouncement, you
.....,. 
cb let the chips fall "mere they may, that you not enter 
3 an order in this case that does anything other than 
4 acfuere to the law. 
5 We have suggested to yeu what the law is. We 
6 think that the law would suggest Llat a retroactive 
7 application of this order is neither apprqJriate, ror 
3 would it be the just thing to do in this case. 
9 Now, I awreciate counsel telling us that, 
10 really, this is for our own good. I realize that an 
11 retroactive order would benefit the petitioners. 
12 I just want to make it clear to you, Your 
13 Honor, that despite what counsel says about a 
14 retroactive order being really go:xi for my client, Mr. 
15 Maile, that isn't what we want J:ecause, from our point 
16 of view, that isn't what's good for us. 
17 THE CXXJRT: Final word, ~Ir. Clark? 
18 MR. CIARK: Well, I guess we agree that you 
. 19 have authority to do this. I think it's a c~estim of 
20 you exercising your discretion. And as I pcinted out a 
21 rnirute ,ago, I see the retroactive application as a 
22 win-win situation for roth sides. 
23 Thank you. 
24 THE CXXJRT: Well, I think the t}pical effective 
25 mte,,,men the court is called UfXln to narre mccessors 
23 
1 of any fiduciary or trustee or perSDnal representative 
2 or guardian, or whatever the case my be, is Eor it to 
3 be effective on its signing or filing. 
And I am going to stay with that t]pical 
5 pattern. I think that's what the law requires. I think 
6 itI S appropriate that the petitioners be nanee: successor 
7 trustees, or successor co-trustees, and would sign an 
8 order and awropriate letters of trusteeship. 
9 As to its effect on the lawsuit, ~. Gjording, 
10 I think, accurately quoted me. I don't think it rs 
11 appropriate for me to consider what its effect is. 
12 I think I should follow the t]pical standards 
13 for the aprointment of fiduciaries, and that is to me 
14 it effective UfXJIl signing and filing, which I liill do. 
15 NoN, I think it I S an interes ting argument and 
16 one that occurred to me, Mr. Clark, that you made is the 
17 analogy that the relation -- the personal 
18 representative I s action before he is officially named 
19 JlBy receive -- may relate rock. 
20 The statute that you quoted .'as 15-3701 and 
21 that JlBy be -- I'm sure you are prepared to make 
22 appropriate arguments with Judge Wilper that, now that 
23 they are officially the cO--trustees" they can ratify or 
24 that it can relate back and their authority may 
continue. 
24 









































12 5 continue. 
25-2 
1 But I am going to leal : for sarffixjy 
2 srrarter than I to determine if tlm"has an effect on 
3 your lawsuit, if it continues as it is or if you have to 
4 refile it. 
5 I'm sorry if the consequence is an econanic one 
6 to everyl.xxJy here that makes you effectively lose sare 
7 tiJre in that suit but I think that I s the way -- that 's 
6 the way the law really carpels rre to go and that's to 
ITBke an order effective tcday.
 
10
 I don I t knCM if you have an order prepared 
11 or-­
12 MR. CIARK: I do, Your Honor, if I could 
13 approach. I have acceptance of aPFOintment of 
14 co-trustees signed by the three prolXlsed co-trustees. 
15 I do have an order of aWlintment of 
16 co-successor trustees that I would ask the oourt to 
17 change the date on the signature -- on the date lXlrtion. 
1B I put "nunc pro tunc" on that, and I think we can cb 
19 that by interlineation. 
20 And then I also have prq:osed letters of 
21 co-successor trustees. I will give oounsel a ropy. 
22 MR. GJrnDm::;: TI1ank you. 
23 THE CXXJRT: I have stricken, on the order, 
24 everything after the date. I dated it the 2nd of Moly. 
25 I have stricken, "authority of the co-successor 
) 25 
1 trustees," effective nunc pro tunc, if that's your 
2 intent. I have stricken that lXlrtion. 
3 Have you filed the original acceptances? 
4 MR. CIARK: Those are the originals, Judge. 
5 THE COORI': They seen to -- all three have 
6 "copy" staups. M3yl:;€ -- is the original t€hind it? 
7 MR. CIARK: Mayl:;€ I gave Mr. Gjording the 
originals. 
THE CXXJRT: These have, starrp=d in red, "ccpy" 
10 on t1ffil. I will just trade you. 
11 MR. CIARK: Sorry. 
12 MR. GJOPDIN3: Your Honor, may I inquire? 
13 THE COORI': Yes, sir. 
14 MR. GJOPDIN3: On the second page of the order, 
15 subparagraph (a), (4) (aJ, I am a little perplexed as to 
16 what that -- what that means. M3yl:;€ counsel can help us 




 THE OJJRT: I'm not sure what it means, Mr. 
20 Gjording. Thank you. 
21 MR. CIAPK: The reason I put that in -- that I 
22 carre frem our unifonn form 1xxJk that I S pranulgated with 
23 the Unifonn Probate Co::!e. 
24 THE CXXJRT: Let's see if it eatles -­ I 
I25 MR. CIARK: I don't have a problem with that 
26 I 
1 reing stricken, if th problem with counsel. 
2 MR. GJQRDIN3:""te'll, I don't knCillr if it's a 
3 problem or not. I just don I t know what it means. 
Without knowing what it means, I would accept the offer 
to strike it. 
THE ffiJRT: If it doesn't advance -- I don' t 
think -- you just need them named, and I think they have 
6 whatever authority the statute a2ICYtls them, 
9 If it's going to ease scme trouble, without any 
10 cbjectioo, I will strike that sul:paragraph (a). 
11 MR. CIARK: All right. 
12 THE CXXJRT: Frankly, Mr. Clark, I'm not sure 
13 what - where -- if that canes from the statutory 
14 language or not. But if you don' t need it-- I doo 't 
15 think it affects your clients' authority at all. 
16 If you don't mind taking this dCYtlnstairs with 
17 you, Mr. Clark, they can oonfonn your copies. If you 
16 need certified ones, they can provide them to you. 
19 (WhereUjX)n, the foregoing audiotap:d 
20 proceedings concluded.) 
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Supreme Court Docket No. 33781 
District Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
APPELLANTS/CROSS­
RESPONDENTS' MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD 
The Appellants/Cross-Respondents, by and through their co-counsel of record, 
Thomas G. Maile, N, and in support of the Amended Motion to Augment the Record, provide 
their Memorandum Brief. The Motion to Augment the Record relates to the issues of standing 
and/or lack ofjurisdiction by the individual beneficiaries. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED 












A. The facts established are properly requested to be made a part of the 
record before this Court. 
The following portions ofthe hearing before the Honorable Judge Beiter on May 2, 2005 
provides:
 




6 A. Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always 
thought it was a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is 
the beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this 
claim. 
During that same hearing counsel for the Taylors provided in his closing argument before
 
Judge Beiter on May 2, 2005 provided:
 
page 17, In 12: MR. CLARK: Yes. Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that,
 
based upon, first, the agreement of the beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that 
the Taylors should serve as co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that same 
agreement, have a guarantee in the disclaimer. So they have some interest in the 
proceeding. Their mother stands to gain and, thereby, they have an interest in the 
proceeding. 
It is well recognized that a judicial admission, applied to the judicial proceedings in 
which it is made, limits the issues upon which the cause is to be tried and. obviates the necessity 
for proofof facts within the ambit of a distinct and unequivocal admission or stipulation so 
made. 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 299, p. 765, § 381e, p. 926; 29 Am. Jur.2d Evidence § 615, p. 668; 
9 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940), §§ 2588, 2590, pp. 586, 587. Ajudicial admission 
includes counsel's admission at trial ofa factual issue upon which the opposing party had the 
burden of proof, McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 782-83, 430 P.2d 670,673-74 
(1967). It is settled law in this state that a formal admission made by an attorney at trial is 
binding on his client as a solemn judicial admission. Hill v. Bice, 65 Idaho 167, 139 P.2d 1010. 
APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED 










   
 
 
See, Bell, Handbook ofEvidence (1957), p. 159. 
After the execution of the global Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement, Mr. 
Taylor was once again clear and unequivocal under oath when he stated "my mother is the 
beneficiary o/the trust". The verified petition filed in the probate court on November 12, 2004, 
requested the probate court to appoint them as trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust. The petition was executed by R. John Taylor as a verification of the facts contained in the 
petition (C.E. #39 exhibit "B.") Page 2 of the verified petition states under oath, "the petitioner's 
88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by virtue ofthe 
tenns of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement." Black's Law Dictionary Revised 
Fourth Edition (1968) defines sole as "comprising only one person". A verified pleading that 
sets forth evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge ofthe verifying signatory is in 
substance an affidavit, and is accorded the same probative force as an affidavit". Camp v. 
Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 693 P.2d 1080 (Ct.App.l984), Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 594, 861 
P.2d 1253, 1259 (Ct. App. 1993), Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 120 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 
2005). 
The court needs to consider the judicial admissions under sworn oath by R. John Taylor. 
This Honorable Court should be mindful that the sworn testimony by R. John Taylor on two 
occasions was provided prior the opinion in Taylor v. Maile (1). Connie Taylor, acting for the 
benefit of the Taylors in negotiating the tenns of the Disclaimer Agreement, drafted a letter to 
Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004 which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up their rights 
as beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth will affinn her prior factual statements in the fonn of an 
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affidavit and agree to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. Ifwe aren't able to reach an 
agreement on that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate 
tax returns". The letter is a proper part of the record herein (C.E. #58 Exhibit "39" to the 
deposition ofBeth Rogers). 
The global "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement (C.E. #5 dep. Rogers 
exhibit 25; C.E. #39-Addendum #2), provides: "1.2 Disclaimer ofAll Other Interests.... 1.2.3: 
Taylor.... hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the Trust, in favor oftheir mother, Helen 
Taylor, and hereby approve immediate distribution to Helen Taylor." The question arises as to 
whether the disclaimer agreement is an unambiguous document. What the Agreement may recite 
is that the Taylors claimed an ownership interest in the claim or cause of action by the tmst. The 
Taylors did not "confinn in the tmst complete ownership and control ofany such claims" 
(section 1.1 ofAgreement). The Taylors did not say they considered themselves as residual 
beneficiaries of that portion of the corpus relating to the cause of action which may be filed. Nor 
did they say they were retaining an interest in any future corpus. They did not truly have any 
ownership interest in the cause ofaction initiated by the trust. The trust owned the claim. They 
were claiming an ownership interest in the litigation in which they intended to pursue as a new 
cause of action as the agreed too successor tmstees. The Taylors wanted control of the lawsuit 
since they had a claim pending in the suit they initiated as beneficiaries which at that time was 
dismissed by the district court. The Taylors wanted to be the successor trustees to initiate 
another lawsuit after this agreement was signed and to exercise control of that litigation. 
The language is telling in clause 1.2.3. disclaimer ofall other interests. This portion of 
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the agreement in essence states we disclaim, renounce any rights to the corpus of the trust, which 
states "DISCLAIM ALL INTERESTS WHATSOEVER IN THE TRUST". This relates to all 
interests of trust including the corpus. They did not disclaim any ownership in the new lawsuit 
as future trustees. They could assert an ownership interest (which mayor may not exist as a 
matter oflaw) but they disclaimed all interest whatsoever in the trust. The Taylors never said we 
disclaim, renounce the trust corpus of everything but the potential possible additional corpus of 
the trust which may relate to the yet filed lawsuit proceeds. 
The multiple judicial admissions by the Taylors ended the ambiguity as a matter oflaw. 
The Taylors' mother became the" the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by virtue of the 
terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement". The Taylors after the Decision in 
Taylor v. Maile (1) found it convenient to attempt to undo their judicial admissions. As they 
were aware, the district court had ruled prior to the Supreme Court decision, that the trust did not 
have the remedy available to it of having the real property restored. The district court stated, 
"once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of 
rescission, the right of rescission is waived." (R. Vol I. p. 149 LL. 10-12; 20-22.) The Judgment 
entered captioned "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims" was legally moot. 
CONCLUSION 
The transcript before the probate court provides additional sworn testimony which should 
be considered by this Court in its determination as to wether the Taylors' had standing to pursue 
their claims as beneficiaries which the court entered the "Judgment on Beneficiaries Claims" 
upon. The Idaho approved jury instructions perhaps best illustrates and summarizes the 
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appellants/cross-respondents' request to augment the record. I.D.J.I. 1.13 provides: 
At the outset ofdeliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an 
emphatic expression ofopinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to 
vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense ofpride may be aroused 
and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it is 
wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For 
you, as for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and 
declaration ofthe truth.(emphasis added). 
DATED this 12th day ofNovember, 2008. 
APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD Page 6 
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 ORDER RE: AMENDED
 
) MOTION TO AUGMENT 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Respondents­ ) CLERK'S RECORD 
Cross-Appellants, ) 






Ada County District Court No. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN MAILE, ) OC 0400473 
husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE REAL ) 














































An AMENDED MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD and AMENDED 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD with 
1,attachments was filed by counsel for the Respondents on November 10, 2008. 1, 
iII
I 
APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD and
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO rl, 
AUGMENT RECORD with attachment were filed by counsel for Appellants on November 10,
2008. APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' AMENDED MOTION TO AUGMENT
;I 
APPELLAiNfj~~~W~RECORD, AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
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RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD and APPELLANTS/CROSS· 
RESPONDENTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD were filed by counsel for the Appellants on November 12, 2008. 
RESPONDENTS' OBJECTION TO APPELLANT'S MOTION AND AMENDED MOTION 
TO AUGMENT RECORD AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS was filed by counsel for 
Respondents on November 21, 2008. The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause 
appeanng, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Respondent's Motion to Augment Clerks Record 
with a file-stamped copy of an Amended Petition to Appoint Trustee from Case No. SP-OT-04­
00874 is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Appellant's Motion to Augment is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Respondents' Brief and argument concerning the 
Amended Petition to Appoint Trustee in Case No. SP-OT-04-00874 is DENIED. 
DATED this St- day of December 2008. 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
9fet~~ _ 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
cc:	 Counsel ofRecord 





































CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
Attorneys for Respondents 
The Train Station, Suite 201 
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) AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD 
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AMENDED AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD 
'.AW OFFICE:S OF" 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LE:WISTON. IDAHO e~501 
EXHIBIT "T" 000836





   -
-































STAIE OF IDAlia ) 
) S5. 
County ofNez Perce ) 
CONNIE W. TAYLOR after being first du1y sworn on oath~ deposes and says:
1 
1. That I am the PlaintiffswCounterdefendants-Respondents' attorney and have personal 
knowledge of the facts herein alleged. 
2. Attached as Exhibit A is a true copy ofthe CONFORMED Amended Petition to Appoint 
wTrustee filed in Ada County Case NO. SP OT 04 00874. 
3. Said exhibit was not included in the Clerk's Record and is essential to a full 
understanding of the issues on appeal. The Appellants' Briefing relies extensively on the original 
Petition for Appointment filed November 15, 2004 and fails to disclose or even discuss the 
Amended Petition which was filed which clarifies that the Taylors continue to be beneficiaries of 
the Trust. 
DATED this 'lflt day ofNovember, 2008. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1Ii day ofNovernber, 2008. 
~ 7~t/A.. ~ 
Notary Public in and for the State 
ofIdaho l residing at Lewiston ~:t 
My Commission expires: $. Ii" lbIf 
AMENDED AFFIDAVIr IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD 
~w OFFIl;:E:$ OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -.1 f'" day of November, 2008, I caused to be s,erved a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 









Dennis M. Charney 
Attorney at Law 
1191 E. Iron Eagle Drive 









, Telecopy (FAX) 
Connie W. Taylor 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIm FOURTH J't)DICI1\L DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR tHe COUNTY OF ADA
 
IN TIm MAlTER OF 
nrn nmODORE L.I0HNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST 
) Case No. SP OT 0400874M 
) 
) AMENDED PETITION 
) TO APPOINT TRUSTEES 
COMES NOW the Petitioner and pursuant to Idaho Code 15-7-403 submits tbis amended petition 
for the appointment ofco-suceessor Trustees for the THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST. 
(1) The Petitioner~ R. John Taylor. is a contingent beneficiary of the THEODORB 1. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST. Atrue and correctcopy ofTHEODOREL. JOHN'SONREVOCABLETRUSThas 
been attached to th~ original Petition For Appointment ofTrostees as Exlubjt A and is incorpor1ilted herein 
by reference. 
Puisuant to t~s otth~ -THEODoRE:C: 'JbJiNSONREVOCABLE TRUSTt Theodore I.. Johnson 
was named the original Trustee. Theodore L. IobDson passed away in September of2002. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Trust, in the event that Theodore L. Johnson was unable or unwilling 
to serve as Trustee: 
Andrew R.ogers 
10816 Jay Rd. 
BOIse, ill 83714
 
4MENDEO PETITION TO .APPOINT TRVSTEE~ .1­
EXHIBIT A
J.A.W OFFICE,!; (I" 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
L.~I:(I'l"ON. IDAHO DllSC'. 
: ... d. 
000839
 .. :31~ -ClAR.t;
' - ~ S '" 
NO.033L' P. 8/13 
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were named as eo-successor Trustees.
 
Pursuant to the terms of the Trust, in the event that Andrew and Beth Rogers were unable or
 








was named as successor Trostee.
 
Andrew and Beth Rogers. serving "s CO-sUccessor Trustees nfter the death rJfTheodore Jolmson1 
resigned as co-SUQcessor Trustees. See Resignation ofTrustees attacbed to Amen(!ed Petition as Exhibit A 
and made a pan hereof by reference. OIl June 10,2004, Garth Fisher deolined and refused to serve as 
suCCl:SSOt Trustee. See Resignation ofTrustees attached fD Amended Petition as said Exhibit A. 
The persons who are sought to be appointed as cowsucce9sor Ttu5tees for the THEl::>DORE L. 
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST are: R, John Taylor, Reed I. Taylor. and DaHan J. Taylor. S,aid persons 
who are sought to be appoinced are aU cOrttingent beneficiaries of the THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST. They are e:ntitled to be appointed pursuant to the above referenced Resignation of 
Trustees. 
No other persons or en~ries have l\ prior or equal right to the appointment under law or the terms of 
the trusL 
(2) The trust is kaown ,s, or describod as: THEODORE L JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST. 
(3) With the death of l'heodore Johnson in September of 2002, the resignation of AJ,drew and Beth 
Rogers as Co-successor Trustees (address above), and the refusil of Garth Fisher (address above) to serve 
as successor Trustee, there is NOT a Trustee whose appointlnent needs to be terminated. 
hMEN1>EO ~ETITIONTO AJlPOrN'l' TRUSTEllS .2­
LAW 01""01:' ()F 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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The names and addresses of the persons who are sought to be appointed as co-successor Trustees(4)
 








Red J. Taylor 
7498 lapwai Rd. 
Lewiston, II) 83501
 
D:allan J, Taylor 
410 Clear Creek Dr. 
Meridian., ID 83642
 
Above said persons, on June 10, 2004, have been nOminatedby Andrew and SethRogers, and Garth 
Fisher to serve as C:o-.successor Trustees ofthe TlIEOOORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, S1nce 
said date, aoove said persOJ'Is have been acting in a capacity that is consistent with that of co-successor 
Tmstees. 
(5) Attached to this Amended Petition !$ B;tthjbit B is II list of the natnes and addresses 4)£ all living 
current and cot1.tingent beneficiaries ofthe nrnODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST plmuant to 
the acntal Trust document. r-rowever~ some contingent beneficiaries have waived their interest in the Trost. 
See true and correctcopy of Disclaimer, Release &Inc1emnity Agreemmt auached to Affidavit ofCounsel 
In Support Of Petitioner's Memorandum In Opposition To Respondent1s Amended Motion To Set Aside 
Order And/Or Motion To Reoonsider as Exhibit F. Notice of tbe hearing regarclfng this reques1: to appoint 
oftrustees has been provided to all ofthe beneficiaries liSted on Exhibit Cand to all other known interested 
pa.rties pursuant to I.C. §15-1.. 401. 
(6) A true and correct eopyofthe THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST balS bel~ attached 
to the original Petition For Appointnlent ofTrustees as Exhibit A. 
AMENDEl> P]!;TITION TO APPOIN'l' 'l'RUSTEES ·3­
.....w OFFIClI:I 0' 
CLARK AND PEENEY 
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The Petitioner, after-the exercise ofrea.wnable diligence, is unawaze ofany instrument revoking the(7) 
TIfEODORE L. JOHNSON BEVOCABLE TRUST. 
Co-sllccessorTrustees Andrew and BethRogers resigned as co-successor Trustees and Garth Fisher(8)
 
declined t() serve as su.ccessor TI"LlStee. See Resignation ofTrustees attached to Amended Petition as Exhibit
 
A. 




~......:.+----------­Paul Tomas Clark, a member of the ·firttl, 




couNTY OF Nez Perce ) 
R. John TayJoJ', being sworn. says that the facts set forth in the fi 
accurate. and complete to the best of the applicant's knowledge an~lbelie 
. 
SUBSCRIBED'AND SWORN to before me this 
AM"NDED pI::TlnON TO AJ."'l"OINT TRUS'tEES .4­
LAw OFPlC:Eli 01' 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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120BT46915~ ~ ,.., 
RESIGNATION OF TRUSTEES 
Effectively immediately~ the undmiglled, Andrew T. Rogers ond Beth J, Rogers, hereby 
resign as trUstees ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Revooable Trust ut& November 4t 1997 and 
nominate as successor co-trustees Reed 1. Taylor; Dll.lhln J. Taylor and R. John TaykiT. 
DECLlNAnqN TO SERVBAS TRUSTEE 
The undersigned, Garth J. Fishel'~ as the deslpled sucCf{l!lorwstee ofthe Theodore L. 
JOJmsOD Revocable.Trost, utd November 4. 1997, hereby declines and refuses to setY~ as 
trustee IU1d joins in tlie nomination ofReed JI Taylor" Pallan'J. Taylor and R. Jolm Ta:,ylor 













~.1 ~A;uw .6 -&-"j! 
Beth J. R.9 m . Date 
/k,Q. •• ..;I'. t;w ('-lo-04 Aiidi'ew T, Rogers Date 
E 
1 i el'J   sl8'l8te     
u
ldj 1i  , ' ~ylor
Helen Taylor 
8483 WHarmonica Way 
Boise, ID 83709 
DaHan J Taylor
 


























West Jordan, UT 84088
 
Beth J Rogers 
108l6JayRd 
Boise, ID 83714 
Lu Davvn Farnworth 
10249 Julian Ct 
Westmlnister, Co 80030 
Ruth F Stephen~ 
3925 N Hackberry Way 

























J David Seely 
1122 N Smm Circle-
Salt Lake City, ur 84116 
Janet S Denison 
9 Danielle Dr 
Danville, NH 03819 
Scott B Johnson 
202 Melba 
Nampa, ID 83686 
Laurie Dunkley 
1178 W Sandy Ct 
Meridian, ID 83642 
120B74S91sq 



























Karl J Seely 
1143 S Denver St Apt B 











































































THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Co-Counsel for Appellants/Cross Respondents 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, arid 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Respondents/Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, tv and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Appellants/Cross-Respondents. 





THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN
 





Supreme Court Docket No. 33781 
District Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
APPELLANTS/CROSS­
RESPONDENTS' OBJECTION TO 
RESPONDENTS/CROSS­
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD 
COMES NOW, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Thomas G. Maile, IV, and pursuant to Rule 30 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, object to the 
Motion to Augment Clerk's Record dated November 3, 2008, together with the Affidavit in 
Support of the Motion to Augment Clerk's Record, and the attachments thereto on the following 
grounds: 
APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' OBJECTION TO RESPONDENTS/CROSS­













A.	 That the Respondents/Cross-Appellants have attempted to interject pleadings from 
another legal proceeding to wit: case number SP OT 0400874M, which by their own 
admission was not part of the Clerk's Record herein; 
B.	 That the motion is not timely. That the briefmg has been completed for approximately 
one (1) year. Any attempt to augment the record with pleadings from another case would 
require additional briefmg by the parties; 
C.	 That the respondents/cross-appellants has failed to attach a copy ofthe document sought 
to be augmented bearing a legible filing stamp of the clerk indicating the date of its filing 
in the current proceeding before the lower court in case number CV OC 04-00473D; 
D.	 That the legal and factual issues that could be involved with the request to augment 
would lead to additional facts that are in addition not part of the current record. That the 
appellants/cross-respondents are prejudiced by the potential inclusion of additional 
pleadings from another case that are not part of the Clerk's Record herein, since there are 
additional facts, including testimony in case number SP OT 0400874M which are not 
part of the Clerk's Record; 
E.	 That the proposed attachment does not have any relevance to admissions made by the 
Taylors by and through their counsel, Connie Taylor, in negotiating the terms of lhe 
Disclaimer Agreement, as demonstrated in her letter to Bart Harwood, attorney for the 
trust, dated April 14, 2004 which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up their 
rights as beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth will affIrm her prior factual stateme:nts in 
the form ofan affIdavit and agree to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. Ifwe 
APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' OBJECTION TO RESPONDENTS/CROSS· 













aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and 
a copy of the trust and estate tax returns". The letter is a proper part of the record herein 
(C.E. #58 Exhibit "39" to the deposition of Beth Rogers). 
F.	 That the proposed attachment does not have any relevance to the judicial admissions 
made by the Taylors contained in the verified petition executed by R. John Taylor on 
November 12,2004, which is a proper part of the record herein (C.E. #39 Exhibit "B"). 
Wherefore, the appellantslcross-respondents, respectfully request that this Court deny the 
Motion to Augment Clerk's Record.
 
DATED this l ~ day ofNovember,
 
/Cross-Respondents 
s~ .C Y, 
sel for Appellants/Cross-Respondc~nts 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~dayofNovember, 2008, I served the foregoing 
APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' OBJECTION TO RESPONDENTS/CROSS­
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD by having a true and complete copy 
personally delivered, by facsimile and/or by depositing the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows: 
APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' OBJECTION TO RESPONDENTS/CROSS­
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD Pg 3 
000847
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Connie W. Taylor () U. S. Mail 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 () Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
APPELLANTS/CROSS-RESPONDENTS' OBJECTION TO RESPONDENTS/CROSS­
APPELLANTS' MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD Pg 4 
000848
E. N .• Co-counsel 







In tIle Supreme Court of the State of Iclaho 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 




THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN )
 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE )
 




























Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants­ ORDER TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Cross-Respondents, 
Supreme Court Docket No. 33781-2006
 











THOMAS MAILE IV and COLLEEN
 






A MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD and AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO AUGMENT CLERK'S RECORD with attachments were filed by counsel for 
Respondents on November 4,2008. Thereafter, an OBJECTION TO MOTION TO AUGMENT 
RECORD was filed by counsel for Appellants/Cross-Respondents on November 5, 2008. The 
Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS SHALL PROVIDE 
THIS COURT A FILE STAMPED COpy OF THE DOCUMENT REQUESTED BELOW and 
subsequently, this Court shall TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE of the file stamped cOl)f.te~~ 
~ 1 0 2008
NO If 
B T: - ------------------­
provided and it shall be placed in this Record on Appeal as an EXHIBIT: 
EXHIBIT "V" 















































I 1. Amended Petition to Appoint Trustees in Ada County Case No. SP OT 0400874M dated April 18, 2005, which is attached as EXHIBIT A to Respondents' Affidavit in Support 
of Motion to Augment Clerk's Record. I
 






K el A. Lehfinan, Ch' . eputy Clerk for I)
 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
 








By Order of the 
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